Iuka: A tale of two views

[Bee]

In as much as I can read about a battle sans a Civil War library, I have done so for Iuka -- including this great post here and another by Ned Baldwin. Recently, an essay was recommended to me: "A Malignant Vindictiveness" by Evan C. Jones in the book Gateway to the Confederacy. To my surprise, it brought up an interesting posit that contradicted what I already knew to be true from the book Triumph Over Adversity (see excerpt below). The Jones essay asserts that Rosecrans was uninformed of the change in battle plan before Iuka, Triumph Over Adversity clearly states the opposite. My problem is twofold:

1. I cannot pursue the Footnotes in the Jones essay, because I do not own the book

2. The Footnotes used in the passage from Triumph Over Adversity lead to yet another book that I do not own: Cozzens, The Darkest Days of the War, 77, 122, 128-129
​

I will clearly disclose that I am entirely partial to the contents of Triumph Over Adversity, but curiosity is getting the better of me as to where did Evan C. Jones get his source from? What does the Cozzens book have to say about this issue? The opposing passages are below:

To adjust for this forecasted failure , Grant changed the overall battle plan. With a dispatch written and signed on his behalf in the handwriting of a staff officer, Colonel Clark Lagow, Grant alerted Ord: "You will see that [Rosecrans] is behind where we expected him. Do not be to [sic] rapid with your advance this morning unless it should be found the enemy are evacuating." Amazingly, Grant never notified Rosecrans of this change of plan and the confusing order resulted in Ord halting his advance, entirely. Evan C. Jones, Gateway to the Confederacy, page 180

In an after action report he [Grant] insisted that "of this change General Rosecrans was promptly informed by dispatch. To this day, however, no such communique, either to Ord or Rosecrans, has ever been found. Ibid

***********************************

"Where in the name of God is Grant?"

In this interrogatory lay the seeds of a dispute. Rosecrans had assumed that Ord would open the action: Ord waited for the sound of Rosecran's guns before moving. That he heard nearly nothing was later attributed to an acoustical shadow, on odd atmospheric condition that deadens noise. But that did not answer the question of who was supposed to open the attack. Despite Grant's change in plans, Rosecrans acted as if the original idea was still in force, going so far as to ignore one of Grant's staff officers, Clark B. Legow, who had urged Rosecrans to attack in compliance with the new orders. Brooks D. Simpson, Triumph Over Adversity, Page 153​

 

[Sid J.]

This thread, is a rather lengthy discussion of Iuka and the communication (or lack of) between Grant and Rosecrans at Iuka.

 

[NedBaldwin]

1. I cannot pursue the Footnotes in the Jones essay, because I do not own the book
​

​

Jones cites Grant's memoirs and Grant's papers. His footnotes support the parts that say "With a dispatch written and signed on his behalf in the handwriting of a staff officer, Colonel Clark Lagow, Grant alerted Ord: "You will see that [Rosecrans] is behind where we expected him. Do not be to [sic] rapid with your advance this morning unless it should be found the enemy are evacuating."" and "In an after action report he [Grant] insisted that "of this change General Rosecrans was promptly informed by dispatch." His footnotes do not prevent evidence that "Amazingly, Grant never notified Rosecrans of this change of plan". While it is true that "To this day, however, no such communique, either to Ord or Rosecrans, has ever been found." but this is not proof that it never existed. Grant claimed he wrote the message but Jones had decided that Grant was wrong. There are others who refer to the message (one of Grant's staff, the scout who claimed to deliver it) yet these sources are not mentioned by Jones. Rosecrans would later claim that he wasnt informed, though Jones didnt quote or footnote Rosecrans nor explain why Rosecrans is more credible that Grant and others.

 

[Bee]

Rosecrans would later claim that he wasnt informed, though Jones didnt quote or footnote Rosecrans nor explain why Rosecrans is more credible that Grant and others.

Thank you very much for your time on this. Due to the fact that I only had partial information (no footnotes), it was hard to make any opinions, other than to say "that does not agree with anything else I have read".

 

[NedBaldwin]

Thank you very much for your time on this. Due to the fact that I only had partial information (no footnotes), it was hard to make any opinions, other than to say "that does not agree with anything else I have read".

