Intersting article on a Meade Counterattack

[ivanj05]

Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't the Fifth Corps in a pretty good position, if Sickles had stayed where he was supposed to, to both support the Third Corps and to counter any move by Longstreet around the Round Tops?

 

[marinegrunt]

Correct me if I am wrong, but wasn't the Fifth Corps in a pretty good position, if Sickles had stayed where he was supposed to, to both support the Third Corps and to counter any move by Longstreet around the Round Tops?

V Corps was somewhere near the Round Tops on the Baltimore Pike on day 2 when Warren called for troops and Vincent sent his brigade up. Not much else seems to have been mentioned of them but they came up too late to save Sickles.

 

[wilber6150]

V Corps or VI Corps?

 

[Pat Answer]

Fifth. The Sixth had just started to arrive around 2 PM on Day 2, IIRC. The Fifth was "in place" already that morning and could have provided quick support of Sickles - if he hadn't been half a mile in front of the position he was supposed to occupy, that is...

 

[wilber6150]

Fifth. The Sixth had just started to arrive around 2 PM on Day 2, IIRC. The Fifth was "in place" already that morning and could have provided quick support of Sickles - if he hadn't been half a mile in front of the position he was supposed to occupy, that is...

I thought parts of the Fifth was heavily engaged during that part of the action.

 

[rpkennedy]

I thought parts of the Fifth was heavily engaged during that part of the action.

2 brigades of the First Division were sent into the Rose Woods/Wheatfield area (Tilton and Sweitzer) while the other was sent to Little Round Top (Vincent).

2 brigades of the Second Division fought in the Valley of Death area (Burbank and Day) and the third was on Little Round Top (Weed).

The Pennsylvania Reserve Division secured Little Round Top and attacked into the Valley of Death.

R

 

[ivanj05]

So if we imagine a July 2nd where Sickles stays put, then Longstreet is going to encounter the 5th Corps under far different circumstances than the historical ones.

 

[wilber6150]

So if we imagine a July 2nd where Sickles stays put, then Longstreet is going to encounter the 5th Corps under far different circumstances than the historical ones.

Then depending on what time of day that Longstreet attempts his flanking maneuver, he could also encounter elements of the VI Corps arriving..

 

[JPK Huson 1863]

SO glad Pleasanton has been disposed of. I was waiting for someone to puleeze invalidate his part as any kind of source. It's a little surprising his name came up- gives me a funny taste in my mouth for any other sources, Pleasanton used with a straight face. Pretty sure I lack the oomp to have done it, best left to the knock down, drag out researchers.

How did Hancock get tied in with Sickles as an ineffective blowhard? Where were Hancock's self-exculpatory rantings post war or for that matter what did he have during the battle which could be laid at his door? He failed to remove Sickles other leg?

I don't know. Despite Sickles nearly complete egomania there was a pause in it, a moment of realization on the battlefield when Meade's prophetic words hit home. The enemy would not allow him to withdraw. They did not, at that moment his position began its' sickening losses. Sickles ever afterward slimed his way out of culpability but I can't shake the feeling his championing of Gettysburg the Battlefield had a lot to do with guilt- nobody laugh. Certainly the old rogue enjoyed the publicity. He also disallowed our Gettysburg being carved into unrecognizable pieces, insisted it remain the memorial to the men who died there it is today. Doesn't sound like the Sickles we all know and love to roll our eyes at mention of his name. He had nearly full control, any other battle field? " Sicklesburg ". The old rogue's intent for Gettysburg was that it be a place for remembering our fallen, ok, and his leg still, seems to me something other then Dan Sickles was on his mind.

 

[OpnCoronet]

From what I have seen from Seminary Ridge, the point at which the Confederate Divisions of Hood and Mclaws emerged for the attack around 4 pm, again assuming Sickles is on Cemetery Ridge, is that it is a straight march almost due East to 3rd Corps, the Round-tops and the flank of the Federal left. What do you see that would have caused the extra movement?
FYI: I have tried to get interest in an open thread on this subject but I cannot seem to generate attention on the topic. If you or anyone whish's to continue the conversation there you are very welcome.
http://civilwartalk.com/threads/gettysburg-day-2.113459/
Thanks again
Bob

Too many people, including historians, seem to be of the opinion that since Sickles was a Jerk,, that fact alone makes him wrong in any of his decisions they do not agree with.

Given the fact, that Lee's precise plan of attack, is debatable(unknown), if one read Lee's carefully worded after battle report, one could get the impression that the real goal of Longstreet's attack was to take the Peach Orchard, to establish a fire base to cover Longstreet's(or perhaps another later attack) on Cemetery Hill later.

