Lee's small staff - was it a problem?

[johncla]

Regardless of whatever was the optimal staff number for Lee, was any evidence found that his actual staffing structure seriously disadvantaged him or more so negatively affected the final outcomes of any of the major engagements of the AoNV?

Interesting comment. What counts as evidence?

1.There seems to be a consensus that AoNV cavalry was mis-managed.
2. We know that Mahone's brigade saw no action at Gettysburg, beyond skirmishing. Similar for Posey's brigade.
3. We know that AoNV suffered from road congestion crossing South Mountain, both on July 1 and July 5, and it seems that other roads were available.
4.We know that the July 2 attack happened very late in the day, and Coddington attributes this largely to delays in the needed pre-attack staff work.

Do we expect evidence linking these to lack of management horsepower? It seems pretty evident to me. Just my opinion, trying to clarify what I'm getting at. You folks are ALWAYS very good at finding holes in my ideas, and I value your feedback highly. Am I wrong here? Tell me.

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

Just my 2 cents - Lee needed a General Daniel Butterfield to organize him (well, the whole CSA army actually) and keep his staff straight and keep Davis where he needed to be but that was never going to happen. I don't know which man in the CSA that could have filled the hole.

Butterfield was a savant when it came to organizing armies and keeping them marching them correctly AND getting supplies, etc to them. He also was the first that required (at Gettysburg) at Meade's council of war, a vote on what they were going to do the next day. He kept everyone on task and they voted - no commanders got left off the hook and could say they changed their mind and there were NO vague orders running around. It's my personal belief that without Butterfield being charge of the council of war, Meade wouldn't have won.

If Lee had a Butterfield, there wouldn't have been a shad bake or a ride around Pennsylvania for Stuart. Jackson would still have been secretive but he wouldn't 'have been as secretive - everyone would have know what their role was and would have played their role instead of a lot of freewheeling that went on.

Lee gave a lot of orders open to a certain amount of interpretation by the commanders. Butterfield would have stopped that.

But the CSA and the governmental part in Richmond wasn't built along those lines so none of this was ever going to happen.

 

[Belfoured]

Remember, Ewell told Lee that he would attack CH but needed support on his right to do so. Lee declined support although Anderson was pretty closeby.

There's more than just that. Early whined to Ewell that his division wasn't up to it and Rodes's division was battered and disorganized. So that left only the arriving Johnson, while the Union position was gaining strength and the ANV had poor intel about that. Ewell's decision was the correct one from a military standpoint IMHO. In fact, I've always believed that if Lee had a staff large and competent enough he might have actually delegated somebody to ride to Ewell and advise - and that guy would have agreed with Ewell. Using up time with a courier riding back and forth and back was not even a poor substitute.

 

[Tom Elmore]

The staffs of both Lee and Meade consisted mainly of junior officers. What may have been needed were more senior officers with the rank clout to get things done.

Meade had Maj. Gen. Butterfield (as @NH Civil War Gal points out), also Lt. Col. Joseph Dickinson, plus roaming independents like Gens. Warren and Hunt, whose tactical judgment was sound but whose decisions might cause friction among combat commanders as we have seen (Hunt versus Hancock, for instance).

Lee had Col. Chilton as AAG but he was handling provost guard duties like his counterpart Brig. Gen. Marsena Patrick. Majors Venable and Marshall were kept busy attending to tactical battlefield matters. Who Lee really needed by his side was Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart (and his cavalry), whose independent judgment he trusted. Lee actions at Gettysburg show him to be a hands-on commander who attended to many details perhaps best handled by staff officers - that was his leadership style by choice, which offers advantages and disadvantages.

You mention Mahone and Posey, which would have been a matter for the division or corps commander to attend to, not Lee's staff.

Your point about additional retreat routes is well taken, but remember, besides Meade's cavalry, there were other ad-hoc cavalry and militia units hanging about in Lee's rear and, given the limited escort available, Lee chose to keep his large wagon train of wounded together under their charge. But additional deployed cavalry assets (Stuart again) could have kept his opponents from exploiting gaps like the one at South Mountain (Monterrey). However, I'm not sure a larger staff would have helped Lee overcome the inherent bottleneck constraints posed by the few available roads for the approach and retreat of his army.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Lee needed a General Daniel Butterfield to organize him (well, the whole CSA army actually) and keep his staff straight and keep Davis where he needed to be but that was never going to happen.