Sorry I cant give you the same info about Cozzens book

 

[5fish]

Is not the Acoustic Shadow the real issue in the Luka battle:

A fresh north wind, blowing from Ord's position in the direction of Iuka, caused an acoustic shadow that prevented the
sound of the guns from reaching him, and he and Grant knew nothing of the engagement until after it was over. Ord's troops stood idly while the fighting raged only a few miles away.[10]

An acoustic shadow or sound shadow is an area through which sound waves fail to propagate, due to topographical obstructions or disruption of the waves via phenomena such as wind currents, buildings, or sound barriers.
Long distance acoustic shadow[edit]
As one website refers to it, "an acoustic shadow is to sound what a mirage is to light".[1] For example, at the Battle of Iuka, a northerly wind prevented GeneralUlysses S. Grant from hearing the sounds of battle and sending more troops. Many other instances of acoustic shadowing were prevalent during the American Civil War, including the Battles of Seven Pines, Gaines' Mill, Perryville and Five Forks. Indeed, this is addressed in the Ken Burns's documentary The Civil War, produced by Florentine Films and aired on PBS in September 1990.[2] Observers of nearby battles would sometimes see the smoke and flashes of light from cannon but not hear the corresponding roar of battle, while those in more distant locations would hear the sounds distinctly.[3]

While Gen. Rosecrans was battling Gen. Price troops, acoustic shadow cause Gen Grant and Gen. Ord stand by allowing Rosecrans orginal plan to fail. If they had heard the sounds of battle, Gen. Ord would have attacked and most likely defeating Gen Price maybe even leading to his capture. There are some who believe Gen. Grant purposefully did not come to Rosecrans aid that day.

 

[dahenry]

Bee, I have the book and will see what I can find.

Dave

 

[dahenry]

Bee,

Here is the first relevant passage from Cozzens' book (page 69) which refers to Grant's thoughts after being reassured by Rosecrans that he (Rosecrans) would be able to reach Iuka by 2:00 p.m. on 19 Sept. "Grant was 'very much disappointed' and dismissed Rosecrans's guarantees. Recalled Grant, 'He said, however, that he would still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day. I did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. It might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault.' Grant altered his plans accordingly. He later claimed that he 'immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans's dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the guns to the south or south-east.' No copy of any such communication from Grant to Ord has been found, and Ord in his report said he did not hear of the change of plans until 10:00 A.M. on September 19, when he was handed a message from Grant's aide, Col. Clark Lagow, that read, 'I send you dispatch received from Rosecrans late in the night. You will see that he is behind where we expected him. Do not be too rapid with your advance this morning unless it should be found that the enemy are evacuating.' On the next page (70) Cozzens notes "Why Grant would have waited until morning to inform Ord of Rosecrans's situation is a mystery. In any case Ord did not move out aggressively at daybreak so no harm was done. Rather, Ord undertook a leisurely reconnaissance, gently probing the Rebel lines but otherwise avoiding a fight."7
Cozzens' footnote for the above (7) refers to Grant's Memoirs, I-411; OR 17 (1):67; Lamers, Edge of Glory, 106-7; Simon , Grant Papers, 6:65-66.
At this point Grant had Ord send a message to Price which included a telegram concerning the battle of Antietam stating "Longstreet and his entire division prisoners, General Hill killed. Entire rebel army of Virginia destroyed." apparently thinking that this news might lead Price to surrender without a fight. I guess Grant thought it worth the effort even though he wouldn't have had any idea where Rosecrans was or when he would begin the battle (my thought). Price refused to lay down his arms and there is no indication how long this exchange lasted. Meanwhile Rosecrans marched towards Iuka and sent Grant a note "Troops are all on the way, in fine spirits by reason of news [of Lee's defeat]. Eighteen miles to Iuka, but think I shall make it by the time mentioned - 2 o'clock p.m." Cozzens continues "Unaware that Grant had cautioned Ord to do nothing until Rosecrans opened the fight, he added 'If Price is there he will have become well engaged by the time we come up, and if so twenty regiments and thirty pieces [of] cannon will finish him.' Wrongly assuming that Ord would start the battle, thereby preventing Price from turning his full attention southward, Rosecrans reiterated his intention to split his command when it reached Barnett's Crossroads: Hamilton's division would go up the Fulton road, and Stanley would advance along the Jacinto (Bay Springs) road." When Rosecrans reached Barnett's Crossroads (no time given) and having no information from Grant, he decided not to split his force in order to block the Fulton road. Then, at 12:30 P.M., two of Grant's staff officers rode up, Col. Clark Lagow and Col. Theophilus Dickey (the latter indicated that they brought a message from Grant but Rosecrans denied it) and the following conversation took place: "General, do you think the enemy is in force at Iuka?" (Lagow). "Yes", answered Rosecrans.
"Are you going to pitch into him ?" (Lagow) . "Yes of course, that is the understanding of my movement, and we are only five or six miles from the enemy. We ought to hear Grant's opening guns on the Railroad by this time."
"Maybe he is waiting for you to begin." (Lagow), Rosecrans replied "Not so, The main attack should begin on the Railroad to attract the enemy's attention and enable me to surprise his left flank and get the roads in his rear."
Lagow then asked if Rosecrans understood that he should attack right away in order to keep the Rebels from retreating, Rosecrans replied "It would be very bad policy to allow the enemy's attention to be first attracted towards his line of communication, to seize and secure which was the object of my movement."
However, shortly thereafter, Rosecrans decided to start his troops towards Iuka (still eight miles away), and to send a message to Grant "Reached here at 12. Cavalry advance drove pickets from near here; met another stand at about 1 mile from here. Hamilton's division is advancing; head of column a mile to the front now. Head of Stanley's column is here."
(pages 70-73).
I can give you the references for the above if you want them, and let me know if I need to clarify anything. I hope it's not too confusing.