One of Sickles main complaints was that Meade had assigned to much territory for his under strength corps to adequately cover. To cover the assigned line, the corps would have to strung out too thinly to be able to deliver sufficient fire by any part of it by a flanking enemy.

To me, in this instance, the proof of the pudding, is in the tasting. Lee's massive flanking attack, wherever it was aimed, was stopped in its tracks before it even got started. Left Longstreet's corps so closely engaged on Lee's Right, that the attack on Day 3, had to be performed by an ad hoc, corps hastily cobbled together with elements haphazardly drawn from two different corps.


P.S The ability of the AoP to stop a full blooded attack by the ANV on its flanks is less than sterling, if past experience was any concern.

 

[wilber6150]

SO glad Pleasanton has been disposed of. I was waiting for someone to puleeze invalidate his part as any kind of source. It's a little surprising his name came up- gives me a funny taste in my mouth for any other sources, Pleasanton used with a straight face. Pretty sure I lack the oomp to have done it, best left to the knock down, drag out researchers.

How did Hancock get tied in with Sickles as an ineffective blowhard? Where were Hancock's self-exculpatory rantings post war or for that matter what did he have during the battle which could be laid at his door? He failed to remove Sickles other leg?

I don't know. Despite Sickles nearly complete egomania there was a pause in it, a moment of realization on the battlefield when Meade's prophetic words hit home. The enemy would not allow him to withdraw. They did not, at that moment his position began its' sickening losses. Sickles ever afterward slimed his way out of culpability but I can't shake the feeling his championing of Gettysburg the Battlefield had a lot to do with guilt- nobody laugh. Certainly the old rogue enjoyed the publicity. He also disallowed our Gettysburg being carved into unrecognizable pieces, insisted it remain the memorial to the men who died there it is today. Doesn't sound like the Sickles we all know and love to roll our eyes at mention of his name. He had nearly full control, any other battle field? " Sicklesburg ". The old rogue's intent for Gettysburg was that it be a place for remembering our fallen, ok, and his leg still, seems to me something other then Dan Sickles was on his mind.

Maybe he thought that this place marked the highpoint of his life and wanted to hold it sacred to himself and his boys...

 

[wilber6150]

Too many people, including historians, seem to be of the opinion that since Sickles was a Jerk,, that fact alone makes him wrong in any of his decisions they do not agree with.

Given the fact, that Lee's precise plan of attack, is debatable(unknown), if one read Lee's carefully worded after battle report, one could get the impression that the real goal of Longstreet's attack was to take the Peach Orchard, to establish a fire base to cover Longstreet's(or perhaps another later attack) on Cemetery Hill later.

One of Sickles main complaints was that Meade had assigned to much territory for his under strength corps to adequately cover. To cover the assigned line, the corps would have to strung out too thinly to be able to deliver sufficient fire by any part of it by a flanking enemy.

To me, in this instance, the proof of the pudding, is in the tasting. Lee's massive flanking attack, wherever it was aimed, was stopped in its tracks before it even got started. Left Longstreet's corps so closely engaged on Lee's Right, that the attack on Day 3, had to be performed by an ad hoc, corps hastily cobbled together with elements haphazardly drawn from two different corps.


P.S The ability of the AoP to stop a full blooded attack by the ANV on its flanks is less than sterling, if past experience was any concern.

But would the attack actually be on the flank of the AoP or would Longstreet himself have been ouotflanked by elements of the V and VI Corps if he tried that maneuver?

 

[ole]

Just WOW!

Normally I kvetch about off-topic posts, but this wandering one has my attention. Too much good input to start hollering about the diversion. Maybe retitle it so it can be searchable?

 

[OpnCoronet]

But would the attack actually be on the flank of the AoP or would Longstreet himself have been ouotflanked by elements of the V and VI Corps if he tried that maneuver?

Who knows, what Lee's ultimate movements for the attack was? We know only for sure that the attack was to be en echelon up, I believe, the Emmetsburg Pike toward Cemetery Hill.

It appears to me, that Lee was unaware of the exact location of the AoP's left flank. and the attack was aimed at Hancock's assumed position, with no ref. to Sickles. If that premise is true, then it would appear, Longstreet's extreme left(Hood) would end up masking the other attacking echelon's from fire from Sickle's original line.

