Intersting article on a Meade Counterattack

[4065921]

I've always had the impression that Lee really underestimated how many troops the Union had during the battle and just how large a force that Meade had at his disposal...Its one thing to make a quick unexpected strike like Chancellorsville, but quite another when the enemy is looking for your moves and ready to counter them...

Jackson's flank attack, like Longstreet's, was not all that sudden or unnoticed. It took Jackson nearly 9 hours to get into position on the Union right flank. Ironically that attack was discovered by ... you guessed it, Sickles, who did attack the rear guard of Jackson's Corps. Mead commanded 5th Corps at the battle Chancellorsville and surly he should have been cognizant of that tactic. Mead, as did Hooker at Chancellorsville, had enemy activity all along his front but like Hooker he did miss the move of an entire Confederate Corps to his flank... While you can question Sickles tactile acumen, he did learn the lesson of Chancellorsville, Mead did not.

 

[wilber6150]

How does Sickles action at Gettysburg show he learned from and was prepared to counter a flanking attack?

 

[4065921]

To come back to the original point, I think that the subject of Meade counterattacking comes down to three very basic questions. When, where, and with what? To be more specific, does he counterattack immediately after Pickett is repulsed, some other time on the 3rd, or on the 4th? What point on the Confederate line does he choose to focus an attack upon? What units does he have to use for a counterattack, and how many of them is he willing to commit?

I agree, an aggressive move on the Confederates could have had the Federals assaulting the high ground along Seminary Ridge, no doubt the thousands of bloody bodies in front of Cemetery Ridge made that plan a no go with all of Meads Generals. Meads only option was to trap Lee in Maryland, which he eventually accomplished at Williamsport however the Confederates had managed to construct a strong defensive line such that Mead would not have chanced an attack given his tactical temperament.

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[rpkennedy]

Stephen Sears wrote that "among all the corps commanders, Sickles found himself defending the least defensible ground in the Union Line. At the point where Cemetery Ridge reached the shoulder of Little Round Top it was virtually no ridge; for some 100 yards the advantage of high ground was lost. [Gettysburg, 249]

The reason I take this description with a grain of salt is that Sears doesn't walk the battlefields he writes about. I've walked Sickles' probable line and, while it dipped up and down, the ground was very broken and wooded so it could be defended better than the line to which he advanced.

R

 

[4065921]

How does Sickles action at Gettysburg show he learned from and was prepared to counter a flanking attack?

Great Point ... not an easy answer because of the contradictory nature of the situations. I think everyone agrees that Sickles tactile acumen, his move out to the Peach Orchard was unwise and can not be supported. However he did respond to what was his in his best judgment, an immediate threat developing on the left of the Union Line.

Also, when you examine Sickles tactics at Gettysburg I think it is important to look at his experience with the Hazel Grove position at Chancellorsville. While it was also excellent ground it too as forward of the defensive line established by Hooker. At Chancellorsville, as he did at Gettysburg, General Sickles' Corps formed a salient forward from the rest of the Federal line. However at Chancellorsville, unlike Gettysburg, Sickles was able to withdraw unhindered, the Grove was subsequently occupied by Stuarts artillery which caused a great number of casualties among Sickles troops, something he took very personally.

 

[OpnCoronet]

IMO, what Meade did with his largest and freshest corps on Day 2, indicates pretty clearly, that even preparing for a counterattack, much less actually executing one, was not on the agenda for Day 2, at least(nor, in the event, Day 3 or 4)
From the events as they occurred, and Meade's actions, show only a desire to riposte Lee's thrusts, with no follow through contemplated by Meade himself, and from his actions(the proof of any of his words), it would seem than was Meade's intention for all three Days of the battle.

 

[wilber6150]

IMO, what Meade did with his largest and freshest corps on Day 2, indicates pretty clearly, that even preparing for a counterattack, much less actually executing one, was not on the agenda for Day 2, at least(nor, in the event, Day 3 or 4)
From the events as they occurred, and Meade's actions, show only a desire to riposte Lee's thrusts, with no follow through contemplated by Meade himself, and from his actions(the proof of any of his words), it would seem than was Meade's intention for all three Days of the battle.

