Lee's small staff - was it a problem?

[johncla]

I've seen comments that say Lee had a small staff. When I count the HQ officers listed in Laino's appendix I see twelve for Lee's HQ, ten for Meade. Did Lee truly have an unusually small staff?

If so, why? Was it Lee's preference, or due to a shortage of talented officers?

If Lee's staff was short-handed, was that a problem? Here's a list of issues that might be traced back to insufficient manpower on the HQ staff.

1. Cavalry mismanagement. a) It seems that Jones and Robertson's brigades were left without sufficient direction between June 25 and July 1. b) Was Imboden's brigade an under-used resource, and can that be traced back to an under-manned staff?

My opinion - Imboden showed himself in the fight at Williamsport on July 6 to be a pretty good battlefield commander. How would you rank Imboden, Kilpatrick and Pleasonton? 1. 2 and 3. Who is no 1? no 2? no 3?

2. Alternative routes across South Mountain. For example the road past the Caledonia Cold Springs Hotel to New Guilford? Or further north, the road from Arendtsville across to Shippensburg? Were there others? Apparently these roads do show up on Hotchkiss' map, so they were known. Maybe there weren't personnel available to evaluate these roads?

My sense is that the roads used in the retreat (July 4 - 7 or so) were choked, over-crowded. It looks like other roads were available to spread the load.

3. Keeping track of fresh units. Billy Mahones' brigade. Never used. Was it intentionally kept back as a reserve, or was it overlooked? Could it have been used in the Trimble/Pettigrew attack? Posey's brigade?

4. Attack planning was apparently under-resourced. Coddington (p371 in my paperback edition) partly blames the delay in starting the day 2 attack on the fact that recon was not done and planning not completed for the attack. "...it is likely that both divisions were on hand for deployment by 830am. ... The question of when they got there is immaterial, for until Lee and his officers had completed other preparations they could not be used." Ouch. Double ouch.

Was Lee's HQ staff short-handed? By preference, or due to lack of trained and experienced officers?

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I've seen comments that say Lee had a small staff. When I count the HQ officers listed in Laino's appendix I see twelve for Lee's HQ, ten for Meade. Did Lee truly have an unusually small staff?

If so, why? Was it Lee's preference, or due to a shortage of talented officers?

If Lee's staff was short-handed, was that a problem? Here's a list of issues that might be traced back to insufficient manpower on the HQ staff.

1. Cavalry mismanagement. a) It seems that Jones and Robertson's brigades were left without sufficient direction between June 25 and July 1. b) Was Imboden's brigade an under-used resource, and can that be traced back to an under-manned staff?

My opinion - Imboden showed himself in the fight at Williamsport on July 6 to be a pretty good battlefield commander. How would you rank Imboden, Kilpatrick and Pleasonton? 1. 2 and 3. Who is no 1? no 2? no 3?

2. Alternative routes across South Mountain. For example the road past the Caledonia Cold Springs Hotel to New Guilford? Or further north, the road from Arendtsville across to Shippensburg? Were there others? Apparently these roads do show up on Hotchkiss' map, so they were known. Maybe there weren't personnel available to evaluate these roads?

My sense is that the roads used in the retreat (July 4 - 7 or so) were choked, over-crowded. It looks like other roads were available to spread the load.

3. Keeping track of fresh units. Billy Mahones' brigade. Never used. Was it intentionally kept back as a reserve, or was it overlooked? Could it have been used in the Trimble/Pettigrew attack? Posey's brigade?

4. Attack planning was apparently under-resourced. Coddington (p371 in my paperback edition) partly blames the delay in starting the day 2 attack on the fact that recon was not done and planning not completed for the attack. "...it is likely that both divisions were on hand for deployment by 830am. ... The question of when they got there is immaterial, for until Lee and his officers had completed other preparations they could not be used." Ouch. Double ouch.

Was Lee's HQ staff short-handed? By preference, or due to lack of trained and experienced officers?

Good question indeed, @johncla. I don't pretend to know the answer, but I wonder in a related issue if Lee utilized a large number of regular staff couriers. If so, the smaller number of staff officers might not be as significant, as they could communicate Lee's and their messages, and get necessary responses as well.

 

[6thMichCav]

I have no qualifications to speak on the other questions, but as far as Imboden, Pleasanton and Kilpatrick, I would rank them in that order.

There are not enough bad things I can say about Judson Kilpatrick, so I will just leave it at that.