Dave

 

[Bee]

Here is the first relevant passage from Cozzens' book (page 69) which refers to Grant's thoughts after being reassured by Rosecrans that he (Rosecrans) would be able to reach Iuka by 2:00 p.m. on 19 Sept. "

Thank you so much, Dave, you have been incredibly kind and helpful. If it would not be too much of an imposition, I would love the final source.

two of Grant's staff officers rode up, Col. Clark Lagow and Col. Theophilus Dickey (the latter indicated that they brought a message from Grant but Rosecrans denied it)

It comes down to this statement ^: Jones states that the order was not delivered by Grant's officers. I have links to Dickey's letter(s), so I still need to review them.

Basically, this is an exercise in understanding how historians interpret sourcing, and hopefully, explain how it came to be that two different historians traveled divergent paths on the same topic. Are we going to land at the same place: Grant's Memoirs + letter(s) written by the camp officer(s)? I don't know, but it will be interesting if we find out that both historians were evaluating the same information, but came to different conclusions.

 

[dahenry]

Bee,

Here are five of the footnotes for pages 70-73:
12. OR 17 (1):138; John Miller Diary, September 19, 1862, Miller Family Papers, Michigan State University; Sanborn, Descriptions of Battles, 8-9. (Sanborn is at Hathitrust here https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89077140424;view=1up;seq=9 )
13. Sanborn, Descriptions of Battles, 9; Hamilton, "Iuka," 734; OR 17 (1):69. (Hamilton refers to Charles S. Hamilton's piece on "The Battle of Iuka" in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War")
14. Alonzo L. Brown, Fourth Minnesota, 80; OR 17 (1):69; "Rosecrans Campaigns," in Report of the Joint Committee, 3:18-19; Theophilus S. Dickey to his wife, September 21, 1862, Wallace-Dickey Papers, ISHL.
15. Sanborn, Descriptions of Battles, 9; Alonzo L. Brown, Fourth Minnesota, 80; Hamilton, "Iuka," 734; OR 17(1): 69, 90, 94.
16. William Starke Rosecrans to John W. Fuller, September 19, 1878, Rosecrans Papers, UCLA; "Rosecrans's Campaigns," in Report of the Joint Committee, 3:19.

I realize this doesn't give you much context for the notes and quotes!

