Johnston and Lee

[Stryker65]

That sounds high to me. Lee surrenders under 30k and at Bentonville Johnston is under 30k I believe. Lee is going to continue to lose men as he moves to NC.

Yes. According to what I have, Lee surrendered the ANV with 25,190 men. According to the OR, Johnston's field army surrendered with 23,840 men. The troops in the Departments of North Carolina and South Carolina surrendered with an additional 15,172 men, but these were detailed men, men in camps of instruction, hospitalized troops and medical workers, etc., and were paroled over a long time.

Meanwhile, on April 30, 1865, Sherman's army numbered 110,003 PFD, with 10-15,000 in garrisons.

 

[SWS]

Had Lee successfully escaped south of the Roanoke, I do think Grant and Meade would have elected to combine with Sherman/Schofield's Goldsboro group on the road to Raleigh via Weldon/Gaston (Sheridan's horse would provide an admirable screen), while Ord (and eventually Thomas) would have occupied Lynchburg and the line of the James River and thence pressed south against Danville. The best the Confederates can hope for is to repeat Bentonville (or Napoleon in 1814) and strike the most vulnerable Federal column before probably withdrawing to a fortified position at Hillsborough. Greensboro and Lee-Johnston would thus face immense pressure from the east and north, and Stoneman's raid on Salisbury (Charlotte had already suffered a fire in January) renders a retirement south of the Yadkin a doubtful enterprise supply-wise. IIRC, Stephen D. Lee, with the Army of Tennessee's baggage train at Augusta, was planning to move north to join Johnston and procure forage from the untouched districts of western S.C., however.

 

[wausaubob]

Had Lee successfully escaped south of the Roanoke, I do think Grant and Meade would have elected to combine with Sherman/Schofield's Goldsboro group on the road to Raleigh via Weldon/Gaston (Sheridan's horse would provide an admirable screen), while Ord (and eventually Thomas) would have occupied Lynchburg and the line of the James River and thence pressed south against Danville. The best the Confederates can hope for is to repeat Bentonville (or Napoleon in 1814) and strike the most vulnerable Federal column before probably withdrawing to a fortified position at Hillsborough. Greensboro and Lee-Johnston would thus face immense pressure from the east and north, and Stoneman's raid on Salisbury (Charlotte had already suffered a fire in January) renders a retirement south of the Yadkin a doubtful enterprise supply-wise. IIRC, Stephen D. Lee, with the Army of Tennessee's baggage train at Augusta, was planning to move north to join Johnston and procure forage from the untouched districts of western S.C., however.

An unnecessary battle under those conditions poses a substantial risk that the US forces will no longer be subject to officer discipline and a black flag killing spree follows. That was the result that Lee dreaded in remarks attributed to him.

 

[Irishtom29]

An unnecessary battle under those conditions poses a substantial risk that the US forces will no longer be subject to officer discipline and a black flag killing spree follows. That was the result that Lee dreaded in remarks attributed to him.

Yes, I recall a battle, Munda, in the civil war between Caesar and the Pompeans in which Caesar's men refused quarter to the Pompean army, many soldiers of which had been granted liberal terms earlier but then continued to be hostile. Caesar's men didn't want to fight these fellas a third time.

 

[wausaubob]

Yes, I recall a battle, Munda, in the civil war between Caesar and the Pompeans in which Caesar's men refused quarter to the Pompean army, many soldiers of which had been granted liberal terms earlier but then continued to be hostile. Caesar's men didn't want to fight these fellas a third time.

I think General Lee anticipated his army breaking apart. Then the federal forces would hunt down those groups one by one and they would be treated like bandits, not as soldiers.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

All,



Wonderdul points and just the sort of discussion I was hoping my post would generate!



I think we can all agree from a realistic perspective that Lee ...Johnston...etc knew the game was pretty much up...and the possibility of them combining and offering a decisive campaign was extremely slim....





