How would you rate Rosecrans?

[NedBaldwin]

Are you suggesting regular rank was senior to volunteer rank? If so then this is wrong. Seniority in a rank is only about the order on the army register (i.e. date of Commission, and order if multiples on the same date), irrespective of whether the Commission is in the regular or volunteer force.

Halleck to McClellan, Feb 19, 1862:
"It was decided in the Mexican war that regulars ranked volunteers, without regard to dates."

 

[67th Tigers]

See page 33 here: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

"campaign — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space."

Major operations in the Civil War were the battles and the movement to the battles.

You flub in defining all of McClellan's operations as a campaign, since his objective in the Peninsula Campaign differed from his objective in the Seven Days Campaign. Lee's Seven Days Campaign had its own objective.

Okay, you persist in calling the Seven Days Battle a "campaign", and separating it from the Peninsula Campaign. In this very odd definition does the Pennsylvania Reserves crossing to Coggin's Point in July '62, and the cavalry recce'ing Petersburg count as a new campaign? Does McClellan advancing two divisions to Malvern Hill in August '62 start another campaign?

Dishonest. It was a correct list of engagements that proved Grant was indeed active. You were shown to be wrong and now you lack the intellectual integrity to admit it.

If what you claimed had any truth, it would be scandalous. Since your claim has no validity, then we don't need to worry.

I see. Yet when I looked at the list of engagements you provided many proved to be (a) Confederate movements, (b) minor recces and (c) naval battles. However now you simply repeat your original assertion without modification.

I can repeat myself without fear of effective contradiction I fear; Grant made faltering movements in his plan to cut Lee's supply lines, four of them roughly 4, 9, 13 and 35 weeks after the Crater, and conducted two cavalry raids 18-19 and 25 weeks post Crater. That's a statement of Grant's activity. Everything you added simply shows the need to move the goalposts to absolve Grant.

Yet so apparently scandalous is Grant's relative lethargy (which parallels similar periods in late '62, early '63, and late '64) that you feel the need to try and deny it.

Overstate much? Yes, you do. "Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan's attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion."
http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va015.htm

Only because the attacks were repulsed. For example: http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va080.htm
I didn't say those particular attacks were more or less significant than any other action. You're the one who claimed Oak Grove was "a significant offensive." To call that claim hyperbole is being charitable.

http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va080.htm

As usual, what you claim has no relation to fact.

Indeed. However Oak Grove was a significant offensive, and was long planned as the precondition of a general assault. In modern terms this was securing the line of departure. McClellan's army successfully advanced their left wing a mile on the 25th, and on the 26th Coys B, I and K of the 1st Ct Heavy Arty brought their siege guns up. Another similar operation on 6th Corps front was planned for the 27th-28th, with all the guns supporting the assault to be in place that night. Hence to a general bombardment and assault.

Oak Grove has essentially no relation to Gaines Mill etc., excepting that both relate to the roads drying out to be able to move artillery. McClellan was pursuing his plan to bring up heavy guns within range of the fortifications, smash them, and suppress the enemy enough to get his infantry through the enemy killing areas and into the assault. Lee developed a plan to try and prevent this by cutting off McClellan's supplies and hence force him out of his trenches where he might by attacked. McClellan didn't abandon his plan of assaulting Richmond until late on the 27th, when Porter collapsed and the supply depot was lost. After some flux on the 28th-30th his planning had crystallised by Malvern Hill into a crossing of the James and making a run for Petersburg, hence he starting the process of trying to get pontoons sent to him to bridge the James.

So McClellan wasn't at the front? Didn't he spend time on the USS Galena during the battle as well?

During the fighting on Porter's front McClellan's CP was 3/4ths of a mile from the infantry fighting. It is a good position where you can see and influence the whole field, and had signals comms to 4 other stations (essentially the ones on the left, center and right of the army and the fleet).

