Lincoln Reconsidering Halleck?

[JerryD]

Reading "How the North Won" by Hattaway and Jones, and the one big takeaway so far is that they are huge fans of Henry Halleck. They characterize him as a brilliant leader who was an extremely successful theatre commander who gets all the credit for capturing Forts Henry and Donelson (Grant was the subordinate he dispatched on this errand), who warned Grant to be careful at Shiloh and if only he had heeded Halleck's advice the battle would have turned out differently, who gets all the credit for the successful western efforts under his command, and who, when brought to DC was given the title of General in Chief but that Lincoln never gave him the authority required for that decision so Halleck was forced to adopt a more Chief of Staff to role to make sure the Union war effort ran effectively, and that as you would expect, he succeeded brilliantly.

To be honest, this really cuts across the grain of my thinking about Halleck. Any Halleck fans out there? Anyone agree with this analysis? Is it time for a reconsideration of Ol' Brains? Has history been too tough on his reputation?

 

[milhistbuff1]

While I haven't read HNW, I'm not so sure I concur with the authors assessment. John F. Marszalek's Commander of All Lincoln's Armies provides a more recent (2004) and more measured perspective I think. Found it quite readable and informative. Going off memory, I recall several moments vividly from reading it that may give key insights for your question.

They include but aren't limited to:
Halleck refusing the order to come East due to a typo in it
the kerfluffle with the pontoon bridges pre-Fredericksburg/delays in the orders for the mud march until the weather was about to turn nasty

Halleck's health issues/lack of executive decisiveness in roles that called for it.

While others had responsibility and their parts in these decisions, Halleck's role gave him the chance to step in decisively.

I would say it's time for a reassessment to add in recovered sources/new research over the last 20 years.

 

[JerryD]

While I haven't read HNW, I'm not so sure I concur with the authors assessment. John F. Marszalek's Commander of All Lincoln's Armies provides a more recent (2004) and more measured perspective I think. Found it quite readable and informative. Going off memory, I recall several moments vividly from reading it that may give key insights for your question.

They include but aren't limited to Halleck refusing the order to come East due to a typo in it, the kerfluffle with the pontoon bridges pre-Fredericksburg/delays in the orders for the mud march until the weather was about to turn nasty and Halleck's health issues/lack of executive decisiveness in roles that called for it.

I would say it's time for a reassessment to add in recovered sources/new research over the last 20 years.

I may need to add that to my reading list. I admit I have never read any biography of Halleck, so maybe a little in depth reading is called for.

 

[Rebforever]

If it wasn't for Halleck, there would be no Grant.

 

[milhistbuff1]

If it wasn't for Halleck, there would be no Grant.

Aye, don't mean my earlier post to sound like an unmitigated attack on HWH. He did some wonderful things, that among them. Ultimately, I think he was put in a role he was ill suited/prepared for.

I may need to add that to my reading list. I admit I have never read any biography of Halleck, so maybe a little in depth reading is called for.

Happy to help, I think you'll find it worth the investment.

 

[JerryD]

If it wasn't for Halleck, there would be no Grant.

Is that really true? My understanding is that Grant succeeded despite Halleck. That at first Halleck did not trust him as he only knew him by his old Army rep as a drunard. And then when Grant succeeded, he saw him as a threat.

 

[Belfoured]

While I haven't read HNW, I'm not so sure I concur with the authors assessment. John F. Marszalek's Commander of All Lincoln's Armies provides a more recent (2004) and more measured perspective I think. Found it quite readable and informative. Going off memory, I recall several moments vividly from reading it that may give key insights for your question.

They include but aren't limited to:
Halleck refusing the order to come East due to a typo in it
the kerfluffle with the pontoon bridges pre-Fredericksburg/delays in the orders for the mud march until the weather was about to turn nasty

Halleck's health issues/lack of executive decisiveness in roles that called for it.

While others had responsibility and their parts in these decisions, Halleck's role gave him the chance to step in decisively.

I would say it's time for a reassessment to add in recovered sources/new research over the last 20 years.

I would agree that Marszalek is worth reading. Hattaway and Jones is still generally solid but four decades is long enough to require another look.

 

[milhistbuff1]

I would agree that Marszalek is worth reading. Hattaway and Jones is still generally solid but four decades is long enough to require another look.

Thanks, Lincoln's Lieutenants may also have prose/quotes/sources of use but can't recall offhand.

 

[Belfoured]

Thanks, Lincoln's Lieutenants may also have prose/quotes/sources of use but can't recall offhand.

I have it but to be honest I've only read a few chapters that interested me so far. I don't recall anything especially new about Halleck.

 

[milhistbuff1]

Thanks, totally understand, so many books, so little time... Was also adding in case the OP/others are interested.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Jeffrey William Hunt's books really highlight the problems between Halleck and Meade. Meade repeatedly proposed operations that Halleck rejected, but whenever Meade sought positive orders Halleck refused to give any.

 

[tony_gunter]

If it wasn't for Halleck, there would be no Grant.

That's decidedly not true. If anything, Halleck nearly torpedoed Grant early in the war and at best held him back. It wasn't until a bigger threat emerged that Halleck was forced to throw all his eggs in the Grant basket.

