Intersting article on a Meade Counterattack

[BillO]

I do not wish to be viewed as a fan of Sickles, however... I am not on the Mead band wagon either. Mead did not expect an attack on his left flank. Mead had a dislike for Sickles type of generalship, he had the same distane for Sheridan and it was Grant that gave Sheridan the freedom to act which he did very successfully. I am not comparing Sickles to Sheridan, however Mead did placed his best generals and his most effective corps on the right and center of his fish-hook. Every piece of real time correspondence that morning, signal corps dispatches, locals, scouting parties from Sickles corps etc... indicated an attack was eminent on the left flank! Mead ignored the intelligence and even pulled Bufords cavelry screen from his left flank. Lee outsmarted Mead and the Federals nearly paid a steep price for it.

I've been to Gettysburg and I agree with Meade. His right was more important than his extended left and that's where your best should be. Cemetery Hill was the keystone of the Federal line. You hold on there and everything else will fall into place.

 

[marinegrunt]

I do not wish to be viewed as a fan of Sickles, however... I am not on the Mead band wagon either. Mead did not expect an attack on his left flank. Mead had a dislike for Sickles type of generalship, he had the same distane for Sheridan and it was Grant that gave Sheridan the freedom to act which he did very successfully. I am not comparing Sickles to Sheridan, however Mead did placed his best generals and his most effective corps on the right and center of his fish-hook. Every piece of real time correspondence that morning, signal corps dispatches, locals, scouting parties from Sickles corps etc... indicated an attack was eminent on the left flank! Mead ignored the intelligence and even pulled Bufords cavelry screen from his left flank. Lee outsmarted Mead and the Federals nearly paid a steep price for it.

None of that matters too much. The commanding general of the AOP made a troop disposition for the entire army. Sickles' freelancing, whether the position he ended up taking was better or not (it wasn't, but ok for now), put that disposition at risk, overextended his entire corps, and created a position the enemy could attack from two sides, which of course they did. Had Sickles stayed put, Longstreet's corps would have had to make a frontal assault on an elevated position; instead they were able to tear into Sickles from two flanks. That's besides the fact that Sickles opened up a hole in the line for enemy troops to get through. And all the proof you need of Sickles' poor judgement is the fact that his corps ceased to be a fighting unit after July 2. Meade's dispositions were sound; troops on an elevated position with shorter lines and better interior communications than his enemy. Sickles had neither the authority nor experience to go off and do his own thing.

And, no, Lee didn't outsmart anybody. He took counsel of his own overconfidence and made repeated attacks on a well entrenched enemy. He got lucky that Sickles screwed up. That's the only reason the Confederates got as far as they did on July 2. Lee actually thought the Union left flank was strung out on the Emittsburg Rd and intended to roll that flank up; Sickles actually helped him almost pull that off. If he had stayed where Meade wanted him, he could have been raining enfilade fire down on the whole ANV 1st Corps while it was on line straddling the Emittsburg Rd. Lee could have outsmarted Meade by leaving him with the black eye the AOP took on day one and whipping around Meade's flank before he could get his ducks in a row. May not have been a decisive victory, but he could have stayed north a bit longer that way and maybe threatened Washington enough to settle a peace.

 

[4065921]

I've been to Gettysburg and I agree with Meade. His right was more important than his extended left and that's where your best should be. Cemetery Hill was the keystone of the Federal line. You hold on there and everything else will fall into place.

I believe that the Federals had to hold all the hills to maintain their position; Culps Hill ,Cemetery Hill and the Round Tops were all critical. If Mead had lost Culps Hill on the first day he would have had to retreat as the whole of his battle line west and his supply line south would be threatened. As it pertains to the second day's battle, if Hood had taken the Round Tops, again, Meads only remaining escape route, The Baltimore Pike, would be severely threatened. With Ewell to his North and A.P. Hill to his West, Mead would have no choice but to retreat quickly or loose the whole of his Army.

As far as Mead having his best on the right and center, Lee agreed with you ... that is why he attacked the vulnerable left flank.

