- Joined
- May 18, 2005
- Location
- Spring Hill, Tennessee
How did we come to learn of the chronology and tactical actions at the Battle of Perryville? No one that participated in the fight was alive when the first book was written on the battle. Historians had to go off of information they had dug out of archives, regimental histories, diaries and letters. There was a bleak amount of information to formulate an opinion about. But, eventually someone tried and brought great attention to this long forgotten battle.
The first book length work on this forgotten battle was published in 1981 by Dr. Kenneth Hafendorfer. Perryville: Battle for Kentucky certainly required many years of leg work digging up sources through libraries, archives and contemporary books to determine his understanding of the battle. But, as laid out in Understanding the Battle of Perryville: The Discovery of the Hafley Cabins and its Impact on Historiography of the battlefield, Hafendorfer made conclusions based on the information he had available and the information he used. Forty-one years later, his conclusion of how the battle unfolded has not been questioned. However, forty-one years later, large amounts of new source materials have been made available.
Now is certainly the time to challenge the sources that Hafendorfer used to determine the tactical movements on the field. Although we know that Cheatham's division began the attack on the Federal left, what sources confirm that Donelson's brigade attacked Webster's brigade and achieved penetration all the way to the Widow Gibson's Cabin? Additionally, what sources confirm that Maney's brigade single-handedly overcame Parsons' battery and practically destroyed Terrill's brigade?
On page 164 of Hafendorfer's book he suggests that Polk only commanded the right wing of the army while Hardee commanded the left. That would leave Bragg in command of the army. Bragg's own words in fact stated that he declined to take command and Polk was left in overall command of the army at the battle. (OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1087)
On page 165, Hafendorfer explains the deployment of all the troops on the field and what the scheme of maneuver was—as ordered by General Bragg—without a single footnote. This is proven wrong by Maney's report that shows the deployment of Cheatham's division was intended to be in solid line instead of column.
On page 166, Hafendorfer explains that Jones' brigade "was to move forward between Johnson and Wood." The only citation following this is the report of Col. Marks of the Seventeenth Tennessee which makes no mention of any of the assumptions that Hafendorfer has made. Later in the same paragraph a citation is made regarding Brig. Gen. Johnson's report, but upon examination, there is no mention of Jones' or Wood's brigades. Captain Stanford's report indicates that Jones' brigade was in the front line and Wood's brigade was in reserve in rear of Jones.
On page 167, Hafendorfer states that "John Calvin Brown's Brigade would soon be up and in line behind Jones…" Again, there is no citation for this deployment. Evidence clearly suggests that Wood's brigade was in rear of Jones as noted above.
On page 169, there is a map of the battlefield that shows Bragg's supposed "grand plan of attack" without any citation.
On page 171, there is a map of the field that notes many, but not all of the names that were placed on the 1877 Ruger and Kilp map. Where and from what source Hafendorfer identifies his homesites is not cited. We can deduce that it was from the Ruger/Kilp map.
On page 181, Hafendorfer states that Bragg determined to move Cheatham's division into Walker's Bend after Polk's delay due to more Federal reinforcements arriving. This movement was made by Polk. (OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1110)
On page 182, Hafendorfer states that Bragg "In his haste to move Cheatham's Division to the right and bring on the engagement, he neglected to send Wharton's cavalry back across the river to find out where the Union left flank really was at this time."
On page 198, Hafendorfer states that in Wharton's attempt to clear the west side of Chaplin River, he misidentified the Federal left flank. "From the eminence in Walkers Bend, Cheatham and Polk could now faintly make out the Federal line, marked by smoke coming from Harris' 19th Indiana Battery, about three-quarters of a mile away above the bluff. From this sighting and reports from Wharton, the Confederate command now took this to be the extreme left of Buell's battle line." Cheatham's report actually states, "About two O'clock I received orders from Maj. Gen. Polk to move my command forward, and at once engage the Enemy, whose lines were distinctly visible across the open field and about three fourths of a mile to my front…"
On page 204, Hafendorfer asserts that Donelson moved his brigade to the left behind a "large knoll" after ascending the west bank of Chaplin River. The citation for this is John Savage's autobiography. None of Savage's testimony mentions the brigade or his regiment moving left to the cover of a large knoll. Donelson's own report mentions nothing of seeking cover or moving his brigade to the left—only that he formed it in line of battle "in an open field."
On the same page, the assertion is made that Cheatham "sent an order to Donelson to charge Harris' battery, which he took as the extreme left of the Union line." He also assumes "Cheatham was unaware of Terrill's line forming off to his right and in front of the Open Hill. The nature of the terrain and heavy woods in that direction had hidden Terrill's line from his view, just as it had blinded Jackson and Terrill to Donelson's arrival upon the bluff." None of these assumptions are cited as it is mere speculation. Cheatham's report reveals that the location of the Federal left flank was known.
On the same page, he states that Donelson ordered Savage to "move out first on a right oblique to unmask themselves from the knoll in front and to charge across the open field toward Harris' Battery." This too is cited using Savage's autobiography; however, this movement is not mentioned by Savage. Savage does explain that the regiment had already moved a considerable distance when a staff officer from General Cheatham arrived telling him that the enemy that they should attack was at the head of the hollow to their right. There was no oblique movement.
He then tells the reader what Donelson's "plan" was. That is, "although not fully explained to Savage, was to move the 16th Tennessee out first, followed by Colonel R. C. Tyler's 15th Tennessee in echelon on its left. Once sufficient ground was gained in the open field in front by the 16th Tennessee, the 15th Tennessee would be brought up into line with it, and with both of these regiments angling toward Harris' left, room would be provided for Colonel John Carter's 38th Tennessee to come up on the left of the 15th Tennessee. In this way, all three regiments would be brought against Harris' position simultaneously from the front and left flank." Donelson's actual report mentions nothing of this "plan." This is not footnoted either.
On page 205, Hafendorfer explains that upon the Sixteenth Tennessee's advance, "Savage's skirmish line easily drove back a few skirmishers of the 33rd Ohio." However, the Sixteenth Tennessee did not deploy skirmishers at Perryville. They moved directly to the attack. There is no citation denoting where this information came from, thus it is an assumption. It likely came from SHS papers, volume 30, page 243. In that publication, Col. Luke Finley published the article "The Battle of Perryville" in 1902. In his telling of the battle, he certainly recalled details from the records and regimental histories that had been written on the battle.
"Wharton, with the Eighth and Fifty-first Tennessee of Donelson, added to his cavalry, makes a flank movement, strikes the Federal left with force. Colonel John H. Savage, with the Sixteenth Tennessee, the Fifteenth closely following him on his left, climbs the heights, strikes the Thirty-third and Second Ohio and brings on the desperate fight. Maney and Stewart being close at hand, but not near enough for the desperate odds, for Jackson has 5,000 men under his brigadiers (Terrill and Webster). Maney files to the right to get upon the bluff, forms line of battle, and moves to the left to take position on the right of Savage, and enters the fight.
A soldier falls here, and now there; the battle is on. The Sixteenth Tennessee makes a splendid movement, staggering at times under the furious fire of the Nineteenth Indiana battery and other artilleryists [sic] and their infantry supports, but again advances and scores the first victory in the Confederate line. It was a costly one, though—forty-one gave their lives and over thrice that number sealed their devotion to duty with their blood—and Parsons and Stone and Bush pour furiously their hurricane of shrapnel and shot in death-dealing blows upon the advancing men of Cheatham on the Federal left. Stewart is held for a brief space in reserve, then thrown in on the left of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Tennessee, and the Federal left is broken by the combined movement of the three brigades."
