By that time Lee was commanding general of ALL the southern armies (if memory serves me correctly). Johnston was a really good soldier, and would have followed orders after such a merger occurred. Johnston might not have liked it, but he was certainly professional enough to do his job to the best of his ability.
Agreed...Johnston certainly was a quality soldier..... I don't remember all the specifics but I recall it was difficult to get him out of "retirement" to come back and command in 65.... Johnston always struck me as a realist .... and I think he realized there wasnt much he could have done with meeting up with Lee
I think some sort of battle.....by that point the largest two Confederate armies would have been united with the Federals only getting more men....I think it would have been similar to Napoleons campaign in France in 1814.
Agreed that the command dynamics could have been touchy. Being subordinate to Lee would not be easy for Johnston, with his prickly personality and ego. Below the surface, Johnston probably had a low level resentment towards Lee, who had taken over command of the ANV from the wounded Johnston, and led it to glory. As far as Lee was concerned, he was most at ease with the crop of officers that he relied on throughout much of the war, and in particular Longstreet. Despite the post-war animosity directed against Longstreet, he and Lee generally worked well together during their long association.
You are certainly right. Their fate was sealed. If they were united they would face the united armies of Grant and Sherman, who would destroy the Confederates.
But maybe if the Confederate had held out longer President Lincoln would have had a different theater schedule and Booth would not have gotten his chance.
Yep. "What if's" are endless, with one affecting other events.
Grant had numerous options to restore his logistical connection and to reinforce Sherman's army by water borne transport. The real events of Appomattox demonstrate that by April 1865 the Confederates had no way to stop Sheridan's cavalry. And that was going to make Confederate logistics nearly impossible even if Lee had escaped at Appomattox.
And if the battle included Sherman's veterans that knew the war had been needlessly prolonged, and Gibbon's USCTs, the possible outcomes are dreadful. It was a battle to be avoided.
Which suggests that it wasn't really a military plan. It was a plan to separate Lee and the Army of No. Virginia from the Confederate government. The surrender was just postponed until there was unmistakable evidence that it was necessary.
It wouldn't even matter whether Lee's army was separated from the government or not. Whenever the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered it meant that the war would end (would still have to "pick up the pieces," with small battles and skirmishes occurring here and there, of course, as actually happened in real life).
^This.
Realists certainly agree with that.
Backed by Gibbon's part of the Army of the James, who could see victory and abolition getting closer day by day.
Sheridan's divisions were probing every gap in the Confederate retreat. It wasn't Maryland any longer. Every Confederate that fell behind was probably picked by the cavalry, fed a few rations, and marched back to the US infantry. Every separation was permanent That conclusion is supported by the quote attributed to General Ewell: This is just murder now.
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