Intersting article on a Meade Counterattack

[Dave Powell]

But there was no large Confederate force on the AOP's left flank until 3 PM or later. Certainly not before. If anything, the opposite was true. Sickles's midday recon actually uncovered the fact that his III Corps front overlapped Lee's right by a considerable margin, since his encounter with RW Anderson's people took place to Sickles's right-front, and there were no Rebels beyond Anderson's right. Sickles simply failed to grasp that fact, and saw what he wanted to see, IMO.

 

[ivanj05]

If Sickles had stayed put and Longstreet moved as historical, would the Fifth Corps not be in a pretty good place to launch some sort of attack/counterattack on the junction between Longstreet and Hill's corps?

 

[wilber6150]

As Sickles' knew(as Meade should have) there was a major Confederate force poised on the extreme left flank of the AoP. with his undermanned corps badly placed and oriented in the wrong direction by his commander in chief. Meade might not remember Chancellorsville, but, Sickles' certainly did.
Longstreet's attack was delayed until well into the Afternoon and when the Federal line was finally broken, it was too late, as night had already fallen,much to Lee's distress, as he had planned it for late morning at best possible

Except it wasn't the extream left flank, as there was another Corps to Sickles left and the VI Corps coming up to the left of that..And Sickles did nothing to show that he was preparing for a strong attack on his flank..His flanks were left hanging so what exactly had he learned from Chancellorsville?

 

[wilber6150]

According to the orders being sent out, Lee certainly misread Meade...

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 2, 1863.
Commanding Officer Twelfth Corps:
The commanding general desires you to make your arrangements for an attack from your front on the enemy, to be made be the Twelfth Corps, supported by the Fifth. He wishes this a strong and decisive attack, which he will order so soon as he gets definite information of the approach of the Sixth Corps, which will also be directed to co-operate in this attack. For this purpose, he has sent an officer to ascertain the whereabouts of General Sedgwick, and report. Very respectfully, &c.,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD, Major-General, Chief of Staf


So we have a two Corps attack supported by elements of a third attacking the flank of the ANV..

 

[OpnCoronet]

Because he had to throw whatever he had in to plug a massive hole in his line, rather than simply reinforce a section of the line under attack.

Did you not read my post? If as other have claimed there were all the reinforcements available, as claimed, to Sickles' original line, why were they not available to fill it when Sickle's advanced, and available to cover Sickle's retreat?

Instead, Meade leaves Culp's Hill almost defensless,

 

[OpnCoronet]

Lee's planned point of attack was somewhere along the Emmittsburg Road, probably in the vicinity of the Peach Orchard, where he believed the Union flank to be. His plan was for Longstreet to attack up the road, rolling up the Federal flank, having Hill's troops support and join the attack as it proceeded up to Cemetery Hill, driving the Army of the Potomac before it. When Sickles moved forward, Longstreet and his division commanders had to reshuffle the plan on the fly, leading to the attack east northeast from their jump off points. Without Sickles' movement, there's no telling if the attack would go off as planned since many of his troops would not be visible from Longstreet's starting point.
Meade found it necessary to support an untenable position by throwing in whatever troops were available in order to stabilize his left flank which had been put in danger by Sickles' advance. If Sickles had stayed where he was, those troops could have been available for a potential counterattack or simply held as a bulk reserve rather than getting parceled out as the need arose.

R

All very neat, except all we know for sure is that Hood was to attack up Emmitsburg Road. But, where are those reinforcements supposedly available to support Sickles' original Line, but not support at least his withdrawal?
Sickles' corps did not suddenly collapse at the first contact with the confederates, the battle raged for more than an hour, but Meade had only Culp's Hill to draw reinforcements? Does that not indicate very strongly, Meade had not positioned his army adequately to receive a major confederate on his left, even after being warned By Sickles' that the confederates on that flank (and as his recon had discovered, were aggressive and in force just opposite the Peace Orchard)

 

[OpnCoronet]

Except it wasn't the extream left flank, as there was another Corps to Sickles left and the VI Corps coming up to the left of that..And Sickles did nothing to show that he was preparing for a strong attack on his flank..His flanks were left hanging so what exactly had he learned from Chancellorsville?

Except, Meade had ordered Sickles to join with Handcock 's lline on the left and the side of Little Round ToP. Much to much ground to cover with his understrengthed corps and in any case to his view dominated by the rise at the Peach Orchard(all of which Meade could have seen for himself, if he could have, gone and seen for himself, as requested by Sickles'. But, apparently the defense of Culp's Hill was to important).