What has always fascinated me between April 2 and 9 was the drive and determination to keep going. Weigley suggested Lee was a "Napoleonic" thinker...(I have my own thoughts on this...for another thread..).... but if thats the case...does Lee hold on to the last min in hopes of reversing the tide like Boney had done several times? Does Lee have the ability to pull off a Washington at Trenton?..... realistically I think not....but from Lee's perspective in real time perhaps such an event was an "option" should the situation arise.....Washington didnt commit to crossing the Delaware and attacking Trenton until the evening of Dec 24...... I honestly think Lee held on to such a possibility until it was absolutely clear there was no further options.....I think it comes down to the simple idea that Lee was determined to play until the end.... 25000...30000...50000 is still a potent force in the field (minus rations)..... not to harp on Bonaparte but his 1814 campaign (which he lost in the end) saw approx 60000 French vs something like 300,000 and he managed to score several almost decisive victories..... Grant knew Lee was dangerous still...and I dont think he "rested" until Lee signed the terms.

 

[wausaubob]

All,



Wonderdul points and just the sort of discussion I was hoping my post would generate!



I think we can all agree from a realistic perspective that Lee ...Johnston...etc knew the game was pretty much up...and the possibility of them combining and offering a decisive campaign was extremely slim....





What has always fascinated me between April 2 and 9 was the drive and determination to keep going. Weigley suggested Lee was a "Napoleonic" thinker...(I have my own thoughts on this...for another thread..).... but if thats the case...does Lee hold on to the last min in hopes of reversing the tide like Boney had done several times? Does Lee have the ability to pull off a Washington at Trenton?..... realistically I think not....but from Lee's perspective in real time perhaps such an event was an "option" should the situation arise.....Washington didnt commit to crossing the Delaware and attacking Trenton until the evening of Dec 24...... I honestly think Lee held on to such a possibility until it was absolutely clear there was no further options.....I think it comes down to the simple idea that Lee was determined to play until the end.... 25000...30000...50000 is still a potent force in the field (minus rations)..... not to harp on Bonaparte but his 1814 campaign (which he lost in the end) saw approx 60000 French vs something like 300,000 and he managed to score several almost decisive victories..... Grant knew Lee was dangerous still...and I dont think he "rested" until Lee signed the terms.

Good post. The problem is that Grant and Sheridan were well versed in the history of Napoleon in 1812 and thereafter. They knew that harassing and attacking the Confederate army was useful, but that what really needed to be done was to get in front of the Confederate army and block it. I think they knew the results when Napoleon made it back to Paris. And they the Duke of Wellington considered the result at Waterloo a very close thing. Sheridan's cavalry could get ahead of the Confederates. And it did have mostly repeating firearms. However the US cavalry probably did not have the mass to block the entire Confederate army. But the conditions of the French retreat from Moscow were not repeated in the US Civil War. The infantry divisions did get in front of the Confederates.
However,... the 1865 Confederates did not an undamaged homeland into which they could retreat, as has been noted by are cogent commentators. The Confederates could not retreat to one the major cities of the 1865 world, there was no Confederate equivalent to Paris.
No matter what happened the Confederate government was going to be in Cuba or Texas, or captured in a few weeks.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

That sounds high to me. Lee surrenders under 30k and at Bentonville Johnston is under 30k I believe. Lee is going to continue to lose men as he moves to NC.

I agree with @Jamieva.

 

[TallTallMan]

I think you are being a little too tough on Johnston. Other than Davis (and possibly Hood), who did Johnston not get along with? My understanding is that he was very popular with the troops and with senior officers.

I tend to think Johnston would have recognized that Lee was at that point appointed as General in Chief of all CSA armies and would have been a good subordinate to this long time friend (and yes, rival).

I thought I was more generous than others! As stated, I really like Johnston, but he was difficult. To be honest, Jeff was worse.

 

[marco75]

At a Winter lecture from Gettysburg NPS the speaker said that if Lee had made it one or two days longer Grant had to stop following and reorganice his supply lines, one of the reasons for his surrender terms at Appomattox. But what hoped Lee to find in North Carolina? Food for his Army? Was the situation better in Johnston's Army? With Richmond captured by the Union, where should the supplys come from? Who should organice that?For both confederate Armies, east and west?