No, remember those OP's I posted, a attack on day 2 was in the works and was being given serious thought before Longstreet attacked.. I will see if I can dig them up again..

 

[wilber6150]

Found the thread...
http://civilwartalk.com/threads/meade-planning-to-attack-on-july-2.25312/#post-314315

 

[ivanj05]

Why would Meade be considering a counterattack on the 2nd? He had the entire AoNV in front of him, two of his corps had been already very roughly handled, one corps commander was dead, the Fifth Corps had only just arrived, and the Sixth Corps which was the largest in his army had yet to arrive. On the night of the 2nd, the Sixth Corps had arrived but the 3rd Corps had been obliterated and the Fifth badly damaged. If I were in Meade's shoes, given the totality of all his circumstances, I can't say that I would be thinking very offensively on the 2nd either.

 

[4065921]

The reason I take this description with a grain of salt is that Sears doesn't walk the battlefields he writes about. I've walked Sickles' probable line and, while it dipped up and down, the ground was very broken and wooded so it could be defended better than the line to which he advanced. R

I see your point regarding Sears however I think this first person quote pretty much sums up the position 3rd Corps was to occupy; Lt. Col. Thomas Rafferty of the Excelsiors' 71st New York, described the terrain in Birney's immediate front, "as so faulty that it was impossible to occupy with any prospect of being able to hold it. The low ground was quite springy and marshy, and was covered thickly with a growth of stunted bushes . . . and masked by the woods and the broken and rocky ground in our front, affording most excellent positions and covers for the rebels to take possession of without risk, and attack us with every advantage in their favor." James Hessler: Sickles at Gettysburg.

 

[4065921]

To come back to the original point

My apologies, while I really appreciate the dialogue on Sickles it is not fair to hijack this thread. I do have a thread started on day 2 and if anyone whish's to discuss any part of that battle please feel free to post there.

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/gettysburg-day-2.113459/

 

[ivanj05]

But you can't make the mistake Sickles made in viewing his position in isolation. Yes, the Third Corps probably occupied the weakest point of the Union line geographically speaking. But the Third Corps was not standing on the field alone. However weak Sickles position might have looked, he was still anchored to the Second Corps on his right and the Round Tops on his left. I'm no professional soldier ( then again neither was ol' Dan ) but I would much rather have a position where my flanks were secure and I was in range of support than I would like to be in a huge salient that doesn't just leave my flanks in the air, but my whole corps too.

 

[wilber6150]

Why would Meade be considering a counterattack on the 2nd? He had the entire AoNV in front of him, two of his corps had been already very roughly handled, one corps commander was dead, the Fifth Corps had only just arrived, and the Sixth Corps which was the largest in his army had yet to arrive. On the night of the 2nd, the Sixth Corps had arrived but the 3rd Corps had been obliterated and the Fifth badly damaged. If I were in Meade's shoes, given the totality of all his circumstances, I can't say that I would be thinking very offensively on the 2nd either.

Because he would have had almost two Corps sitting on the flank of the ANV and a flank attack by the AoP certainly wouldn't be anything that Lee would expect, and from all accounts that was exactly right.. All the dispatches have Lee and the ANV on the offensive and hardly any thought on what would happen if they were attacked...

 

[ivanj05]

Because he would have had almost two Corps sitting on the flank of the ANV and a flank attack by the AoP certainly wouldn't be anything that Lee would expect, and from all accounts that was exactly right.. All the dispatches have Lee and the ANV on the offensive and hardly any thought on what would happen if they were attacked...

All very true. Of course, Sickles's folly rendered all of that moot. That said, I think my point reguarding the night of the 2nd still stands.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Because he would have had almost two Corps sitting on the flank of the ANV and a flank attack by the AoP certainly wouldn't be anything that Lee would expect, and from all accounts that was exactly right.. All the dispatches have Lee and the ANV on the offensive and hardly any thought on what would happen if they were attacked...[/QUOTE]



Lee usually seemed to have the uncanny ability to reading the hearts and minds(perhaps even their souls) of opposing commanders. As far as fearing a counterattack(or even an attack) he seems to have read Meade correctly enough.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Because he would have had almost two Corps sitting on the flank of the ANV and a flank attack by the AoP certainly wouldn't be anything that Lee would expect, and from all accounts that was exactly right.. All the dispatches have Lee and the ANV on the offensive and hardly any thought on what would happen if they were attacked...