 

[4065921]

Lee actually thought the Union left flank was strung out on the Emittsburg Rd and intended to roll that flank up; Sickles actually helped him almost pull that off. If he had stayed where Meade wanted him, he could have been raining enfilade fire down on the whole ANV 1st Corps while it was on line straddling the Emittsburg Rd.

If Sickles was in position as ordered by Mead, Hood would not have moved South to North along the Emmitsburg Road as was originally directed by Lee. You discount the fact that Hood would have followed standard military practice of the day and pushed skirmishers, perhaps an entire regiment, 300-500 feet forward of his Division as it advanced. The Union cavalry screen that would have discovered this movement was not in place. These Skirmishers, led by an officer and many times accompanied by sharpshooters, would have discovered the actual left flank of Meads defensive line on the far ridge before Hood's division even crossed the Emittsburg road. No doubt Longstreet would have adjusted his attack bringing his entire Corps, 13,000 of the Confederacy's best, squarely onto 3rd Corps left flank. What would have happened at that point is truly conjecture.

 

[marinegrunt]

If Sickles was in position as ordered by Mead, Hood would not have moved South to North along the Emmitsburg Road as was originally directed by Lee. You discount the fact that Hood would have followed standard military practice of the day and pushed skirmishers, perhaps an entire regiment, 300-500 feet forward of his Division as it advanced. The Union cavalry screen that would have discovered this movement was not in place. These Skirmishers, led by an officer and many times accompanied by sharpshooters, would have discovered the actual left flank of Meads defensive line on the far ridge before Hood's division even crossed the Emittsburg road. No doubt Longstreet would have adjusted his attack bringing his entire Corps, 13,000 of the Confederacy's best, squarely onto 3rd Corps left flank. What would have happened at that point is truly conjecture.

That's a tough sell. What Hood would have done is pure conjecture; his orders were given to him based on what Lee thought was the left of the Union line. Those orders didn't change when it was discovered that Sickles was where he was; Hood's division was still supposed to advance along the road. They went where they went based on his personal orders and confusion that resulted from his wounding (Law was unaware that he now had the division and didn't issue orders to resume the advance) very early on in the attack. That's how the 15th Alabama ended up in front of the 20th Maine; it wasn't planned that way. As far as skirmishers, their role is to push in front of the advance of the division and locate opposition in its front; they wouldn't have gone on a two mile circuitous march to the far right of the Confederate position, especially not after seeing Sickles pulled up in front of them in a salient. And Longstreet, while not in agreement with Lee, never countermanded his orders by telling anyone to go anywhere but along the Emittsburg Rd., before or after it was discovered that Meade's line was where it was. Placing his entire corps on the left flank of III Corps would have absolutely exposed his entire corps to enfilade fire from the Little Round Top; it's very unlikely he would have put his whole corps onto that flank.

 

[W. Richardson]

The absolutely best defense of Meade immediately after Gettysburg that I have ever read, or am ever likely to, is this short piece from, of all places, Esquire, which did an excellent Civil War series:

"Lincoln Was Dead Wrong After Gettysburg"

Do not miss reading this. I promise you'll be glad you did. Even if you don't agree with the conclusions of the author (who is a serving Army officer and professional strategist), his use of the popular British TV show Top Gear to illustrate his points is brilliant and highly entertaining!

Totally agree with this article ! Thanks for sharing it.

Respectfully,

William

 

[thomas aagaard]

I ran across this article and thought people might want to read it..
http://npshistory.com/series/symposia/gettysburg_seminars/12/essay9.pdf

I act access the file :-( anyone who can share it some other way?

 

[ErnieMac]

I agree that Meade was not expecting an attack on his left, but have to question the concept that Meade 'placed' his best commands on the right-center. At noon on July 2 the Federal line from right to left was 12th Corps and 1st Corps (Wadsworth's Division) on Culp's Hill, 11th Corps in the Cemetery, 1st Corps (Doubleday's and Rowley's Divisions) south of the Cemetery, 2nd Corps on Cemetery Ridge and 3rd Corps further south on the Cemetery Ridge (Sickle's hadn't move forward yet) approaching Little Round Top. The 5th Corps was in reserve along the Baltimore Pike awaiting the arrival of the 6th Corps at which time Meade planned to send it to the left flank.