He was on the USS Galena from 0915 to 1130, when at Harrison's he signals for a tug to take him ashore. He apparently takes another ship back upriver, as the logs don't record him boarding again. The Galena ran back upriver at 1330 anchoring off Haxall's around 1400. It seems it was probably one of the two ships that ran upriver in the interim (or maybe Galenas officers were sloppy, very possible). He'd left a written order stating that Sumner was in command during his absence, and this became a point of contention as Sumner ordered the position on Malvern abandoned and Porter refused the order.

McClellan returned before the fighting, sided with Porter and remained (excepting his tour of the front) at his command post during the fighting.

At 2000 McClellan signals that he'd like Rodgers to come ashore to communicate, and Rodgers leaves in the boat at 2010 with van Vliet. This would be him being asked to attend McClellan's O-group at the orchard near Malvern House. McClellan boards the Galena with Rodgers at 2300 and they steam down to Harrison's in signals comms with the station established there by the party that accompanied McClellan ashore ca. 1130, who signal the arrival of units throughout the night.

 

[67th Tigers]

I am not wrong. On the register, regular generals were ordered first, volunteer after; by regulation that is how it worked -- regular army generals were senior to volunteer generals of the same grade, regardless of date.

Yep, I missed the change which is in the Army Regulations thus: https://books.google.be/books?id=xb...lunteer rank&pg=PA10#v=snippet&q=rank&f=false

Thanks for correcting me.

 

[David Moore]

It is odd to me that you accuse others of not being clear and whine about short replies but then you write things like this question. Why should he go through Chase?


Yes, thus i havent made any point about it.

I fear this has devolved into semantics.
Rosecrans like anyone in a position of power wanted authority that would enable him to carry out his plans without interference.
He had had bad experiences in WV and NE Mississippi with those above him. Rosecrans I think was forthright in going to the man constitutionally at the top of the military. He didn't go through a member of congress to ask for what he wanted. He of course also communicated with Halleck and Stanton. Chase was the closest thing Rosecrans had to a political sponsor. He could have written to Chase and asked for him to pull strings to get his commission date changed. He could have used the leverage of having been sought out by Horace Greeley as a presidential candidate to seek a higher rank like Washburne did for Grant.
The relationship of politicians and generals in the war is an interesting and important one. Chase claimed to have pulled strings for Rosecrans (Lamers p 186) and to have used his influence to promote Rosecrans' military ideas (Lamers p 94.)
Chase had an interest in this too as he had political ambitions that could benefit from being associated with a successful general. It is also interesting that Chase was the person in Washington whom Garfield wrote to to express his unhappiness with Rosecrans after Tullahoma. The rise and fall of generals can't be understood without understanding the politics of the war. I shall repeat the words of General Ord written in 1864 (sorry Mr Porter):

"...the politicians still control matters here- or seek to control them so that a general who is simply governed by military interests, and discards politics would be pulled to pieces and turned away -"

Given all this I can't fault Rosecrans for going right to the top in expressing his opinions.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I havent faulted Rosecrans for going to the top with his requests; I have faulted him for whining about a personal matter. The date of his commission had no bearing on "authority that would enable him to carry out his plans without interference." You keep trying to frame it as having something to do with his responsibilities as commander, like the requests about paymasters were. But the request for changing the date of his rank was purely personal.

I fear this has devolved into semantics.
Rosecrans like anyone in a position of power wanted authority that would enable him to carry out his plans without interference.
He had had bad experiences in WV and NE Mississippi with those above him. Rosecrans I think was forthright in going to the man constitutionally at the top of the military. He didn't go through a member of congress to ask for what he wanted. He of course also communicated with Halleck and Stanton. Chase was the closest thing Rosecrans had to a political sponsor. He could have written to Chase and asked for him to pull strings to get his commission date changed. He could have used the leverage of having been sought out by Horace Greeley as a presidential candidate to seek a higher rank like Washburne did for Grant.
The relationship of politicians and generals in the war is an interesting and important one. Chase claimed to have pulled strings for Rosecrans (Lamers p 186) and to have used his influence to promote Rosecrans' military ideas (Lamers p 94.)
Chase had an interest in this too as he had political ambitions that could benefit from being associated with a successful general. It is also interesting that Chase was the person in Washington whom Garfield wrote to to express his unhappiness with Rosecrans after Tullahoma. The rise and fall of generals can't be understood without understanding the politics of the war. I shall repeat the words of General Ord written in 1864 (sorry Mr Porter):

