How would you rate Rosecrans?

How do you rate Rosecrans?

  • on a scale of one to 10 10 being the best

    Votes: 1 1.7%
  • Rosecrans was the best Union Commander

    Votes: 2 3.4%
  • Rosecrans was a good general but he drooped the ball at Chickumaga big time

    Votes: 48 82.8%
  • Rosecrans was just a little bit better then the drunk guy in command at the battle of the Crater

    Votes: 7 12.1%

  • Total voters
    58
I believe I stated Grant's wartime career:

a. showed "massive periods of inactivity and lethargy" (5th December)
b. that Grant made no serious attempt to attack Petersburg from the Crater until April '65 (6th), and instead developed a vague plan to extend the lines NW
c. then pointed out when challenged that minor recces and CS attacks do not constitute Grant's activity, and then ennumerated Grant's actions during the period

The real key to understanding this is that Grant on the evening of the Crater (31st July '64) ordered his siege artillery to return to Washington and gave a warning order to send two corps to Washington. This was Grant finally giving up on the possibility of reaching a decision.

One should note that the telegraphic conversation between Grant, Sherman and Halleck ca. 16th July '64 has Grant opining that he (Grant) could not win in Virginia, and was only looking to hold a position that would force Lee to retain troops around Richmond and Petersburg. He thought Early with 25,000 men was on his way to reinforce Johnston, and advised Sherman to adopt a defensive posture and content himself with raiding the enemy railroads until large drafts from the east could reinforce him. As it turns out he was wrong about Early and ended up making detachments to the Valley.

However, this indicates that by mid-July at least Grant had given up on reaching a decision in Virginia. One suspects things had been heading that way for about a month. Certainly post-Crater there is essentially no significant attempt to carry the enemies defences, excepting Butler exceeding his orders for a demonstration of course which angers Grant who refuses to reinforce Butler's success. Grant engages in 35 weeks of vague on-again, off-again attempts to sever Lee's communications be extending his lines 3 miles. This of course ultimately is successful when Sheridan comes down at overruns Pickett at Five Forks.

The question is how to characterise this period? As Sheridan was ultimately successful many will try and ignore the 35 weeks of floundering. We shouldn't do this as it gives us a valuable insight into Grant's generalship. Grant had come into a(nother) situation where he was out of his depth: a battle of posts. Here he had literally no idea how to prosecute the action, hence him actually sending away his siege artillery and giving up on the idea of working deliberately against works. He falls back on the idea of cutting the enemies supply lines, which is sound but is not prosecuted well. Part of this may be a simple lack of the necessary manpower extend his lines by 3 miles.



I'm not "defending McClellan". I'm holistically analysing generalship during the war. Here you've made a value judgment, and are seeking to justify it. This is backwards thinking.


I'll let your double standard for Grant stand on its own.
 
I didn't say that. That is but one letter, apparently the most important letter to some on this site, exchanged between Lincoln and Rosecrans.

More shoddy research. Lincoln's letter was part of a much lengthier correspondence between Rosecrans and authorities at Washington over issues of rank. You might want to read those letters rather than ask people what they think of the letters you post here. Enjoy.
 
Trying to be sarcastic in the first sentence.
The second sentence refers to the fact that this quote from Lincoln:
"I can never forget, whilst I remember anything, that about the end of last year, and beginning of this, you gave us a hard earned victory which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over."
is prominently displayed in the Stones River Battlefield Visitor Center.
I was suggesting maybe Mr Baldwin and Mr Porter might want to substitute the quote from the Rosecrans letter they find so central to his story for the one above.

It seems to me that a competent biographer would be aware of both letters. Lincoln's praise of Rosecrans for Stones River is appropriate for that place; both letters should be part of a biography of Rosecrans's military career during the American Civil War.

You can best explain why you disagree.
 
Citing what you say I left out would be helpful. A lot has been posted over the last few weeks.

