Leadership

[timewalker]

I was reading the other day and was struck with a thought. I know, you are astonished that a thought could actually work its way into this thick skull, but anyway, I thought I would bounce it off of y'all.

It seems to me that one of the great differences in leadership between the Union and Confederate armies is that the Confederate leadership practically sprung forth at the commencement of the war fully formed, like Athena from the head of Zeus. Granted, there was a little shuffling at the start of the war, but Lee, Johnston, Longstreet, Jackson, Stuart, etc. were identified early and placed in positions of command. Once these commanders fell or needed to be replaced, the pool of competant replacements just wasn't there.

In the Union army, however, it took some time for the cream to rise to the top: Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Meade, Sheridan, etc. all worked their way up. The command structure of the Union at the end of the war was infinitely stronger than the start of the war, where the Confederate command structure was weaker.

Why do you suppose this was? Were the best Confederate subordinate commanders killed off before they could rise? Did politics prevent some of the better ones (like, for instance, Cleburn of whom I know little but who is highly respected on this forum) from rising to higher command? Did the fact that the Confederate have a Lee, a Jackson and a Longstreet at the start mean that there was not simply the opportunity to rise as in the Union ranks where the top echelons were weaker? Was the Confederate "first rank" simply so good that it was impossible to do any better, as opposed to the Union where almost anyone could do a better job? Or am I wrong in my initial premise?

Ladies and Gentlemen, what say you?

 

[OpnDownfall]

One thing that others have commented on, is how many civil war officers, especially those of the North, had left the service before the war. While most of the best and brightest of the southern armed forces were still in uniform when the war started.
Bruce Catton, I think, noted that the the Union War Dept, at the wars beginning, was so hide-bound , addiccted to paper shuffling and so choked with red tape that keeping its paper work flowing from desk to desk was about the limits of its capabilities.
At the end of the War, most of the senior officers of the Union Armies were young men in their thirties, a few in their forties and fewer still, in their fifties and sixties.z(similarly,the Union Armies themsellves were even younger, mostly, relative to the other age groups, teenagers and men in their early twenties)

 

[Bonny Blue Flag]

In my humble opinion...

The South didn't have the luxury of time to go thru the machinations of putting together an army of appointed senators, governors, etc. The South knew they were starting out with "one hand tied behind their backs" so a call was put out for leaders, troops and the population as a whole to fight a defensive battle--everyone wants to defend home, family and country. This gives a powerful boost to the human psyche. This psychological boost was put to good use during the beginning years of the war. the run. It was when the people realized their situation was not going to improve and they eventually lacked the needed number of good generals on the field that the situation changed to the North's favor.

The North started out on the offensive so they were not driven by the same reasons the South was. They were driven by big business, profits, the mind-set of factory work and hourly wages. The North took the first couple of years to organize itself and understand how to be a military power and how to develope it's leaders. With the South beginning to faulter in the latter years of the war, the North took advantage of this, and used its resources wisely.

Bottom line, the South used it's genuine talent for thinking and acting fast with whatever is at hand. The North used it's talent for thinking things through and sticking with it until the end.

Together, these talents make for a country that can be a fearless friend and a formidable foe.

--BBF

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

Interesting thought.

I've long thought of the Confederate senior officer corps as having an adequate first rank, but no real mechanism of providing backfill. This is consistent with a plan for a short war, or possibly, an aristocratic society. Or both, I guess.

FWIW, I'm not certain that any of the generals on either side rose terribly far above a "B+."

 

[Bonny Blue Flag]

I agree with you there. The generals and officers out of the military schools were trained as engineers! Too many times on this forum have we said, "If only Gen. --- would have done this.. / If only Gen. --- had not done that..."

The male culture of the time was inflexible when it came to owning up to mistakes and correcting them, or refusing to see any other plan but their own and in glowing terms only.

Testosterone run amuck.

--BBF

 

[gary]

It took some time for the Southern leaders to rise too.

