Leadership

[Freddy]

Grant, whether at Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, or the Overland Campaign showed a determination and a strategy to win. He may not have been flashy but he got the job done even at the cost of tens of thousands of his own men. Could any other Union general have done what Grant did, win the war?

 

[PINCKNEYUSMCRET]

There is something in all of us that makes us what we are and how we react. Some of it can be trained in, and a lot of it goes with how you are raised, and some I think the most important part is that little something god put in you. I have known men who when you first met them you would not think much of. But when push came to shove they showed a coolness and bravery that was to be admiered and emulated. There was just something in them. Grant and Lee had it for sure. I believe Hood did as well. He lacked in some things, but courage and sense of duty was not one of them. What would keep a man in the fight after losing a leg and use of an arm except for that.

Pinckney

 

[ole]

Very well said, Sir Pinckney. Hood had that, at least. If he had nothing else, he had grit. And we can easily extend that to others who had grit but no sense whatsoever. Which is to be the more desirable?

Ole

 

[Elennsar]

"Having both". Having just one is incomplete, like having only one side of your brain.

 

[M E Wolf]

Dear Ole and List Members,

I think there must be good sense along with grit. You don't live that long with just grit. When you couple it with good sense; to me it is a winning combination.

I also agree with PinkneyUSMCRet; about being given a gift from God; as there are many types of personalities and traits; not much different then a recipee per se; to which--in the right time, place in history; makes all the difference; regardless if the history is in a famous battle or in a moment of crisis in life.

Being surrounded by individuals with their own individualized personalities, can also influence a person. As pointed out by PickneyUSMCRet; if you knew those around you--knowing weakness/strengths; you can act and be fairly sure how the others will react. Buddy system works as long as warfare has existed, as I see in looking throughout civilization and warfare.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

 

[trice]

Dear Ole and List Members,

I think there must be good sense along with grit. You don't live that long with just grit. When you couple it with good sense; to me it is a winning combination.

I also agree with PinkneyUSMCRet; about being given a gift from God; as there are many types of personalities and traits; not much different then a recipee per se; to which--in the right time, place in history; makes all the difference; regardless if the history is in a famous battle or in a moment of crisis in life.

Being surrounded by individuals with their own individualized personalities, can also influence a person. As pointed out by PickneyUSMCRet; if you knew those around you--knowing weakness/strengths; you can act and be fairly sure how the others will react. Buddy system works as long as warfare has existed, as I see in looking throughout civilization and warfare.

I agree with a lot of what people have said here, particularly Pinckney. People are unique, and a lot of what's on the surface doesn't seem to matter when the crunch comes. Grant was one of those who seemed to rise to meet difficulties, at his best in the Mexican War, dealing with the cholera as he took his troops through Panama to California, and in the Civil War. Yet the comments of those meeting him in those days seem to reflect a puzzlement, an attempt to figure out how there could be such strength in this little, nondescript man.

My Dad told me once that my Uncle Luke was probably the most fearless man he ever met, but not the bravest. That puzzled me, because Luke seemed pretty brave to me. Among other things, he'd pulled or talked nine jumpers down from the Golden Gate when he was a cop, and been one of those who enlisted on December 8, 1941. When he died, they had to move the wake to the cathedral to accomodate the crowds, and they shut down the center of San Francisco to get the funeral procession through; Earl Warren flew in from Washington for it. Dad told me he thought Luke acted first, and it didn't really occur to him to be afraid until afterwards; other men had to face the fear first.

Maybe that's part of the "four-o'clock-courage". Maybe having to conquer that, all alone in the dark, is harder than what we see on the surface.

Maybe this is another clue, from Grant's Memoirs:
=====
M[SIZE=-1]Y[/SIZE] experience in the Mexican war was of great advantage to me afterwards. Besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to make them personally acquainted. It also brought them in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. Then, in my particular case, I had been at West Point at about the right time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. Graduating in 1843, I was at the military academy from one to four years with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846—seven classes. These classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding high commands. All the older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion, I had also served with and known in Mexico: Lee, J. E. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, Holmes, Hebért and a number of others on the Confederate side; McCall, Mansfield, Phil. Kearney and others on the National side. The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion—I mean what I learned of the characters of those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I do not pretend to say that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. But my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge. The natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. A large part of the National army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities, but I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that I felt this.
=====

Tim

 

[timewalker]

Didn't mean to turn this into a thread about Grant, but he does seem to embody many of the leadership qualities of which we speak.