The positions of the 1st, 11th and 12th Corps, with the exception of Geary's Division of the 12th Corps, had been established by Hancock and Warren at the end of the July 1 fighting. Hancock had positioned Geary's Division near Round Top on July 1st and Meade sent it to Culp's Hill the following morning when reinforcements arrived. The positioning of the 2nd and 3rd Corps had, IMO, more to do with their lines of advance. Both arrived in the early morning of July 2, the 2nd Corps on the Taneytown Road and the 3rd Corps on the Emmitsburg Pike. Logistically it made sense for them to take the positions they occupied.

At noon on July 2 the right consisted of the 1st, 11th and 12th Corps. The 1st Corps had been considered one of the best in the AoP, but had been shattered on July 1, suffering 40%+ casualties. The 12th Corps was a solid performer, but one of the best? The 11th Corps - need I say more. The reputation was not entirely deserved, but "best". Again my opinion, but I think the placement of the Army of the Potomac's corps was more a matter of happenstance than plan.

 

[Jamieva]

There was no masterplan to how the union corps were aligned on July 2. The I, XI and XII basically stayed where they had finished July 1 and the subsequent corps filled in the line south from there as they arrived.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

The fact that Harmon gives credence to anything allegedly said by Alf Pleasonton is grounds to dismiss this piece in its entirety. Like Phil Sheridan, Pleasonton was a pathological liar incapable of telling the truth. It's well documented, just as Sheridan's many prevarications are. Like Sheridan, it's safe to assume that if Pleasonton's lips were moving, he was lying like a rug.

 

[wilber6150]

The fact that Harmon gives credence to anything allegedly said by Alf Pleasonton is grounds to dismiss this piece in its entirety. Like Phil Sheridan, Pleasonton was a pathological liar incapable of telling the truth. It's well documented, just as Sheridan's many prevarications are. Like Sheridan, it's safe to assume that if Pleasonton's lips were moving, he was lying like a rug.

In your research have you come across evidence one way or the other on whether a counter-attack was at least being considered or in the planning stages for July 3?

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

In your research have you come across evidence one way or the other on whether a counter-attack was at least being considered or in the planning stages for July 3?

Formally, no. Harmon argues that the cavalry actions of Farnsworth and Merritt were part of a counterattack. So far as I know, they are the only things that could be considered to be a counterattack.

 

[4065921]

There was no masterplan to how the union corps were aligned on July 2. The I, XI and XII basically stayed where they had finished July 1 and the subsequent corps filled in the line south from there as they arrived.

I went back and reviewed the references on my statement "Mead did placed his best generals and his most effective corps on the right and center of his fish-hook", I must concede that my statement was based on unsubstantiated opinions and of Meads reported disdain for Sickles and not the factual deployment as laid out in ErnieMacs post.

Thanks for the correction.

 

[4065921]

That's a tough sell. What Hood would have done is pure conjecture; his orders were given to him based on what Lee thought was the left of the Union line. Those orders didn't change when it was discovered that Sickles was where he was; Hood's division was still supposed to advance along the road. They went where they went based on his personal orders and confusion that resulted from his wounding (Law was unaware that he now had the division and didn't issue orders to resume the advance) very early on in the attack. That's how the 15th Alabama ended up in front of the 20th Maine; it wasn't planned that way. As far as skirmishers, their role is to push in front of the advance of the division and locate opposition in its front; they wouldn't have gone on a two mile circuitous march to the far right of the Confederate position, especially not after seeing Sickles pulled up in front of them in a salient. And Longstreet, while not in agreement with Lee, never countermanded his orders by telling anyone to go anywhere but along the Emittsburg Rd., before or after it was discovered that Meade's line was where it was. Placing his entire corps on the left flank of III Corps would have absolutely exposed his entire corps to enfilade fire from the Little Round Top; it's very unlikely he would have put his whole corps onto that flank.