 

[tony_gunter]

Reading "How the North Won" by Hattaway and Jones, and the one big takeaway so far is that they are huge fans of Henry Halleck. They characterize him as a brilliant leader who was an extremely successful theatre commander who gets all the credit for capturing Forts Henry and Donelson (Grant was the subordinate he dispatched on this errand), who warned Grant to be careful at Shiloh and if only he had heeded Halleck's advice the battle would have turned out differently, who gets all the credit for the successful western efforts under his command, and who, when brought to DC was given the title of General in Chief but that Lincoln never gave him the authority required for that decision so Halleck was forced to adopt a more Chief of Staff to role to make sure the Union war effort ran effectively, and that as you would expect, he succeeded brilliantly.

To be honest, this really cuts across the grain of my thinking about Halleck. Any Halleck fans out there? Anyone agree with this analysis? Is it time for a reconsideration of Ol' Brains? Has history been too tough on his reputation?

Just to go after the low-hanging fruit first, Halleck didn't warn Grant prior to Shiloh. Halleck wired Grant to wait until he was reinforced before assuming the offensive. For whatever reason, the telegraph operator changed the wording to "fortified."

So … thanks, random telegraph operator, for the sage advice / warning.

 

[JerryD]

So I am not seeing anyone taking up the proposition that history has been unkind to Halleck. Am I reading that correctly?

 

[huskerblitz]

I have not done a lot of reading of Halleck. But based on what I do know, I think Halleck was cautious early on and wasn't sure if Grant was trustworthy in his plans, such as Henry and Donnelson, which I think is completely understandable. Eventually, he learned that he could trust Grant. Everything I do remember reading, Halleck's expertise at the administrative level was very much needed. No, maybe not a great theater general, but the army needs individuals in different positions. I really don't see the Halleck-Grant relationship as anything more or less than learning how to work together, just as any management position.

But I know @tony_gunter prefers the extreme position if it doesn't instill Grant as the next messiah.

 

[Pat Answer]

Hattaway and Jones are rather nice to everyone and, frankly, I always liked their approach: preferring as much as possible correspondence written as events unfolded over later reports and memoirs to give leaders making decisions in real time with imperfect information the benefit of the doubt. Their emphasis is on the evolution of strategy on both sides so Halleck, like Meigs, gets high marks for administrative competence.

I, too, have to get my hands on the Marszalek book at some point. My uninformed feeling is that a fair assessment of Halleck should take into account the tough position he was in once he got to Washington. Lincoln famously called him "a first-rate clerk," but some of that probably stemmed from his unwillingness to do obvious dirty work; for all his strengths the President was fond of the "I want General X to do this, but if it fails I want him to take the blame so don't say I ordered it…" game.
That said, Halleck also played that game well and seemed to run more interference for his favorites than for others.
Was he truly in over his head (as it definitely seemed at some points in late August 1862)? Or did he sense that being the actual head of the army came with unacceptable risks in piranha-infested political waters? Both? Neither?

 

[JerryD]

Hattaway and Jones are rather nice to everyone and, frankly, I always liked their approach: preferring as much as possible correspondence written as events unfolded over later reports and memoirs to give leaders making decisions in real time with imperfect information the benefit of the doubt. Their emphasis is on the evolution of strategy on both sides so Halleck, like Meigs, gets high marks for administrative competence.

I, too, have to get my hands on the Marszalek book at some point. My uninformed feeling is that a fair assessment of Halleck should take into account the tough position he was in once he got to Washington. Lincoln famously called him "a first-rate clerk," but some of that probably stemmed from his unwillingness to do obvious dirty work; for all his strengths the President was fond of the "I want General X to do this, but if it fails I want him to take the blame so don't say I ordered it…" game.
That said, Halleck also played that game well and seemed to run more interference for his favorites than for others.
Was he truly in over his head (as it definitely seemed at some points in late August 1862)? Or did he sense that being the actual head of the army came with unacceptable risks in piranha-infested political waters? Both? Neither?

Good analysis, and to be honest Hattaway and Jones make this very point about the political situation Halleck walked into when he came east, and I had not really considered him in that light before, and thus the reason for this thread. I think its just possible that Halleck respected the chain of command too much and when confronted by Lincoln who had strong opinions on how the war should be run, Halleck felt it was his duty to do what Lincoln wanted, rather than to steer Lincoln into Halleck's preferred path. Just a thought.

 

[wausaubob]

Reading "How the North Won" by Hattaway and Jones, and the one big takeaway so far is that they are huge fans of Henry Halleck. They characterize him as a brilliant leader who was an extremely successful theatre commander who gets all the credit for capturing Forts Henry and Donelson (Grant was the subordinate he dispatched on this errand), who warned Grant to be careful at Shiloh and if only he had heeded Halleck's advice the battle would have turned out differently, who gets all the credit for the successful western efforts under his command, and who, when brought to DC was given the title of General in Chief but that Lincoln never gave him the authority required for that decision so Halleck was forced to adopt a more Chief of Staff to role to make sure the Union war effort ran effectively, and that as you would expect, he succeeded brilliantly.

To be honest, this really cuts across the grain of my thinking about Halleck. Any Halleck fans out there? Anyone agree with this analysis? Is it time for a reconsideration of Ol' Brains? Has history been too tough on his reputation?

Not likely.

 

[wausaubob]

1st battle of Corinth. The failure to support David Farragut's up river approach to Vicksburg. Who fixed those problems? Halleck never took a risk, and had no operational capacity. Again, who was in command when the war in the east turned in favor of the US in 1864? And who was in command when the US eventually won? Halleck knew what he was bad at. And that's where Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas come in. McPherson too, went from Halleck's staff to working for Grant.

 

[wausaubob]

Henry Halleck was involved in getting the President to stop making political appointments in the army. And Halleck continuously tried to improve the US livestock purchasing program until finally most of the corruption was wrung out.