Agree about Dan Butterfield's demonstrated skills as a chief of staff. Thought effectiveness in this role partly depended too on the dynamics of the relationship with the army commander. Butterfield excelled in the job working for his friend and drinking buddy, Joe Hooker. Meade also recognized his abilities but retained him only temporarily, because he distrusted him.

Wonder whether Butterfield would have been effective in the job working alongside Lee, as his chief of staff. Thought Butterfield's ambitious and self-serving nature, as well as his penchant for getting involved in intrigues at the highest levels, might have rubbed the wrong way with Lee. There may well have been a clash of values between the pair that undermined the effectiveness of their working relationship. And besides, he was not a Virginian, which seemed to be a common denominator among Lee's key staff members.

Doubt he would have lasted long, if he got the position in Lee's army.

 

[Belfoured]

The staffs of both Lee and Meade consisted mainly of junior officers. What may have been needed were more senior officers with the rank clout to get things done.

Meade had Maj. Gen. Butterfield (as @NH Civil War Gal points out), also Lt. Col. Joseph Dickinson, plus roaming independents like Gens. Warren and Hunt, whose tactical judgment was sound but whose decisions might cause friction among combat commanders as we have seen (Hunt versus Hancock, for instance).

Lee had Col. Chilton as AAG but he was handling provost guard duties like his counterpart Brig. Gen. Marsena Patrick. Majors Venable and Marshall were kept busy attending to tactical battlefield matters. Who Lee really needed by his side was Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart (and his cavalry), whose independent judgment he trusted. Lee actions at Gettysburg show him to be a hands-on commander who attended to many details perhaps best handled by staff officers - that was his leadership style by choice, which offers advantages and disadvantages.

You mention Mahone and Posey, which would have been a matter for the division or corps commander to attend to, not Lee's staff.

Your point about additional retreat routes is well taken, but remember, besides Meade's cavalry, there were other ad-hoc cavalry and militia units hanging about in Lee's rear and, given the limited escort available, Lee chose to keep his large wagon train of wounded together under their charge. But additional deployed cavalry assets (Stuart again) could have kept his opponents from exploiting gaps like the one at South Mountain (Monterrey). However, I'm not sure a larger staff would have helped Lee overcome the inherent bottleneck constraints posed by the few available roads for the approach and retreat of his army.

"The staffs of both Lee and Meade consisted mainly of junior officers. What may have been needed were more senior officers with the rank clout to get things done."

That's the important issue IMHO - size relates to it because the optimum implementation would mean that you can afford to dispatch a guy with rank and authority to the scene instead of a courier riding back and forth. To be clear, I'm only addressing the size/composition of Lee's staff generally for an army of that size. I picked the July 1 example as a hypothetical focused only on the "discretionary" character of the orders.

 

[Belfoured]

Agree about Dan Butterfield's demonstrated skills as a chief of staff. Thought effectiveness in this role partly depended too on the dynamics of the relationship with the army commander. Butterfield excelled in the job working for his friend and drinking buddy, Joe Hooker. Meade also recognized his abilities but retained him only temporarily, because he distrusted him.

Wonder whether Butterfield would have been effective in the job working alongside Lee, as his chief of staff. Thought Butterfield's ambitious and self-serving nature, as well as his penchant for getting involved in intrigues at the highest levels, might have rubbed the wrong way with Lee. There may well have been a clash of values between the pair that undermined the effectiveness of their working relationship. And besides, he was not a Virginian, which seemed to be a common denominator among Lee's key staff members.

Doubt he would have lasted long, if he got the position in Lee's army.

One of the issues we need to keep in mind regarding Meade at Gettysburg is that he only became army CO three days earlier and had to scramble on everything in the midst of a rapidly evolving military crisis.

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

Meade also recognized his abilities but retained him only temporarily, because he distrusted him.

I'm a little surprised that you take such a harsh view of Butterfield. James Pula has written a very good book about him. Meade distrusted him but he honestly saved Meade's bacon at Gettysburg. Please give an example of him being self-serving anymore than anyone else was.

Gettysburg wasn't just about the active fighting on the battlefield. It was about ALL the armies passing to and fro on the roads leading into and out of Gettysburg. Butterfield was in charge of the order of how the army was going to pass on the roads, which troops/regiments needed to stand aside as they passed, etc. It was incredibly complicated. The average person only focuses on the battle - understandably so - but there was a whole lot of regiments, cavalry, artillery, supplies that had to support that and it simply had to proceed in a certain order. Butterfield was in charge of all that. This took several days - and if you were in the way with the artillery pounding through, you would simply be run over and that happened.