Finley may have learned of the fighting between the Sixteenth Tennessee and the 33rd Ohio from Thomas Head's regimental history of the Sixteenth Tennessee that was published in 1885—seventeen years before the publication of his article. Head had also made an assumption.
Hafendorfer then utilizes Percival Oldershaw's report to explain that Parsons' right guns were turned when the Sixteenth Tennessee was within 300 yards of the battery. He describes the heavy cannon fire that begins to decimate the rebel regiment. But rather than 300 yards, Oldershaw describes in two different accounts that the enemy that the battery fired into was not more than 90 yards away. Oldershaw's account is very revealing. The following is from his report of the battle.
"This battery had fired but a few shots when we heard rifle-shots below in the woods, when the enemy soon advanced and came in sight in the edge of the woods fronting our troops. No sooner was this seen by General Terrill and Lieutenant Parsons, then directing the fire of the guns, that they changed the direction of the fire, and opened at short range (about 90 yards) on the flank of the enemy with grape with deadly accuracy. It checked the advance of the enemy, and after a few more rounds they changed front and faced the battery, which then flanked our left."
This second Oldershaw account is from Buell's investigation.
"I think it was about 1 or a little later—probably half past 1—when we saw the rebel infantry line. I myself was in the front, near to General Jackson, and when we first saw them they were not more than 90 yards from us, in the woods. Previous to seeing them we were firing at long range from two batteries without seeing any enemy, and it was a great surprise to General Jackson and myself, as expressed by General Jackson, that the enemy was near to us. We had time to turn the cannons around a little and fire a few rounds of grape at this short range of not more than 90 yards. Almost in returning the first round of grape General Jackson fell by a bullet."
Clearly, Hafendorfer has had to tweak the narrative substantially. It is clear there was no other Confederate unit in action at that point of the fight. Knowing that the Sixteenth Tennessee was the far right or northernmost unit in the Rebel advance, the battery had to have been engaging the Sixteenth Tennessee at less than ninety yards. Additionally, Savage stated in his autobiography that the regiment had to change direction to the right. This would have had the regiment marching northerly past the battery allowing it to fire into the left flank of the Sixteenth Tennessee at a short range of ninety yards as Oldershaw related.
Still on page 205, Hafendorfer stated that Parsons' guns opened fire on the Sixteenth Tennesseee as it reached a depression "parallel to Parsons' line." At the same time Harris' battery opened fire on the regiment about 800 yards west of their position. However, terrain features block any line of sight from Harris' position to the location at which Hafendorfer has placed the regiment.
On page 206, he explains that Donelson was "surprised and shocked" when Parsons' battery opened fire on the brigade. Hafendorfer then tries to explain a sequence of events that he doesn't understand. He writes that Donelson didn't want to continue in the direction of Harris' battery because it would be "suicidal," so instead he decides to attack northwardly in the direction of Parsons' battery. He states that Donelson sent orders to "halt his regiment and to align it in a more northerly direction." Donelson actually gave two orders to Savage. "I accordingly gave orders for a change of direction further to the right, in making this move I sent forward a staff officer to order Col Savage Comdg Regt on the right to halt when in the proper direction, until I could bring up the other two Regts in line of battle. This order was not obeyed because as I have since learned one of Genl Cheatham's Staff ordered said Regts to move forward rapidly." The first order was to change direction and the second order was to halt and await the support of the other regiments. The second order was not obeyed as Cheatham's staff officer ordered Savage to "move forward rapidly." Hafendorfer fails to understand that it wasn't the change of direction that was over-ridden by Cheatham's staff officer, but it was the order to halt and await the other regiments. Hafendorfer construes the "move forward rapidly" to mean that Cheatham still wants Donelson to attack toward Harris. This does not coincide with Cheatham's report that states Donelson was confronting the battery that Maney was soon ordered to attack and seize.
This is the point at which the narrative chronology of the battle took a different turn from the actual historical chronology of the battle. Historiography then birthed the idea that Donelson's brigade mistakenly attacked the center of the Federal lines practically cementing the idea that Maney's brigade singlehandedly took Open Knob and captured Parsons' battery.
Kenneth Noe's book Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle was published in 2001—twenty years after the first major work on the battle. He had the early days of the information age, but still, much has been added to the databases available on-line today. Starting in Noe's book at the time Savage is given orders by Donelson to attack, we will test Noe's citations.
On page 195, Noe states that Donelson "approached him and directed him to assault the only Federal battery barely visible on the horizon—Sam Harris's Indiana battery…" The citation for this is footnote #42. The citations for that footnote are Savage's autobiography, Chaplin Cross' Camp and Field, Warner's Generals in Gray and Author's Perryville Tour Notes, July 17, 1999. None of these citations actually support the statement that Donelson ordered Savage to assault Harris' battery. In all probability, it was the tour notes that he wrote dictated by Kurt Holman at the State Park from which he inserted this speculation into his narrative. This narrative began with Hafendorfer's book written eighteen years earlier.
Then on page 196, Noe states that "Savage clearly misconstrues Cheatham's intent, which was to have all of Donelson's present brigade flank the battery, which presumably anchored the northern terminus of the Federal line, and thus turn the enemy force out of its position." This is footnoted as #43. The only source that would be able to provide any intent out of the sources listed would be Donelson's report, but none of it is quoted, as Donelson said nothing of his own or of Cheatham's intent.
On page 198, Noe declares that "Savage's interpretation of Donelson's orders added to the confusion. He drove his regiment at a furious clip directly at Sam Harris's distant battery, angry for the rest of his life that the 15th Tennessee did not keep up with him. As a result, the 16th Tennessee approached the hollow all but alone, moving far out in front of the remainder of the brigade." This is footnote #52. He cites the Clark memoirs, Hooper diary and Womack's diary. None of these sources state what battery they were attacking, nor do they suggest that Savage was mad at the 15th Tennessee. Thus, these assumptions are over-reaching the source materials available. The most damning evidence to Noe's account is Womack's statement. "At each extremity of this wood they had placed a battery. The one at the northern extremity, of 7 guns, that at the southern about the same. "Victory" for our motto was shouted all along our line, and fearlessly and gallantly we charged them. The Regt. to which I belonged (Col. Savage's) was on the extreme right of Gen. Bragg's army, and was directly in front of the seven-gun battery before spoken of."
On pages 198 and 199, Noe claims that the Sixteenth Tennessee came under the fire of Simonson's and Harris' batteries breaking the Sixteenth's lines. This is footnoted using only Federal accounts. The men in the Sixteenth Tennessee relate that they did not come under artillery fire until they were within 150 yards of a battery that enfiladed their line of battle. There is no citation to back up the author's supposition.
The first paragraph on page 199 claims that the Sixteenth Tennessee pressed on toward Harris' battery—halting to dress his lines in a hollow half way between his starting point and Harris' battery. He adds that Savage stated he would be able to come over the next hill and be within 60 or 70 yards of Harris' battery. But just as they realign, seven guns from Parsons' battery "unexpectedly fired lengthwise into the hollow from Savage's right with every sort of projectile they carried in their caissons, enfilading the attackers with deadly precision." Noe states that "no one suspected that the battery was there." This is footnoted by #56 and 57. The citations used to substantiate this claim do not reflect the narrative that Noe has provided. The first source cited is Percival Oldershaw who was at Parsons' battery when it first opened fire. "I myself was in the front, near to General Jackson, and when we first saw them they were not more than 90 yards from us, in the woods. … We had time to turn the cannons around a little and fire a few rounds of grape at this short range of not more than 90 yards." (OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1060). It is evident this source cannot support the narrative due to distances. Oldershaw's distance would put the rebel force less than a third of the distance to the Rebel cemetery.