"...the politicians still control matters here- or seek to control them so that a general who is simply governed by military interests, and discards politics would be pulled to pieces and turned away -"

Given all this I can't fault Rosecrans for going right to the top in expressing his opinions.

 

[cash]

Okay, you persist in calling the Seven Days Battle a "campaign", and separating it from the Peninsula Campaign. In this very odd definition does the Pennsylvania Reserves crossing to Coggin's Point in July '62, and the cavalry recce'ing Petersburg count as a new campaign? Does McClellan advancing two divisions to Malvern Hill in August '62 start another campaign?



I see. Yet when I looked at the list of engagements you provided many proved to be (a) Confederate movements, (b) minor recces and (c) naval battles. However now you simply repeat your original assertion without modification.

I can repeat myself without fear of effective contradiction I fear; Grant made faltering movements in his plan to cut Lee's supply lines, four of them roughly 4, 9, 13 and 35 weeks after the Crater, and conducted two cavalry raids 18-19 and 25 weeks post Crater. That's a statement of Grant's activity. Everything you added simply shows the need to move the goalposts to absolve Grant.

Yet so apparently scandalous is Grant's relative lethargy (which parallels similar periods in late '62, early '63, and late '64) that you feel the need to try and deny it.



Indeed. However Oak Grove was a significant offensive, and was long planned as the precondition of a general assault. In modern terms this was securing the line of departure. McClellan's army successfully advanced their left wing a mile on the 25th, and on the 26th Coys B, I and K of the 1st Ct Heavy Arty brought their siege guns up. Another similar operation on 6th Corps front was planned for the 27th-28th, with all the guns supporting the assault to be in place that night. Hence to a general bombardment and assault.

Oak Grove has essentially no relation to Gaines Mill etc., excepting that both relate to the roads drying out to be able to move artillery. McClellan was pursuing his plan to bring up heavy guns within range of the fortifications, smash them, and suppress the enemy enough to get his infantry through the enemy killing areas and into the assault. Lee developed a plan to try and prevent this by cutting off McClellan's supplies and hence force him out of his trenches where he might by attacked. McClellan didn't abandon his plan of assaulting Richmond until late on the 27th, when Porter collapsed and the supply depot was lost. After some flux on the 28th-30th his planning had crystallised by Malvern Hill into a crossing of the James and making a run for Petersburg, hence he starting the process of trying to get pontoons sent to him to bridge the James.



During the fighting on Porter's front McClellan's CP was 3/4ths of a mile from the infantry fighting. It is a good position where you can see and influence the whole field, and had signals comms to 4 other stations (essentially the ones on the left, center and right of the army and the fleet).

He was on the USS Galena from 0915 to 1130, when at Harrison's he signals for a tug to take him ashore. He apparently takes another ship back upriver, as the logs don't record him boarding again. The Galena ran back upriver at 1330 anchoring off Haxall's around 1400. It seems it was probably one of the two ships that ran upriver in the interim (or maybe Galenas officers were sloppy, very possible). He'd left a written order stating that Sumner was in command during his absence, and this became a point of contention as Sumner ordered the position on Malvern abandoned and Porter refused the order.

McClellan returned before the fighting, sided with Porter and remained (excepting his tour of the front) at his command post during the fighting.

At 2000 McClellan signals that he'd like Rodgers to come ashore to communicate, and Rodgers leaves in the boat at 2010 with van Vliet. This would be him being asked to attend McClellan's O-group at the orchard near Malvern House. McClellan boards the Galena with Rodgers at 2300 and they steam down to Harrison's in signals comms with the station established there by the party that accompanied McClellan ashore ca. 1130, who signal the arrival of units throughout the night.