Initially Lee wasn't given command of the army in Virginia. He held lesser posts and was undistinguished in the defense of Western Virginia. In fact, he lost it. But for Johnston's wounding at Seven Pines, Lee may not have risen to command until later in the war.

Jackson was also a minor figure during the first year. Both Joe Johnston and P. Beauregard held higher positions than Jackson did. It was only after both men were out of the picture or favor with Davis could Jackson rise.

 

[atthelevy]

Military Leadership and the South

There are so many factors that can be included in an examination of the leadership of the military during the Civil War.

The first being that the south even today ( 35 % of all currently enlisted military personnel hails from 13 southern states) has a very strong military tradition which is influenced by a variety of denominaters: the opportunities for employment, the geography of the south, and the idea of the inherent nobility of military service that is again, still a tradition in southern thinking and politics just to name a few.

Most of the immediate (and many of the late) leaders of the Army North and South were graduates of West Point, a Southern Military Paragon. Most of them were highly involved in the previous great involvement
of the Mexican War. The the great leaders of the Mexican War were predominantly Southern. So when the Civil War broke out it was natural that these leaders would choose sides with their respective states.

The unfortunate choice of the early generals in the North was based on the
military leaders who were left, which were slim picking. A consideration that Lincolns first choice for leadership was Lee , explains the position of the North.

The fact Lincoln allowed political consideration to influence his choice of leaders was another unfortunate problem.
McClellan is the primary example;. he was a general who exhibited a blatant enmity towards Lincoln and a not so subtle indifference to who won the conflict, having his own political ambitions.

The Northern generals who emerged late in the war like Grant and Sherman did not have influential political connections (in the beginning) and had actually retired from the Military after the Mexican war having had unsuccesful careers afterward.
Part of the reason they were each successful eventually was their early indifference to politics.

Grants' greatest attribute as a general in the Civil war however, was his experience in the Mexican conflict. He was a Quartermaster, in charge of supplying a huge army in a war far from home. In the rear with the gear. He was resourceful and kept his army fed, unlike the South who pillaged their own resources (human and natural) and did not have the funds or the agriculture to sustain their army (growing cotton instead of food) . History has shown that a starving and ill equipped army does not usually win in the end.

Shermans' greatest attribute as a general was his undying loyality to his friend Grant
and his certifiable mental illness which allowed him run a campaign of total destruction with no mercy. Total war, with no remorse what so ever. He is still considered a Satanic-like figure in the south.
Meades' success at Gettysburg is based more on the fact that the Union captured the high ground and that Lee made serious mistakes than on his own superior skill.
Meade offered his resignation after Lincolns' severe chastistment for his not pursuing Lees army after Gettysburg.

 

[timewalker]

I wonder if part of it is that West Point was essentially an engineering school and there was much greater opportunity for engineers in the North (with more railroads and canals, as well as factories); thus, more incentive for West Pointers in the North to leave the military than in the South?

 

[ole]

The question did stir some thinking. (Although my skull is not so thick as timewalker's, its contents are stagnating at a greater rate.) Timewalker's latest post makes good sense.

The regular army was a dead end for most. (Even Lee was only a light Colonel after how many years in the service?) Part of this was the failure to provide pensions, so you had to wait for a general to die before another man got a promotion.

But here is where timewalker's speculation rings true: why would you settle for passing away as a captain when you could just quit and make some decent money? As a consequence, those USMA graduates living in the north found private industry use of their degree more attractive than remaining in the regular army.

But in the south, graduates more religiously regarded the army as a career. (Maybe more like the English-patrician: Army, Clergy or Politics?) Hence, the Confederacy had more career-army officers to choose from when the war broke out? (Fleeting thought, Robert Anderson was a highly respected officer of advanced age, and he was only a Major.)

A final ramble: It was earlier stated that Lincoln's political appointments were unfortunate. It might be that Lincoln had to accept some really bad generals with those appointments, but it would be interesting to calculate how many ten's of thousands of recruits those appointments brought in. This was the political part; it was not because he owed someone for carrying a state during the election. (If a man says, "I have eight regiments, may I be a Brigadier General?" Oh yes!)