Two things about Grant's personality/leadership ability stand out.

First, Grant tells of how, very early in the war, he led a unit of troops out to confront the Confederates. He says he was scared the whole time he was marching there. Once they arrived, the Confederates were gone and Grant had an epiphany: he realized the Confederates were just as scared of him as he was of them. Seems to me that many (especially McClellan and Hooker) never learned this lesson.

Second, Grant made his plans based on what he was going to do, not what the enemy might do. Sherman commented on this: "Wilson, I'm a great deal smarter
man than Grant ; I see things a great deal more quickly than he does; I know more about law, and history, and war, and nearly everything else than he does, but I'll tell you where he beats me, and beats the world— he don't care a d*** for what he can't see the enemy doing, and it scares me like h***!"

I recall seeing a program on the mafia where a mob enforcer said that the secret to success in his job, as taught to him by his father, was not to worry about what the other guy was going to do do you; only worry about what you were going to do to him. Recall Grant's famous quote: "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." I think Lee also had this quality of making his plans and not worrying about what the enemy might do.

 

[Glorybound]

Tim's post above inspired me to peruse Grant's memoirs online to look for a part I had read a long time ago, which dealt with his uncertainties and doubts leading the 21st Illinois. He was a colonel and this was the first command he was given which he would actually lead into battle. I found the part and post an excerpt from it below:

"In the twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed ours. As soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses could carry them. I
kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. We halted at night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet.

As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and
higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view I halted. The place where Harris had
been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable."



http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4367/4367-pdf/4367-pdf.pdf






Lee

 

[trice]

...
I recall seeing a program on the mafia where a mob enforcer said that the secret to success in his job, as taught to him by his father, was not to worry about what the other guy was going to do do you; only worry about what you were going to do to him. Recall Grant's famous quote: "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." I think Lee also had this quality of making his plans and not worrying about what the enemy might do.

It is, of course, much easier to say than to do.

In addition, it is not as absolute as it sounds. If we look at Pope at 2nd Manasas, for example, we see a general who paid too little attention to what the enemy was doing. He devotes his whole attention to Jackson to the point of monomania, ignoring the rest of the Confederate force and the indications that his flank is endangered. The result: a smashing victory for the Confederates and an unnecessary invasion of Maryland with the loss of Harpers Ferry and the garrison. Even when unmentioned, there is a quality of balance to be considered in these statements.

Tim

 

[trice]

...
I recall seeing a program on the mafia where a mob enforcer said that the secret to success in his job, as taught to him by his father, was not to worry about what the other guy was going to do do you; only worry about what you were going to do to him. Recall Grant's famous quote: "Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what are we going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." I think Lee also had this quality of making his plans and not worrying about what the enemy might do.

Thinking about Lee and this statement, I remember The Wilderness.

After two days there, Grant looked out over the smouldering field and saw Lee's army digging in on the other side, waiting for him to come on again. He said to a member of his staff: "After two such days, Joe Johnston would have retreated."

Lee stood on the other side, wondering what Grant would do. Lee had just hit the AoP as hard or harder than he had Hooker at Chancellorsville. Hooker had retreated then; Hooker probably would have retreated now. What about Grant?

A reasonable course was to pull back to Fredericksburg, now open. Grant could evacuate his wounded, rest and reorganize. Most generals would after such a fight, and they could at least claim to have secured the crossing of the Rappahannock where Burnside and Hooker had failed.

But Lee thought something else was possible. He could not remember Grant from Mexico, but he had studied his campaigns in the West (the year before he had commented that Grant appeared to be a fighter, and that Pemberton did not appear to be one.) He had talked with Longstreet, a member of Grant's wedding party, and Longstreet said Grant would fight them each and every day the war lasted.

