{⋆★⋆} GEN Johnston, Joseph E

Joseph Eggleston Johnston
:CSA1stNat:
General Johnston.jpg


Born: February 3, 1807

Birthplace: Longwood House, near Farmville, Virginia

Father: Judge Peter Johnston 1763 – 1831
(Buried: Johnston Cemetery, Abingdon, Virginia)​

Mother: Mary Valentine Wood 1769 – 1825
(Buried: Johnston Cemetery, Abingdon, Virginia)​

Wife: Lydia Mulligan Sims McLane 1822 – 1887
(Buried: Green Mount Cemetery, Baltimore, Maryland)​

Married: July 10, 1845 in Prince Edward County, Virginia

Children: None

Signature:
Johnston.jpg


Education:


1829: Graduated from West Point Military Academy (13th in class)​
Studied Civil Engineering​

Occupation before War:

1829: Brevet 2nd Lt. United States Army, 4th Artillery​
1829 – 1836: 2nd Lt. United States Army, 4th Artillery​
1836 – 1837: 1st Lt. United States Army, 4th Artillery​
1836: Aide to Major General Winfield Scott​
1837: Resigned from United States Army on May 31st
1837 – 1838: Civilian Topographic Engineer​
1838 – 1846: 1st Lt. United States Army, Corps of Topographic Engineers​
1846 – 1860: Captain, United States Army, Topographic Engineers​
1848 – 1858: Chief Topographic Engineer, Department of Texas​
1858: Acting Inspector General for the Utah Expedition​
1860 – 1861: Brigadier General, United States Army, Quartermaster Department​
1861: Resigned from United States Army on April 22nd

Civil War Career:
Before war.jpg


1861: Major General of Virginia State Forces​
1861: Brigadier General in the Confederate Army​
1861: Commanding General, Army of the Shenandoah​
1861: Commanding General, Army of the Potomac​
1861 – 1865: General of Confederate Army, Infantry​
1861 – 1862: Commanding General, Department of Northern Virginia​
1862: Wounded in right shoulder and Chest, Battle of Seven Pines​
1862 – 1863: Commander of C.S.A., Department of the West​
1863 – 1864: Commanding General, Army of Tennessee​
1865: Commanding General, Army of Tennessee​
1865: Commanding General, Department of Tennessee and Georgia​
1865: Commanding General, Department of South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia​
1865: Commanding General, Department of North Carolina​
1865: Surrendered at Bennett House near Durham, North Carolina​

Occupation after War:

1866 – 1867: President Alabama & Tennessee River Railroad Company​
Agent for Liverpool, London, and Globe Insurance in Savannah, Georgia​
1875: Declined Presidency of Arkansas Industrial University
After war.jpg
1876 – 1877: Moved from Savannah, Georgia to Richmond, Virginia​
1879 – 1881: United States Representative from Virginia​
1885 – 1887: United States Commissioner of Railroads​
1887 – 1891: Participated in Veteran Gatherings​
1891: Honorary pallbearer at General Sherman’s Funeral​
1891: Refused to wear his hat at General Sherman’s Funeral​

Died: March 21, 1891

Place of Death: Washington, D.C.

Cause of Death: Pneumonia

Age at time of Death: 84 years old

Buried: Green Mount Cemetery, Baltimore, Maryland
 
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The "bad blood" between Johnston and Jefferson Davis started with Johnston's being named a full General but behind 3 others. He felt he was Senior to them all. He left the old army as a quartermaster general.
 
The "bad blood" between Johnston and Jefferson Davis started with Johnston's being named a full General but behind 3 others. He felt he was Senior to them all. He left the old army as a quartermaster general.

In that case, we had two very stubborn and ego driven people, not a good recipe for the top political and military leadership going to war!
 
1891: Refused to wear his hat at General Sherman's Funeral

What’s the story?
As a sign of respect to Sherman, Johnston uncovered his head during the funeral, saying that Sherman would have done the same if the roles were reversed. That honorable gesture may have led to a cold that contributed to Johnston's own passing just days later.
 
I didnt realize he was buried in Green Mount Cemetery here in Baltimore! I will need to pay my respects.
 
As a sign of respect to Sherman, Johnston uncovered his head during the funeral, saying that Sherman would have done the same if the roles were reversed. That honorable gesture may have led to a cold that contributed to Johnston's own passing just days later.
The connection has always sounded to me like the medically dubious logic you'd get from your mother as a kid if you were outside in the cold or the rain without a coat, etc. You might get hypothermic but, at least directly, I've never understood how that applies to a virus. Same story about William Henry Harrison at his Inauguration. I'm willing to be enlightened. (Maybe hypothermia lowers your immunity to somebody giving you the virus?)
 