 

[Belfoured]

Good question indeed, @johncla. I don't pretend to know the answer, but I wonder in a related issue if Lee utilized a large number of regular staff couriers. If so, the smaller number of staff officers might not be as significant, as they could communicate Lee's and their messages, and get necessary responses as well.

I'm not pretending to answer all the questions in the OP but as a general rule I think Lee's staff was too small.

Everybody was on a learning curve with the novelty of much larger armies when the Civil War began. The tradition was extremely small staffs for much smaller armies. But as the War went on and experience showed the need for more and specialized staff, some army CO's - such as Grant - adapted. That's one area where Lee never really did. So his staff remained small and less specialized. Sending couriers back and forth wouldn't solve all that. Imagine, just for example, delegating a competent staff officer with authority to Ewell on July 1. I've made clear that I think Ewell objectively made the correct military decision but having a competent officer with authority present could have addressed the discretionary part of Lee's orders based on personal assessment of the situation.

 

[Belfoured]

I have no qualifications to speak on the other questions, but as far as Imboden, Pleasanton and Kilpatrick, I would rank them in that order.

There are not enough bad things I can say about Judson Kilpatrick, so I will just leave it at that.

And the three of them are not on a HOF list, by any stretch.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Lee's command & control reflected the experience he had commanding much smaller units. He was accustomed to managing battle spaces that he could see with his own eyes. The operations in Virginia were on landscapes he was familiar with. Local civilians flocked to Lee's HQ with reports that gave him a situational awareness that he did not have in Pennsylvania.

Strange as it may seem to us today, in 1863 no map of Pennsylvania existed. Local maps were oriented toward showing voting districts. The local map Lee had of the Gettysburg region only showed orchards because they were taxed.

Stonewall Jackson commissioned a large scale map of the operations area that included Pennsylvania. On that map, the word Gettysburg all but covered the battle space. Lee literally had no idea what the lay of the land was beyond the ridge where the Army of the Potomac was deployed. The Union commanders had the same problem with a lack of maps, but they had something that Lee did not.

This is where Lee's skeleton staff left him at a distinct disadvantage. The U.S. Signal Corps had 14 signal stations on high ground throughout the battle space. A signal team watched Pickett's charge, in effect, over Lee's shoulder from high ground behind his lines. Lee not having the staff to take advantage of the Confederate Signal Service assets that came into Pennsylvania with the Army of Northern Virginia led to severe tactical disruptions.

An example is the contrast between the Little Round Top Signal station vs Longstreet's famous maneuver to avoid being observed by it. Had a signal team ( ordinarily a mounted team of (+/-) six signalists ) been dispatched to a station of observation, Longstreet would have been in contact with them & onward to Lee's HQ. We know there was a signal station operating at Lee's HQ.

As it was Longstreet marched off blindly following orders that were hours old. We know how that went.

It did not have to be that way. Simultaneously, the Army of the Cumberland was in the final phase of the Tullahoma Campaign that began on July 24.

This is Rosecrans' map of Middle Tennessee.

This detail shows front from which the Army of the Cumberland jumped off. From Franklin to Works at Triune to Fortress Rosecrans at Murfreesboro to Fort Transit at Readyville to the XX Corps HQ at Bradyville the entire line was connected by couriers, telegraph & visual signals.

On the first week of June, Rosecrans' new signals staff officer & a completely worked up Beardslee Repeating Telegraph unit arrived at the arm HQ in Murfreesboro. On June 24 a 500 year rain event (TVA) soaked Middle Tennessee for a month. The sweeping envelopment of Bragg's right from Bradyville was slowed to a crawl. West of there is Old Fort Nash, now known as Beech Grove at the mouth of Hoover's Gap.

Wilder's Brigade of mounted infantry blitzed through Hoover's Gap & took up position at Old Fort Nash. Forcing the gap was predicted to take three days & cost 2,000 casualties. Thomas in person rode through the gap & immediately saw the opportunity that it created. He reported to Rosecrans who sent orders to the HQ in Murfreesboro via the Beardslee network. Because all of the officers concerned had detailed accurate maps, new orders were written & distributed during the night.

This is a detail of the map that Generals Stanley & Grainger had for their operation against Bragg's HQ in Shelbyville. The granular detail gave them a complete grasp of the battle space.