So Lee looked at his maps and considered what the ANV should do. If Grant wasn't going to move to Fredericksburg, another possibility stood out: continue the move towards Richmond. If he was doing that, he'd go through Spotslyvania. So Lee positioned himself to do something about that while he waited, he sent Anderson (Longstreet's old Corps) to Spotsylvania, where they'd be positioned to block the road to Richmond.

Grant, of course, was moving to his right that night, trying to slip past Lee at Spotsylvania. Lee lucked out, as Anderson marched through the night because of the burning woods. The armies smashed into one another.

But Lee's luck was deserved. He was acting to impose his will on the situation before he had any indication of Grant's movement. Grant was doing the same, trying to make Lee react to his moves, to make the campaign fit his will.

That's the reason the Overland Campaign is seen by so many as a butchery, an indecisive slugging match. In reality, the moves are quick and deadly, the calculations and decisions full of risk. Only the skill of the commanders and the bravery of the men makes it appear so brutal. Had the armies been less tough or one of the commanders less talented, either the AoP would have been beaten back or Richmond would have fallen much quicker.

Tim

 

[timewalker]

It is, of course, much easier to say than to do.

In addition, it is not as absolute as it sounds. If we look at Pope at 2nd Manasas, for example, we see a general who paid too little attention to what the enemy was doing. He devotes his whole attention to Jackson to the point of monomania, ignoring the rest of the Confederate force and the indications that his flank is endangered. The result: a smashing victory for the Confederates and an unnecessary invasion of Maryland with the loss of Harpers Ferry and the garrison. Even when unmentioned, there is a quality of balance to be considered in these statements.

Tim

Indeed. I was explaining strategy to my son last night and I told him that slavishly following your own plan without regard to what the enemy is doing is suicide.

The difference, however, is that others were too paralyzed to even make plans for fear of what the enemy might do. They thus reacted instead of acted. Grant put a plan in place without regard for all the possibilities of what the enemy might do, but then had the flexibility to change those plans when the fell apart upon contact with the enemy. Pope was so single minded in the pursuit of his plan that he ignored or discounted everything that did not match his plan. Hooker came up with a brilliant plan to get on Lee's flank, executed perfectly, but then froze when Lee did not do what he expected.

So perhaps we should add flexibility to the list of what we are looking for in a great commander. The ability to change plans that are not working and come up with new ones on the fly.

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

...
So Lee looked at his maps and considered what the ANV should do. If Grant wasn't going to move to Fredericksburg, another possibility stood out: continue the move towards Richmond. If he was doing that, he'd go through Spotslyvania. So Lee positioned himself to do something about that while he waited, he sent Anderson (Longstreet's old Corps) to Spotsylvania, where they'd be positioned to block the road to Richmond.
...

Wasn't it here that one of his top lieutenants asked Lee why Grant would go to that specific place, and Lee responded "because that is where he must go."

 

[trice]

Wasn't it here that one of his top lieutenants asked Lee why Grant would go to that specific place, and Lee responded "because that is where he must go."

I think so; something close to that.

But that's really a fairly common concept in military operations (although maybe only the good ones really know it when the war is going on).

When Lee invaded PA, he was relying on something similar: if he threatened Harrisburg, the Union would have to stop him, which would bring the AoP well North and keep Richmond secure.

Down in VA, Hooker saw that Lee would have to halt his invasion and race back if the AoP moved on Richmond. He suggested it, but other pressures were greater.

Sherman's campaign around Atlanta is dependent on cutting the RRs. If he can cut them all, Johnston/Hood will have to abandon the city. At the same time, if Johnston/Hood could ever have cut the RR north of Atlanta successfully before the city fell, Sherman would have had to go back.

Rosecrans Tullahoma Campaign, Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky, Grant's Henry & Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga campaigns, Lee's Seven Days -- all are built on the concept that if one side moves this way the other must move that way, that threats have to be countered, that certain things cannot be ignored. Or that if they are ignored, bad things will follow for the enemy.

In 1864, in Virginia, all of Grant's moves are aimed at Richmond (even Sigel and Hunter in the Shenadoah). He knows in a general way what Lee will do, because he knows how good Lee is -- and how sound all his movements are. So when Grant plans a move, he can see what Lee might try, and he knows there are very few counters that are sound, sometimes only one, and so he knows in a general way where Lee will be going. He can also see that there are things Lee can do to him, and what type of moves he can make to counter those. And he knows that he cannot counter them all, that some risks much be taken to launch a blow.