You make some Interesting points, however I am addressing the issue soley as if Sickles had followed orders and placed his battle line on Cemetery Ridge up to Little Round Top as ordered by Mead. Lee's original attack plan was based on faulty intelligence as to the exact location of the Federal left. Lee's main objective was to roll up the left flank of the Federal Army, not the Emmitsburg Road.

If Sickles had stayed on Cemetery Ridge, the divisions of McLaws and Hood would have had emerged from the woods on Seminary Ridge and discovered that the Federal Left flank was not along the Emmitsburg Road but was actually ¾ mile further east. Both Lee and Longstreet no doubt would have directed that Hood and McLaws march due east where they would fall squarely on the extended left flank of Mead's Army. Additionally Anderson's division would have covered the exposed flank of the Confederate left as they advanced and Porter Alexander would have set up his Artillery in the Peach Orchard with excellent high ground to shell Union Lines. Even with the late start and difficult terrain Longstreet would most certainly have turned the Federal Left flank.

What I see in this scenario is similar to what Jackson did at Chancellorsville when he was searching for the right flank of Hookers army. He was obligated to change his original route from the Orange Plank Road to the Orange Turnpike a mile further north to better position his attack. Of course Jackson's attack is historical fact and my depiction of day 2 at Gettysburg, with Sickles staying at his assigned position on Cemetery Ridge is historical conjecture but it is not a far reach.

 

[rpkennedy]

You make some Interesting points, however I am addressing the issue soley as if Sickles had followed orders and placed his battle line on Cemetery Ridge up to Little Round Top as ordered by Mead. Lee's original attack plan was based on faulty intelligence as to the exact location of the Federal left. Lee's main objective was to roll up the left flank of the Federal Army, not the Emmitsburg Road.

If Sickles had stayed on Cemetery Ridge, the divisions of McLaws and Hood would have had emerged from the woods on Seminary Ridge and discovered that the Federal Left flank was not along the Emmitsburg Road but was actually ¾ mile further east. Both Lee and Longstreet no doubt would have directed that Hood and McLaws march due east where they would fall squarely on the extended left flank of Mead's Army. Additionally Anderson's division would have covered the exposed flank of the Confederate left as they advanced and Porter Alexander would have set up his Artillery in the Peach Orchard with excellent high ground to shell Union Lines. Even with the late start and difficult terrain Longstreet would most certainly have turned the Federal Left flank.

What I see in this scenario is similar to what Jackson did at Chancellorsville when he was searching for the right flank of Hookers army. He was obligated to change his original route from the Orange Plank Road to the Orange Turnpike a mile further north to better position his attack. Of course Jackson's attack is historical fact and my depiction of day 2 at Gettysburg, with Sickles staying at his assigned position on Cemetery Ridge is historical conjecture but it is not a far reach.

There would likely have been large numbers of Union troops along the Emmittsburg Road in the form of clouds of skirmishers so who's to say that Longstreet and his division commanders wouldn't have thought that that was the line? There are numerous examples of commanders believing that a skirmish line was the main line of battle.

In all honesty, I see where you're coming from but I'm not buying it.

R

 

[4065921]

There would likely have been large numbers of Union troops along the Emmittsburg Road in the form of clouds of skirmishers so who's to say that Longstreet and his division commanders wouldn't have thought that that was the line? There are numerous examples of commanders believing that a skirmish line was the main line of battle.

In all honesty, I see where you're coming from but I'm not buying it.

R

No doubt the fog of war has been the cause of many an errant maneuver and the Federals did have skirmishers pushed out as far as Emmitsburgh Road. They would have put a small fight with the Confederate skirmishers advancing in front of Hoods and McLaws division but would have eventually retreated back towards Cemetery Ridge.