The other sources that are supposed to support this claim in footnote 56 are Donelson's report, a newspaper article by a member of the 80th Indiana, and the Author's Perryville Tour Notes, July 18, 1999. Donelson's report makes no mention of anything that supports the author's narrative. The member of the 80th Indiana strictly relates what he saw of the rebel enemy in the woods to his front. He makes no mention of what unit it may have been and his article does not support Noe's narrative. The only source that can support his narrative was from his tour notes which are speculation, as no actual primary source supports the narrative or has not been provided. Footnote #57 is a simple quote of a member of the Sixteenth Tennessee that doesn't support the narrative, but simply mentions the loss of men when the regiment became heavily engaged.
Still on page 199, footnote #59 is an attempt to support narrative that explains "Another projectile from Parsons's guns passed through the head of Savage's horse, wounding it severely without killing it outright." The single source listed for this footnote is Savage's autobiography. However, his autobiography can't support this narrative. Savage relates that they were on top of a hill when they received the canister fire, and Parsons' battery would have been seven to eight hundred yards north of the regiment at this point according to Noe's narrative.
Beginning on page 199 and ending on page 200 under footnote #60, Noe writes:
"In the hell that the hollow had suddenly become, one of Donelson's staff officers somehow caught up with Savage. With horror Donelson had seen Parsons's unexpected fire from the right. "I did not have the proper direction," he later lamented. Obviously something had gone wrong, for they had not struck the Federal flank but rather had charged head-on into a formidable line. Now they were trapped in the cross fire of three batteries: left, center, and right. Donelson ordered Savage to shift to the right and halt while he brought up the balance of the brigade on the run. Together they would storm the unmasked battery on the knob and secure the flank. Savage for once agreed with Donelson, and he began sliding his men more to the right while Donelson raced to hurry up the rest of his brigade. More confusion followed. Reacting differently to the same scene, an excited Cheatham bypassed Donelson in the chain of command and personally sent both regiments straight ahead to support Savage. He would send Stewart as well, he promised, while Maney would move to the right flank and attack the new battery. Donelson should continue pushing straight ahead."
Only two sources are cited for this entire paragraph. Donelson's report and Thomas Head's regimental history of the Sixteenth Tennessee. Of Donelson's entire report, "I did not have the proper direction" is the only fragment quoted. However, Donelson's report in no way supports the above narrative. Donelson's report gives a very different take showing that when the order to change direction was given, the Sixteenth Tennessee was not even under fire from infantry yet, only sporadic and random spherical case fired in the direction of the Confederates.
Donelson's report:
"In the execution of this order proceeding in the direction of the Enemy battery, I soon ascertained from the fire of another Battery of the Enemy's further on our right that I did not have the proper direction. I accordingly gave orders for a change of direction further to the right, in making this move I sent forward a staff officer to order Col Savage Comdg Regt on the right to halt when in the proper direction, until I could bring up the other two Regts in line of battle. This order was not obeyed because as I have since learned one of Genl Cheatham's Staff ordered said Regts to move forward rapidly. The consequence was when this Regt came within range of the Enemy's small arms, they received the first shock of the Enemy's fire. The other two Regtscame within range [this is struck through] the 38th and 15th came as rapidly as possible. The Enemy was near a small farm House and Cornfield from which point they opened fire upon the 16th Tenn Regt and upon the other two Regts as they came into line on the left. The fight here was obstinate and warmly contested. Col. Savage received a flesh wound in his leg and an injury to his back."
"It is proper that I state that in making through the open field for more than ½ mile the Brigade was subjected to the cross firing of two of the Enemy's Batteries killing and wounding several although shot and shell fell in profusion there was no faltering on the part of men or officers. The three Regts moving forward at a double quick step amid yells and cheers at every step."
Clearly, Donelson's report cannot support Noe's narrative. Noe didn't recognize that Donelson issued two orders. The first order was to change direction to the right and the second order was to halt and await the arrival of the other two regiments. Donelson then stated that it was the order to halt and await the other regiments that Savage disobeyed as a staff officer of Cheatham ordered him to "move forward rapidly" in the new direction of attack. The other source for Noe's paragraph is Thomas Head's history. Head's version of the fight may be skewed as well. Although he was a member of the regiment, his service records indicate that he was most likely on detached service as a wagon train guard during the Kentucky campaign. It is probable that he didn't participate in the battle as his three separate versions of the battle differ somewhat dramatically. Nonetheless, Head's narrative merely states that the regiment was heavily engaged by infantry and artillery from "right, left and front." Those three words are the only ones that can support any of Noe's narrative.
The next paragraph on page 200 explains that the Fifteenth Tennessee caught up to the Sixteenth Tennessee and joined the fight on their left. Savage drew his gun and now "ordered his men forward, hoping to escape the killing fire from at least Sam Harris's guns." According to Noe they raced "up out of the hollow and down the other side of the hill." This is cited in footnote #61 that provides three sources for his narrative. The first source is OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1064 which is a federal report. The reports are from Col. Hall (105th Ohio) and Capt. Anderson (AAG Terrill's Brig.). This must be an oversight, as Noe's narrative places the Sixteenth Tennessee at least 700 yards south of these units. The second source is an article in The Southern Confederacy dated November 13, 1862. The article gives a brief and generic description of the battle. It doesn't offer any supporting evidence to support an attack on Harris' battery or the regiment racing out of a hollow and over a hill. The third source is J. J. Womack's of the Sixteenth Tennessee. The page reference given to support the narrative can only substantiate that they suffered "terribly" in their combat and were forced to fall back twice. No mention of what the narrative is representing.
On page 202, the third paragraph is footnoted #65. This paragraph explains that the 33rd Ohio which had already retreated, now redeployed behind a fence on the northern flank of the Sixteenth Tennessee. Savage ordered his men to wheel to the right and charged the fence in the "general direction" of Open Knob. The 33rd took heavy casualties fell back to the main Federal line leaving their Lt. Colonel Oscar Moore at the fence wounded in the leg. The citations for this paragraph are a letter from a Waddle of the 33rd Ohio to his sister, Head's regimental history, Savage's autobiography, Thompson's memoir of the Sixteenth Tennessee and Waddle's book Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland. Waddle's letter mirrors his narrative from his book except that in his letter he admits to turning back to the rear before delivering an order to his regiment. The description of the fight is too generic to support that his regiment engaged the Sixteenth Tennessee and does not mention shooting at a rebel regiment's flank after falling back. Head's regimental history does mention that an enemy unit was on their flank, but describes them being near a cabin. "…a heavy force was now massed in front, and on the right of the Sixteenth Tennessee Regiment. The enemy bending his line around the right flank of the Sixteenth Tennessee Regiment near an old log cabin, an enfilading fire of musketry and artillery was poured into its ranks…" The only battery that would have been on the regiment's right is Parsons' battery over 700 yards away. Savage relates that they had already charged enemy skirmishers along a fence that ran up to these two cabins and had captured the fence and cabins and the battery firing on them was only thirty to forty yards away. This is supposed to support the speculation that the 33rd Ohio was at this fence, but again, no Federal account corroborates this from these sources. Thompson's memoir merely mentions a "flanking party" on their right that was advancing at "right shoulder shift." He then adds "just at this critical moment," Maney's brigade suddenly appeared and "drove back the flanking party." Clearly, this account doesn't support Noe's narrative either.
