Leadership

And even at that, Washburne's sponsorship might well have have had deep roots in the desire of every city, town or hamlet to have a local become an officer.

I'm thinking that Galena didn't exactly have a plethora of USMA graduates -- that Grant might have been the only one. Hence, personal friend or not, Washburne had good reason to get one of his own constituents commissioned.

Ole

Indeed, I recall that Washburn lobbied for Grant simply because he was from Illinois and Washburn wanted Illinois to have its "share" of Brigadiers. It had little to do with any personal relationship between Grant and Washburn. In fact, prior to the war, Grant had been a Democrat.
 
Indeed, I recall that Washburn lobbied for Grant simply because he was from Illinois and Washburn wanted Illinois to have its "share" of Brigadiers. It had little to do with any personal relationship between Grant and Washburn. In fact, prior to the war, Grant had been a Democrat.
I didn't say that personal friendship had nothing to do with the appointment -- just that there were likely reasons past that one particular one. (And there's no rule that says a Republican and a Democrat can't be close friends.)

Ole
 
And even at that, Washburne's sponsorship might well have have had deep roots in the desire of every city, town or hamlet to have a local become an officer.

I'm thinking that Galena didn't exactly have a plethora of USMA graduates -- that Grant might have been the only one. Hence, personal friend or not, Washburne had good reason to get one of his own constituents commissioned.

Ole

Grant moved to Galena in the Spring of 1860. In April of 1861, at a public meeting about raising a regiment in Galena, Washburne recommended Grant to be an officer in that regiment, because Grant was the only man in town with military experience.

I am not sure how well Washburne actually knew Grant before the war. Congressman Washburne was, however, a close associate of Abraham Lincoln in Illinois politics and legal circles.

Tim
 
In a calendar year, they must have been at least acquainted. (Small town, dontcha know.) If not with Grant himself, at least with his brothers and those who had done business with him.

Ole
 
Washburne

Tim said:

Grant moved to Galena in the Spring of 1860. In April of 1861, at a public meeting about raising a regiment in Galena, Washburne recommended Grant to be an officer in that regiment, because Grant was the only man in town with military experience.

I am not sure how well Washburne actually knew Grant before the war. Congressman Washburne was, however, a close associate of Abraham Lincoln in Illinois politics and legal circles.

Tim

I found this at http://all-biographies.com/politicians/elihu_benjamin_washburne.htm It appears Washburne did not know Grant before the war. But met him early and took an interest and supported him all thru his Presidency!

"Mr. Washburne was the leading man of his Congressional District, "carrying it in his breeches pocket," as the saying is; occupying an elegant mansion, and powerful in political and social influence. At the first war meeting held in Galena, for the mustering of volunteers, he offered a resolution, and, in fact, engineered the meeting. . . .Ex-captain Ulysses S. Grant was present, unnoticed and taking no active part in the proceedings, with evidently no suspicion of the strange fate which was to lift him from the obscurity of his father's leather store to the Presidential chair. At a second meeting, the company was organized and officered, but Grant was not thought of.

A few days after, Mr. Collins (Grant's partner, and a Democrat) met Mr. Washburne and rallied him on the selection made for captain of Galena's first volunteer company, " when they could get such a man as Grant." "What is Grant's history? was Mr. Washburne's natural inquiry. "Why, he is old man Grant's son, was educated at West Point, served in the army for eleven years, and came out with the very best reputation." So the Congressman looked up the quiet leather dealer, Grant, . . . The two "struck hands," and Mr. Washburne insisted on Grant's accompanying him to Springfield, the Capital of the State.

Grant had already applied to Ohio, his native State, for a chance to serve, and to the Adjutant-General, at Washington from whom came no response. So they went to Springfield Pope was the hero of the hour; confusion reigned. Grant got employment in Governor Yates' office, and the Governor, after a while, discovered his abilities, and gave him the command of a regiment. For his next promotion, the future President was indebted to the active interest of his friend, Washburne.

It so happened that President Lincoln had sent to each of the Illinois Senators and Representatives, a circular, asking them to nominate four Brigadiers. Mr. Washburne pressed Grant's claims, on the ground that his section of the State had raised a very large number of men for the war, and were entitled to such an appointment; his arguments prevailed, and, to his own great surprise, Grant was made a Brigadier-General.