He also wasn't afraid of fighting and he was severely wounded at Gettysburg. Meade did not treat him right at all. Other commanders valued him and he went out to the Western Theater when he recovered. But he does not get the credit he should get for the success at Gettysburg. Meade was darn lucky to have him and should have known it but he acted in a shameful manner towards Butterfield.

I think one of the main issues of jealousy with Butterfield was officers were quite jealous of him because he was paid a full salary from his company during the time he was in the army. He came from a very wealthy family that was only getting richer, yet he was very generous with his money during and after the war, and even with the Confederates after the war.

Sherman thought highly of him and his skills and pulled him down to Atlanta. He was wounded again down there and never returned to active duty in the field.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I'm a little surprised that you take such a harsh view of Butterfield. James Pula has written a very good book about him. Meade distrusted him but he honestly saved Meade's bacon at Gettysburg. Please give an example of him being self-serving anymore than anyone else was.

Gettysburg wasn't just about the active fighting on the battlefield. It was about ALL the armies passing to and fro on the roads leading into and out of Gettysburg. Butterfield was in charge of the order of how the army was going to pass on the roads, which troops/regiments needed to stand aside as they passed, etc. It was incredibly complicated. The average person only focuses on the battle - understandably so - but there was a whole lot of regiments, cavalry, artillery, supplies that had to support that and it simply had to proceed in a certain order. Butterfield was in charge of all that. This took several days - and if you were in the way with the artillery pounding through, you would simply be run over and that happened.

He also wasn't afraid of fighting and he was severely wounded at Gettysburg. Meade did not treat him right at all. Other commanders valued him and he went out to the Western Theater when he recovered. But he does not get the credit he should get for the success at Gettysburg. Meade was darn lucky to have him and should have known it but he acted in a shameful manner towards Butterfield.

I think one of the main issues of jealousy with Butterfield was officers were quite jealous of him because he was paid a full salary from his company during the time he was in the army. He came from a very wealthy family that was only getting richer, yet he was very generous with his money during and after the war, and even with the Confederates after the war.

Sherman thought highly of him and his skills and pulled him down to Atlanta. He was wounded again down there and never returned to active duty in the field.

Thanks for the description of Butterfield's positive role as Meade's Chief of staff at Gettysburg.

Agree that Butterfield also served ably and loyally in the short period as Meade's Chief of staff and am not disputing his bravery under fire.

My focus was really on your implied question originally raised - Would Butterfield have done a similarly competent job as Chief of staff in Lee's Confederate army? (In raising that, have not had the benefit of reading Pula's work on Butterfield).

In making any such comparative evaluation, bear in mind that Butterfield would have been operating in another type of command structure that involved different personalities and a different culture.

Upon digging a bit deeper into Butterfield, found nothing specific during the CW to prove he was any more self-serving than other senior officers in the army. Perhaps his fundamental fault lie in the fact that he was too tight (aligned) with Hooker, and this led to a widespread perception that he was a Hooker partisan and could not be trusted by competing generals for command positions at the highest levels. It probably didn't help that Meade too was an able administrator, and this may have resulted in a further rivalry emerging between the pair of them. It's also noted that shortly following Gettysburg at the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, a bunch of disgruntled generals including Butterfield (who Meade removed as his Chief of staff on Jul. 14 after the battle), fabricated and contrived testimonies that Meade had mismanaged the battle and would have given up the fight on Jul. 2 if they had not persuaded him to do otherwise, and further that he let the Southern army escape. Meade in a later letter to John Gibbon on May 15, '64, blamed Butterfield as the main contriver by saying the latter had distorted his contingency plan for an orderly retreat into an abject giving up of the field. (See 'Gettysburg' by Stephen Sears, @ p. 588, note 18).

Found that personally the arrogant Butterfield was widely detested in the army. Apparently, when he was transferred to division command in Hooker's XX Corps at Atlanta, and before he fell ill and retired, the troops sarcastically nicknamed him , 'Dan the Magnificent'. (Don't know if that tag said something hidden or undesirable about his perceived personaliy flaws in command).

