Lee Doesn't Order Pickett's Charge

[121st PA Vols]

I didn't say you said Longstreet was a bad corps commander, I'm merely saying I myself don't think he was. I also don't think it's that far off to say Lee's disappointment in Lee's own performances in 1862 and 1863 were that he wasn't able to destroy a federal army in the field. I'm sure I could open another can of worms by saying 2nd Manassas possibly shows an example where Longstreet launching his assault a day later missed an opportunity for that attack to be done in concert with the rest of the army.

I'm sort of deeply uninterested in the general ranking of who is best and who is worst because there aren't really apples to apples comparisons of any of these guys: some were presented with fantastic opportunities and some had to live through 1864 or had to live with the logistical constrains of their theater. It's pretty silly to pretend as dweebs on the internet we could have done so much better and know so much better with all the gifts of hindsight.

fyrd. Good point on Longstreet at 2nd Man and Cannae on another thread. I feel an understanding of Lee's wanting a victory of this degree shows his sense of urgency and personality, but more his understanding the war had to be a short war. While he was ailing, I've never felt 'he was off his game' tho that is arguable. He always understood the importance of time (big or small picture), getting the attacks off early and coordinated, and had a solid battle plan Day-2. The need for a decisive and conclusive victory on the battlefield (barring peace initiatives, influences) had to be the highest priority for the existence of the Confederacy.

And amen to your remark "It's pretty silly to pretend as dweebs on the internet we could have done so much better and know so much better with all the gifts of hindsight." That is ALWAYS a good reminder.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Too late. Lee was in the dark until June 29th when Longstreet's spy Harrison provided info on the AotP's whereabouts. Lee was able to concentrate much of the army and in particular recall Ewell from Harrisburg and vicinity, which gave him an advantage on Day 1. But because of his lack of useful intelligence all along, Lee lost the initiative and never regained it.

It's also why he didn't assent to Longstreet's request to swing around and get behind the Union army. He had no idea where the other Union Corps were, there was no way he was going to operate a wide swing south with only Jenkins Irregular cavalry.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

It's also why he did assent to Longstreet's request to swing around and get behind the Union army. He had no idea where the other Union Corps were, there was no way he was going to operate a wide swing south with only Jenkins Irregular cavalry.

I liked your post, knowing that you meant to write "...why he DIDN'T assent to....."

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I liked your post, knowing that you meant to write "...why he DIDN'T assent to....."

Correct, I fixed it!

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I liked your post, knowing that you meant to write "...why he DIDN'T assent to....."

BTW, this just came to me, but obviously the lack of cavarly, esepcially his best brigades had an extremley detrimental effect on the battle. But i was thinking, did any other general use their cavalry better than Lee did? Like I've read numerous times where Bragg, Johnston, ect. didn't make best use of their Cavalry, seemed, that Lee absolutely knew how to use them both to screen his army, in battle, and in reconnaissance.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

BTW, this just came to me, but obviously the lack of cavarly, esepcially his best brigades had an extremley detrimental effect on the battle. But i was thinking, did any other general use their cavalry better than Lee did? Like I've read numerous times where Bragg, Johnston, ect. didn't make best use of their Cavalry, seemed, that Lee absolutely knew how to use them both to screen his army, in battle, and in reconnaissance.

Good thought. I don't know about Joe Johnston's effectiveness in using cavalry, but Bragg certainly did NOT use it well.

 

[Jotamaran]

There was some thought given by Lee to shift Ewell's Corps from the far left and bring it into closer alignment with Hill and Longstreet's Corps at Seminary Ridge. This would have the advantage of reducing the ANV's fragile outer lines and providing more combat power along a shorter front. This move didn't happen of course, as Lee remained committed to threatening the federal right flank in the hope of pinning down Slocum's Corp while the ANV's planned main assault occurred along the Emmitsburg Road. But in the end, Ewell's uncoordinated assaults at Culps and East Cemetary Hills did not produce the desired result.