And the double standard continues. McClellan gets attacked and he's not guilty of lethargy. Grant gets attacked and he's guilty of lethargy.

Grant "high-tails it to his boat" but McClellan "boards" his boat.

Fan boys love their double standards to elevate their heroes by denigrating better generals.

 

[67th Tigers]

Fan boys love their double standards to elevate their heroes by denigrating better generals.

Yes they do. The irony is of course that this applies to you, and you don't see it.

I should state that it seems you have a very unrealistic impression of Grant, who is not a general without ability, but also is one lacking in some areas. The war produced no perfect generals, but what war has? Grant, Rosecrans and McClellan were all good generals with different strengths and weaknesses.

In the specific cases we're arguing about Grant really did become, as Lincoln put it, "McClellanized" at Richmond.

 

[Rebforever]

Yes they do. The irony is of course that this applies to you, and you don't see it.

I should state that it seems you have a very unrealistic impression of Grant, who is not a general without ability, but also is one lacking in some areas. The war produced no perfect generals, but what war has? Grant, Rosecrans and McClellan were all good generals with different strengths and weaknesses.

In the specific cases we're arguing about Grant really did become, as Lincoln put it, "McClellanized" at Richmond.

Well, one has to admit, General Robert Edward Lee might have had something to do with that!

 

[Horace Porter]

Yes they do. The irony is of course that this applies to you, and you don't see it.

I should state that it seems you have a very unrealistic impression of Grant, who is not a general without ability, but also is one lacking in some areas. The war produced no perfect generals, but what war has? Grant, Rosecrans and McClellan were all good generals with different strengths and weaknesses.

In the specific cases we're arguing about Grant really did become, as Lincoln put it, "McClellanized" at Richmond.

Source for this quote, please. You've made unsupported claims before and declined to give sources.

See your failure to answer post #164, this thread.

I suspect I know the source you would want to cite, but you had better read who used the word "McClellanized." See page 170 of the likely source. Your claim is based on a sloppy reading of page 181. The essay in question had since been challenged, and the author offers not a shred of evidence for his claims as to what happened on July 31, 1864. But don't let that stop you.

 

[cash]

Yes they do. The irony is of course that this applies to you, and you don't see it.

You apparently haven't read my posts very closely. I hold them to the same standards. I haven't said McClellan was lethargic in the Seven Days, and I haven't said McClellan "high-tailed it to his boat."

You're apparently so used to misstating Grant's record that you're now misstating what I am doing.

 

[cash]

Bumping

 

[Nathan Towne]

A board of officers was convened in 1900-01 to determine who came up with the plan to open the Cracker Line and they concluded it was Rosecrans. The conclusion is on page 20
https://archive.org/stream/reportofboardofa00unit#page/20/mode/2up

It actually goes well beyond that. Rosecrans was out laying out the line on the 19th. They just hadn't had what was necessary in order to implement it until the last several days as support began to come up on the other side of the river.

The Army had a little more than 204,400 daily rations on hand on the night of the 19th, with another 90,000 coming in on the 20th. They were still replenishing rations at a rate which was going to permit to them to hold out for some time, actually, but the trouble was that they were doing so by this point at the expense of forage, which was depleting and killing the animals and of ordinance. The consequence of insufficient forage was gradually cutting into the ability to maintain the flow of rations, due to the loss of wagon animals, over time, which is what would have ultimately choked them out. However, there was still a flow of animals coming down from Nashville and the need for more wagons had been repeatedly requisitioned. That would have also helped to alleviate the problem. Ordinance, though, was the other casualty in this. It was beginning to pile up in the Army depots. By the 19th, there was enough stacked up in Bridgeport to blow a hole in the world.

As far as the cracker line is concerned, though, yes, the planning process was actually largely complete by the time of the change in command.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Nothing I posted was from Dana's Sept 27th and later telegrams.
Here is a telegram from Dana sent the same day as Meigs':

[Hon. E. M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.]
Chattanooga, September 27.