On the morning of the 25th the main axis of attack was changed to the XIV Corps advancing through the center. Bragg, in contrast had no idea that his left flank was gone for nearly 48 hours. With the Cumberlanders slogging through knee deep mud hooking toward his only connection to Chattanooga, Bragg ordered an immediate retreat. On July 4th as Grant sat down with Pemberton & Lee ordered the withdrawal from Gettysburg, the Cumberlanders were on top of Monteage Mountain & headed for the Tennessee River.

That is what an army level staff could do under the stress of a fifty mile wide advance, torrential rains & a night time complete change in the main thrust of the advance. In the dim light of a rain soaked dawn officers up & down the chain of command had clear orders stating what was expected of them along with accurate maps showing where they were expected to be. Compare that with Ewell passing Lee's order around asking what his staff made of Lee's ambiguous language.

On the morning of June 25 the Army of the Cumberland's front was (+/-) 80 miles wide. Gettysburg is 41 miles from the Potomac river crossing into Pennsylvania. Rosecrans had about the same number of troops as Lee did when he crossed. Lee desperately needed staff, logistics, a functioning signal net, commanders who knew how to use it along with men up & down the chain of command who reported what they saw via that network. We know what happened when a Civil War army advanced into enemy territory without it.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I'm not pretending to answer all the questions in the OP but as a general rule I think Lee's staff was too small.

Everybody was on a learning curve with the novelty of much larger armies when the Civil War began. The tradition was extremely small staffs for much smaller armies. But as the War went on and experience showed the need for more and specialized staff, some army CO's - such as Grant - adapted. That's one area where Lee never really did. So his staff remained small and less specialized. Sending couriers back and forth wouldn't solve all that. Imagine, just for example, delegating a competent staff officer with authority to Ewell on July 1. I've made clear that I think Ewell objectively made the correct military decision but having a competent officer with authority present could have addressed the discretionary part of Lee's orders based on personal assessment of the situation.

Good logic, @Belfoured.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Did Lee truly have an unusually small staff?

If so, why? Was it Lee's preference, or due to a shortage of talented officers?

If Lee's staff was short-handed, was that a problem?

Interesting questions put out.

Regardless of whatever was the optimal staff number for Lee, was any evidence found that his actual staffing structure seriously disadvantaged him or more so negatively affected the final outcomes of any of the major engagements of the AoNV?

Could poor staff work (due to inadequate staffing) have been responsible for the loss of SO 191 prior to Antietam?

My limited knowledge of Lee's personality and command style is that he possibly preferred a leaner staffing structure. Also, there would have been a relatively small pool of suitable senior officers to choose from for such roles, especially as the casualty counts mounted through the course of the war.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I'm not pretending to answer all the questions in the OP but as a general rule I think Lee's staff was too small.

Everybody was on a learning curve with the novelty of much larger armies when the Civil War began. The tradition was extremely small staffs for much smaller armies. But as the War went on and experience showed the need for more and specialized staff, some army CO's - such as Grant - adapted. That's one area where Lee never really did. So his staff remained small and less specialized. Sending couriers back and forth wouldn't solve all that. Imagine, just for example, delegating a competent staff officer with authority to Ewell on July 1. I've made clear that I think Ewell objectively made the correct military decision but having a competent officer with authority present could have addressed the discretionary part of Lee's orders based on personal assessment of the situation.

Belfoured raises a good point. The only army Lee had ever experienced in the field was during the war with Mexico. At Buona Vista Taylor commanded 5,000 men. General Scott's force grossed at (+/-) 10,000 but rampant disease ravaged the ranks so the actual number answering the roll at any given time is unknowable.

Obviously, Lee, like many officers in the Civil War command style was inevitably based on what amounted to divisional & corps commands. There had to be a certain amount of "muscle memory" carried forward. Davis' Mexican War experience is cited as shaping his actions as generalissimo.

 

[JerryD]

I have seen it written by people who should know much better than I that CSA generals tended to have smaller staffs than was optimal. One reason being that staff officers were not considered fighters and it was better to have competent young men leading on the battlefield. Thus the CSA Congress only authorized a limited number of staff positions. Seems a bit shortsighted to me, but that was the explanation.

I have also seen it written that Lee in particular could have benefitted from a larger staff given his age. More staff would have meant less work for him to do, so he could preserve his strength and health for more important matters. Whether this was really an issue or not, I don't know, but the logic seems pretty solid. I just don't know how much actual work Lee was doing that he could have foisted onto a trusted subordinate.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

Good question indeed, @johncla. I don't pretend to know the answer, but I wonder in a related issue if Lee utilized a large number of regular staff couriers. If so, the smaller number of staff officers might not be as significant, as they could communicate Lee's and their messages, and get necessary responses as well.

