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Brev. Brig. Gen'l
- Joined
- Feb 20, 2005
- Location
- Right here.
I believe I stated Grant's wartime career:
a. showed "massive periods of inactivity and lethargy" (5th December)
b. that Grant made no serious attempt to attack Petersburg from the Crater until April '65 (6th), and instead developed a vague plan to extend the lines NW
c. then pointed out when challenged that minor recces and CS attacks do not constitute Grant's activity, and then ennumerated Grant's actions during the period
The real key to understanding this is that Grant on the evening of the Crater (31st July '64) ordered his siege artillery to return to Washington and gave a warning order to send two corps to Washington. This was Grant finally giving up on the possibility of reaching a decision.
One should note that the telegraphic conversation between Grant, Sherman and Halleck ca. 16th July '64 has Grant opining that he (Grant) could not win in Virginia, and was only looking to hold a position that would force Lee to retain troops around Richmond and Petersburg. He thought Early with 25,000 men was on his way to reinforce Johnston, and advised Sherman to adopt a defensive posture and content himself with raiding the enemy railroads until large drafts from the east could reinforce him. As it turns out he was wrong about Early and ended up making detachments to the Valley.
However, this indicates that by mid-July at least Grant had given up on reaching a decision in Virginia. One suspects things had been heading that way for about a month. Certainly post-Crater there is essentially no significant attempt to carry the enemies defences, excepting Butler exceeding his orders for a demonstration of course which angers Grant who refuses to reinforce Butler's success. Grant engages in 35 weeks of vague on-again, off-again attempts to sever Lee's communications be extending his lines 3 miles. This of course ultimately is successful when Sheridan comes down at overruns Pickett at Five Forks.
The question is how to characterise this period? As Sheridan was ultimately successful many will try and ignore the 35 weeks of floundering. We shouldn't do this as it gives us a valuable insight into Grant's generalship. Grant had come into a(nother) situation where he was out of his depth: a battle of posts. Here he had literally no idea how to prosecute the action, hence him actually sending away his siege artillery and giving up on the idea of working deliberately against works. He falls back on the idea of cutting the enemies supply lines, which is sound but is not prosecuted well. Part of this may be a simple lack of the necessary manpower extend his lines by 3 miles.
I'm not "defending McClellan". I'm holistically analysing generalship during the war. Here you've made a value judgment, and are seeking to justify it. This is backwards thinking.
I'll let your double standard for Grant stand on its own.