Dave

 

[Bee]

Bee,

Here are five of the footnotes for pages 70-73:
12. OR 17 (1):138; John Miller Diary, September 19, 1862, Miller Family Papers, Michigan State University; Sanborn, Descriptions of Battles, 8-9. (Sanborn is at Hathitrust here https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89077140424;view=1up;seq=9 )
13. Sanborn, Descriptions of Battles, 9; Hamilton, "Iuka," 734; OR 17 (1):69. (Hamilton refers to Charles S. Hamilton's piece on "The Battle of Iuka" in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War")
14. Alonzo L. Brown, Fourth Minnesota, 80; OR 17 (1):69; "Rosecrans Campaigns," in Report of the Joint Committee, 3:18-19; Theophilus S. Dickey to his wife, September 21, 1862, Wallace-Dickey Papers, ISHL.
15. Sanborn, Descriptions of Battles, 9; Alonzo L. Brown, Fourth Minnesota, 80; Hamilton, "Iuka," 734; OR 17(1): 69, 90, 94.
16. William Starke Rosecrans to John W. Fuller, September 19, 1878, Rosecrans Papers, UCLA; "Rosecrans's Campaigns," in Report of the Joint Committee, 3:19.

I realize this doesn't give you much context for the notes and quotes!

Dave

You have done me a great favour, Dave. I can run down the sources with this list, and interestingly, I already have some of them from teasing out information on Iuka in general. It seems that I will be a busy bee looking over the sources and comparing and contrasting. Again, thank you for your time and effort.

 

[5fish]

Is it not the issue of smoke from the battle Rosencrans was involved in with Van Dorn at Luka... even if the sound was masked by the temperature...

http://www.aotc.net/Iuka.htm

Still, others reported seeing the clouds of smoke above the raging battle. But there is more – the evening of the battle Rosecrans had sent messengers to Grant requesting an attack by Ord the next morning. Grant neither acknowledged receipt of the message nor did he order the attack,

 

[NedBaldwin]

...Grant neither acknowledged receipt of the message nor did he order the attack,

Except that there is a record of a message from Grant to Ord acknowledging the receipt of the message and ordering Ord to attack. ‍

 

[5fish]

Rosecrans Despite its relative obscurity,

Time is not on Rosencrans side he only has 3 hours of light left... It is Mid September so it's going to get dark early. One could find the sunset in Northern Mississippi in September 1862... it would have been early...

However, Rosecrans had further to march, was hindered by bad weather, and did not arrive until late the afternoon of the next day, whereupon he prepared to attack Price immediately. Price didn't wait but attacked first. The ensuing battle was desperate, lasted about 3 hours, and ended in the dark as more or less a draw.

Time doom the attack on Luka... Even, if Ord had heard the sounds of battle threes hours may not have been enough to capture Price army...

The smoke as an issue becomes less how long or intense does the fighting have to be to see the smoke from an intense battle an hour or two... again giving orb and Grant little time to bring battle...

Ord moved his force to within four miles of the town, skirmishing slightly with the Rebels as he went. Around 4pm, with no sounds of battle, smoke was seen rising from near the town. Ord figured that Price and his ilk were burning their stores in preparation of a retreat. Though so close, Ord heard nothing. The wind was not with him and, as it blew the smoke east, it blew the sound as well.

Price gave Rosencrans a bloody nose... Time was Rosencrans true enemy that day.. and Ord misread the smoke...

The Federals could not fully deploy because of the ground over which they were attacking. When Price hit them, they were caught with one boot off. But the Union troops held together – Price could not route them. Driving them back, his Rebels managed to capture nine pieces of artillery.

http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-expected-yet-unexpected-battle-of-iuka/

 

[5fish]

including this great post here and another by @NedBaldwin .

No one ever talks about the note to Price from Ord... Price thought Grant was coming for him but note sure did confirm it...

In the morning, Sterling Price received a dispatch from Union General Edward Ord, commanding a division under Grant. It was about the battle of Antietam.

"Longstreet and his entire division prisoners," read the report. "General Hill killed. Entire rebel army of Virginia destroyed, Burnside having reoccupied Harper's Ferry and cut off retreat."

When Grant received the news from Washington, he reasoned that if it were true, then the war was all but over. He forwarded the message to Price, demanding that his army be surrendered.

Price replied...