As Sickles' knew(as Meade should have) there was a major Confederate force poised on the extreme left flank of the AoP. with his undermanned corps badly placed and oriented in the wrong direction by his commander in chief. Meade might not remember Chancellorsville, but, Sickles' certainly did.
Longstreet's attack was delayed until well into the Afternoon and when the Federal line was finally broken, it was too late, as night had already fallen,much to Lee's distress, as he had planned it for late morning at best possible

 

[rpkennedy]

As Sickles' knew(as Meade should have) there was a major Confederate force poised on the extreme left flank of the AoP. with his undermanned corps badly placed and oriented in the wrong direction by his commander in chief. Meade might not remember Chancellorsville, but, Sickles' certainly did.
Longstreet's attack was delayed until well into the Afternoon and when the Federal line was finally broken, it was too late, as night had already fallen,much to Lee's distress, as he had planned it for late morning at best possible

Longstreet wasn't going to be attacking Sickles' flank if Sickles had stayed where he was.

R

 

[OpnCoronet]

Longstreet wasn't going to be attacking Sickles' flank if Sickles had stayed where he was.

R

So? In the first place we don't know Lee's planned point of attack, but, in any case, at the first volley from Sickle's thin lines draws Hood's attention and what does he do? And How , exactly, does that affect the battle?
The confederate attacks progresses from the Federal Left to the right, while Federal reinforcements, if any, will move from their right to the left. The purpose of the confederate en echelon attack?
But, in reality, Longstreet's corps never gets off the mark and his corps in immediately engaged and killing the impetus of the planned attack immediately and the his drive becomes a slow hard slog, just to reach the Federal MLR.
With all those reinforcements, supposedly available, why did Meade find necessary to denude vital Culp's Hill of most of its troops to reinforce his Left?

 

[ivanj05]

So? In the first place we don't know Lee's planned point of attack, but, in any case, at the first volley from Sickle's thin lines draws Hood's attention and what does he do? And How , exactly, does that affect the battle?
The confederate attacks progresses from the Federal Left to the right, while Federal reinforcements, if any, will move from their right to the left. The purpose of the confederate en echelon attack?
But, in reality, Longstreet's corps never gets off the mark and his corps in immediately engaged and killing the impetus of the planned attack immediately and the his drive becomes a slow hard slog, just to reach the Federal MLR.
With all those reinforcements, supposedly available, why did Meade find necessary to denude vital Culp's Hill of most of its troops to reinforce his Left?

Because he had to throw whatever he had in to plug a massive hole in his line, rather than simply reinforce a section of the line under attack.

 

[rpkennedy]

So? In the first place we don't know Lee's planned point of attack, but, in any case, at the first volley from Sickle's thin lines draws Hood's attention and what does he do? And How , exactly, does that affect the battle?
The confederate attacks progresses from the Federal Left to the right, while Federal reinforcements, if any, will move from their right to the left. The purpose of the confederate en echelon attack?
But, in reality, Longstreet's corps never gets off the mark and his corps in immediately engaged and killing the impetus of the planned attack immediately and the his drive becomes a slow hard slog, just to reach the Federal MLR.
With all those reinforcements, supposedly available, why did Meade find necessary to denude vital Culp's Hill of most of its troops to reinforce his Left?

Lee's planned point of attack was somewhere along the Emmittsburg Road, probably in the vicinity of the Peach Orchard, where he believed the Union flank to be. His plan was for Longstreet to attack up the road, rolling up the Federal flank, having Hill's troops support and join the attack as it proceeded up to Cemetery Hill, driving the Army of the Potomac before it. When Sickles moved forward, Longstreet and his division commanders had to reshuffle the plan on the fly, leading to the attack east northeast from their jump off points. Without Sickles' movement, there's no telling if the attack would go off as planned since many of his troops would not be visible from Longstreet's starting point.

Meade found it necessary to support an untenable position by throwing in whatever troops were available in order to stabilize his left flank which had been put in danger by Sickles' advance. If Sickles had stayed where he was, those troops could have been available for a potential counterattack or simply held as a bulk reserve rather than getting parceled out as the need arose.

R