Lincoln Lincoln studies war

Cavalier

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Jul 20, 2019
It is with some anxiety that I pose my first question. I have read that, as the war progressed Lincoln, realizing he knew little of strategy, and beginning to distrust his military advisors, began to study these subjects on his own. If this is the case, and I am not sure that it is, does anyone know which works he studied, or even which would have been available to him at the time? I can only think of Jomini and Clauswitz and I not sure they were translated to English yet. Thanks in advance to anyone cares to comment.
 
Almost certainly not Clausewitz. He didn't really attract much notice till a decade or two later.

Jomini definitely was available in English-- there was an edition brought out in 1862, I believe, by West Point, and IIRC it's out there as a Google Book. One of Jomini's prime proponents was right there at Lincoln's elbow, too-- "Old Brains" Halleck, who himself had written a biography of Jomini.

ETA: I was not implying Google Books was around in 1862. Everyone knows Lincoln would have used Wikipedia, anyway...
 
Mark F. Jenkins. Thanks for your responce. I was not aware the Halleck wrote that biography. I have also never seen any source that went into just how Lincoln studied up on strategy or that he ever read a specific book on it. We know that Lee studied Napoleon's campaigns because there are records of him taking out books on the subject at the West Point library. But I have never been able to come across any source that actually points to anything similar on the part of Lincoln while he was president.

I believe it would be reasonable to assume that Lincoln's ability to navigate himself around Google books and Wikipedia and his skill at Call of Duty and Mortal Combat would far exceed my poor efforts in those endeavors.
 
You might want to read this book review of James M. McPherson's, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief, on the Abraham Lincoln's Classroom website. It may answer some of your questions.

 
I read somewhere that Lincoln requested books on military strategy and tactics from the Library of Congress. Don't know exactly which ones.

The January 2009 issue of the Smithsonian Magazine states that Lincoln's "experience as a largely self-taught lawyer with a keen analytical mind who had mastered Euclidean geometry for mental exercise enabled him to learn quickly on the job. He read and absorbed works on military history and strategy; he observed the successes and failures of his own and the enemy's military commanders and drew apt conclusions; he made mistakes and learned from them; he applied his large quotient of common sense to slice through the obfuscations and excuses of military subordinates. By 1862 his grasp of strategy and operations was firm enough almost to justify the overstated but not entirely wrong conclusion of historian T. Harry Williams: 'Lincoln stands out as a great war president, probably the greatest in our history, and a great natural strategist, a better one than any of his generals.'"

It also states that "[a]lthough Lincoln never read Karl von Clausewitz's famous treatise On War, his actions were a consummate expression of Clausewitz's central argument: 'The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. Therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.'"

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/lincoln-as-commander-in-chief
 
Almost certainly not Clausewitz. He didn't really attract much notice till a decade or two later.

Jomini definitely was available in English-- there was an edition brought out in 1862, I believe, by West Point, and IIRC it's out there as a Google Book. One of Jomini's prime proponents was right there at Lincoln's elbow, too-- "Old Brains" Halleck, who himself had written a biography of Jomini.

ETA: I was not implying Google Books was around in 1862. Everyone knows Lincoln would have used Wikipedia, anyway...
There were too many German scholars in the US for the leading military men not to be aware of von Clausewitz. Grant and Sherman concentrated heavily on the logistical questions posed by von Clausewitz. They were aware of the business side of it. Lincoln would have known of the questions, but would not have had time to master the business.
 
Lincoln's thinking, as well as that of Winfield Scott, was heavily influenced by the British experience with Napoleon. There was a very heavy commitment to multiple naval squadrons, from the beginning, because every Confederate state was connected to the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico or the Mississippi River. In addition, an operation to capture New Orleans, and control river traffic, was part of the first 13 months of fighting. Therefore one should be looking at British writing and British advice.
 
Do we ever have Lincoln make a (confirmable) quote or reference - even jovially - about published works of military strategy?
 
The clearest expression I have encountered was Lincoln's idea that if all US armies moved at once, the advantage the Confederates had, in moving on interior lines would be neutralized. In order to do that the western and eastern commanders had to trust each other and the telegraph wires had to stay connected. That was an indication that Lincoln and McClellan were communicating, but ideas were still developing.
 
There were too many German scholars in the US for the leading military men not to be aware of von Clausewitz. Grant and Sherman concentrated heavily on the logistical questions posed by von Clausewitz. They were aware of the business side of it. Lincoln would have known of the questions, but would not have had time to master the business.

On the contrary, Clausewitz was little-known until later; German military thought didn't become the "in" thing until after the Franco-Prussian War. Mid-century, the French were the masters of land war par excellence, as were the British with naval war. (I was surprised, though, to see Clausewitz-- still not translated into English at the time-- mentioned in Halleck's summary of the art of war. Up to then I had thought Clausewitz entirely unknown on this side of the Atlantic.)

The primary vehicle for putting Jomini before the attentions of future Union and Confederate officers were the lectures of West Point instructor Dennis Hart Mahan, who was very influenced by Jomini.
 
I disagree. Lieber and the other Germans in the US were aware that von Clausewitz had asked important questions. And Lincoln was very aware of the connection between policy and strategy. There were many translators working in New York and many Prussian trained officers were in the US army. So the ideas were developing. The code of war developed by Lieber was full of answers to questions posed by von Clausewitz. Did Lincoln a full translation? No. But Lieber's influence on Halleck and Grant and the legality of wartime emancipation is pretty clear.
 
Overall Lincoln was treating the Confederacy the way the British treated Napoleon. Lincoln was particularly weak in understanding the business side of war, how to keep the army fed and supplied while it moved and fought. That required professionals and sorting by experience. Lincoln never quite understood the connection between the army, the railroad industry, and the telegraph insiders, but he gradually got out of their way and let them create a type of warfare that would ravage the next century.
 
My recollection is that Lincoln and McClellan were discussing concentration in time. But even in 1864, the first attempt at simultaneous movement produced mixed results at best. The second attempt resulted in the capture of the outer forts at Mobile Bay, the severing of the Weldon railroad, the partial demolition of the Confederate western army and the fall of Atlanta, and the application of overwhelming force in the Shenandoah Valley. A severe blockade, combined with concentration in time, was the correct strategy. But it required a massive mobilization beyond what the US thought it could do in 1862.
 
Clausewitz didn't invent the linkage of political strategy and military strategy. It's right there in Jomini, too. Clausewitz did formulate it in its clearest terms, but it wasn't necessary to read his work in order to be exposed to that idea.
 
To all hands above: I will be busy checking into all the sites you posted and the information you provided. Thank you all very much for your responces and the opinions you expressed!
 
I have nothing but respect for the rapidity and depth of his learning on military strategy. Whenever he disagreed with Mac and others his points were not foolish nor amateur. He knew when he saw strategic folly but never push his weight around. He gave his opinion and it was usually informed and it seemed some West Point men took offense to the "Baboon" or "Gorilla" meddling in their affairs. I dont think he could have led an army but he had a decent understanding of strategy by late 1862 if not earlier. Given the weight resting on his shoulders, it is pretty amazing.
 

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