Just thinking out loud.

Ole

 

[Elennsar]

Quite a few, I'm sure. Either directly (Sickles, for instance) or indirectly (Sigel), I think most politicial generals were picked for just that reason.

Also, with a scanty supply of West Pointers (even not counting the loss of those who went South), some officers of civilian life had to be picked. And how would you judge in advance if a man had the right stuff?

With the benefit of hindsight, practicing law or being a teacher seems to have been a good route.

But that may say something for the types of men who went into law and teaching rather than for that as a job in and of itself.

 

[ole]

Another fleeting thought: only the top of the class got to be engineers. The rest got to rot in a coastal fort or somewhere near the edge of the known world.

Across the US at the time of secession, those most experienced in command during the War with Mexico were generally too old to take the field in 1861. Those with war experience had been Lieutenants, Captains and Majors -- with few in actual command of much more than a company.

Given that some experience with seeing the elephant is better than none, it remains that virtually no one in the regular army had commanded a regiment during a war. In a regiment, logistical requirements are handled primarily at the level of the Colonel's staff. And that was largely a matter of drawing from the Brigadier's staff (who drew from the division).

The sad part of the onset is that neither Lincoln nor Davis had neither the personal qualifications nor available staffing to conduct a real war. Classical OJT on the part of everyone involved.

Ole

 

[M E Wolf]

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen;

Owing to the fact, that the US Military at the breakout of the hostilities between North and South, was rather small to begin with; with Lt. General Winfield Scott being the elder chief; had been grooming Colonel Robert E. Lee for the position of his replacement. General Twiggs had been showing signs of behavior contrary to the Army's benefit and totally manifested when the incidents in the South took place.

I agree with posts prior to mine; where engineers were the 'cream of the crop' and best educated in their class. Although West Point/U. S. Military Academy did many things to educate their students--to actually fight though was on the job training. Yes, horsemanship, fencing, organization, drilling, artillery, etc. was taught--the classes of West Point proved they produced failures as well as successes.

The pension system for soldiers/officers were awful. Like today--unless you hold full bird Colonel or above, do pensions give some measure of comfort but, even so--unless a general or higher; do you fully retire.

I disagree with the assessment that Jefferson Davis did not have any military experience. President Jefferson Davis graduated from West Point (U.S. Military Academy) in 1828, had frontier duty, fought in the Mexican War; at Monterrey and Buena Vista and wounded at Buena Vista.

President Abraham Lincoln was a Captain in the militia.

So, in my personal opinion--any of the two presidents that should have known better, as far as military goes--should have been President Davis.

The engineers of the Military, often went into private practice after their obligations to the military were over. Meade, Haupt, etc. to name a few.
They were creating the internal structure of the industrial 'North.'

I find many of the Southern military, being career military more so than those in the Northern regions. I can only assume, that those from the South had more personal wealth, e.g. plantations, family wealth; e.g. Lee with the marriage to Mary Custis, grand daughter to Washington, Lee with his connections to Lighthorse Harry Lee and his various uncles. Whereas, those in the North who were without the personal wealth and or family wealth; had to create it.

Those who sought to increase their wealth had to do so, outside the military. Some brilliant officers left the military as to teach in military like schools; such as VMI.

When the Rebellion and Secession took hold; it is evident that people often sided with their state. Not all but a good portion did so.

Militias and those who volunteered out numbered the regular military, and in order to be supported by the population; those political generals were appointed on both military armies. Civilian generals weren't all bad--I look at General Gordon for the CSA, N. B. Forrest, Turner Asby, Thomas Logan, Stand Waite etc.; as well as for the North--General J. L. Chamberlain (of 20th Maine fame), Francis Barlow, Francis Blair, John Brook, Daniel Butterfield, etc.

But, for certain--The Southern Army had more engineering grads from military academies then the North. The North seemingly had more generals who served frontier/garrison/artillery duties/quartermaster.