The next paragraph on page 202 is footnoted #66. This paragraph speculates that the Sixteenth Tennessee advanced "as far as two outbuildings belonging to the Widow Gibson." There, Savage "spotted Sam Harris' battery between fifty and a hundred yards obliquely to the right." The men of the regiment "hunkered down momentarily" using the cabins as cover from canister and rifle fire. The sources for this citation are Savage's autobiography and Author's Collection at the state park. The quotes that he uses by Savage are exact, but they don't support that the regiment was at Widow Gibson's or confronting Harris' battery. Savage specifically states that the battery confronting them is "thirty or forty" yards from the cabins. The footnote reads:
The exact nature of the buildings remains unknown, but both Hafendorfer and Kurt Holman believe that they were outbuildings on the Gibson farm. Ongoing archaeological investigations at the site should reveal more in the years to come.
Since the publication of the book, at least the corn-crib has been identified on the field, but it was a lone structure over one-hundred yards from the Gibson cabin. This does not support the author's narrative that the regiment was at the Gibson farm or near Harris' battery.
The next two paragraphs on pages 202 thru 203 all relate chronology of the fight on the Federal side. This chronology seems to be out of sync with the actual events as related by the reports. One thing that is declared by Noe is that the 2nd and 33rd Ohio were both ordered to fill the "treacherous gap" at the Gibson farm but they "soon came pouring back into Webster's rear lines in the face of Savage's desperate charge." This was done by Savage's regiment alone according to the narrative—even though the strength of those two regiments came to nearly 860 men against the 370 men of Savage's regiment that had already been terribly depleted according to Noe's narrative.
The last paragraph on page 203 is footnoted #69. The sources for this footnote are the Clark Memoir, Donelson's report, the Hooper diary, Biggs' CV account, the Hupp diary, Savage's autobiography, Thompson's memoir, the Womack diary and a letter from Kurt Holman to Kenneth Noe dated March 11, 1999. Noe's paragraph follows.
"Despite such difficulties, the combined fire from parts of two infantry brigades and three artillery batteries continued to decimate Donelson's outnumbered brigade. One attempt to shift around to the right and attack Parsons's battery went nowhere when the man leading it, a private named Andrew Dow, realized that he was attacking alone. As he shouted to countermand Dow's one-man flanking maneuver, a minié ball ripped through Savage's leg even as a steel canister ball hit a cabin and struck off a chunk of wood that then ricocheted into the colonel's back, felling him and leaving him temporarily paralyzed. Savage remained sensible long enough to turn over command to Donelson, who had personally brought up the 38th Tennessee, and to urge him to attack Parsons. Unit cohesion all but disappeared in the madness that followed as the fresher men of the 38th began intermingling with the already blended 15th and 16th Tennessee Regiments. After about fifteen minutes, Donelson could take no more. Casualties in the brigade already probably surpassed 20 percent, and losses among what was left of the hard-hit 16th Tennessee were staggering, amounting to perhaps half its strength a half-hour earlier. Wounded and dead men lay everywhere. He still had no artillery support. Two of his regiments, the 8th and 51st Tennessee, remained lost in the rear with Carnes, all useless to him. Stewart had not come up either. Left all but abandoned, Donelson's brigade finally fell back, perhaps as far as the ridge where the men had first gathered before their attack. By 2:30 p.m., the Confederate attack on the left had floundered."
Clark's Memoir only supports the numerous casualties that the regiment had sustained. Contrary to how this source was supposedly used to support the narrative, Clark states that Maney's brigade appeared on their right, and "saved the remainder of our regiment from being killed & captured." The Hooper Diary does not support the narrative at all. Hooper's narrative is contradictory to Noe's narrative.
"…got in 1 ½ or 200 yards where we turned loose on them, but we were now carried in advance of the other Regiments but we advanced on driving the Enemy before us; for some distance til we were about to be cut off at this critical time we got help by or from General Maney's Brigade We were at this time and had been for some time in about fifty to one hundred yards of a battery of 8 or 9 pieces on our right and our left wing with another firing down our center, all heavily supported by infantry. We with our assistance now taken the battery on our right but before this I think we had killed nearly all their horses, and a great many of their men and to be regretted we had lost many of our brave fellows out of the old 16th."
The Biggs account merely states that the 38th and 16th Tennessee regiments became intermingled at one point, there is no mention of a retreat. The Ormond Hupp diary does not support the narrative. From his battery's position, Simonson's guns would not have had line of sight to the corncrib or Gibson cabin. The Savage, Thompson and Womack accounts all relate the capture of a large battery and the killing of General Jackson very early in the fight. None of them mention a retreat, and they all mention the arrival of Maney's brigade on their immediate right.
Noe declares that one private attempted to "shift around to the right and attack Parsons's battery." However, Noe places the Sixteenth Tennessee at the corncrib at the Gibson farm. Parsons' battery was nearly 800 yards north and east of where Noe places the regiment. Clearly, he is confused by the accounts. Noe also misconstrues Savage's statement about turning over command to Donelson. After being wounded, "Savage remained sensible long enough to turn over command to Donelson, who had personally brought up the 38th Tennessee, and to urge him to attack Parsons." Savage misspoke when he related that he turned over his command to Donelson. His lieutenant-colonel was David M. Donnell. Savage wrote, "I said to Colonel Donelson: "I am unfit for duty. Take charge. Go to the battery. It belongs to the Sixteenth." It was Lieutenant Colonel Donnell whom he turned the command over to. Lastly Noe claims that after about fifteen minutes of the slaughter at the Gibson farm, "Donelson could take no more." He then asserts that Donelson withdrew his brigade "perhaps as far as the ridge where the men had first gathered before their attack." There is no supporting evidence in any of the sources that he cited that suggest Donelson's brigade retreated. Only Cheatham's report mentions a brief relief of Donelson's brigade once Stewart's brigade was committed to the attack which simply consisted of Donelson reforming his command in a hollow 100 yards from Open Knob. He also claims that the Confederate attack had "floundered." Yet, nearly all of the sources he cited claim they captured a battery and killed the Federal General Jackson. The last source that Noe cites is correspondence with Kurt Holman. Holman is the only source that could back up any of the claims in the paragraph, however, his conclusions are clouded with assumptions and impossibilities. And of course, Holman wasn't there.
On page 204, Noe states that after receiving the order to "attack, drive and press" the enemy, Maney moves his brigade forward without waiting for two of his regiments to arrive. There is no source that suggests this. However, Noe left out Cheatham's report of the battle. Cheatham was not in Walker's Bend as Noe declares. He had personally watched the advance of Donelson's brigade and was aware that Parsons' guns were devastating this brigade. "I here gave Genl. Maney orders to move rapidly through the woods and attack and carry a Battery of Eight Guns (12 lb Napoleons) of the Enemy, planted on an eminence in an open field some three hundred yards to the front and about one hundred yards beyond the edge of the woods, which was fiercely opposing my advance, and had almost destroyed Genl. Donelson's Command on my left." Noe leaves out the portion of Maney's report that states "I ascertained by a personal reconnaissance the position of the enemy. Facing my approach and slightly to the right of General Donelson's command was a strong battery placed on a hilltop in an open field and less than 120 yards from the nearest edge of the woods, in which I was. The battery was actively engaged, partly on Donelson's command at short range and partly in firing into the woods through which I was approaching." These quotes cannot support Noe's narrative of the battle; thus, they were left out of the narrative. Noe has placed Donelson's brigade nearly 800 yards south and west of Parsons' battery at the Gibson farm.