As soon as Sickle's position was discovered, Hood could be expected to reorient and come in hard on Sickle's thin lines, while the other two echelon's slammed into Hancock's left or worse at the juncture between Hancock's and Sickles' corps. rolling up the Federal Line and taking the commanding heights of Cemetery Hill.(If that is, that was Lee's plan, but, who knows) And, of course, if Lee could get any kind of timely coordination or initiative from his other corps commanders

 

[OpnCoronet]

Ooop's, correction, I meant Longstreet's extreme right(where Hood was) not left...Sorry.

 

[wilber6150]

Who knows, what Lee's ultimate movements for the attack was? We know only for sure that the attack was to be en echelon up, I believe, the Emmetsburg Pike toward Cemetery Hill.

It appears to me, that Lee was unaware of the exact location of the AoP's left flank. and the attack was aimed at Hancock's assumed position, with no ref. to Sickles. If that premise is true, then it would appear, Longstreet's extreme left(Hood) would end up masking the other attacking echelon's from fire from Sickle's original line.

As soon as Sickle's position was discovered, Hood could be expected to reorient and come in hard on Sickle's thin lines, while the other two echelon's slammed into Hancock's left or worse at the juncture between Hancock's and Sickles' corps. rolling up the Federal Line and taking the commanding heights of Cemetery Hill.(If that is, that was Lee's plan, but, who knows) And, of course, if Lee could get any kind of timely coordination or initiative from his other corps commanders

I've always had the impression that Lee really underestimated how many troops the Union had during the battle and just how large a force that Meade had at his disposal...Its one thing to make a quick unexpected strike like Chancellorsville, but quite another when the enemy is looking for your moves and ready to counter them...

 

[ivanj05]

Who knows, what Lee's ultimate movements for the attack was? We know only for sure that the attack was to be en echelon up, I believe, the Emmetsburg Pike toward Cemetery Hill.

It appears to me, that Lee was unaware of the exact location of the AoP's left flank. and the attack was aimed at Hancock's assumed position, with no ref. to Sickles. If that premise is true, then it would appear, Longstreet's extreme left(Hood) would end up masking the other attacking echelon's from fire from Sickle's original line.

As soon as Sickle's position was discovered, Hood could be expected to reorient and come in hard on Sickle's thin lines, while the other two echelon's slammed into Hancock's left or worse at the juncture between Hancock's and Sickles' corps. rolling up the Federal Line and taking the commanding heights of Cemetery Hill.(If that is, that was Lee's plan, but, who knows) And, of course, if Lee could get any kind of timely coordination or initiative from his other corps commanders

In such circumstances, while Sickles lines would have been thin, he would have been behind pretty good defensive terrain, and he would have been tied into the Second Corps on his flank. He would also have the Fifth Corps behind him able to come up to support him en masse, rather than being fed in piecemeal into a meat grinder as historical.

Much of the success of Longstreet's attack on the 2nd can be attributed to the Third Corps occupying a salient with too few troops to hold it and being open to assault from multiple directions. If Sickles was were he was supposed to be, Longstreet would be attacking a very different type of position.

 

[ole]

In such circumstances, while Sickles lines would have been thin, he would have been behind pretty good defensive terrain, and he would have been tied into the Second Corps on his flank. He would also have the Fifth Corps behind him able to come up to support him en masse, rather than being fed in piecemeal into a meat grinder as historical.

Much of the success of Longstreet's attack on the 2nd can be attributed to the Third Corps occupying a salient with too few troops to hold it and being open to assault from multiple directions. If Sickles was were he was supposed to be, Longstreet would be attacking a very different type of position.

Wow! Ivan, you've nailed it.

Sickles' stupid move disrupted the plan. Whether that was good or bad is open to discussion. It's a "what if" had he stayed where he was placed.

Now. Can we get back to Meade's counterattack? There are people out there looking f0r that and it isn't here.

 

[ivanj05]

To come back to the original point, I think that the subject of Meade counterattacking comes down to three very basic questions. When, where, and with what? To be more specific, does he counterattack immediately after Pickett is repulsed, some other time on the 3rd, or on the 4th? What point on the Confederate line does he choose to focus an attack upon? What units does he have to use for a counterattack, and how many of them is he willing to commit?

 

[4065921]

In such circumstances, while Sickles lines would have been thin, he would have been behind pretty good defensive terrain, and he would have been tied into the Second Corps on his flank. He would also have the Fifth Corps behind him able to come up to support him en masse, rather than being fed in piecemeal into a meat grinder as historical..

Stephen Sears wrote that "among all the corps commanders, Sickles found himself defending the least defensible ground in the Union Line. At the point where Cemetery Ridge reached the shoulder of Little Round Top it was virtually no ridge; for some 100 yards the advantage of high ground was lost. [Gettysburg, 249]