You know how to address that issue, since you've been the one posting a lot.

What was left out of the Garfield quote was the following (pardon me for reposting):
"the political leaders were not not unwilling to see evil befall him [Rosecrans].
That seems important to me.

We have seen what correspondence seems important to you and what correspondence does not.

You brought up the topic of contacting authors not me.

You want me to speculate on what people long gone were thinking when they wrote something or did something. You have also told us how you have had discussions with some living authors. But when we ask you (an author) direct questions, look at how you behave.
 
So tell me what was I trying to be?
btw I have no interest in getting into a discussion with you about what you or me or anyone was thinking or intended to say. Post some substantive comments about the war and I will be happy to respond otherwise I will probably respond with the words: not relevant to the war.
That means you don't really need to respond to the question I asked in the first sentence.
 
Rosecrans was not under Grant in March '63 when he wrote the letter. I'd say he was hoping to be placed over Grant.

The aide story had something to do with giving Don Piatt's brother-in-law a job.

Let's breakdown what Rosecrans says in the Mar 16, 1863 telegram to Lincoln:

He asks that paymasters should serve in the field. Do you know why he asks for this?
Is it perhaps because the soldiers weren't being paid promptly?
He sent the following to Stanton:
NASHVILLE, November 23, 1862.
Hon. E. M. STANTON:
Major Larned informs me that he needs $1,000,000 to complete payment to this corps to August 31. Many have been led by lack of pay to temporarily desert, to look after their families. They are poor men, and much in need of money. Officers are without the means of subsistence. Can you not direct the necessary funds to be sent to complete the payment? It would be of incalculable advantage to this command.
Many regiments have received no pay for six months.
W. S. ROSECRANS

He asks that his commission be antedated to December 1861. He doesn't say why but based on Lincoln's reply
and Rosecrans' experience serving under Grant I think it is safe to assume that he didn't want to be in a situation where
he was under Grant.

He returns to the issue of paymasters. He specifically mentions the expedition of payment to the soldiers.
He wanted to keep Maj. Charles Larned as his paymaster but this was not allowed.
See page 228-9 https://books.google.com/books?id=GsZzRJLA9hQC&pg=PA228&lpg=PA228&dq=rosecrans+paymasters+army+of+the+cumberland&source=bl&ots=p4ht_yzXvk&sig=tdKvMX_fBNipP_xJiRCc104XEkg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiSp4Ke8OHJAhWJ1RoKHeCkCHkQ6AEINzAE#v=onepage&q=rosecrans paymasters army of the cumberland&f=false
He mentions an aide whom he didn't want appointed who has a drinking problem.

He mentions Donn Piatt's brother in law.
According to the footnote on page 140 Piatt's brother in law was Byron Kirby
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln6/1:301?rgn=div1;view=fulltext
Kirby was wounded at Stones River.
From Rosecrans report on the battle: Simple justice to the gallant officers of my staff, the noble and lamented Lieutenant Colonel Garesche, chief of staff; Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, chief quartermaster; Lieutenant Colonel Symonds, chief commissary; Major C. Goddard, senior aide-de-camp; Major Ralston Skinner, judge advocate general; Lieutenant Frank S. Bowl, aide-de-camp of General Tyler; Captain Chas. R. Thompson, my aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Byron Kirby, 6th U. S. infantry, aide-de-camp, who was wounded on the 31st; R. S. Thoms, esq., a member of the Cincinnati bar, who acted as volunteeraide-de-camp, behaved with distinguished gallantry;
see also page 117 of this
https://books.google.com/books?id=G_YKAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA117&lpg=PA117&dq=Byron+Kirby+civil+war&source=bl&ots=ActwveXDEc&sig=JHHchHo-CcCMfh2cY59IZhO5y5w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjS85y14-HJAhUM0h4KHVTJDNYQ6AEIRTAI#v=onepage&q=Byron Kirby civil war&f=false

I don't see nepotism in Rosecrans' words about Kirby but promotion of a valiant soldier. What do you see in them?