It's a lot like a boxing match. When one fighter throws a punch, he opens himself up for a counter-punch. There are only so many coumbinations and punches to use, only so much space in the ring. Sometimes you take a shot to get your own blow in. Sometimes you stand off and cut your opponent up; sometimes you close in and slug it out toe-to-toe. A lot of what you do depends on your opponent, a lot depends on you. A lot is simply in the match-up: maybe you are bigger or stronger, maybe faster, maybe you can take a punch better. But in Lee and the ANV Grant faced a top-notch opponent, one that took all the Union had before going down.

Tim

 

[M E Wolf]

Dear Timewalker;

In your post [Ref #51]; this is about the same comment Lee made about Burnside; at the Battle of Fredericksburg at Marye's Heights.

The lack of flexibility. Thus, gives a more narrow view of options the enemy has, especially in defense. Lee had moved in late as a means of defense in a hurry; while Burnside wasted opportunity waiting for his pontoon boats. IF! Burnside allowed General Couch and General W. S. Hancock, use the cow path and ford across the Rappahanock River; Lee's goose would have been cooked.

But, the inflexibility of Burnside of his plans approved by the President himself; it seemingly is Burnside who does not understand that being 'commander'--he can change plans in which conditions or circumstances change.

So while the screw-up with the pontoon boats, the shipment and transportation was putting Burnside's plans on hold, eating up time and opportunity to plow through Fredericksburg, Virginia to Richmond, Virginia--Lee swung his troops in and entrenched. And the Union suffered a similar fate like Pickett's Charge.

Ironicly, when Pickett's Charge failed; the Union troops at the wall raised their voices and shouted "Marye's Heights" -- not "Fredericksburg" as in the movie Gettysburg

Yet, as a brigade commander, Burnside took control and took New Bern, and captured it handsomely, coordinating with the Marines and Navy in doing so. But, in this case, he wasn't answering to a President...only to another General.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

 

[M E Wolf]

Good analogy Trice...

I think so; something close to that.

But that's really a fairly common concept in military operations (although maybe only the good ones really know it when the war is going on).

When Lee invaded PA, he was relying on something similar: if he threatened Harrisburg, the Union would have to stop him, which would bring the AoP well North and keep Richmond secure.

Down in VA, Hooker saw that Lee would have to halt his invasion and race back if the AoP moved on Richmond. He suggested it, but other pressures were greater.

Sherman's campaign around Atlanta is dependent on cutting the RRs. If he can cut them all, Johnston/Hood will have to abandon the city. At the same time, if Johnston/Hood could ever have cut the RR north of Atlanta successfully before the city fell, Sherman would have had to go back.

Rosecrans Tullahoma Campaign, Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky, Grant's Henry & Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga campaigns, Lee's Seven Days -- all are built on the concept that if one side moves this way the other must move that way, that threats have to be countered, that certain things cannot be ignored. Or that if they are ignored, bad things will follow for the enemy.

In 1864, in Virginia, all of Grant's moves are aimed at Richmond (even Sigel and Hunter in the Shenadoah). He knows in a general way what Lee will do, because he knows how good Lee is -- and how sound all his movements are. So when Grant plans a move, he can see what Lee might try, and he knows there are very few counters that are sound, sometimes only one, and so he knows in a general way where Lee will be going. He can also see that there are things Lee can do to him, and what type of moves he can make to counter those. And he knows that he cannot counter them all, that some risks much be taken to launch a blow.

It's a lot like a boxing match. When one fighter throws a punch, he opens himself up for a counter-punch. There are only so many coumbinations and punches to use, only so much space in the ring. Sometimes you take a shot to get your own blow in. Sometimes you stand off and cut your opponent up; sometimes you close in and slug it out toe-to-toe. A lot of what you do depends on your opponent, a lot depends on you. A lot is simply in the match-up: maybe you are bigger or stronger, maybe faster, maybe you can take a punch better. But in Lee and the ANV Grant faced a top-notch opponent, one that took all the Union had before going down.