In October, 1861, Mr. Washburne saw Grant at Cairo, Illinois, and seemed to have become impressed with the idea that Grant was "the coming man" of the war. When General Pope's friends urged that general's claims for a Major-General's stars, Mr. Washburne secured from the President a promise that none of the brigadiers then in commission should be promoted until they had distinguished themselves in the field. When Grant's reputation was assailed by reports of intemperance, etc., Mr. Washburne took no rest until he had sifted the evidence, and disproved the charge. The battle of Fort Donelson rendered General Grant, in a large degree, independent of Mr. Washburne's friendly offices; but the intimacy and friendship of the two men were in no wise weakened, and it was Mr. Washburne who had the pleasure of framing the bill by which the rank and title of Lieutenant-General, only previously conferred on General Washington, was created and bestowed upon General Grant."

Don
 
Dear List Members;

To see General Grant's Commission to the rank of Lieutenant-General; here is a site that has the original copy to peek at....it is written in Lincoln's secretary's hand and signature is that of Abraham Lincoln's handwriting.

Lieutenant General Grant (Memory): American Treasures of the...
Shown here is Grant's commission as lieutenant general, which was presented to him by President Abraham Lincoln on March 10, 1864. Grant was subject only to ...

www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm129.html - 9k - Similar pages

http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm129.html

Not on a fancy printed commission with top and bottom Vignettes. Just rather plain for such a lofty rank.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
Dear List Members;

To see General Grant's Commission to the rank of Lieutenant-General; here is a site that has the original copy to peek at....it is written in Lincoln's secretary's hand and signature is that of Abraham Lincoln's handwriting.

Lieutenant General Grant (Memory): American Treasures of the...
Shown here is Grant's commission as lieutenant general, which was presented to him by President Abraham Lincoln on March 10, 1864. Grant was subject only to ...

www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm129.html - 9k - Similar pages

http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm129.html

Not on a fancy printed commission with top and bottom Vignettes. Just rather plain for such a lofty rank.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

Thank you, my dear Wolf. I would have expected something much, much fancier. A plain document for two plain men.
 
For an officer's commission...

I also expected to see a document with an engraved image and flourishing pensmanship. Instead, a simple ruled paper. Wow.
 
Has anyone ever put it more succintly than Bill Slim?


For myself, I had little to be proud of; I could not rate my generalship high. The only test of generalship is success, and I had succeeded in nothing I had attempted. Time and again I had tried to pass to the offensive and to regain the initiative and every time I had seen my house of cards fall down as I tried to add its crowning storey. I had not realized how the Japanese, formidable as long as they are allowed to follow undisturbed their daring projects, are thrown into confusion by the unexpected. I should have subordinated all else to the vital need to strike at them and thus to disrupt their plans, but I ought, in spite of everything and at all risks, to have collected the whole strength of my corps before I attempted any counter-offensive. Thus I might have risked disaster, but I was more likely to have achieved success. When in doubt as to two courses of action, a general should choose the bolder. I reproached myself now that I had not.

In preparation, in execution, in strategy, and in tactics we had been worsted, and we had paid the penalty- defeat. Defeat is bitter. Bitter to the common soldier, but trebly bitter to his general. The soldier may comfort himself with the thought that, whatever the result, he has done his duty faithfully and steadfastly, but the commander has failed in his duty if he has not won victory- for that is his duty. He has no other comparable to it. He will go over in his minds the events of the campaign. 'Here,' he will think, 'I went wrong; here I took counsel of my fears when I should have been bold; there I should have waited to gather strength, not struck piecemeal; at such a moment I failed to grasp opportunity when it was presented to me.' He will remember the soldiers whom he sent into the attack that failed and who did not come back. He will recall the look in the eyes of men who trusted him. 'I have failed them,' he will say to himself, 'and failed my country!" He will see himself for what he is- a defeated general. In a dark hour he will turn in upon himself and question the very foundations of his leadership and his manhood.

And then he must stop! For, if he ever is to command in battle again, he must shake off these regrets, and stamp on them, as they claw at his will and his self-confidence. He must beat off these attacks he delivers against himself, and cast out the doubts born of failure. Forget them, and remember only the lessons to be learnt from defeat- they are more than from victory.

Defeat Into Victory pages 120-121
 
None that I'm aware of.

That last part...how a general must recognize his mistakes and how serious they are and then stop the self criticism just as he recognizes that - is beautiful.
 
Has anyone ever put it more succintly than Bill Slim?


For myself, I had little to be proud of; I could not rate my generalship high. The only test of generalship is success, and I had succeeded in nothing I had attempted. Time and again I had tried to pass to the offensive and to regain the initiative and every time I had seen my house of cards fall down as I tried to add its crowning storey. I had not realized how the Japanese, formidable as long as they are allowed to follow undisturbed their daring projects, are thrown into confusion by the unexpected. I should have subordinated all else to the vital need to strike at them and thus to disrupt their plans, but I ought, in spite of everything and at all risks, to have collected the whole strength of my corps before I attempted any counter-offensive. Thus I might have risked disaster, but I was more likely to have achieved success. When in doubt as to two courses of action, a general should choose the bolder. I reproached myself now that I had not.

