I don't understand Lee's Orders for Day 2

[WLamby]

I can't remember where I read this, and I apologize for the lack of detail here, but my understanding of Lee's orders for Longstreet on Day 2 was for an attack from the southern end of the battlefield, moving essentially N-NE, with the left flank on the Emmitsburg Road. I remembered this, but thought that when I saw the actual battlefield and hiked this route (which I did over July 4th holiday a couple weeks ago) that I would understand the orders. Being there didn't help me out at all and I remain baffled by Lee's orders (perhaps these weren't his orders).

This would arrange a Confederate line from E to W (with the left flank on the Emmitsburg Road) while the Union line was mostly aligned N to S.

Assuming Sickles had followed orders, the Confederate line would therefore have been at roughly a right angle to the Union line, marching parallel to the Union position.

I also can't remember whether Hood was instructed to attack at first light or whether those orders were given on Day 2 after Longstreet's countermarch and then Sickle's position forced a modification of tactics.

Am I misunderstanding this?

 

[amweiner]

As I understand it (and I hasten to add that I am no expert!), Lee wasn't entirely clear on the Union dispositions on July 2nd, thinking that the AOP was straddling the Emmitsburg Road rather than Cemetery Ridge (as you know, the Ridge is more N-S than the road, which is closer to SW-NE).

The plan, as I've read, was for Hood's division to be on the right of the Emmitsburg Road and McLaws to be on the left. They would move en echelon, intending to roll up the Union flank.

The Confederate attack was meant to be an oblique movement, roughly following the direction of the Emmitsburg Road.

I now step back and defer to people who know more about the battle than I do.

 

[Irishtom29]

That's OK, I don't understand either. The best understanding I have is that Lee didn't understand the situation and intended Longstreet to attack up the Emitsburg road, which would've left a flank open to the 3rd Corps, had it not moved out to the road.

 

[WLamby]

That's a great map. Is that from that book filled with Gettysburg maps? I have seen it, but don't own a copy.

So, Lee had not expected the Union to be on Cemetary Ridge? That seems odd as there doesn't seem to be any other defensible position between Cemetary Ridge.

I think I am remembering Lee having information that the Union may have appeared weak and still awaiting reinforcements at Little Round Top in the early morning hours...

Rereading an account of the battle is going to make a lot more sense now that I've been there.

 

[amweiner]

That's a great map. Is that from that book filled with Gettysburg maps? I have seen it, but don't own a copy.

So, Lee had not expected the Union to be on Cemetary Ridge? That seems odd as there doesn't seem to be any other defensible position between Cemetary Ridge.

I think I am remembering Lee having information that the Union may have appeared weak and still awaiting reinforcements at Little Round Top in the early morning hours...

Rereading an account of the battle is going to make a lot more sense now that I've been there.

I got that map straight from the Wikipedia entry on the second day's battle. Not the best source, I know, but it shows an approximation of what Lee had in mind rather than what did happen.

I read recently, but can't remember where, that Lee had a poor map of the Gettysburg area and so was hampered in his understanding of the Union dispositions. Considering also his strong reliance on Stuart, who wasn't on the field yet, and his minimal use of the cavalry present to do good recon, it's little wonder he had a vague sense of who was where. I have also read that Samuel Johnston, the staff officer who do a recon ride towards the Round Tops, did so in the early morning while Union troops were still coming up and getting into position. He probably came back with an incomplete picture of what was going on.

As for Cemetery Ridge, it's not very ridge-y. In a lot of places it's barely higher than the ground in front of it, so I don't know that the ANV would've seen it as an imposing defensive spot (like Marye's Heights, for example).

I have a nice book with detailed maps, Gettysburg: A Battlefield Atlas, by Craig Symonds.

Hope it helps a bit!

 

[Dom71]

In Allen Guelzo's book "The Last Invasion", he speaks of Lee's orders for day two being unaware that the 3rd corps. was on the field. Those attack orders were drawn up thinking the Union troops on cemetery ridge were the left flank, which is why his attack is heading up the Emmitsburg road. When Longstreet reaches the jumping off point they are stunned to find Union troops along the road in the Peach orchid.

 

[cwd22]

When Lee drew up his plans for the assault, he seemed to be under the impression that the 2nd Corps was at the left flank of the Union line. This would put the flank somewhere around the current location of the PA Monument.

From my entirely unprofessional understanding, he'd intended for Hood's division to advance up the valley of Plum Run in column and deploy into line somewhere around the George Weikert farm to strike the exposed flank. Meanwhile McLaws division was to advance with it's left flank aligned on the Emmitsburg Road to fall upon the front of the Union 2nd Corps en echelon.