A very serious fermentation reigns in the Twentieth and Twentyfirst Army Corps, and, indeed, throughout this whole army, growing out or events connected with the battle on Sunday last.

I have already reported that the generals of those two corps left the field of battle amid the rout of the right wing, made their way here with the crowd of fugitives, and went to sleep, while one division of each corps remained fighting with the left wing to the end. The generals of division and of brigade feel deeply this desertion of their commanders, and say, as I am informed on good evidence, for only two or three have spoken to me on the subject, that they can no longer serve under such superiors, and that if it is required of them they must resign. This feeling is universal among them, including men like Major-Generals Palmer and Sheridan and Brigadier-Generals Wood, Johnson, and Hazen. What is the sentimont of Davis I do not know, but I judge from his expressions on a kindred subject that he must agree with the others.

Of course this is a matter which I cannot directly inquire into, and cannot be so fully informed about as if it were an ordinary affair. The feelingin the case of McCook is deepened by the recollection of his faults at Perryville and Murfreesborough, and of the great waste of life which they caused ; while toward Crittenden it is relieved somewhat by consideration for his excellent heart, general good sense, and charming social qualities. Against these, however, is balanced the fact, which I can testify to from my own observation, that he is constantly wanting in attention to the duties of his command, never rides his lines, or exercises any special care for the well-being and safety of his troops, and, in fact, discharges no other function than that of a medium for the transmission of orders.

The feeling of the officers I have mentioned above does not seem in the least to partake of a mutinous or disorderly character; it is rather conscientious unwillingness to risk their men and the country's cause in hands proved to be so uncertain and unsafe. No formal representation of this unwillingness has been made to Rosecrans, but he has been made aware of the state of things by private conversations wi+h several of theparties. The defects of bis character complicate the difficulty. He abounds in friendliness and approbativeness, and is greatly lacking in firmness and steadiness of will. He is a temporizing man, dreads so heavy an alternative as is now presented, and hates to break with McCook and Crittenden. Besides, there is a more serious obstacle to his acting decisively in the fact that if Crittenden and McCook fled to Chattanooga, withthe sound of artillery in their ears, from that glorious field where Thomas and Granger were saving their army and their country's honor, he fled also; and although it may be said in his excuse that, under the circumstances, it was proper for the commanding general to go to his base of operations, while the corps commanders ought to remain with their troops, still he feels that that excuse cannot entirely clear him either in his owneyes or in those of the army. In fact, it is perfectly plain that while the subordinate commanders will not resign if he is retained in the chief command, as I believe they certainly will if McCook and Crittenden are not relieved, their respect for him as a general has received an irreparable blow. And that not from his abandonment of the army alone but from his faulty management on the field, especially in leaving a gap of a whole brigade distance between the divisions of Wood and Davis, and not providing for it till after the battle had become furious, when he attempted to fill it with Van Cleve's forces as I have explained in former reports. But for this gap General Davis thinks the enemy could not have broken his lines and routed the right wing. Thus you will see that here in the face of the enemy this army is in a dangerous condition. The officers who have taken this grave resolution are among the bravest and most discreet in our service. In my judgment the removal of Crittenden and McCook is imperatively required, not merely as a matter of discipline, but to preserve the efficacy, not to say the organization, of this army.

If it be decided to change the chief commander also, I would take the liberty of suggesting that some Western general of high rank and great prestige, like Grant, for instance, would be preferable as his successor to any one who has hitherto commanded in East alone.

I should add that Bosecrans himself intends to punish Negley for having withdrawn his division from tlin battle on Sunday without orders and with his ranks undisturbed, ho having been directed to post himself behind Baird on the extreme left; and all parties feel that Van Cleve ought to be relieved on account of his age, and the utter confusion of mind and incapacity which he manifested on Saturday and Sunday both.