In preparation, in execution, in strategy, and in tactics we had been worsted, and we had paid the penalty- defeat. Defeat is bitter. Bitter to the common soldier, but trebly bitter to his general. The soldier may comfort himself with the thought that, whatever the result, he has done his duty faithfully and steadfastly, but the commander has failed in his duty if he has not won victory- for that is his duty. He has no other comparable to it. He will go over in his minds the events of the campaign. 'Here,' he will think, 'I went wrong; here I took counsel of my fears when I should have been bold; there I should have waited to gather strength, not struck piecemeal; at such a moment I failed to grasp opportunity when it was presented to me.' He will remember the soldiers whom he sent into the attack that failed and who did not come back. He will recall the look in the eyes of men who trusted him. 'I have failed them,' he will say to himself, 'and failed my country!" He will see himself for what he is- a defeated general. In a dark hour he will turn in upon himself and question the very foundations of his leadership and his manhood.

And then he must stop! For, if he ever is to command in battle again, he must shake off these regrets, and stamp on them, as they claw at his will and his self-confidence. He must beat off these attacks he delivers against himself, and cast out the doubts born of failure. Forget them, and remember only the lessons to be learnt from defeat- they are more than from victory.

Defeat Into Victory pages 120-121

Slim is great. When I was teaching strategy and doctrine I used a quotation from his book in my class: "There is only one principle of war and that's this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him the most, when he ain't looking."

Regards,
Cash
 
Has anyone ever put it more succintly than Bill Slim? ...

Thanks; I never read the book nor saw the quote before. Slim certainly got to the heart of the matter.

It reminds me of Grant. His first plan when coming to Virginia was to strip the army down to essentials, load ten days worth of supplies into the wagons, and move down the slope of the Blue Ridge. He would then come against Lee and Richmond from the West, forcing a fight on different ground.

That's about as bold a plan as you can find in VA in 1864. If Lee loses, he is forced back towards the Chesapeake. If Grant loses, he is forced back against the mountains. Given Grant's cutting loose from his LOC, he needs to force a decision or get back to his supplies within a fortnight. Potentially, this would decide the war in May, 1864 -- one way or the other.

When it was all over, Grant would say this was what he should have done and would have done if he had known the Army of the Potomac as well as he did after a few months of campaigning.

Tim
 
Slim reminds me of Grant in so many ways as well. It's so nice and refreshing to actually find a person in a position of power who doesn't have the attitude of a Montgomery or a MacArthur.
 
Slim's book of his campaigns in Burma, "Defeat Into Victory" is wonderful.

At one point in the harrowing retreat out of Burma, Slim is pinned down by a Japanese machine gun. He glanced to his left to see a Gurkha soldier laughing at him. "You don't know what to do!" shouted the man. Slim thinks to himself. "He's right, I don't!"

Slim molded a new army in India, consisting of many different nations. When he couldn't get enough supplies, he improvised. "God helps those who help themselves" was his motto. And he went back to Burma to achieve a great victory.

For a British general especially, he was Grant-like in his lower middle class background and lack of "side." Saluting was an "ordeal." He's a good writer, too, who earned extra money writing under a pen name before the war.
 
Just one comment on leadership that I thought I'd throw out there.... this may hold true for these Generals also. The quality of men under you make a big difference. I have heard that in the south in the beginning of the war they were turning recruits away, in the north they had to institute a draft later in the war. I believe on average the southerner was a much better soldier then a northern one. Not to say the north did not produce it's share of excellent men.... I just think the southerner had much more heart into it.
 
Just one comment on leadership that I thought I'd throw out there.... this may hold true for these Generals also. The quality of men under you make a big difference. I have heard that in the south in the beginning of the war they were turning recruits away, in the north they had to institute a draft later in the war. I believe on average the southerner was a much better soldier then a northern one. Not to say the north did not produce it's share of excellent men.... I just think the southerner had much more heart into it.
It's very possible that this was true in the early weeks of the war when both armies were ramping up.

But... both sides instituted a draft later on, and I'd be hard pressed to believe that any man would be more motivated than a USCT.

In the west, at least, both armies were often about the same number of effectives when they clashed. Had there been a huge difference in quality of either soldiers of leadership, that would have become very apparent before 1863.

One other note: Good leaders attract the best followers. You see this in the private sector as well.
 
I have heard that in the south in the beginning of the war they were turning recruits away, in the north they had to institute a draft later in the war.

Yet the confederates instituted the draft first. Sort of puts your theory into the garbage pail.

Regards,
Cash
 

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