The rest of Rosecrans' letter is a disavowal of covetousness of personal favors and the explanation of why he wrote to Lincoln.

Now tell me, in some detail please, why this letter is of prime importance to the full story of what Rosecrans did in the war and how the letter reflects poorly on Rosecrans?
 
Last edited:
Let's breakdown what Rosecrans says in the Mar 16, 1863 telegram to Lincoln:

He asks that paymasters should serve in the field. Do you know why he asks for this?
Is it perhaps because the soldiers weren't being paid promptly?
He sent the following to Stanton:
NASHVILLE, November 23, 1862.
Hon. E. M. STANTON:
Major Larned informs me that he needs $1,000,000 to complete payment to this corps to August 31. Many have been led by lack of pay to temporarily desert, to look after their families. They are poor men, and much in need of money. Officers are without the means of subsistence. Can you not direct the necessary funds to be sent to complete the payment? It would be of incalculable advantage to this command.
Many regiments have received no pay for six months.
W. S. ROSECRANS

He asks that his commission be antedated to December 1861. He doesn't say why but based on Lincoln's reply
and Rosecrans' experience serving under Grant I think it is save to assume that he didn't want to be in a situation where
he was under Grant.

He returns to the issue of paymasters. He specifically mentions the expedition of payment to the soldiers.
He wanted to keep Maj. Charles Larned as his paymaster but this was not allowed.
See page 228-9 https://books.google.com/books?id=GsZzRJLA9hQC&pg=PA228&lpg=PA228&dq=rosecrans+paymasters+army+of+the+cumberland&source=bl&ots=p4ht_yzXvk&sig=tdKvMX_fBNipP_xJiRCc104XEkg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiSp4Ke8OHJAhWJ1RoKHeCkCHkQ6AEINzAE#v=onepage&q=rosecrans paymasters army of the cumberland&f=false
He mentions an aide whom he didn't want appointed who has a drinking problem.

He mentions Donn Piatt's brother in law.
According to the footnote on page 140 Piatt's brother in law was Byron Kirby
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln6/1:301?rgn=div1;view=fulltext
Kirby was wounded at Stones River.
From Rosecrans report on the battle: Simple justice to the gallant officers of my staff, the noble and lamented Lieutenant Colonel Garesche, chief of staff; Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, chief quartermaster; Lieutenant Colonel Symonds, chief commissary; Major C. Goddard, senior aide-de-camp; Major Ralston Skinner, judge advocate general; Lieutenant Frank S. Bowl, aide-de-camp of General Tyler; Captain Chas. R. Thompson, my aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Byron Kirby, 6th U. S. infantry, aide-de-camp, who was wounded on the 31st; R. S. Thoms, esq., a member of the Cincinnati bar, who acted as volunteeraide-de-camp, behaved with distinguished gallantry;
see also page 117 of this
https://books.google.com/books?id=G_YKAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA117&lpg=PA117&dq=Byron+Kirby+civil+war&source=bl&ots=ActwveXDEc&sig=JHHchHo-CcCMfh2cY59IZhO5y5w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjS85y14-HJAhUM0h4KHVTJDNYQ6AEIRTAI#v=onepage&q=Byron Kirby civil war&f=false

I don't see nepotism in Rosecrans' words about Kirby but promotion of a valiant soldier. What do you see in them?

The rest of Rosecrans' letter is a disavowal of covetousness of personal favors and the explanation of why he wrote to Lincoln.

Now tell me, in some detail please, why this letter is of prime importance to the full story of what Rosecrans did in the war and how the letter reflects poorly on Rosecrans?
Boy, you sure know a lot about a letter you just claimed you knew nothing about.
 
Boy, you sure know a lot about a letter you just claimed you knew nothing about.