However, when Longstreet's divisons arrived close to their intended positions later then planned they found the Union 3rd Corps blocking their intended route of assault and had to shift southward accordingly. At this point the Round Tops were still undefended and there was probably no knowledge that the 5th Corps was in close supporting distance.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

I got that map straight from the Wikipedia entry on the second day's battle. Not the best source, I know, but it shows an approximation of what Lee had in mind rather than what did happen.

I read recently, but can't remember where, that Lee had a poor map of the Gettysburg area and so was hampered in his understanding of the Union dispositions. Considering also his strong reliance on Stuart, who wasn't on the field yet, and his minimal use of the cavalry present to do good recon, it's little wonder he had a vague sense of who was where. I have also read that Samuel Johnston, the staff officer who do a recon ride towards the Round Tops, did so in the early morning while Union troops were still coming up and getting into position. He probably came back with an incomplete picture of what was going on.

As for Cemetery Ridge, it's not very ridge-y. In a lot of places it's barely higher than the ground in front of it, so I don't know that the ANV would've seen it as an imposing defensive spot (like Marye's Heights, for example).

I have a nice book with detailed maps, Gettysburg: A Battlefield Atlas, by Craig Symonds.

Hope it helps a bit!

Yes Lee depended on Stuart. Stuart should not only have been guarding the flank and rear (One of the reasons the attack is late is that Law (of Hood's Division) is off doing this and needs time to arrive. Also note they have alreadymarched over twenty miles on a very hot day before they attack) but his headquarters deals with collating intelligence. (Lee has a relatively small headquarters and it appears at times this additional task is too much for it).

Then there is the morning 'reconnaissance' of Samuel Johnston. Much has been written and said about this but it all appears very vague. Certainly it seems very unlikely he went where he said he did and anyway even if what he had reported was accurate (it wasnt) then the situation had changed even further by the time the attack actually happens.

I also have Gettysburg: A Battlefield Atlas, by Craig Symonds and if you like maps I can recommend it.

In Allen Guelzo's book "The Last Invasion", he speaks of Lee's orders for day two being unaware that the 3rd corps. was on the field. Those attack orders were drawn up thinking the Union troops on cemetery ridge were the left flank, which is why his attack is heading up the Emmitsburg road. When Longstreet reaches the jumping off point they are stunned to find Union troops along the road in the Peach orchid.

Only problem with that is that the 3rd Corps has been having a skirmisher duel with the forces in front of it for most of the day. Perhaps he didnt realise the size of the opposition but he must have known someone was somewhere in that vicinity. However he probably assumed that two of his best and largest divisions would sweep aside whoever they were...

 

[cash]

I can't remember where I read this, and I apologize for the lack of detail here, but my understanding of Lee's orders for Longstreet on Day 2 was for an attack from the southern end of the battlefield, moving essentially N-NE, with the left flank on the Emmitsburg Road. I remembered this, but thought that when I saw the actual battlefield and hiked this route (which I did over July 4th holiday a couple weeks ago) that I would understand the orders. Being there didn't help me out at all and I remain baffled by Lee's orders (perhaps these weren't his orders).

This would arrange a Confederate line from E to W (with the left flank on the Emmitsburg Road) while the Union line was mostly aligned N to S.

Assuming Sickles had followed orders, the Confederate line would therefore have been at roughly a right angle to the Union line, marching parallel to the Union position.

I also can't remember whether Hood was instructed to attack at first light or whether those orders were given on Day 2 after Longstreet's countermarch and then Sickle's position forced a modification of tactics.

Am I misunderstanding this?

Lee believed the Union line was about 100 or so yards to the west of its actual location, with the line ending about even with the Pennsylvania Memorial today. Lee's orders, then would result in a flank attack on the Union line.

 

[FZ11]

Here's the deal. Due to poor scouting,Lee thinks the Federal left does not extend much farther south beyond Cemetery Hill. Lee thinks that he can attack straddling and up the Emmitsburg Road and strike the left flank of Federals. Further examination of the position,variously attributed to scouts of Longstreet,McLaws,and/or Hood, discovers Sickles position stretches all the way to LRT. Therefore Lee decides to realign his attack from UP the Emmitsburg Road,to ACROSS the Emmitsburg Road toward Little Round Top. It takes some time to realign,and about 4 pm apprx. 22,000 men attack en echelon beginning with Hood from the Confederate right to left across the Emmitsburg Road toward Little Round Top with about 22,000 men. Just like Hood told 'em before the attack.......They can't take Little Round Top with a frontal assault. Others will have addl. info.

 

[WLamby]

BTW, my wife and I "marched" about 15 miles on a fairly hot day, from our hotel to the Billy Yank trail, and then with a couple of little extra (slightly lost?) miles to see all of the Day 2 and Day 3 battle geography (south of Culp's hill anyway which we drove up to just before leaving the city).

It was great to have some estimation of what Longstreet's troops did (except we weren't carrying a bunch of lead).