I think the problem with this idea is that it would have meant that Ewell's Corps would be unavailable for action for much of July 2. The distance it would need to move is not great, of course, if one just looks at the map. But it is not so simple as that in practice. Ewell's Corps would have had to turn its back to the opponent, then march in good order through areas that were probably already filled with supplies, stragglers, camps, and so on, and also potentially Gettysburg town itself, until it reached Seminary Ridge, and then it would have had to spend yet more time deploying into battle-ready formations after reaching Seminary Ridge. Realistically, I think that it probably wouldn't have been ready for action from its new position until, I would guess, late afternoon. So by making this decision, Lee would have been deciding to allow a large fraction of his army to be unavailable for combat for potentially most of the day, all the while he knew that the Union was getting reinforcements and time to dig in further. This would have been a very tough decision to make. As it happened, Longstreet's attack was delayed and did not get going until the afternoon anyway, so perhaps it does not matter much if Ewell's Corps was not ready on Seminary Ridge until the late afternoon or so. But Ewell's Corps moving away from Culp's Hill would of course have been instantly noticed by the Union command, and they would then have felt free to send substantial reinforcements from the area to shore up defenses further to the south-west.

Similar problems come up with the various commonly put-forth ideas about how Lee should have shifted his entire army to the right on July 2 before launching any major attacks. Probably the simplest and quickest way to implement such an idea would have been that Longstreet would have moved to flank the entire Union line from the south, Hill would have marched to the place that Longstreet's corps was maneuvering for its launch-off point in the actual July 2 orders, and Ewell would have marched to take Hill's place. But even moving a single corps successfully and on time proved to be a major problem for the Confederates at Gettysburg. A very likely result of any attempt that Lee made to shift all three of his corps significantly right-ward in the face of the opponent would have been an organizational disaster that would have made Longstreet's actual difficulties on that day seem like child's play in comparison. Very likely, the entire day would have been taken up by the repositioning. And Meade would have easily observed it all happening and would have had plenty of time, and good interior lines, to adjust to it. This was not like Chancellorsville, where forest cover and Union incompetence allowed the Confederates to turn the Union flank without the Union reacting. So I don't see how trying to tactically turn the Union left would have significantly improved Confederate prospects. And this is all assuming, of course, that Meade does not launch an attack while the Confederates are repositioning. I don't think he would have, but that is another variable that Lee would have had to consider.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I think the problem with this idea is that it would have meant that Ewell's Corps would be unavailable for action for much of July 2. The distance it would need to move is not great, of course, if one just looks at the map. But it is not so simple as that in practice. Ewell's Corps would have had to turn its back to the opponent, then march in good order through areas that were probably already filled with supplies, stragglers, camps, and so on, and also potentially Gettysburg town itself, until it reached Seminary Ridge, and then it would have had to spend yet more time deploying into battle-ready formations after reaching Seminary Ridge. Realistically, I think that it probably wouldn't have been ready for action from its new position until, I would guess, late afternoon. So by making this decision, Lee would have been deciding to allow a large fraction of his army to be unavailable for combat for potentially most of the day, all the while he knew that the Union was getting reinforcements and time to dig in further. This would have been a very tough decision to make. As it happened, Longstreet's attack was delayed and did not get going until the afternoon anyway, so perhaps it does not matter much if Ewell's Corps was not ready on Seminary Ridge until the late afternoon or so. But Ewell's Corps moving away from Culp's Hill would of course have been instantly noticed by the Union command, and they would then have felt free to send substantial reinforcements from the area to shore up defenses further to the south-west.

Similar problems come up with the various commonly put-forth ideas about how Lee should have shifted his entire army to the right on July 2 before launching any major attacks. Probably the simplest and quickest way to implement such an idea would have been that Longstreet would have moved to flank the entire Union line from the south, Hill would have marched to the place that Longstreet's corps was maneuvering for its launch-off point in the actual July 2 orders, and Ewell would have marched to take Hill's place. But even moving a single corps successfully and on time proved to be a major problem for the Confederates at Gettysburg. A very likely result of any attempt that Lee made to shift all three of his corps significantly right-ward in the face of the opponent would have been an organizational disaster that would have made Longstreet's actual difficulties on that day seem like child's play in comparison. Very likely, the entire day would have been taken up by the repositioning. And Meade would have easily observed it all happening and would have had plenty of time, and good interior lines, to adjust to it. This was not like Chancellorsville, where forest cover and Union incompetence allowed the Confederates to turn the Union flank without the Union reacting. So I don't see how trying to tactically turn the Union left would have significantly improved Confederate prospects. And this is all assuming, of course, that Meade does not launch an attack while the Confederates are repositioning. I don't think he would have, but that is another variable that Lee would have had to consider.

It's what Lee wanted to do after July 1st. In fact he was drafting orders to that effect when Ewell came and said he could take Culp's Hill, which he bungled, but if Ewell hadn't of come to talk to Lee later that night and pushed for his attack on Culp's Hill (which he thought Johson was attacking), then Lee would have moved Ewell around to the right.