Yes, Lee did utilize staff couriers who were strictly speaking, not directly attached to his staff. That is the argument made by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. In his book Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons: Stand Headquarters Operations in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865. Lee relied a great deal on ancillary personnel attached to his headquarters to backstop his assigned staff. All generals of the period did much the same thing.

That said, Lee's staff was too small. A US Army infantry division in the Second World War, containing about 17,000 men, had in 1943, an authorized headquarters staff of 149 personnel (although that includes personal staff, general staff and special staff) to manage operations. An army the size of the ANV definitely needed far more trained staff than Lee ever had, possibly by an entire order of magnitude but that was never going to happen.

Incidentally, Grant's own staff was also seriously undermanned. As Lieutenant General Commanding the Armies of the United States, his headquarters had all of twenty officers assigned to it at the beginning of the Overland campaign. He could have done with trained staff officers too. Grant was fortunate to have John Rawlins as his Chief of Staff. Lee certainly never had a man of that caliber in his command.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Yes, Lee did utilize staff couriers who were strictly speaking, not directly attached to his staff. That is the argument made by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. In his book Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons: Stand Headquarters Operations in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865. Lee relied a great deal on ancillary personnel attached to his headquarters to backstop his assigned staff. All generals of the period did much the same thing.

That said, Lee's staff was too small. A US Army infantry division in the Second World War, containing about 17,000 men, had in 1943, an authorized headquarters staff of 149 personnel (although that includes personal staff, general staff and special staff) to manage operations. An army the size of the ANV definitely needed far more trained staff than Lee ever have, possibly by an entire order of magnitude but that was never going to happen.

Incidentally, Grant's own staff was also seriously undermanned. As Lieutenant General Commanding the Armies of the United States, his headquarters had all of twenty officers assigned to it at the beginning of the Overland campaign. He could have done with trained staff officers too. Grant was fortunate to have John Rawlins as his Chief of Staff. Lee certainly never had a man of that caliber in his command.

Good info., @35th MA InfRegt. I do believe that Lee had some good staff officers, such as Walter Taylor and Charles Marshall. Additionally, Lee usually utilized his staff fairly effectively.

The information below was taken from JohnsMilitaryHistory.com.
"Civil War generals, especially Lee, are often criticized for having inadequate and inefficient staffs, and these criticisms are not without justification.

There are few books dedicated to the subject, with J Boone Bartholomees' "Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons" among them. Bartolomees concludes that Lee's staff, larger than it appeared, was large but at the same time not large enough.

Lee's staff, often described as 14 general staff officers, may have been just part of a much larger HQ group of up to 695 total. This figure was around 390 in 1863-64 and around 80 at Appomattox. That being said, what these numbers actually count is not clear, but they seem to include numerous support personnel such as clerks and couriers in addition to actual staff officers. Major Taylor had five clerks, for example, and 25 couriers were used in the Second Manassas campaign to send messages between Lee and Jackson, and couriers were also used to send messages to and from signal flag and semaphore stations.

Lee was known to borrow officers from other units when all his staff was occupied! (Bartholomees 7-12, 203, 206, 213)"

 

[Belfoured]

Yes, Lee did utilize staff couriers who were strictly speaking, not directly attached to his staff. That is the argument made by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. In his book Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons: Stand Headquarters Operations in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865. Lee relied a great deal on ancillary personnel attached to his headquarters to backstop his assigned staff. All generals of the period did much the same thing.

That said, Lee's staff was too small. A US Army infantry division in the Second World War, containing about 17,000 men, had in 1943, an authorized headquarters staff of 149 personnel (although that includes personal staff, general staff and special staff) to manage operations. An army the size of the ANV definitely needed far more trained staff than Lee ever had, possibly by an entire order of magnitude but that was never going to happen.

Incidentally, Grant's own staff was also seriously undermanned. As Lieutenant General Commanding the Armies of the United States, his headquarters had all of twenty officers assigned to it at the beginning of the Overland campaign. He could have done with trained staff officers too. Grant was fortunate to have John Rawlins as his Chief of Staff. Lee certainly never had a man of that caliber in his command.