Without knowledge of any recorded instances to cite about him being excessively self-serving, a clue might be provided of Butterfield's command conduct by examining his postwar behavior - as people tend to repeat patterns of behavior. After Butterfield left active service, Noah Trudeau states in 'Gettysburg' (@ page 557), ...' He became a consummate inside operator during Grant's presidency, with a reputation for profiting from his circumstances'... This conduct might say something about Butterfield's enduring character.

My initial contention remains. Don't know if Butterfield could have adapted to being as effective a Chief of staff in the command hierarchy under Lee (who was so dissimilar to Hooker, and to Meade). Have doubts that the same synergies would have been present as there was while he retained that role in the same AotP over a six month period.

Merely my own viewpoint.

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

Well, let's not derail this thread into a Butterfield thread. My point was, Lee needed someone like a Butterfield (with his capabilities) to run things and liaise with Davis and other generals under his (Lee's) commands in an effective manner.

 

[rpkennedy]

I think that there were a couple issues with Lee's staff, some of which have been mentioned above. First, the size was too small in so far as there were multiple officers who were filling multiple roles. There were times when Lee had to personally attend to details that his staff should/could have handled but they were off doing other duties. For example, Lee had to sort out an army trains situation that his commissary or quartermaster officer should have dealt with. Additionally, many of the staff officers were not of a rank commensurate with their responsibilities. A wreath of stars on a collar might have put an exclamation point on some orders that a colonel just could not express. It certainly helped on July 2 that Gouverneur Warren could issue an order and expect a division commander to listen. No one is going to listen to an engineer lieutenant colonel but a brigadier general is another matter.

Lastly, and probably most importantly, the issue of competence and professionalism. While both sides were learning on the job (and there were definitely significant hurdles that had to be jumped for both armies), the Army of the Potomac just did a much better job in getting the best men into the positions where they could perform most efficiently. By 1863, the AotP's logistics were a well-run machine that Meade could pretty much rely on Rufus Ingalls to run. Now, part of that is that the Union's supply situation was on a whole other level than the AoNV's but having a super competent general kept a lot of logistics issues off of Meade's plate. Lee's staff simply never got that level of competency and Lee had to take on a lot of these issues himself in order to ensure they were done correctly.

Ryan

 

[FZ11]

There's more than just that. Early whined to Ewell that his division wasn't up to it and Rodes's division was battered and disorganized. So that left only the arriving Johnson, while the Union position was gaining strength and the ANV had poor intel about that. Ewell's decision was the correct one from a military standpoint IMHO. In fact, I've always believed that if Lee had a staff large and competent enough he might have actually delegated somebody to ride to Ewell and advise - and that guy would have agreed with Ewell. Using up time with a courier riding back and forth and back was not even a poor substitute.

Yeah, but then the question would be "Who is in command Ewell or Lee's Advisor". So, communication worked the only way it could work, back in the day. Ewell made the right call. Lee, made some wrong calls here, not related to staff. .02

 

[Belfoured]

I think that there were a couple issues with Lee's staff, some of which have been mentioned above. First, the size was too small in so far as there were multiple officers who were filling multiple roles. There were times when Lee had to personally attend to details that a his staff should/could have handled but they were off doing other duties. For example, Lee had to sort out an army trains situation that his commissary or quartermaster officer should have dealt with. Additionally, many of the staff officers were not of a rank commensurate with their responsibilities. A wreath of stars on a collar might have put an exclamation point on some orders that a colonel just could not express. It certainly helped on July 2 that Gouverneur Warren could issue an order and expect a division commander to listen. No one is going to listen to a lieutenant colonel engineer but a brigadier general is another matter.

Lastly, and probably most importantly, the issue of competence and professionalism. While both sides were learning on the job (and there were definitely significant hurdles that had to be jumped for both armies), the Army of the Potomac just did a much better job in getting the best men into the positions where they could perform most efficiently. By 1863, the AotP's logistics were a well-run machine that Meade could pretty much rely on Rufus Ingalls to run. Now, part of that is that the Union's supply situation was on a whole other level than the AoNV's but having a super competent general kept a lot of logistics issues off of Meade's plate. Lee's staff simply never got that level of competency and Lee had to take on a lot of these issues himself in order to ensure they were done correctly.

Ryan

That's a great point about Warren and rank/authority.

As I said above, I've always been puzzled that Lee's first experience with the ANV in the Seven Days did not prompt him to take a hard look at this issue. The staff work that week was a cluster - including, as you indicate he did generally, getting himself too personally involved with micromanagement.