Sickle's movement was only a hundred yards or so further West , but, those reinforcement noted by you were available for to fill the gap created by Sickles' advance, and did not? If it is true that they were available at all, the reinforcements from Culp's Hill should have been for them, as they occupied the deserted lines of the original position would they not?

 

[OpnCoronet]

According to the orders being sent out, Lee certainly misread Meade...

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 2, 1863.
Commanding Officer Twelfth Corps:
The commanding general desires you to make your arrangements for an attack from your front on the enemy, to be made be the Twelfth Corps, supported by the Fifth. He wishes this a strong and decisive attack, which he will order so soon as he gets definite information of the approach of the Sixth Corps, which will also be directed to co-operate in this attack. For this purpose, he has sent an officer to ascertain the whereabouts of General Sedgwick, and report. Very respectfully, &c.,
DANL. BUTTERFIELD, Major-General, Chief of Staf


So we have a two Corps attack supported by elements of a third attacking the flank of the ANV..

No, what we have is a plan of battle on paper. Like McClellan, Meade always had aggressive plans available to him, but almost always thought better of them, in the end.

 

[ivanj05]

Did you not read my post? If as other have claimed there were all the reinforcements available, as claimed, to Sickles' original line, why were they not available to fill it when Sickle's advanced, and available to cover Sickle's retreat?

Instead, Meade leaves Culp's Hill almost defensless,

Thanks for questioning my reading comprehension. The ability to reinforce Sickles while he was anchored to the rest of the AoP's defensive position is obviously tactically different than trying to protect a massive salient that is both much thinner than the corresponding position on Cemetary Ridge and already under massive attack both in front and the unprotected flanks.

 

[wilber6150]

Except, Meade had ordered Sickles to join with Handcock 's lline on the left and the side of Little Round ToP. Much to much ground to cover with his understrengthed corps and in any case to his view dominated by the rise at the Peach Orchard(all of which Meade could have seen for himself, if he could have, gone and seen for himself, as requested by Sickles'. But, apparently the defense of Culp's Hill was to important).

Sickle's movement was only a hundred yards or so further West , but, those reinforcement noted by you were available for to fill the gap created by Sickles' advance, and did not? If it is true that they were available at all, the reinforcements from Culp's Hill should have been for them, as they occupied the deserted lines of the original position would they not?

And yes because of Sickles unordered advance the strength of a Union Corps was ****** away trying to support it..So now the whole Union position should be shifted around to support one generals unauthorized repositioning? But, I guess Culps hill and the right flank of the army wasn't to important...The fighting wasn't to intense there

 

[wilber6150]

No, what we have is a plan of battle on paper. Like McClellan, Meade always had aggressive plans available to him, but almost always thought better of them, in the end.

His plan was to attack if the Confederates didn't, and he did exactly what he should have let the enemy come to him. Why waste his men on a attack if Lee was willing to attack him?

 

[OpnCoronet]

His plan was to attack if the Confederates didn't, and he did exactly what he should have let the enemy come to him. Why waste his men on a attack if Lee was willing to attack him?

Most of Meade's plans were almost always contingent on what Lee did, i.e., his actions were almost always dictated by Lee.

 

[OpnCoronet]

And yes because of Sickles unordered advance the strength of a Union Corps was ****** away trying to support it..So now the whole Union position should be shifted around to support one generals unauthorized repositioning? But, I guess Culps hill and the right flank of the army wasn't to important...The fighting wasn't to intense there

My point was where were those reinforcements that were supposedly available to reinforce Sickles' original Line but not his attack just a few hundred yds. West? If they were within support distance, they should have been sent rather than the defenders of Culp's Hill.

 

[OpnCoronet]

His plan was to attack if the Confederates didn't, and he did exactly what he should have let the enemy come to him. Why waste his men on a attack if Lee was willing to attack him?

Letting Lee come to him, was the battle plans of most Union generals who contributed to Lee's greatest victories, i.e., it was a plan that tended to end not well for passive Union commanders. It ended better for Meade(not well), simply because of the inadequacies of Lee's Generalship than to anything Meade did.




P.S. by the way, What did Meade think of the casualty ratio's of the two armies.

 

[ivanj05]

My point was where were those reinforcements that were supposedly available to reinforce Sickles' original Line but not his attack just a few hundred yds. West? If they were within support distance, they should have been sent rather than the defenders of Culp's Hill.