Grant did, however, expand his staff size and capabilities for army command after 1862 in a way that Lee did not. You're referring to the staff Grant had as G-in-C with him in the field for the Overland Campaign. I think that's mixing "apples and oranges" in a sense, given that his HQ technically was in Washington and for dealing with other departments/armies he also had somebody named Halleck as his "central office" director. Purely opinion ...

One would think that Lee would have grasped the need after the multiple screw ups during the Seven Days ...

 

[Belfoured]

Good info., @35th MA InfRegt. I do believe that Lee had some good staff officers, such as Walter Taylor and Charles Marshall. Additionally, Lee usually utilized his staff fairly effectively.

The information below was taken from JohnsMilitaryHistory.com.
"Civil War generals, especially Lee, are often criticized for having inadequate and inefficient staffs, and these criticisms are not without justification.

There are few books dedicated to the subject, with J Boone Bartholomees' "Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons" among them. Bartolomees concludes that Lee's staff, larger than it appeared, was large but at the same time not large enough.

Lee's staff, often described as 14 general staff officers, may have been just part of a much larger HQ group of up to 695 total. This figure was around 390 in 1863-64 and around 80 at Appomattox. That being said, what these numbers actually count is not clear, but they seem to include numerous support personnel such as clerks and couriers in addition to actual staff officers. Major Taylor had five clerks, for example, and 25 couriers were used in the Second Manassas campaign to send messages between Lee and Jackson, and couriers were also used to send messages to and from signal flag and semaphore stations.

Lee was known to borrow officers from other units when all his staff was occupied! (Bartholomees 7-12, 203, 206, 213)"

My own opinion is that his staff officers at the Taylor/Marshall level were too few and without enough support. As I noted, couriers are great for carrying orders and messages but that doesn't address decision-making and execution regarding the numerous requirements of a sizable army on campaign. What might have sufficed for Scott's 10,000 man army in Mexico was woefully inadequate for an army that, for example, during the Seven Days was c. 105,000-110,000. Hardly a coincidence that staff work for the ANV that week was a debacle.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

Grant did, however, expand his staff size and capabilities for army command after 1862 in a way that Lee did not. You're referring to the staff Grant had as G-in-C with him in the field for the Overland Campaign. I think that's mixing "apples and oranges" in a sense, given that his HQ technically was in Washington and for dealing with other departments/armies he also had somebody named Halleck as his "central office" director. Purely opinion ...

One would think that Lee would have grasped the need after the multiple screw ups during the Seven Days ...

Oh, I don't argue with the notion that Grant made more effective use of his staff than Lee, and had higher grade officers to boot. And yes, Grant in the field was back stopped by Halleck in Washington. I was merely expressing my opinion that Grant's field headquarters could have been larger. I should have made that more clear.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Oh, I don't argue with the notion that Grant made more effective use of his staff than Lee, and had higher grade officers to boot. And yes, Grant in the field was back stopped by Halleck in Washington. I was merely expressing my opinion that Grant's field headquarters could have been larger. I should have made that more clear.

I believe there is a misconception. Have you read Grant's telegraphic messages in the Thomas Eckert Collection at the Huntington Library? All of the telegrams between City Point & Washington are there. I realize that our Virginia eccentric friends have a hard time with the continental war Grant was managing. Anyways, what Grant's HQ was actually sending to Washington will be revelatory. The entire staff in Washington was Grant's, QM General, Ordinance Dept, Medical, every Army commander, etc, et al. Absolutely everyone reported to Grant… Somebody had to verify routine promotions in California after all.

 

[Cavalier]

I don't remember where I read this but I believe that the contention was that the staff of a Division commander in Napoleon's army was larger then the staffs of either Meade or Lee at Gettysburg and that at least 12 member of the Division commanders were officers of field grade.

John

 

[FZ11]

I'm not pretending to answer all the questions in the OP but as a general rule I think Lee's staff was too small.

Everybody was on a learning curve with the novelty of much larger armies when the Civil War began. The tradition was extremely small staffs for much smaller armies. But as the War went on and experience showed the need for more and specialized staff, some army CO's - such as Grant - adapted. That's one area where Lee never really did. So his staff remained small and less specialized. Sending couriers back and forth wouldn't solve all that. Imagine, just for example, delegating a competent staff officer with authority to Ewell on July 1. I've made clear that I think Ewell objectively made the correct military decision but having a competent officer with authority present could have addressed the discretionary part of Lee's orders based on personal assessment of the situation.

Remember, Ewell told Lee that he would attack CH but needed support on his right to do so. Lee declined support although Anderson was pretty closeby.