C. A. DANA. [Hon. E. M. Stanton,

Secretary of War.}

One can believe Dana or Meigs. I have some quotes from Johnson, Palmer and Sheridan about Rosecrans.
You should also know that in the 1880s Dana did write to Rosecrans and told him he might have been misinformed and unfair.

The trouble with Dana is is that he wasn't actually really in much position to be making these types of judgements, as evidenced by the fact, just right there in the correspondence which you highlighted, by incorrectly describing the dispositions of the Army on the field at the time of the breakthrough. Dana had been sent to the Army in order to report back on what he saw to the War Department. He was essentially a spy for the War Department, which other commanders in other theaters may have dealt with a bit more effectively when it happened for them than Rosecrans did, but that is a difficult discussion.

 

[Nathan Towne]

You said he was commanding the Army of the Potomac. He wasn't.

Grant set the overall strategy. Execution of the tactics to implement that strategy was Meade's job.

Yes. That was an arrangement which in terms of not being interfered with only lasted several hours into the May 5th fighting in the The Wilderness before Grant began to intercede with direct tactical orders, though.

I am not entirely sure what the relevancy of that to the topic at hand here is though.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'd rate Rosecrans poorly as a field commander, on any level, because he had little respect for his superiors and he insulted subordinates, and because he lost his composure during battle.

In some type of engineering or planning position, he may have excelled. But as it was, he definitely earned his dismissal.

 

[tony_gunter]

We have at presently a lot of discussion of Rosecrans .
Therefore fair poster how do you rate him from a scale of 1 to 10?

Intel / intuition 5
Teamwork / Political deftness 1
Agility / Momentum (maneuver warfare vs attrition warfare, OODA) 5
Battlefield presence / bravery 6
Administrative / Logistics / Strategic planning 10

That's overall a 5.4

 

[Nathan Towne]

One thing that we must all be careful with though, when dealing with any historical actor, is psychoanalysis, or making generalized judgements.

For example, one may put forward an assertion that Rosecrans too frequently "insulted subordinates" as a means of criticism. What makes these types of statements so silly though is that we can readily demonstrate criticisms coming from exactly the opposite direction, as well.

Take Dana in his September 27th message to the government, for instance, when he stated that Rosecrans "abounds in friendliness and approbativeness and is greatly lacking in firmness and steadiness of will. He is a temporizing man…"

These types of blanket assessments can often be fairly easily dismissed.

 

[DanSBHawk]

One thing that we must all be careful with though, when dealing with any historical actor, is psychoanalysis, or making generalized judgements.

For example, one may put forward an assertion that Rosecrans too frequently "insulted subordinates" as a means of criticism. What makes these types of statements so silly though is that we can readily demonstrate criticisms coming from exactly the opposite direction, as well.

Take Dana in his September 27th message to the government, for instance, when he stated that Rosecrans "abounds in friendliness and approbativeness and is greatly lacking in firmness and steadiness of will. He is a temporizing man…"

There is no equivalence between the two. Insults between the political and military leadership level are mundane, and not in any way comparable to a commander insulting the troops that are fighting and dying under his command.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Intel / intuition 5

This is a good point, and it is a recurring failure for Rosecrans.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There is no equivalence between the two. Insults between the political and military leadership level are mundane, and not in any way comparable to a commander insulting the troops that are fighting and dying under his command.

I do recognize the way in which you read it and the way in which some did and it was definitely unfortunate in that regard, but I don't really read it that way and his later statements definitely made his overall intent clear.

Intel / intuition 5
Teamwork / Political deftness 1
Agility / Momentum (maneuver warfare vs attrition warfare, OODA) 5
Battlefield presence / bravery 6
Administrative / Logistics / Strategic planning 10

That's overall a 5.4

The intel issue was definitely a serious one. Rosecrans did try to refine and improve, or continue to develop the intelligence service of the Army of the Cumberland, as had Buell, but from what I have seen, I don't feel as though it ever got quite up to the level of, say, the B.M.I., as it had been established in the Army of the Potomac under Hooker.