The plan looks marvelous if only it was made at first light and before Little Round Top was so thoroughly reinforced and if Sickles wasn't so... unpredictable.

 

[rpkennedy]

Then there is the morning 'reconnaissance' of Samuel Johnston. Much has been written and said about this but it all appears very vague. Certainly it seems very unlikely he went where he said he did and anyway even if what he had reported was accurate (it wasnt) then the situation had changed even further by the time the attack actually happens.

As for Johnston's ride, there are several possibilities for its terminus. A case can be made for a spot on the western slope of Big Round Top where the area in front of Cemetery Ridge could be observed in spite of the trees. Johnston might have been able to see the troop columns along lower Cemetery Ridge and likely Buford's cavalry around the Peach Orchard. I'll be entirely honest but I'm not convinced about this position.

There is also a compelling case to be made that Johnston arrived on the southern spur of Little Round Top where he very easily could have seen lower Cemetery Ridge and that Geary's men had already departed when he arrived so they would not have been noticed.

But, as you said, it's vague as to where he went and the situation had changed significantly by the time that Longstreet was in position in spite of Lee's expectations.

Ryan

 

[Scott Bowden]

I can't remember where I read this, and I apologize for the lack of detail here, but my understanding of Lee's orders for Longstreet on Day 2 was for an attack from the southern end of the battlefield, moving essentially N-NE, with the left flank on the Emmitsburg Road. I remembered this, but thought that when I saw the actual battlefield and hiked this route (which I did over July 4th holiday a couple weeks ago) that I would understand the orders. Being there didn't help me out at all and I remain baffled by Lee's orders (perhaps these weren't his orders).

This would arrange a Confederate line from E to W (with the left flank on the Emmitsburg Road) while the Union line was mostly aligned N to S.

Assuming Sickles had followed orders, the Confederate line would therefore have been at roughly a right angle to the Union line, marching parallel to the Union position.

I also can't remember whether Hood was instructed to attack at first light or whether those orders were given on Day 2 after Longstreet's countermarch and then Sickle's position forced a modification of tactics.

Am I misunderstanding this?

Hi. The issues concerning Lee's initial orders and how those were modified by Lee in the afternoon are covered in detail in chapters 6 and 7 of my book, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E Lee and the Gettysburg campaign.

Please see link:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0306812614/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

Regards,

Scott

 

[infomanpa]

Here is something that helped me.

 

[Scott Bowden]

Here is something that helped me.
View attachment 196994

Those maps as diagramed and labeled are very misleading. Besides, Longstreet didn't modify the plan (not to be confused with the tactical execution); Lee modified his original plan.

 

[Irishtom29]

Hi. The issues concerning Lee's initial orders and how those were modified by Lee in the afternoon are covered in detail in chapters 6 and 7 of my book, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E Lee and the Gettysburg campaign.

Please see link:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0306812614/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

Regards,

Scott

I'm not buying your book, elaborate here.

 

[infomanpa]

Those maps as diagramed and labeled are very misleading. Besides, Longstreet didn't modify the plan (not to be confused with the tactical execution); Lee modified his original plan.

Tell Noah Trudeau that. He's the author of the diagrams from the Gettysburg book that I referenced.

 

[W117Monte]

Here is something that helped me.
View attachment 196994

So the only reason that hood and Mclaws were split was so they could hit the salient in two sides? Based on those maps, it would appear the first plan might have also worked. If I'm reading it correctly.

 

[Scott1967]

As Far as I know Lee didn't have a clue where the Union line ended , Add to the Fact that the Union could quite clearly track Hoods and Mclaws Divisions from higher ground , You also have to factor in the III Corp which threw a spanner in the works as far as the Rebs were concerned.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing but I'm as baffled as anyone as to why Lee chose to attack on Day 2 you could say the momentum was with the ANV but without knowing Unions dispositions and numbers it was very uncharacteristic of Lee.

Does anyone have a thought on how Lee would have supported those two Divisions if they had succeeded on breaking through? After all its nearly 1 mile to Mclaws and 1.5 miles to Hood from AP Hills Corp.

 

[rpkennedy]

As Far as I know Lee didn't have a clue where the Union line ended , Add to the Fact that the Union could quite clearly track Hoods and Mclaws Divisions from higher ground , You also have to factor in the III Corp which threw a spanner in the works as far as the Rebs were concerned.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing but I'm as baffled as anyone as to why Lee chose to attack on Day 2 you could say the momentum was with the ANV but without knowing Unions dispositions and numbers it was very uncharacteristic of Lee.

Does anyone have a thought on how Lee would have supported those two Divisions if they had succeeded on breaking through? After all its nearly 1 mile to Mclaws and 1.5 miles to Hood from AP Hills Corp.

Longstreet wasn't supposed to break through. The idea was to roll the line north towards Hill, allowing him to join in on the attack.

Ryan