In my opinion, the leadership qualities have nothing to do with having military education or not--it is the man who must have that quality first. The military academy polishes and refines it. But, actual on the job training can be more practical. When the Southern army lost so many up and coming officers at Gettysburg; they could not be replaced as rapidly as they were killed that day. North lost a good many good leaders also but, not as critical to their army as it was to the South.


Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

 

[ole]

When the Southern army lost so many up and coming officers at Gettysburg; they could not be replaced as rapidly as they were killed that day. North lost a good many good leaders also but, not as critical to their army as it was to the South.

It lost more than a hatful at Chancellorsville, starting the slippery slope.

In my opinion, the leadership qualities have nothing to do with having military education or not--it is the man who must have that quality first. The military academy polishes and refines it.

Agreed. Lincoln, although having next to zero military savvy, exhibited more leadership when he was a boy than Jeff Davis did through all his years (overstated for emphasis). And I'll figure that what was taught at the USMA was command, rather than leadership.

 

[gary]

I should add that it took time for the North to sort out its political generals from its fighting generals. Granted there were some political generals who proved competent and even good, especially John Logan. As for the fighting generals, by this I mean the professionally West Point trained generals who would actually fight. McClellan could train, but couldn't fight. Burnsides would fight, but not very well (Knoxville being the exception). Thus, it took time for the fighters like Grant to be recognized and given increasing authority and responsibility. It's a good thing that Lincoln read all the telegrams that came through so he learned to recognize the fighers and the feinters.

 

[Baggage Handler #2]

Back when I used to (have to) pay attention in classes on such subjects, there was a whole block or two on the subject of leadership vs management, with the studies typically concluding that an absolutely brilliant manager or superb leader might enjoy some success, the best overall commander will be the one who strikes a balance, showing good strength in both categories.

I do think the Southern hierarchy placed very little emphasis on management with the inevitable result, while Lincoln was able to use - effectively - a number of generals who weren't terribly effective in combat. Rosecrans leaps to mind, as does Halleck, although in a very different sense.

Ole's point about "command" being taught is interesting. I don't think it is taught today as a distinct subject, but the elements of it are. I do not know about how things were done back then, however so it may be the case.

 

[oneplez]

Political officers

atthelevy in Post # 7 said:

"The Northern generals who emerged late in the war like Grant and Sherman did not have influential political connections (in the beginning) and had actually retired from the Military after the Mexican war having had unsuccesful careers afterward.

Part of the reason they were each successful eventually was their early indifference to politics."


I disagree. Both named officers had many political sponsers. Sherman was untouched by any others in the Union Army for the number and positions. They both used "political sponsors" to the hilt.

• 6. Historian William Skelton, "An American Profession of Arms," 287—297, referred to such activity as regulars viewing politics from a professional perspective. Besides branch and service parochialism, officers sought to influence their careers using political lobbying and the mobilization of powerful friends, a common activity in the antebellum officer corps and an accepted practice-

• 24. When the thirty-year-old lieutenant (Sherman) was married in May 1850, his wedding was a major political event in the capital. Senators Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and T- H. Benton attended, along with President Zachary Taylor and his entire cabinet. Sherman also returned to Washington to attend President Taylor's funeral as a temporary aide-de-camp to the adjutant general of the army; Memoirs, 1:84-85-

• 25. William T Sherman, Trie Sherman Letters: Correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, ed. Rachel Sherman Thomdike (New York: Scrib-ners,1894), 110-

• 26. Sherman recounts several frank and informal meetings with the president in Memoirs, 1:167, 175,192.

• 27. Senator Ewing (Sherman's Father in law/Stepfather) had gone so far as asking Secretary or the Interior Caleb Smith of Indiana to support Sherman's appointment. Secretary Smith said he would support Ewing if Sherman's name were mentioned again in cabinet meetings- Thomas Ewing to W. T-Sherman, May 8, 1861, and W. T. Sherman to Thomas Ewing, May 23, 1861, William T. Sherman Papers, and Library of Congress-

• 28. Thomas Ewing to W. T. Sherman, May 31, 1861, reel 1, William T. Sherman Family Papers (microfilm).