Tim

I think you are quite 'dead on' in your analogy of leadership, especially the one about boxing. Indeed--there are limited options and for the flurry of blows; few really are knock out blows.

Respectfully submitted,
M. E. Wolf

 

[ole]

Like the boxing analogy. Frequently, the winning fighter is the one who wears his opponent down to the point where he can no longer effectively defend himself. Points scored early in the matchup mean little in the 11th and 12th rounds.

Ole

 

[trice]

Like the boxing analogy. Frequently, the winning fighter is the one who wears his opponent down to the point where he can no longer effectively defend himself. Points scored early in the matchup mean little in the 11th and 12th rounds.

My Dad used to talk to me about Rocky Marciano. Said the other guy was usually winning early, and blocking most of Marciano's shots with arms and shoulders. Marciano kept beating on them, behind on points. Late in the fight, their arms would be beaten and tired, and they couldn't get them up fast enough or high enough, or keep Marciano far enough off. Then Marciano's blows would pound them to the body and head, and the fight would be over.

Something like that happened to Lee and the ANV. By 1865 they were still tough and smart, but they were worn down, like the Confederacy behind them.

Tim

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

My $0.02.

Some people look at maps and see only lines. Others may look at the same map and really see things. Relationships, choke points, possibilities. I used to fly sailplanes before I settled down, and we'd talk about reading air. There were those who could, and there were those who had really short flights. To stay aloft and to go somewhere as fast as was possible required as much concentration as chess - where am I, where do I want to be in 5 minutes, in 10, what will happen here or there to allow or prevent that...
It was really quite similar to chess with your bottom on the line. "If I mess this up bad enough, I'm going to die." Some guys couldn't handle that, and you really didn't want to be in the sky with them (think Hooker at Chancellorsville). Some had absolutely no fear. You really didn't want to be in the sky with them either (think Hood). Some - and there were very few - would prepare in private with meticulous detail and do things that seemed impossibly dangerous or just impossible. Yet they had calculated all of the angles and there was really very little left to chance. I knew men like this.

Take a pan full of that and add something else...

In a former job, I had the opportunity to teach professional technical classes. It scared me after a while, how it was possible to make people ask the questions you wanted them to, make them not ask others, control their moods, their attitudes, even their pulses to an extent by simple force of will...

And even that's not enough.

Because there is the attention to logistics to consider as well.

At some point - and it sounds trite, but I'm convinced its absolutely true, you'll find the absolutely necessary ingredients are purpose, self discipline, and love for your troops - and not in that order. Show me a commander who didn't look after his men and I'll show you desertions and apathy, maybe even semi-purposeful failure. I often think Show me a commander who really cares - who sweats the details, and not only will his troops watch his back, they'll follow him even when it's hopeless.

 

[atthelevy]

Grant really had only one political connection at the onset of the war Congressman Elihu Washburne, who was a lawyer in Galena and a friend of Grant. This relationship alone sums up Grants political supporters at the onset. Unlike the "real" political generals Grant was not a well known (or liked) golden boy of those in political power. When Grant first offered his services to assist with troops in Illinois he was flatly rejected, John Pope did not like him and called him a "deadbeat".
Had Grant had influential political connections at the time, it is highly unlikely that he would have been so easily dismissed. Drilling volunteer regiments in Galena could hardly be construed as a political appointment. Not until Washburne made a personal recommendation directly to Lincoln on Grants behalf was Grant given a Commission from Washington. Washburne was for the most part solely responsible for Grants initial rise in the Civil war, not a host of political supporters.
After Grants re-instatement, it was his incredible skills of organization that resulted in his meteoric rise to prominence not his connections.

 

[ole]

Not until Washburne made a personal recommendation directly to Lincoln on Grants behalf was Grant given a Commission from Washington. Washburne was for the most part solely responsible for Grants initial rise in the Civil war, not a host of political supporters.

And even at that, Washburne's sponsorship might well have have had deep roots in the desire of every city, town or hamlet to have a local become an officer.

I'm thinking that Galena didn't exactly have a plethora of USMA graduates -- that Grant might have been the only one. Hence, personal friend or not, Washburne had good reason to get one of his own constituents commissioned.

Ole