 

[Belfoured]

Yeah, but then the question would be "Who is in command Ewell or Lee's Advisor". So, communication worked the only way it could work, back in the day. Ewell made the right call. Lee, made some wrong calls here, not related to staff. .02

I agree that Ewell made the right call. Where we may disagree is on my point that with the right staff Lee could send an officer with authority to give Ewell input as to Lee's intentions about "if practicable" based on the specific facts confronting Ewell. That's Lee "in command" - not Lee's Advisor.

 

[FZ11]

I agree that Ewell made the right call. Where we may disagree is on my point that with the right staff Lee could send an officer with authority to give Ewell input as to Lee's intentions about "if practicable" based on the specific facts confronting Ewell. That's Lee "in command" - not Lee's Advisor.

Yes, but Ewell has the on-site facts and multiple generals with him. Lee is off-site and has only his vague "if practicable" phraseology. Couriers were the only means of on field, personal, communication at the time. Guess Lee could have been his own courier and ridden to Ewell. I'm sure Lee was busy and tired, so he used couriers.

 

[Belfoured]

Yes, but Ewell has the on-site facts and multiple generals with him. Lee is off-site and has only his vague "if practicable" phraseology. Couriers were the only means of on field, personal, communication at the time. Guess Lee could have been his own courier and ridden to Ewell. I'm sure Lee was busy and tired, so he used couriers.

I think we may be miscommunicating. The point of sending a staff officer with authority is to ascertain the facts confronting Ewell and advise him as to how those fit the "if practicable" contingency in Lee's orders. I don't think we question whether Lee could have ridden over to Ewell and done that himself. But Lee needs to be handling more than just Ewell's sector. So the effective substitute is the guy I'm referring to. The problem is what you're pointing out - the only actual option for Lee on July 1 was a courier riding back and forth. I'm NOT saying Lee should have done that instead of a courier. I'm saying that his staff should have been large enough and qualified enough that Lee had another option.

 

[FZ11]

I think we may be miscommunicating. The point of sending a staff officer with authority is to ascertain the facts confronting Ewell and advise him as to how those fit the "if practicable" contingency in Lee's orders. I don't think we question whether Lee could have ridden over to Ewell and done that himself. But Lee needs to be handling more than just Ewell's sector. So the effective substitute is the guy I'm referring to. The problem is what you're pointing out - the only actual option for Lee on July 1 was a courier riding back and forth. I'm NOT saying Lee should have done that instead of a courier. I'm saying that his staff should have been large enough and qualified enough that Lee had another option.

So, what would the "other option " be? Walkie Talkies? Ewell is the commander, has numerous generals with him. Again, Ewell's question would be "Who is in command Me (Ewell) or this advisor? The advisor, you suggest, would have no more current information than Ewell, himself. They gotta use the courier system.

 

[Belfoured]

So, what would the "other option " be? Walkie Talkies? Ewell is the commander, has numerous generals with him. Again, Ewell's question would be "Who is in command Me (Ewell) or this advisor? The advisor, you suggest, would have no more current information than Ewell, himself. They gotta use the courier system.

Are we playing some sort of little game here? Ewell was smarter than that. If a high ranking staff officer ASSIGNED BY LEE is sent by Lee TO ACT IN LEE'S PLACE, assess the facts on the ground, and advise Ewell on what Lee intended was the meaning of "in practicable" in light of those facts, Ewell wasn't dumb enough not to get it. It has nothing to do with understanding an order that directed Ewell to "attack now", period. It applied to a contingent order. Or maybe you don't think even Lee could ride to Ewell and do that ...

 

[FZ11]

Are we playing some sort of little game here? Ewell was smarter than that. If a high ranking staff officer ASSIGNED BY LEE is sent by Lee TO ACT IN LEE'S PLACE, assess the facts on the ground, and advise Ewell on what Lee intended was the meaning of "in practicable" in light of those facts, Ewell wasn't dumb enough not to get it. It has nothing to do with understanding an order that directed Ewell to "attack now", period. It applied to a contingent order. Or maybe you don't think even Lee could ride to Ewell and do that ...

Well, then, Lee's advisor should be the commander, Not Ewell. Right?

 

[Belfoured]

Well, then, Lee's advisor should be the commander, Not Ewell. Right?

Try harder.