I finally got tired of checking these. But, they clearly don't jive with the sources.
The first book length work on this forgotten battle was published in 1981 by Dr. Kenneth Hafendorfer. Perryville: Battle for Kentucky certainly required many years of leg work digging up sources through libraries, archives and contemporary books to determine his understanding of the battle. But, as laid out in Understanding the Battle of Perryville: The Discovery of the Hafley Cabins and its Impact on Historiography of the battlefield, Hafendorfer made conclusions based on the information he had available and the information he used. Forty-one years later, his conclusion of how the battle unfolded has not been questioned. However, forty-one years later, large amounts of new source materials have been made available.
Now is certainly the time to challenge the sources that Hafendorfer used to determine the tactical movements on the field. Although we know that Cheatham's division began the attack on the Federal left, what sources confirm that Donelson's brigade attacked Webster's brigade and achieved penetration all the way to the Widow Gibson's Cabin? Additionally, what sources confirm that Maney's brigade single-handedly overcame Parsons' battery and practically destroyed Terrill's brigade?
On page 164 of Hafendorfer's book he suggests that Polk only commanded the right wing of the army while Hardee commanded the left. That would leave Bragg in command of the army. Bragg's own words in fact stated that he declined to take command and Polk was left in overall command of the army at the battle. (OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1087)
On page 165, Hafendorfer explains the deployment of all the troops on the field and what the scheme of maneuver was—as ordered by General Bragg—without a single footnote. This is proven wrong by Maney's report that shows the deployment of Cheatham's division was intended to be in solid line instead of column.
On page 166, Hafendorfer explains that Jones' brigade "was to move forward between Johnson and Wood." The only citation following this is the report of Col. Marks of the Seventeenth Tennessee which makes no mention of any of the assumptions that Hafendorfer has made. Later in the same paragraph a citation is made regarding Brig. Gen. Johnson's report, but upon examination, there is no mention of Jones' or Wood's brigades. Captain Stanford's report indicates that Jones' brigade was in the front line and Wood's brigade was in reserve in rear of Jones.
On page 167, Hafendorfer states that "John Calvin Brown's Brigade would soon be up and in line behind Jones…" Again, there is no citation for this deployment. Evidence clearly suggests that Wood's brigade was in rear of Jones as noted above.
On page 169, there is a map of the battlefield that shows Bragg's supposed "grand plan of attack" without any citation.
On page 171, there is a map of the field that notes many, but not all of the names that were placed on the 1877 Ruger and Kilp map. Where and from what source Hafendorfer identifies his homesites is not cited. We can deduce that it was from the Ruger/Kilp map.
On page 181, Hafendorfer states that Bragg determined to move Cheatham's division into Walker's Bend after Polk's delay due to more Federal reinforcements arriving. This movement was made by Polk. (OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1110)
On page 182, Hafendorfer states that Bragg "In his haste to move Cheatham's Division to the right and bring on the engagement, he neglected to send Wharton's cavalry back across the river to find out where the Union left flank really was at this time."
On page 198, Hafendorfer states that in Wharton's attempt to clear the west side of Chaplin River, he misidentified the Federal left flank. "From the eminence in Walkers Bend, Cheatham and Polk could now faintly make out the Federal line, marked by smoke coming from Harris' 19th Indiana Battery, about three-quarters of a mile away above the bluff. From this sighting and reports from Wharton, the Confederate command now took this to be the extreme left of Buell's battle line." Cheatham's report actually states, "About two O'clock I received orders from Maj. Gen. Polk to move my command forward, and at once engage the Enemy, whose lines were distinctly visible across the open field and about three fourths of a mile to my front…"
On page 204, Hafendorfer asserts that Donelson moved his brigade to the left behind a "large knoll" after ascending the west bank of Chaplin River. The citation for this is John Savage's autobiography. None of Savage's testimony mentions the brigade or his regiment moving left to the cover of a large knoll. Donelson's own report mentions nothing of seeking cover or moving his brigade to the left—only that he formed it in line of battle "in an open field."
On the same page, the assertion is made that Cheatham "sent an order to Donelson to charge Harris' battery, which he took as the extreme left of the Union line." He also assumes "Cheatham was unaware of Terrill's line forming off to his right and in front of the Open Hill. The nature of the terrain and heavy woods in that direction had hidden Terrill's line from his view, just as it had blinded Jackson and Terrill to Donelson's arrival upon the bluff." None of these assumptions are cited as it is mere speculation. Cheatham's report reveals that the location of the Federal left flank was known.
On the same page, he states that Donelson ordered Savage to "move out first on a right oblique to unmask themselves from the knoll in front and to charge across the open field toward Harris' Battery." This too is cited using Savage's autobiography; however, this movement is not mentioned by Savage. Savage does explain that the regiment had already moved a considerable distance when a staff officer from General Cheatham arrived telling him that the enemy that they should attack was at the head of the hollow to their right. There was no oblique movement.
He then tells the reader what Donelson's "plan" was. That is, "although not fully explained to Savage, was to move the 16th Tennessee out first, followed by Colonel R. C. Tyler's 15th Tennessee in echelon on its left. Once sufficient ground was gained in the open field in front by the 16th Tennessee, the 15th Tennessee would be brought up into line with it, and with both of these regiments angling toward Harris' left, room would be provided for Colonel John Carter's 38th Tennessee to come up on the left of the 15th Tennessee. In this way, all three regiments would be brought against Harris' position simultaneously from the front and left flank." Donelson's actual report mentions nothing of this "plan." This is not footnoted either.
On page 205, Hafendorfer explains that upon the Sixteenth Tennessee's advance, "Savage's skirmish line easily drove back a few skirmishers of the 33rd Ohio." However, the Sixteenth Tennessee did not deploy skirmishers at Perryville. They moved directly to the attack. There is no citation denoting where this information came from, thus it is an assumption. It likely came from SHS papers, volume 30, page 243. In that publication, Col. Luke Finley published the article "The Battle of Perryville" in 1902. In his telling of the battle, he certainly recalled details from the records and regimental histories that had been written on the battle.
"Wharton, with the Eighth and Fifty-first Tennessee of Donelson, added to his cavalry, makes a flank movement, strikes the Federal left with force. Colonel John H. Savage, with the Sixteenth Tennessee, the Fifteenth closely following him on his left, climbs the heights, strikes the Thirty-third and Second Ohio and brings on the desperate fight. Maney and Stewart being close at hand, but not near enough for the desperate odds, for Jackson has 5,000 men under his brigadiers (Terrill and Webster). Maney files to the right to get upon the bluff, forms line of battle, and moves to the left to take position on the right of Savage, and enters the fight.
A soldier falls here, and now there; the battle is on. The Sixteenth Tennessee makes a splendid movement, staggering at times under the furious fire of the Nineteenth Indiana battery and other artilleryists [sic] and their infantry supports, but again advances and scores the first victory in the Confederate line. It was a costly one, though—forty-one gave their lives and over thrice that number sealed their devotion to duty with their blood—and Parsons and Stone and Bush pour furiously their hurricane of shrapnel and shot in death-dealing blows upon the advancing men of Cheatham on the Federal left. Stewart is held for a brief space in reserve, then thrown in on the left of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Tennessee, and the Federal left is broken by the combined movement of the three brigades."