In fact around 12:00 pm that day Sickles dispatched Colonel Berdan and his First U. S. Sharpshooters, approximately 100 men, and an additional 210 men of the 3rd Maine Infantry across the Emmitsburg Road to scout the woods along Seminary Ridge. They ran into three Alabama regiments of General Wilcox's brigade west of Emmitsburg Road then high-tailed it back to Cemetery Ridge.

 

[marinegrunt]

You make some Interesting points, however I am addressing the issue soley as if Sickles had followed orders and placed his battle line on Cemetery Ridge up to Little Round Top as ordered by Mead. Lee's original attack plan was based on faulty intelligence as to the exact location of the Federal left. Lee's main objective was to roll up the left flank of the Federal Army, not the Emmitsburg Road.

If Sickles had stayed on Cemetery Ridge, the divisions of McLaws and Hood would have had emerged from the woods on Seminary Ridge and discovered that the Federal Left flank was not along the Emmitsburg Road but was actually ¾ mile further east. Both Lee and Longstreet no doubt would have directed that Hood and McLaws march due east where they would fall squarely on the extended left flank of Mead's Army. Additionally Anderson's division would have covered the exposed flank of the Confederate left as they advanced and Porter Alexander would have set up his Artillery in the Peach Orchard with excellent high ground to shell Union Lines. Even with the late start and difficult terrain Longstreet would most certainly have turned the Federal Left flank.

What I see in this scenario is similar to what Jackson did at Chancellorsville when he was searching for the right flank of Hookers army. He was obligated to change his original route from the Orange Plank Road to the Orange Turnpike a mile further north to better position his attack. Of course Jackson's attack is historical fact and my depiction of day 2 at Gettysburg, with Sickles staying at his assigned position on Cemetery Ridge is historical conjecture but it is not a far reach.

Lee thought that the left of the AOP was along the Emittsburg Rd. except further up towards Cemetery Hill. Longstreet and Hood were surprised to find Sickles where he was at the Peach Orchard and along the Trostle Farm road.

There's plenty of doubt as to what Longstreet and Lee would have done. By the time Longstreet was ready it was 4 p.m.; to then make another countermarch (Meade was watching) in order to fall on the AOP's left flank would have involved hours to get there unobserved, form battle lines and attack. The Peach Orchard was higher ground than that around it, but it was still not as high as Cemetery Ridge. Nor was it even necessary to advance that far to gain an artillery platform; Warfield Ridge allowed for artillery support.

Jackson did indeed change his plans, but only because he got a heads up from Fitz Lee as to the right flank of the AOP being in the air. Longstreet and Hood (and Lee, for that matter) didn't have that kind of intel.

I certainly follow what you're saying about why would have happened if Sickles had been where he was supposed to be. I just think given the circumstances and the fact the Longstreet and Hood had to make it up as they went that there's no real way to say for sure what would have happened had Sickles stayed put. Either way, he disobeyed an order and messed with his commander's deployment, and that can't happen even if he did move his men to better ground.

 

[4065921]

Lee thought that the left of the AOP was along the Emittsburg Rd. except further up towards Cemetery Hill. Longstreet and Hood were surprised to find Sickles where he was at the Peach Orchard and along the Trostle Farm road.

There's plenty of doubt as to what Longstreet and Lee would have done. By the time Longstreet was ready it was 4 p.m.; to then make another countermarch (Meade was watching) in order to fall on the AOP's left flank would have involved hours to get there unobserved, form battle lines and attack. The Peach Orchard was higher ground than that around it, but it was still not as high as Cemetery Ridge. Nor was it even necessary to advance that far to gain an artillery platform; Warfield Ridge allowed for artillery support.

Jackson did indeed change his plans, but only because he got a heads up from Fitz Lee as to the right flank of the AOP being in the air. Longstreet and Hood (and Lee, for that matter) didn't have that kind of intel.

I certainly follow what you're saying about why would have happened if Sickles had been where he was supposed to be. I just think given the circumstances and the fact the Longstreet and Hood had to make it up as they went that there's no real way to say for sure what would have happened had Sickles stayed put. Either way, he disobeyed an order and messed with his commander's deployment, and that can't happen even if he did move his men to better ground.