However, as he soon informed General Ord, even "if the facts were as stated in those dispatches they would only move him and his soldiers to greater exertions in behalf of their country, and that neither he nor they will ever lay down their arms — as humanely suggested by General Ord — until the independence of the Confederate States shall have been acknowledged by the United States."1

Price was already well on his way to leaving Luka even before Grant got there...

As the morning slid to afternoon, Price and his men were nearly ready to leave. The enemy, under General Ord, was expected to come from the northwest. They had not yet arrived when Price's pickets to the southwest were driven in.

http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-expected-yet-unexpected-battle-of-iuka/

 

[RobertP]

What was the source of the false information about Antietam? I assume it was a telegram, that battle having been fought only 1-2 days earlier. Does that message exist in the record?

 

[Sid J.]

What was the source of the false information about Antietam? I assume it was a telegram, that battle having been fought only 1-2 days earlier. Does that message exist in the record?

Cairo, September 18, 1862.
General Grant:
The reports from Washington this evening contain intelligence of general engagement on 16th near Sharpsburg, between rebel army under General Lee and Union forces. Hotly contested all day and renewed on morning of 17tli, rebels having been re-enforced during the night by Jackson's army and Union army by 30,000 men from Washington, and entire force on both sides engaged until 4 p. m., at which time Hooker gained position, flanked rebels, and threw them into disorder.
Longstreet and his entire division prisoners. General Hill killed. Entire rebel army of Virginia destroyed, Burnside having reoccupied Harper's Ferry and cut off retreat.
General Hooker slightly wounded. Action very sanguinary. Requisitions for surgeons and hospital supplies larger than ever before.
Latest advices say entire rebel army must be captured or killed, as Potomac is rising and our forces pressing the enemy continuallv.
. J. C. VAN DUZER,
Superintendent.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077730236;view=2up;seq=232;skin=mobile

 

[RobertP]

Cairo, September 18, 1862.
General Grant:
The reports from Washington this evening contain intelligence of general engagement on 16th near Sharpsburg, between rebel army under General Lee and Union forces. Hotly contested all day and renewed on morning of 17tli, rebels having been re-enforced during the night by Jackson's army and Union army by 30,000 men from Washington, and entire force on both sides engaged until 4 p. m., at which time Hooker gained position, flanked rebels, and threw them into disorder.
Longstreet and his entire division prisoners. General Hill killed. Entire rebel army of Virginia destroyed, Burnside having reoccupied Harper's Ferry and cut off retreat.
General Hooker slightly wounded. Action very sanguinary. Requisitions for surgeons and hospital supplies larger than ever before.
Latest advices say entire rebel army must be captured or killed, as Potomac is rising and our forces pressing the enemy continuallv.
. J. C. VAN DUZER,
Superintendent.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077730236;view=2up;seq=232;skin=mobile

Thanks. Van Duzer was a telegraph guy. Wondering who gave him the inaccurate information to transmit and why was it being sent to Mississippi? Was the same sent to other Union commands?

 

[Drew]

Cairo, September 18, 1862.
General Grant:
The reports from Washington this evening contain intelligence of general engagement on 16th near Sharpsburg, between rebel army under General Lee and Union forces. Hotly contested all day and renewed on morning of 17tli, rebels having been re-enforced during the night by Jackson's army and Union army by 30,000 men from Washington, and entire force on both sides engaged until 4 p. m., at which time Hooker gained position, flanked rebels, and threw them into disorder.
Longstreet and his entire division prisoners. General Hill killed. Entire rebel army of Virginia destroyed, Burnside having reoccupied Harper's Ferry and cut off retreat.
General Hooker slightly wounded. Action very sanguinary. Requisitions for surgeons and hospital supplies larger than ever before.
Latest advices say entire rebel army must be captured or killed, as Potomac is rising and our forces pressing the enemy continuallv.
. J. C. VAN DUZER,
Superintendent.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077730236;view=2up;seq=232;skin=mobile

I kind of hope (and think) U.S. Grant was smart enough not to believe this...

Does anyone know if it was addressed in his memoir of the War?

 

[5fish]

A little piece of me was hoping to be a con. I was hoping Grant was trying to con Price into surrending...