Finley may have learned of the fighting between the Sixteenth Tennessee and the 33rd Ohio from Thomas Head's regimental history of the Sixteenth Tennessee that was published in 1885—seventeen years before the publication of his article. Head had also made an assumption.
Hafendorfer then utilizes Percival Oldershaw's report to explain that Parsons' right guns were turned when the Sixteenth Tennessee was within 300 yards of the battery. He describes the heavy cannon fire that begins to decimate the rebel regiment. But rather than 300 yards, Oldershaw describes in two different accounts that the enemy that the battery fired into was not more than 90 yards away. Oldershaw's account is very revealing. The following is from his report of the battle.
"This battery had fired but a few shots when we heard rifle-shots below in the woods, when the enemy soon advanced and came in sight in the edge of the woods fronting our troops. No sooner was this seen by General Terrill and Lieutenant Parsons, then directing the fire of the guns, that they changed the direction of the fire, and opened at short range (about 90 yards) on the flank of the enemy with grape with deadly accuracy. It checked the advance of the enemy, and after a few more rounds they changed front and faced the battery, which then flanked our left."
This second Oldershaw account is from Buell's investigation.
"I think it was about 1 or a little later—probably half past 1—when we saw the rebel infantry line. I myself was in the front, near to General Jackson, and when we first saw them they were not more than 90 yards from us, in the woods. Previous to seeing them we were firing at long range from two batteries without seeing any enemy, and it was a great surprise to General Jackson and myself, as expressed by General Jackson, that the enemy was near to us. We had time to turn the cannons around a little and fire a few rounds of grape at this short range of not more than 90 yards. Almost in returning the first round of grape General Jackson fell by a bullet."
Clearly, Hafendorfer has had to tweak the narrative substantially. It is clear there was no other Confederate unit in action at that point of the fight. Knowing that the Sixteenth Tennessee was the far right or northernmost unit in the Rebel advance, the battery had to have been engaging the Sixteenth Tennessee at less than ninety yards. Additionally, Savage stated in his autobiography that the regiment had to change direction to the right. This would have had the regiment marching northerly past the battery allowing it to fire into the left flank of the Sixteenth Tennessee at a short range of ninety yards as Oldershaw related.
Still on page 205, Hafendorfer stated that Parsons' guns opened fire on the Sixteenth Tennesseee as it reached a depression "parallel to Parsons' line." At the same time Harris' battery opened fire on the regiment about 800 yards west of their position. However, terrain features block any line of sight from Harris' position to the location at which Hafendorfer has placed the regiment.
On page 206, he explains that Donelson was "surprised and shocked" when Parsons' battery opened fire on the brigade. Hafendorfer then tries to explain a sequence of events that he doesn't understand. He writes that Donelson didn't want to continue in the direction of Harris' battery because it would be "suicidal," so instead he decides to attack northwardly in the direction of Parsons' battery. He states that Donelson sent orders to "halt his regiment and to align it in a more northerly direction." Donelson actually gave two orders to Savage. "I accordingly gave orders for a change of direction further to the right, in making this move I sent forward a staff officer to order Col Savage Comdg Regt on the right to halt when in the proper direction, until I could bring up the other two Regts in line of battle. This order was not obeyed because as I have since learned one of Genl Cheatham's Staff ordered said Regts to move forward rapidly." The first order was to change direction and the second order was to halt and await the support of the other regiments. The second order was not obeyed as Cheatham's staff officer ordered Savage to "move forward rapidly." Hafendorfer fails to understand that it wasn't the change of direction that was over-ridden by Cheatham's staff officer, but it was the order to halt and await the other regiments. Hafendorfer construes the "move forward rapidly" to mean that Cheatham still wants Donelson to attack toward Harris. This does not coincide with Cheatham's report that states Donelson was confronting the battery that Maney was soon ordered to attack and seize.
This is the point at which the narrative chronology of the battle took a different turn from the actual historical chronology of the battle. Historiography then birthed the idea that Donelson's brigade mistakenly attacked the center of the Federal lines practically cementing the idea that Maney's brigade singlehandedly took Open Knob and captured Parsons' battery.
Kenneth Noe's book Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle was published in 2001—twenty years after the first major work on the battle. He had the early days of the information age, but still, much has been added to the databases available on-line today. Starting in Noe's book at the time Savage is given orders by Donelson to attack, we will test Noe's citations.
On page 195, Noe states that Donelson "approached him and directed him to assault the only Federal battery barely visible on the horizon—Sam Harris's Indiana battery…" The citation for this is footnote #42. The citations for that footnote are Savage's autobiography, Chaplin Cross' Camp and Field, Warner's Generals in Gray and Author's Perryville Tour Notes, July 17, 1999. None of these citations actually support the statement that Donelson ordered Savage to assault Harris' battery. In all probability, it was the tour notes that he wrote dictated by Kurt Holman at the State Park from which he inserted this speculation into his narrative. This narrative began with Hafendorfer's book written eighteen years earlier.
Then on page 196, Noe states that "Savage clearly misconstrues Cheatham's intent, which was to have all of Donelson's present brigade flank the battery, which presumably anchored the northern terminus of the Federal line, and thus turn the enemy force out of its position." This is footnoted as #43. The only source that would be able to provide any intent out of the sources listed would be Donelson's report, but none of it is quoted, as Donelson said nothing of his own or of Cheatham's intent.
On page 198, Noe declares that "Savage's interpretation of Donelson's orders added to the confusion. He drove his regiment at a furious clip directly at Sam Harris's distant battery, angry for the rest of his life that the 15th Tennessee did not keep up with him. As a result, the 16th Tennessee approached the hollow all but alone, moving far out in front of the remainder of the brigade." This is footnote #52. He cites the Clark memoirs, Hooper diary and Womack's diary. None of these sources state what battery they were attacking, nor do they suggest that Savage was mad at the 15th Tennessee. Thus, these assumptions are over-reaching the source materials available. The most damning evidence to Noe's account is Womack's statement. "At each extremity of this wood they had placed a battery. The one at the northern extremity, of 7 guns, that at the southern about the same. "Victory" for our motto was shouted all along our line, and fearlessly and gallantly we charged them. The Regt. to which I belonged (Col. Savage's) was on the extreme right of Gen. Bragg's army, and was directly in front of the seven-gun battery before spoken of."
On pages 198 and 199, Noe claims that the Sixteenth Tennessee came under the fire of Simonson's and Harris' batteries breaking the Sixteenth's lines. This is footnoted using only Federal accounts. The men in the Sixteenth Tennessee relate that they did not come under artillery fire until they were within 150 yards of a battery that enfiladed their line of battle. There is no citation to back up the author's supposition.
The first paragraph on page 199 claims that the Sixteenth Tennessee pressed on toward Harris' battery—halting to dress his lines in a hollow half way between his starting point and Harris' battery. He adds that Savage stated he would be able to come over the next hill and be within 60 or 70 yards of Harris' battery. But just as they realign, seven guns from Parsons' battery "unexpectedly fired lengthwise into the hollow from Savage's right with every sort of projectile they carried in their caissons, enfilading the attackers with deadly precision." Noe states that "no one suspected that the battery was there." This is footnoted by #56 and 57. The citations used to substantiate this claim do not reflect the narrative that Noe has provided. The first source cited is Percival Oldershaw who was at Parsons' battery when it first opened fire. "I myself was in the front, near to General Jackson, and when we first saw them they were not more than 90 yards from us, in the woods. … We had time to turn the cannons around a little and fire a few rounds of grape at this short range of not more than 90 yards." (OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1060). It is evident this source cannot support the narrative due to distances. Oldershaw's distance would put the rebel force less than a third of the distance to the Rebel cemetery.