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Yes. According to what I have, Lee surrendered the ANV with 25,190 men. According to the OR, Johnston's field army surrendered with 23,840 men. The troops in the Departments of North Carolina and South Carolina surrendered with an additional 15,172 men, but these were detailed men, men in camps of instruction, hospitalized troops and medical workers, etc., and were paroled over a long time.

Meanwhile, on April 30, 1865, Sherman's army numbered 110,003 PFD, with 10-15,000 in garrisons.

Yep. The final outcome was inevitable.

 

[RedRover]

Yes. According to what I have, Lee surrendered the ANV with 25,190 men. According to the OR, Johnston's field army surrendered with 23,840 men. The troops in the Departments of North Carolina and South Carolina surrendered with an additional 15,172 men, but these were detailed men, men in camps of instruction, hospitalized troops and medical workers, etc., and were paroled over a long time.

Meanwhile, on April 30, 1865, Sherman's army numbered 110,003 PFD, with 10-15,000 in garrisons.

Indeed. But of the 175,000 or so Confederate soldiers surrendered and paroled, only a small part were "combat effective" prior. Of the ca. 28,000 personnel of the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered by General Lee at Appomattox, only about 8,000 foot soldiers "effective" and armed and organized for combat. Gen. A.L. Long:

Of the forces surrendered by Joe Johnston in North Carolina, mustering about 18,578, Johnston reports there were only about 14,179 effectives present in the infantry and artillery, and something over 2,000 cavalry total.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Indeed. But of the 175,000 or so Confederate soldiers surrendered and paroled, only a small part were "combat effective" prior. Of the ca. 28,000 personnel of the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered by General Lee at Appomattox, only about 8,000 foot soldiers "effective" and armed and organized for combat. Gen. A.L. Long:

View attachment 534689


Of the forces surrendered by Joe Johnston in North Carolina, mustering about 18,578, Johnston reports there were only about 14,179 effectives present in the infantry and artillery, and something over 2,000 cavalry total.

Good observation, @RedRover.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Indeed. But of the 175,000 or so Confederate soldiers surrendered and paroled, only a small part were "combat effective" prior. Of the ca. 28,000 personnel of the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered by General Lee at Appomattox, only about 8,000 foot soldiers "effective" and armed and organized for combat. Gen. A.L. Long:

View attachment 534689


Of the forces surrendered by Joe Johnston in North Carolina, mustering about 18,578, Johnston reports there were only about 14,179 effectives present in the infantry and artillery, and something over 2,000 cavalry total.

Great point.....out of curiousity....does this factor in all the cavalrymen and artillerymen who were serving as "infantry"..... for instance what would the artillerymen fighting with muskets at Appomattox Station on the 8th have been considered in the "effective" category? Or the members of the Baltimore Light Artillery...who were spread across Cav..Inf..& Arty...Surely they were counted as part of a battery organization on record....but in practice they werent acting in that role.....no doubt as the days wore on more and more artillerymen and cavalrymen found themselves acting the part of infantry.... I'm not suggesting it would have made a difference...the gig was up....but I'm certainly curious to know if anyone in the higher command was aware of the "transition of branches" and factored it into their understanding of "effectives."

 

[Stryker65]

Great point.....out of curiousity....does this factor in all the cavalrymen and artillerymen who were serving as "infantry"..... for instance what would the artillerymen fighting with muskets at Appomattox Station on the 8th have been considered in the "effective" category? Or the members of the Baltimore Light Artillery...who were spread across Cav..Inf..& Arty...Surely they were counted as part of a battery organization on record....but in practice they werent acting in that role.....no doubt as the days wore on more and more artillerymen and cavalrymen found themselves acting the part of infantry.... I'm not suggesting it would have made a difference...the gig was up....but I'm certainly curious to know if anyone in the higher command was aware of the "transition of branches" and factored it into their understanding of "effectives."

The artillerymen fighting with muskets at Appomattox Station were captured the same day, so they wouldn't have been counted in the total. If you are referring to at that time, they would have been referred to as "effectives" but in whatever capacity "effective" meant for artillery units.