Just wanted to let you know that I really appreciate your comments regarding our conversation on Day 2 at Gettysburg and General Sickles advanced position. I am writing a paper for my Masters on that subject and to put it succinctly I am looking at the very real possibility that had Sickles stayed on Cemetery Ridge as originally ordered, the Federal left would have been turned, Taneytown Road cut off and the whole of the Union Army threatened.

I am actually surprised that most people, including Professors, whom while agreeing with my points, will simply dismiss my thesis out of hand because "Sickles is a jerk who disobeyed orders". I need someone to challenge the tactical basis of my thesis and you are of the few that presented some points for me to look at.

That being said, you made some comments regarding the proposed movements that Confederate skirmishers and Longstreet's Corps would have made assuming Sickles is on Cemetery Ridge that I cannot reconcile:

"As far as skirmishers, their role is to push in front of the advance of the division and locate opposition in its front; they wouldn't have gone on a two mile circuitous march to the far right of the Confederate position."

"in order to fall on the AOP's left flank would have involved hours to get there unobserved, from battle lines and attack."

From what I have seen from Seminary Ridge, the point at which the Confederate Divisions of Hood and Mclaws emerged for the attack around 4 pm, again assuming Sickles is on Cemetery Ridge, is that it is a straight march almost due East to 3rd Corps, the Round-tops and the flank of the Federal left. What do you see that would have caused the extra movement?

FYI: I have tried to get interest in an open thread on this subject but I cannot seem to generate attention on the topic. If you or anyone whish's to continue the conversation there you are very welcome.

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/gettysburg-day-2.113459/

Thanks again

Bob

 

[OpnCoronet]

I have never quite understood the confidence of some, in the AoP successfully repelling a full blooded confederate assault on one of its flank, especially if it was unexpected, i.e., Sickles seemed to be the only one aware of such an attack or even worried by it.
Was Sickles(or Hancock) corps disposed by Meade's orders to receive planned confederate attack?

 

[marinegrunt]

Just wanted to let you know that I really appreciate your comments regarding our conversation on Day 2 at Gettysburg and General Sickles advanced position. I am writing a paper for my Masters on that subject and to put it succinctly I am looking at the very real possibility that had Sickles stayed on Cemetery Ridge as originally ordered, the Federal left would have been turned, Taneytown Road cut off and the whole of the Union Army threatened.

I am actually surprised that most people, including Professors, whom while agreeing with my points, will simply dismiss my thesis out of hand because "Sickles is a jerk who disobeyed orders". I need someone to challenge the tactical basis of my thesis and you are of the few that presented some points for me to look at.

That being said, you made some comments regarding the proposed movements that Confederate skirmishers and Longstreet's Corps would have made assuming Sickles is on Cemetery Ridge that I cannot reconcile:

"As far as skirmishers, their role is to push in front of the advance of the division and locate opposition in its front; they wouldn't have gone on a two mile circuitous march to the far right of the Confederate position."

"in order to fall on the AOP's left flank would have involved hours to get there unobserved, from battle lines and attack."

From what I have seen from Seminary Ridge, the point at which the Confederate Divisions of Hood and Mclaws emerged for the attack around 4 pm, again assuming Sickles is on Cemetery Ridge, is that it is a straight march almost due East to 3rd Corps, the Round-tops and the flank of the Federal left. What do you see that would have caused the extra movement?

FYI: I have tried to get interest in an open thread on this subject but I cannot seem to generate attention on the topic. If you or anyone whish's to continue the conversation there you are very welcome.

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/gettysburg-day-2.113459/

Thanks again

Bob

Appreciate your kind words I enjoy different views on the battle. They did indeed track due east but that didn't place them on the flank. The far right brigade of Hood's division, Law's brigade, accidentally went up and over the lower part of Round Top and this is how the 15th Alabama ran into Chamberlain's 20th Maine on the southern slope of Little Round Top. Skirmishers probably would not have taken that route as they would have cleared the immediate area in front of the advancing division, not an errant brigade that went off course.