The other sources that are supposed to support this claim in footnote 56 are Donelson's report, a newspaper article by a member of the 80th Indiana, and the Author's Perryville Tour Notes, July 18, 1999. Donelson's report makes no mention of anything that supports the author's narrative. The member of the 80th Indiana strictly relates what he saw of the rebel enemy in the woods to his front. He makes no mention of what unit it may have been and his article does not support Noe's narrative. The only source that can support his narrative was from his tour notes which are speculation, as no actual primary source supports the narrative or has not been provided. Footnote #57 is a simple quote of a member of the Sixteenth Tennessee that doesn't support the narrative, but simply mentions the loss of men when the regiment became heavily engaged.
Still on page 199, footnote #59 is an attempt to support narrative that explains "Another projectile from Parsons's guns passed through the head of Savage's horse, wounding it severely without killing it outright." The single source listed for this footnote is Savage's autobiography. However, his autobiography can't support this narrative. Savage relates that they were on top of a hill when they received the canister fire, and Parsons' battery would have been seven to eight hundred yards north of the regiment at this point according to Noe's narrative.
Beginning on page 199 and ending on page 200 under footnote #60, Noe writes:
"In the hell that the hollow had suddenly become, one of Donelson's staff officers somehow caught up with Savage. With horror Donelson had seen Parsons's unexpected fire from the right. "I did not have the proper direction," he later lamented. Obviously something had gone wrong, for they had not struck the Federal flank but rather had charged head-on into a formidable line. Now they were trapped in the cross fire of three batteries: left, center, and right. Donelson ordered Savage to shift to the right and halt while he brought up the balance of the brigade on the run. Together they would storm the unmasked battery on the knob and secure the flank. Savage for once agreed with Donelson, and he began sliding his men more to the right while Donelson raced to hurry up the rest of his brigade. More confusion followed. Reacting differently to the same scene, an excited Cheatham bypassed Donelson in the chain of command and personally sent both regiments straight ahead to support Savage. He would send Stewart as well, he promised, while Maney would move to the right flank and attack the new battery. Donelson should continue pushing straight ahead."
Only two sources are cited for this entire paragraph. Donelson's report and Thomas Head's regimental history of the Sixteenth Tennessee. Of Donelson's entire report, "I did not have the proper direction" is the only fragment quoted. However, Donelson's report in no way supports the above narrative. Donelson's report gives a very different take showing that when the order to change direction was given, the Sixteenth Tennessee was not even under fire from infantry yet, only sporadic and random spherical case fired in the direction of the Confederates.
Donelson's report:
"In the execution of this order proceeding in the direction of the Enemy battery, I soon ascertained from the fire of another Battery of the Enemy's further on our right that I did not have the proper direction. I accordingly gave orders for a change of direction further to the right, in making this move I sent forward a staff officer to order Col Savage Comdg Regt on the right to halt when in the proper direction, until I could bring up the other two Regts in line of battle. This order was not obeyed because as I have since learned one of Genl Cheatham's Staff ordered said Regts to move forward rapidly. The consequence was when this Regt came within range of the Enemy's small arms, they received the first shock of the Enemy's fire. The other two Regts
"It is proper that I state that in making through the open field for more than ½ mile the Brigade was subjected to the cross firing of two of the Enemy's Batteries killing and wounding several although shot and shell fell in profusion there was no faltering on the part of men or officers. The three Regts moving forward at a double quick step amid yells and cheers at every step."
Clearly, Donelson's report cannot support Noe's narrative. Noe didn't recognize that Donelson issued two orders. The first order was to change direction to the right and the second order was to halt and await the arrival of the other two regiments. Donelson then stated that it was the order to halt and await the other regiments that Savage disobeyed as a staff officer of Cheatham ordered him to "move forward rapidly" in the new direction of attack. The other source for Noe's paragraph is Thomas Head's history. Head's version of the fight may be skewed as well. Although he was a member of the regiment, his service records indicate that he was most likely on detached service as a wagon train guard during the Kentucky campaign. It is probable that he didn't participate in the battle as his three separate versions of the battle differ somewhat dramatically. Nonetheless, Head's narrative merely states that the regiment was heavily engaged by infantry and artillery from "right, left and front." Those three words are the only ones that can support any of Noe's narrative.
The next paragraph on page 200 explains that the Fifteenth Tennessee caught up to the Sixteenth Tennessee and joined the fight on their left. Savage drew his gun and now "ordered his men forward, hoping to escape the killing fire from at least Sam Harris's guns." According to Noe they raced "up out of the hollow and down the other side of the hill." This is cited in footnote #61 that provides three sources for his narrative. The first source is OR, Pt. 1, Vol. 16, p. 1064 which is a federal report. The reports are from Col. Hall (105th Ohio) and Capt. Anderson (AAG Terrill's Brig.). This must be an oversight, as Noe's narrative places the Sixteenth Tennessee at least 700 yards south of these units. The second source is an article in The Southern Confederacy dated November 13, 1862. The article gives a brief and generic description of the battle. It doesn't offer any supporting evidence to support an attack on Harris' battery or the regiment racing out of a hollow and over a hill. The third source is J. J. Womack's of the Sixteenth Tennessee. The page reference given to support the narrative can only substantiate that they suffered "terribly" in their combat and were forced to fall back twice. No mention of what the narrative is representing.
On page 202, the third paragraph is footnoted #65. This paragraph explains that the 33rd Ohio which had already retreated, now redeployed behind a fence on the northern flank of the Sixteenth Tennessee. Savage ordered his men to wheel to the right and charged the fence in the "general direction" of Open Knob. The 33rd took heavy casualties fell back to the main Federal line leaving their Lt. Colonel Oscar Moore at the fence wounded in the leg. The citations for this paragraph are a letter from a Waddle of the 33rd Ohio to his sister, Head's regimental history, Savage's autobiography, Thompson's memoir of the Sixteenth Tennessee and Waddle's book Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland. Waddle's letter mirrors his narrative from his book except that in his letter he admits to turning back to the rear before delivering an order to his regiment. The description of the fight is too generic to support that his regiment engaged the Sixteenth Tennessee and does not mention shooting at a rebel regiment's flank after falling back. Head's regimental history does mention that an enemy unit was on their flank, but describes them being near a cabin. "…a heavy force was now massed in front, and on the right of the Sixteenth Tennessee Regiment. The enemy bending his line around the right flank of the Sixteenth Tennessee Regiment near an old log cabin, an enfilading fire of musketry and artillery was poured into its ranks…" The only battery that would have been on the regiment's right is Parsons' battery over 700 yards away. Savage relates that they had already charged enemy skirmishers along a fence that ran up to these two cabins and had captured the fence and cabins and the battery firing on them was only thirty to forty yards away. This is supposed to support the speculation that the 33rd Ohio was at this fence, but again, no Federal account corroborates this from these sources. Thompson's memoir merely mentions a "flanking party" on their right that was advancing at "right shoulder shift." He then adds "just at this critical moment," Maney's brigade suddenly appeared and "drove back the flanking party." Clearly, this account doesn't support Noe's narrative either.