The connection has always sounded to me like the medically dubious logic you'd get from your mother as a kid if you were outside in the cold or the rain without a coat, etc. You might get hypothermic but, at least directly, I've never understood how that applies to a virus. Same story about William Henry Harrison at his Inauguration. I'm willing to be enlightened. (Maybe hypothermia lowers your immunity to somebody giving you the virus?)
Common cold is viral, indeed.
But I’ll likely never be convinced that standing in a cold rain doesn’t at least contribute. As you say, perhaps lowers immunity. But I’m about 6 years short of my MD degree…….so I’m sure I’ll be corrected.
But a cold is nothing a few well-placed leeches won’t cure.
 
The connection has always sounded to me like the medically dubious logic you'd get from your mother as a kid if you were outside in the cold or the rain without a coat, etc. You might get hypothermic but, at least directly, I've never understood how that applies to a virus. Same story about William Henry Harrison at his Inauguration. I'm willing to be enlightened. (Maybe hypothermia lowers your immunity to somebody giving you the virus?)
Sure, I was raised with the same viewpoint. While you cannot "catch a cold" from being in the cold, excessive cold may definitely lower a person's resistance to any virus that is floating around. That may have happened with Johnston and I suppose Harrison, particularly given their particular ages, and physical conditions.
 
The "bad blood" between Johnston and Jefferson Davis started with Johnston's being named a full General but behind 3 others. He felt he was Senior to them all. He left the old army as a quartermaster general.

That's disputed.

There's a story which Craig L. Symonds says is a myth about Johnston and Davis having had a conflict in their West Point days over a girl at Benny's Haven tavern - Symond's says this didn't happen because the dutiful student Johnston moved in different social circles to the trouble-maker Davis, and there's no evidence Johnston ever visited Benny's Haven.

There is also the aftermath of the Mexican War when Davis was Secretary of War and Johnston was petitioning to given the Colonels rank he felt he had earned but been denied by a technicality - Davis found his argument entirely without merit and rejected it.

The ranking of the five full Generals was certainly the most infamous roadblock in their relationship but - even if only from Davis's time as Secretary of War in the Federal Government - they did have previous differences which could be considered the origins of their feud.
 
There was also a personality clash between Johnston and Davis. They were both strong-willed men who did not like to back down from slights, perceived or real.
 
Joe Johnston to me has always come across as the George McClellan of the Confederacy. Soldiers loved him, but the high command and the president despised him, and with good reason. The man was strategically timid, too willing to give ground, undermining the integrity of the Confederacy as a nation. The people who praise his "Fabian strategy" forget how, with all the ground the Union is given, the more slaves will flee from the plantations, likely never to be returned if peace was ever achieved. He is lucky for the fact that the men who proceeded and succeed him in command were more tactically and logistically incompetent.
 
Joe Johnston to me has always come across as the George McClellan of the Confederacy. Soldiers loved him, but the high command and the president despised him, and with good reason. The man was strategically timid, too willing to give ground, undermining the integrity of the Confederacy as a nation. The people who praise his "Fabian strategy" forget how, with all the ground the Union is given, the more slaves will flee from the plantations, likely never to be returned if peace was ever achieved. He is lucky for the fact that the men who proceeded and succeed him in command were more tactically and logistically incompetent.

"More than one historian has suggested that there is some similarity between the wartime careers of Johnston and his old friend, George B. McClellan. Like Johnston, McClellan was loved by his men, he was reluctant to advance when urged to do so, and he was eventually dismissed by the chief executive. But the similarity is only superficial, for Johnston lacked McClellan's monumental ego and political ambition. Johnston sought no higher calling than to do his duty as a soldier; he never wanted anything more than command in the field and a clear definition of his authority and responsibility. While both men protested that they faced vastly superior armies in the field, in Johnston's case such claims were at least accurate."

Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography
Craig L. Symonds
Page 385-386
 
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Joe Johnston to me has always come across as the George McClellan of the Confederacy. Soldiers loved him, but the high command and the president despised him, and with good reason. The man was strategically timid, too willing to give ground, undermining the integrity of the Confederacy as a nation. The people who praise his "Fabian strategy" forget how, with all the ground the Union is given, the more slaves will flee from the plantations, likely never to be returned if peace was ever achieved. He is lucky for the fact that the men who proceeded and succeed him in command were more tactically and logistically incompetent.
I've heard this analogy before, and while I understand the superficial similarities, I think it fundamentally ignores the difference in strategic position each man inherited. The Union, to win, needed to conquer the South. They needed someone who was comfortable on the offensive and willing to bring the power of the North to bear. The CSA on the other hand was committed to the defensive. They merely had to outlast the Union in order to win independence. So while I understand the comparison to McClellan, I think the more appropriate analogy is to George Washington. Washington's greatest military achievement was keeping an army in the field and avoiding having it destroyed by superior forces, so it could fight another day. He was willing to take selected offensive movements when he saw the opportunity, but for the most part fought on the defensive. I think Johnston was tying to emulate this strategy. Yes, just like Washington, it required giving up territory in order to preserve the army. Washington gave up both New York and Philadelphia. While the loss of slaves from a CSA perspective would be regrettable, it was less regrettable than the loss of soldiers.
 