They were sent. Nearly all of the Fifth Corps along with a full brigade of the Second Corps, plus McGilvery's batteries from the artillery reserve were committed in a near hopeless attempt to hold Sickles position. Even after committing all of that, as far as Meade could tell he still had a gaping hole in his line. Pulling nearly the entire Twelfth Corps off Culps Hill may have been an error on Meade and Slocum's part, but they had a pretty serious and in that moment much more pressing problem on their hands. A problem, mind you, they would not have had if Sickles had stayed put.

 

[rpkennedy]

My point was where were those reinforcements that were supposedly available to reinforce Sickles' original Line but not his attack just a few hundred yds. West? If they were within support distance, they should have been sent rather than the defenders of Culp's Hill.

Instead of reinforcing and backing up Sickles' original position, they (along with other units) were forced to attempt to reinforce and hold a significantly weaker and longer position further to the west.

R

 

[OpnCoronet]

They were sent. Nearly all of the Fifth Corps along with a full brigade of the Second Corps, plus McGilvery's batteries from the artillery reserve were committed in a near hopeless attempt to hold Sickles position. Even after committing all of that, as far as Meade could tell he still had a gaping hole in his line. Pulling nearly the entire Twelfth Corps off Culps Hill may have been an error on Meade and Slocum's part, but they had a pretty serious and in that moment much more pressing problem on their hands. A problem, mind you, they would not have had if Sickles had stayed put.

So you are saying sending in another corps plus artillery, Meade was still so fearful he drew another corps on a vital position. That does not speak well for Meade's nerve or ability to use his training and experience to penetrate the fog of war to see accurately what is occurring in his own army.

My main point is, were the reinforcement noted by you within supporting distance of Sickle's original line, ordered by Meade, if not, why not?


P.S. Culp's hill was saved not because of anything Meade did(he was busily withdrawing most of the troops there) but because once again Lee could not get Ewell off the mark until it was too late and then made only a feeble attempt to take the position, i.e., once again Lee's plan was frustrated by his inability to effectively command his corps commanders.

 

[rpkennedy]

So you are saying sending in another corps plus artillery, Meade was still so fearful he drew another corps on a vital position. That does not speak well for Meade's nerve or ability to use his training and experience to penetrate the fog of war to see accurately what is occurring in his own army.

My main point is, were the reinforcement noted by you within supporting distance of Sickle's original line, ordered by Meade, if not, why not?


P.S. Culp's hill was saved not because of anything Meade did(he was busily withdrawing most of the troops there) but because once again Lee could not get Ewell off the mark until it was too late and then made only a feeble attempt to take the position, i.e., once again Lee's plan was frustrated by his inability to effectively command his corps commanders.

The Fifth Corps was positioned to the right rear and rear of the Third Corps' original position. So, well within supporting distance.

R

 

[wilber6150]

Letting Lee come to him, was the battle plans of most Union generals who contributed to Lee's greatest victories, i.e., it was a plan that tended to end not well for passive Union commanders. It ended better for Meade(not well), simply because of the inadequacies of Lee's Generalship than to anything Meade did.




P.S. by the way, What did Meade think of the casualty ratio's of the two armies.

Most of Lees greatest victories was reacting to Union attacks coming towards him and counter striking.. His biggest defeats was when he went on the offensive against a prepared Union defense...But, none of this has anything to do with whther Meade had plans to attack Lee does it?

 

[ivanj05]

So you are saying sending in another corps plus artillery, Meade was still so fearful he drew another corps on a vital position. That does not speak well for Meade's nerve or ability to use his training and experience to penetrate the fog of war to see accurately what is occurring in his own army.

My main point is, were the reinforcement noted by you within supporting distance of Sickle's original line, ordered by Meade, if not, why not?


P.S. Culp's hill was saved not because of anything Meade did(he was busily withdrawing most of the troops there) but because once again Lee could not get Ewell off the mark until it was too late and then made only a feeble attempt to take the position, i.e., once again Lee's plan was frustrated by his inability to effectively command his corps commanders.

Yes, they were in supporting distance, which is why they were committed to a hopleless battle to salvage an unsustainable position. And sending the Twelfth Corps had nothing to do with Meade's nerve, and everything to do with a massive hole in his center that wasn't supposed to be there and was in serious and urgent peril. I'm not arguing that sending nearly an entire corps from right to center wasn't a tactical error, but at the time that error was made the right flank was not in serious trouble. The center, however, had nearly ceased to exist.