The next paragraph on page 202 is footnoted #66. This paragraph speculates that the Sixteenth Tennessee advanced "as far as two outbuildings belonging to the Widow Gibson." There, Savage "spotted Sam Harris' battery between fifty and a hundred yards obliquely to the right." The men of the regiment "hunkered down momentarily" using the cabins as cover from canister and rifle fire. The sources for this citation are Savage's autobiography and Author's Collection at the state park. The quotes that he uses by Savage are exact, but they don't support that the regiment was at Widow Gibson's or confronting Harris' battery. Savage specifically states that the battery confronting them is "thirty or forty" yards from the cabins. The footnote reads:
The exact nature of the buildings remains unknown, but both Hafendorfer and Kurt Holman believe that they were outbuildings on the Gibson farm. Ongoing archaeological investigations at the site should reveal more in the years to come.
Since the publication of the book, at least the corn-crib has been identified on the field, but it was a lone structure over one-hundred yards from the Gibson cabin. This does not support the author's narrative that the regiment was at the Gibson farm or near Harris' battery.
The next two paragraphs on pages 202 thru 203 all relate chronology of the fight on the Federal side. This chronology seems to be out of sync with the actual events as related by the reports. One thing that is declared by Noe is that the 2nd and 33rd Ohio were both ordered to fill the "treacherous gap" at the Gibson farm but they "soon came pouring back into Webster's rear lines in the face of Savage's desperate charge." This was done by Savage's regiment alone according to the narrative—even though the strength of those two regiments came to nearly 860 men against the 370 men of Savage's regiment that had already been terribly depleted according to Noe's narrative.
The last paragraph on page 203 is footnoted #69. The sources for this footnote are the Clark Memoir, Donelson's report, the Hooper diary, Biggs' CV account, the Hupp diary, Savage's autobiography, Thompson's memoir, the Womack diary and a letter from Kurt Holman to Kenneth Noe dated March 11, 1999. Noe's paragraph follows.
"Despite such difficulties, the combined fire from parts of two infantry brigades and three artillery batteries continued to decimate Donelson's outnumbered brigade. One attempt to shift around to the right and attack Parsons's battery went nowhere when the man leading it, a private named Andrew Dow, realized that he was attacking alone. As he shouted to countermand Dow's one-man flanking maneuver, a minié ball ripped through Savage's leg even as a steel canister ball hit a cabin and struck off a chunk of wood that then ricocheted into the colonel's back, felling him and leaving him temporarily paralyzed. Savage remained sensible long enough to turn over command to Donelson, who had personally brought up the 38th Tennessee, and to urge him to attack Parsons. Unit cohesion all but disappeared in the madness that followed as the fresher men of the 38th began intermingling with the already blended 15th and 16th Tennessee Regiments. After about fifteen minutes, Donelson could take no more. Casualties in the brigade already probably surpassed 20 percent, and losses among what was left of the hard-hit 16th Tennessee were staggering, amounting to perhaps half its strength a half-hour earlier. Wounded and dead men lay everywhere. He still had no artillery support. Two of his regiments, the 8th and 51st Tennessee, remained lost in the rear with Carnes, all useless to him. Stewart had not come up either. Left all but abandoned, Donelson's brigade finally fell back, perhaps as far as the ridge where the men had first gathered before their attack. By 2:30 p.m., the Confederate attack on the left had floundered."
Clark's Memoir only supports the numerous casualties that the regiment had sustained. Contrary to how this source was supposedly used to support the narrative, Clark states that Maney's brigade appeared on their right, and "saved the remainder of our regiment from being killed & captured." The Hooper Diary does not support the narrative at all. Hooper's narrative is contradictory to Noe's narrative.
"…got in 1 ½ or 200 yards where we turned loose on them, but we were now carried in advance of the other Regiments but we advanced on driving the Enemy before us; for some distance til we were about to be cut off at this critical time we got help by or from General Maney's Brigade We were at this time and had been for some time in about fifty to one hundred yards of a battery of 8 or 9 pieces on our right and our left wing with another firing down our center, all heavily supported by infantry. We with our assistance now taken the battery on our right but before this I think we had killed nearly all their horses, and a great many of their men and to be regretted we had lost many of our brave fellows out of the old 16th."
The Biggs account merely states that the 38th and 16th Tennessee regiments became intermingled at one point, there is no mention of a retreat. The Ormond Hupp diary does not support the narrative. From his battery's position, Simonson's guns would not have had line of sight to the corncrib or Gibson cabin. The Savage, Thompson and Womack accounts all relate the capture of a large battery and the killing of General Jackson very early in the fight. None of them mention a retreat, and they all mention the arrival of Maney's brigade on their immediate right.
Noe declares that one private attempted to "shift around to the right and attack Parsons's battery." However, Noe places the Sixteenth Tennessee at the corncrib at the Gibson farm. Parsons' battery was nearly 800 yards north and east of where Noe places the regiment. Clearly, he is confused by the accounts. Noe also misconstrues Savage's statement about turning over command to Donelson. After being wounded, "Savage remained sensible long enough to turn over command to Donelson, who had personally brought up the 38th Tennessee, and to urge him to attack Parsons." Savage misspoke when he related that he turned over his command to Donelson. His lieutenant-colonel was David M. Donnell. Savage wrote, "I said to Colonel Donelson: "I am unfit for duty. Take charge. Go to the battery. It belongs to the Sixteenth." It was Lieutenant Colonel Donnell whom he turned the command over to. Lastly Noe claims that after about fifteen minutes of the slaughter at the Gibson farm, "Donelson could take no more." He then asserts that Donelson withdrew his brigade "perhaps as far as the ridge where the men had first gathered before their attack." There is no supporting evidence in any of the sources that he cited that suggest Donelson's brigade retreated. Only Cheatham's report mentions a brief relief of Donelson's brigade once Stewart's brigade was committed to the attack which simply consisted of Donelson reforming his command in a hollow 100 yards from Open Knob. He also claims that the Confederate attack had "floundered." Yet, nearly all of the sources he cited claim they captured a battery and killed the Federal General Jackson. The last source that Noe cites is correspondence with Kurt Holman. Holman is the only source that could back up any of the claims in the paragraph, however, his conclusions are clouded with assumptions and impossibilities. And of course, Holman wasn't there.
On page 204, Noe states that after receiving the order to "attack, drive and press" the enemy, Maney moves his brigade forward without waiting for two of his regiments to arrive. There is no source that suggests this. However, Noe left out Cheatham's report of the battle. Cheatham was not in Walker's Bend as Noe declares. He had personally watched the advance of Donelson's brigade and was aware that Parsons' guns were devastating this brigade. "I here gave Genl. Maney orders to move rapidly through the woods and attack and carry a Battery of Eight Guns (12 lb Napoleons) of the Enemy, planted on an eminence in an open field some three hundred yards to the front and about one hundred yards beyond the edge of the woods, which was fiercely opposing my advance, and had almost destroyed Genl. Donelson's Command on my left." Noe leaves out the portion of Maney's report that states "I ascertained by a personal reconnaissance the position of the enemy. Facing my approach and slightly to the right of General Donelson's command was a strong battery placed on a hilltop in an open field and less than 120 yards from the nearest edge of the woods, in which I was. The battery was actively engaged, partly on Donelson's command at short range and partly in firing into the woods through which I was approaching." These quotes cannot support Noe's narrative of the battle; thus, they were left out of the narrative. Noe has placed Donelson's brigade nearly 800 yards south and west of Parsons' battery at the Gibson farm.
I finally got tired of checking these. But, they clearly don't jive with the sources.
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