Joe Johnston to me has always come across as the George McClellan of the Confederacy. Soldiers loved him, but the high command and the president despised him, and with good reason. The man was strategically timid, too willing to give ground, undermining the integrity of the Confederacy as a nation. The people who praise his "Fabian strategy" forget how, with all the ground the Union is given, the more slaves will flee from the plantations, likely never to be returned if peace was ever achieved. He is lucky for the fact that the men who proceeded and succeed him in command were more tactically and logistically incompetent.
Interesting comparison, but there are key differences. McClellan's war strategy of "conciliation" (aka "soft war") was totally disavowed by the Lincoln administration by the 2nd year of the war, and was one of the reasons that led to Mac's ouster and a new lineup of senior Union commanders. But Johnston's "fabian" strategy (whether effective or not is another matter), was never repudiated by the Davis administration, and remained in place with other competing methods throughout the war. Yes, Johnston was relieved by Davis for ostensibly pursuing such a strategy, but it had more to do with Johnston's effectiveness in carrying out that strategy. In any case, Johnston was the "cat that couldn't stay away," and unlike McClellan, he lasted from start to finish.
 
Interesting comparison, but there are key differences. McClellan's war strategy of "conciliation" (aka "soft war") was totally disavowed by the Lincoln administration by the 2nd year of the war, and was one of the reasons that led to Mac's ouster and a new lineup of senior Union commanders. But Johnston's "fabian" strategy (whether effective or not is another matter), was never repudiated by the Davis administration, and remained in place with other competing methods throughout the war. Yes, Johnston was relieved by Davis for ostensibly pursuing such a strategy, but it had more to do with Johnston's effectiveness in carrying out that strategy. In any case, Johnston was the "cat that couldn't stay away," and unlike McClellan, he lasted from start to finish.
Davis' strategy was not Fabian. He wanted to establish solid defensive fronts and prevent the Union from getting into the Confederate heartland. The Confederacy was built upon a brittle institution; the active implementation of such a strategy merely benefitted the Union, and harmed the Confederacy.
I will renege on prior statements implying Johnston was intentionally implementing the Fabian strategy. From all I've read, I see no reference or quotation or any evidence that his retreats were part of some grand plan; Davis fired the guy at Atlanta when, in response to a telegram asking what Johnston's strategy was to defeat Sherman, Johnston replied essentially he had no strategy beyond awaiting Sherman's next movement (some people argue he did this out of fear of revealing his true plans and information leaking to the enemy...but there is no prior or later incident of such strategic military intelligence actively affecting a major campaign). He retreat not as part of some elaborate plan, but because his position was no longer tenable, and he was enticed to retreat again and again and again. This is the same throughout the western theater, of generals being outmaneuvered by better Union commanders (Grant, Sherman, Rosecrans, and Thomas). And yet, you get a lot of grifters saying Johnston was a better general than Lee on such a flimsy argument.
The only reason why Johnston kept getting put back in command positions over and over is because the Confederacy did not have enough officers to shuffle around, compared to the Union. Meanwhile, the Union has most of the west pointers, plus many capable political generals like Logan and Blair who could take up high command roles. So guys like McClellan can get the boot and Lincoln doesn't have to call him back for a new position, because he has so many other options available to him.
 
Davis' strategy was not Fabian
Agreed. The point being that whatever one wants to call Johnston's war strategy, it was contrary to Davis' original strategy of holding on to or defending the borders or key points of the Confederacy. Yet Johnston remained in command more or less from beginning to end, despite differences over Davis about the means of fighting the war.
He retreat not as part of some elaborate plan, but because his position was no longer tenable, and he was enticed to retreat again and again and again
Yes, while I am not as harsh a critic of Johnston, and it is convenient to use the term "fabian" regarding Johnston, whether accurate or not, Johnston's movements were highly reactional, in contrast to Lee, whose strategy clearly relied on seizing the initiative whenever possible.

he Confederacy did not have enough officers to shuffle around, compared to the Union.
There may have been fewer Confederate officers to shuffle around, but as events unfolded, and expectations changed, the Union was able to select an "A" team that it stuck with and ultimately led it to victory. Unlike the Confederacy, whose main strategic dilemma was the lack of a clear and concise strategy from beginning to end. That confused thinking also contributed with way that the Confederacy recycled officers back and forth.
 
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