 

[Old Soldier]

Lee's command & control reflected the experience he had commanding much smaller units. He was accustomed to managing battle spaces that he could see with his own eyes. The operations in Virginia were on landscapes he was familiar with. Local civilians flocked to Lee's HQ with reports that gave him a situational awareness that he did not have in Pennsylvania.

Strange as it may seem to us today, in 1863 no map of Pennsylvania existed. Local maps were oriented toward showing voting districts. The local map Lee had of the Gettysburg region only showed orchards because they were taxed.

Stonewall Jackson commissioned a large scale map of the operations area that included Pennsylvania. On that map, the word Gettysburg all but covered the battle space. Lee literally had no idea what the lay of the land was beyond the ridge where the Army of the Potomac was deployed. The Union commanders had the same problem with a lack of maps, but they had something that Lee did not.

This is where Lee's skeleton staff left him at a distinct disadvantage. The U.S. Signal Corps had 14 signal stations on high ground throughout the battle space. A signal team watched Pickett's charge, in effect, over Lee's shoulder from high ground behind his lines. Lee not having the staff to take advantage of the Confederate Signal Service assets that came into Pennsylvania with the Army of Northern Virginia led to severe tactical disruptions.

An example is the contrast between the Little Round Top Signal station vs Longstreet's famous maneuver to avoid being observed by it. Had a signal team ( ordinarily a mounted team of (+/-) six signalists ) been dispatched to a station of observation, Longstreet would have been in contact with them & onward to Lee's HQ. We know there was a signal station operating at Lee's HQ.

As it was Longstreet marched off blindly following orders that were hours old. We know how that went.

It did not have to be that way. Simultaneously, the Army of the Cumberland was in the final phase of the Tullahoma Campaign that began on July 24.

Maps
Maps in these far away time were NOT the maps we see today. They often showed particular resources (those orchards!) or were simple road maps. Town plans were often not kept up to date, they changed so quickly. Rivers and coasts were generally well-mapped as often they were the only surveyable asset. Relief - the shape of the land - was still by illustration (mountain peaks or 'rolling hills') or by hatchure - a form of hill-shading which was supposed to show the path of water down a slope. Real contours - lines joining points of the same height - were rare as they required a detailed survey and fairly close spot height surveys. They were used, but was more to show form, not height. No GPS in those days, just map and compass.

Staff
Don't try to compare these campaigns with any modern (post 1900) military activity. Telegraph was only just becoming relevant and for many generals the only form of signalling was by flag - visual distances only. Yes, the general-in-charge basically still looked out over the battle and directed from his point of view. Very 18th Century, but still effective. Given the tactics and training of both armies it would seem to be appropriate. Most of the generals would have experience in this sort of command.

However, there were a lot more staff needed just to support that army properly in the field. The dreaded 'Logistics'. Equipment, ammunition, food, water were all needed and would probably account for 60% or more of staff. they often operated away from the 'general staff'. It is often forgotten or overlooked. That was one aspect of Lee's (and Sherman's) marches - lack of logistic support - living off the land.

We tend to forget just how rapidly things were changing in the 1860s. Technology, tactics - and command. It has to be said that both sides tended to be 'behind the times' since they had little practical experience and they were often operating on 'good guess' principles (and crossed fingers!). Communication was the key, but not yet evolved effectively. The Brits and French discovered this during the Crimean War (1854-56) and things changed rapidly afterwards - not always in the same direction however.

 

[johncla]

Strange as it may seem to us today, in 1863 no map of Pennsylvania existed. Local maps were oriented toward showing voting districts. The local map Lee had of the Gettysburg region only showed orchards because they were taxed.

Stonewall Jackson commissioned a large scale map of the operations area that included Pennsylvania.

I'm not sure WHEN Lee got a good map, but it seems Jedidiah Hotchkiss was on his staff. I remember reading in accounts of the retreat that on the afternoon of the 3rd Lee asked Hotchkiss to make a map of the routes back to Williamsport and the river. I assume Hotchkiss delivered.as requested.

And, see in the attached screencap the legend from a map in the 'Atlas to the OR'. This is a wonderful map I have used on my YouTube channel. If you've ever wondered (I have) where Bonaughton, Mummasburg, and Greenwood are located, this is the map for you. From the text in the legend I infer that this map found in the OR is the FEDERAL version of a Hotchkiss map. So when was the Hotchkiss version of this map available to Genl Lee?