Ewell failed to pin in place the units at his front anyways. Almost all of XII Corps, besides Greene's brigade marched south to the Union left flank, while Hancock sent the majority of his corp into the fray as well. Only Greene's brigade, I and XI Corps (who weren't useful for offensive action), and a couple of brigades from Hancock's corps manned the northern part of the fish hook.

 

[genbeau]

If Lee does not order Pickett to charge at Gettysburg, would it have been possible for the Confederates to win the battle. If they do win, and Lee asserts his dominance in the North after winning at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, would the momentum have swung to the Confederates? Would if be possible for them to win the war?

Possibly, but they still would have been pretty beat up and out of supplies. They may have taken the antietam effect and turned back.
But it would have been fun to see the effect on union sensitivies if they had wracked sherman like destruction on scranton, philadelphia and pennsylvania in general. Then, Some opinions here might be quite different.

 

[LincolnHarlan]

If Lee does not order Pickett to charge at Gettysburg, would it have been possible for the Confederates to win the battle. If they do win, and Lee asserts his dominance in the North after winning at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, would the momentum have swung to the Confederates? Would if be possible for them to win the war?

A Confederate victory at Gettysburg was still possible without Pickett's Charge — but far from guaranteed. More likely, the best Lee could have achieved was a tactical draw or orderly withdrawal with less damage.
Pickett's Charge could have preserved Lee's army and possibly made Gettysburg a draw or small win.
A Confederate victory at Gettysburg might have created enough political pressure for the North to consider negotiations — especially if followed by other military or political setbacks.
But the structural odds were always against the Confederacy. Even with momentum, they'd need a diplomatic breakthrough or Lincoln's defeat in 1864 to win the war.

 

[wausaubob]

Its still an interesting hypothetical question. The Confederates would be trying to establish a defensible position near Washington, D.C.. But the Army of the Potomac didn't need to fight. In only needed to swing to its left and protect Washington. The fall of Vicksburg was imminent, but the news from Mississippi was subject to a delay in getting a steamboat up river to Memphis. Without Pickett's charge, would Longstreet's entire 1st Corps been in better condition to travel to Georgia?

 

[BCS1973]

... they'd need a diplomatic breakthrough or Lincoln's defeat in 1864 to win the war.

I'm still not sure that a Lincoln defeat in '64 would have been enough. I think a diplomatic breakthrough would have had to come with support of many Pounds Sterling to effectively help the Confederacy. It's an interesting "what if" that could go in all sorts of directions, but if the trend line is somewhat similar to the actual history between election "day" of 64 and late march of 65, it seems pointless for the Union to quit just because McClellan is President (hindsight). I'm thinking in that particular scenario, the ANV is still surrendering just as Mac is starting to get his cabinet in order, but I'm getting a little off topic.

 

[BCS1973]

Possibly, but they still would have been pretty beat up and out of supplies. They may have taken the antietam effect and turned back.
But it would have been fun to see the effect on union sensitivies if they had wracked sherman like destruction on scranton, philadelphia and pennsylvania in general. Then, Some opinions here might be quite different.

Confederate attacks on Scranton and Philly were never going to happen under the best of circumstances. The most that would happen is that maybe newspapers frighten people, likely well after the confederates are gone. The geography of that portion of the country protected Scranton well beyond any serious reach of the ANV. Similarly, an effective invasion in Philly would have required an amphibious assault by the CSN, which it wasn't capable of at that point, or ever as far as I can tell. The Susquehanna river (a mile wide and a foot deep in places) effectively cut off those areas of PA as well as points north and east.

Ewell's advance men (Jenkins Cavalry) got within eyesight of the West Shore of the Susquehanna at Harrisburg. They literally rode across the property I grew up on to scout the defenses of H-burg at Bridgeport and New Cumberland. Ewell's order from Lee at that time regarding Harrisburg was, "If it comes within your means, take it". He didn't and it probably let the Confederacy live on for quite while longer post Gettysburg.

In addition to being the Capitol of PA, Harrisburg was also an important railroad junction (east west between Philly and Pittsburgh and points west, and north south from points north of NY to Baltimore, DC as well as south central PA). Trashing that junction would have been a small strategic and probably a bigger PR success, but would have risked the entire war effort of the south.