I think this establishes Sherman's early and latter political connections.

Additionally His Father in law, Thomas Ewing, had a helped create the Republican party and was one of the nominators of Lincoln as the party's Presidential nominee.

Despite Sherman's many protestations of dislike of politicians, he apparently solicited them when he felt the need.

As to Grant, I know that Congressman Elihu Washburn befriended him on April 16, 1861. He sought to make Grant Captain of a Galena, IL regiment and later got his promotions up to Major General.

Don

 

[Elennsar]

Sherman and Grant did not play the game of politics the way that oh, McClellan did, however.

Yes, their promotions were done in some part because of friendly politicians, but neither tried interfering themselves with what the government did.

That is something that made them stand out.

 

[trice]

...
But, for certain--The Southern Army had more engineering grads from military academies then the North. The North seemingly had more generals who served frontier/garrison/artillery duties/quartermaster.
...

Originally, West Point was the first and only Engineering College in the United States. Until very recently, all West Point graduates finished with an Engineering degree, accepted as such in all 50 states.

At the end of 1860, there were a bit over 1000 officers in the US Army. Altogether 313 of them, about 28%, resigned to "go South". That leaves 72% who didn't.

Tim

 

[oneplez]

Elennsar Said:

"Sherman and Grant did not play the game of politics the way that oh, McClellan did, however.

Yes, their promotions were done in some part because of friendly politicians, but neither tried interfering themselves with what the government did."


I'm not aware of what variations of political "game playing" existed at the time, nor how 'style' points were awarded, since according to my post apparently "all officers played politics." The person who wrote the post claimed they (Grant and Sherman) were not "politically inclined, either at the beginning of the war or the end. That is grossly incorrect.

Sherman's Father in law was so well connected he used those connections to:

• get him into WP,

• get his first promotion to colonel of a Regular Regiment (he refused command of a volunteer regiment because they were of a class he didn't want to command).

• Retention in the army after his period of craziness in Kentucky.

• get his first assignment, after a recuperation, as a drill master of new recruits.

• get his assignment, by Halleck (who admitted that he "greatly admired Senator (?) Ewing and would not refuse any request"), to the AOT.

• and, his acceptance by Grant.

Grants acceptance was certainly predicated on his knowledge of Sherman's political connections, not on his exhibited military proficiency.

Grants political games were copiously commented on in Gideon Welles Diary and Sherman's overt attempts escape me but, he had his whole family from Senator John, Father in law Thomas and wife Ellen working old "Foggy Bottom" up to and including the President.

Don

 

[whitworth]

The Worth of an officer

Most officers in the United States Army, at the time of the Civil War, never had the chance to command large armies, until they took command. Even the West Pointers. Even Robert E. Lee. One never knew who would succeed or who would fail at commanding a division or a corps.

One thing is fairly certain -West Pointers had to fail first.

Lee had only one commander at Gettysburg, at or above division command, who didn't graduate from West Point. Rodes went to VMI.

Yes, most West Pointers from the north, could maintain a much better financial career outside the army. Many of them were good engineers. For a southern soldier, the life of a plantation owner was the only good objective and that took money most didn't have. A Lee could have made a move to the plantation with his father-in-laws support. Bragg resigned before the war, and started, as I recall a sugar plantation in Louisiana. I recall he married well.

The great disadvantage of the U.S. Army was that it was established and had a chain of command. Some officers got lost for awhile in the chain of command. Civilian volunteers took higher commands than some of the better regular officers.

Then there were the political appointments for general, made by Abraham Lincoln. Perhaps the costs of politics are too high. Lincoln appointed some incompetent brutes.

By 1862, the U.S. had such superiority in supply and steamboats, most land points in the Confederacy, near water, would fall to a competent general.
By 1863, the United States was spending millions and millions on the military and navy, that victory was soon a very near chance.


Some Confederate generals never were seen as acceptable for higher command. The lack of a West Point degree, did not help.