Lee sent Early south and east of Ewell towards Wrightsville, PA with orders to preserve the Columbia-Wrightsville RR bridge. I can only guess at the reason that order was given, but it certainly wasn't to move towards Philly or Scranton (I'm guessing escape route). Early failed in that task as Union forces ultimately burned the bridge. At that point in time, there was a 10 foot low head dam below the Columbia Wrightsville Bridge. Crossing there for advancement or retreat wasn't a thing without the bridge.
Lee had left the pontoons he had south of the Potomac.

For Ewell, there was one covered foot and wagon bridge called the Camelback at Harrisburg, another wooden RR bridge barely south (CVRR I think), and the wooden RR Marysville bridge several miles North of H-burg (basically in the area of today's Rockville Bridge). Union orders were to burn the camelback if the Confederates disloged the rather weak defences at Oyster Point (modern day Camp Hill) and Bridgport (modern day Lemoyne, PA).

Crossing a railroad bridge or two that you didn't control was a total **** shoot for the Confederates, and likely to lead to disaster. Slogging through a shallow but mile wide river in the face of artillery and rifle fire from the largest training camp in the Union was probably not much better either, especially considering Lee's force was incapable of occupying enemy territory for any sustained amount of time even if successful in the endeavor.

Take it as you may, but the mass of the Confederate Army trapped on the West bank of the Susky by relatively weak Union defences on the East Bank and Meade coming up from the south, makes it at least likely that the ANV is crushed between Meade and the Susquehanna, or if by small miracle, they successfully cross the Susky they get trapped there. Either is likely to lead to the surrender or destruction of the ANV prior to Vicksburg. But then again, I'm following you off topic in the point that G-burg (and by default Pickett's Charge) doesn't happen.

 

[genbeau]

Confederate attacks on Scranton and Philly were never going to happen under the best of circumstances. The most that would happen is that maybe newspapers frighten people, likely well after the confederates are gone. The geography of that portion of the country protected Scranton well beyond any serious reach of the ANV. Similarly, an effective invasion in Philly would have required an amphibious assault by the CSN, which it wasn't capable of at that point, or ever as far as I can tell. The Susquehanna river (a mile wide and a foot deep in places) effectively cut off those areas of PA as well as points north and east.

Ewell's advance men (Jenkins Cavalry) got within eyesight of the West Shore of the Susquehanna at Harrisburg. They literally rode across the property I grew up on to scout the defenses of H-burg at Bridgeport and New Cumberland. Ewell's order from Lee at that time regarding Harrisburg was, "If it comes within your means, take it". He didn't and it probably let the Confederacy live on for quite while longer post Gettysburg.

In addition to being the Capitol of PA, Harrisburg was also an important railroad junction (east west between Philly and Pittsburgh and points west, and north south from points north of NY to Baltimore, DC as well as south central PA). Trashing that junction would have been a small strategic and probably a bigger PR success, but would have risked the entire war effort of the south.

Lee sent Early south and east of Ewell towards Wrightsville, PA with orders to preserve the Columbia-Wrightsville RR bridge. I can only guess at the reason that order was given, but it certainly wasn't to move towards Philly or Scranton (I'm guessing escape route). Early failed in that task as Union forces ultimately burned the bridge. At that point in time, there was a 10 foot low head dam below the Columbia Wrightsville Bridge. Crossing there for advancement or retreat wasn't a thing without the bridge.
Lee had left the pontoons he had south of the Potomac.

For Ewell, there was one covered foot and wagon bridge called the Camelback at Harrisburg, another wooden RR bridge barely south (CVRR I think), and the wooden RR Marysville bridge several miles North of H-burg (basically in the area of today's Rockville Bridge). Union orders were to burn the camelback if the Confederates disloged the rather weak defences at Oyster Point (modern day Camp Hill) and Bridgport (modern day Lemoyne, PA).

Crossing a railroad bridge or two that you didn't control was a total **** shoot for the Confederates, and likely to lead to disaster. Slogging through a shallow but mile wide river in the face of artillery and rifle fire from the largest training camp in the Union was probably not much better either, especially considering Lee's force was incapable of occupying enemy territory for any sustained amount of time even if successful in the endeavor.

Take it as you may, but the mass of the Confederate Army trapped on the West bank of the Susky by relatively weak Union defences on the East Bank and Meade coming up from the south, makes it at least likely that the ANV is crushed between Meade and the Susquehanna, or if by small miracle, they successfully cross the Susky they get trapped there. Either is likely to lead to the surrender or destruction of the ANV prior to Vicksburg. But then again, I'm following you off topic in the point that G-burg (and by default Pickett's Charge) doesn't happen.

Agreed