Boy, you sure know a lot about a letter you just claimed you knew nothing about.
This thread is quickly going downhill. It'll go to moderation or disappear if that continues.
Posted as moderator.
I would ask the moderator to not shut this down until DanSBHawk replies or says he won't reply.
I took some time to respond to the questions posed to me regarding the telegram sent to Lincoln.
For my part I will not post anything on here until DanSBHawk has posted.
 
I would ask the moderator to not shut this down until DanSBHawk replies or says he won't reply.
I took some time to respond to the questions posed to me regarding the telegram sent to Lincoln.
For my part I will not post anything on here until DanSBHawk has posted.
I can agree to that. Off topic/inflammatory posts will be deleted until then. After Dan replies or makes his intention not to,apparent, we'll make a decision.

Posted as moderator
 
I note that you haven't accused your idol McClellan of being inactive and "boldly doing nothing" during the Seven Days Campaign. Why not?

Okay. You do know there is no such thing as "the Seven Days Campaign"? There is the Peninsula Campaign of April-August 1862, and the "Seven Days" is really a two week period in the middle of it starting with McClellan advancing his lines and bring up the siege artillery for a general assault planned for ca. 30th June, and ends at Westover Landing with Stuart taking a sound drubbing. During the Seven Days of course McClellan's army is quite active fighting of its life against a superior enemy army, and thanks to solid planning and staff work by McClellan and his HQ survived. Even as moving to Harrison's Landing McClellan is planning to cross the James and move on Petersburg, and has sent requisitions for pontoons to bridge the James. Lincoln of course hates the idea, and Halleck forbids it even as the Pennsylvania Reserves are holding the right bank of the river and the cavalry have recce'd Petersburg for the movement, much as he wanted to forbid Grant but couldn't...

So to bring this back to Rosecrans; the Seven Days and Chickamauga are interesting because these are the only two large battles where it is the Rebels that have the larger army. In both cases the Federals were forced to fall back on their communications, and indeed create new supply lines. In both cases the Federal commanders performed excellently under very difficult circumstances and saved their armies, and in both cases armchair generals carp on about why they didn't destroy the superior enemy who had gained advantage in both cases by sudden concentration. These same armchair generals of course assiduously ignore that happened at Holly Springs, and that Grant's response to a similar situation the the Seven Days was (a) the same and (b) much less well executed, losing control of half his army.
 
Okay. You do know there is no such thing as "the Seven Days Campaign"? There is the Peninsula Campaign of April-August 1862, and the "Seven Days" is really a two week period in the middle of it starting with McClellan advancing his lines and bring up the siege artillery for a general assault planned for ca. 30th June, and ends at Westover Landing with Stuart taking a sound drubbing. During the Seven Days of course McClellan's army is quite active fighting of its life against a superior enemy army, and thanks to solid planning and staff work by McClellan and his HQ survived. Even as moving to Harrison's Landing McClellan is planning to cross the James and move on Petersburg, and has sent requisitions for pontoons to bridge the James. Lincoln of course hates the idea, and Halleck forbids it even as the Pennsylvania Reserves are holding the right bank of the river and the cavalry have recce'd Petersburg for the movement, much as he wanted to forbid Grant but couldn't...

So to bring this back to Rosecrans; the Seven Days and Chickamauga are interesting because these are the only two large battles where it is the Rebels that have the larger army. In both cases the Federals were forced to fall back on their communications, and indeed create new supply lines. In both cases the Federal commanders performed excellently under very difficult circumstances and saved their armies, and in both cases armchair generals carp on about why they didn't destroy the superior enemy who had gained advantage in both cases by sudden concentration. These same armchair generals of course assiduously ignore that happened at Holly Springs, and that Grant's response to a similar situation the the Seven Days was (a) the same and (b) much less well executed, losing control of half his army.

You should tell the rest of the world there's no such thing as the Seven Days Campaign. But nice distraction.

The fact is that McClellan didn't do the attacking during the Seven Days--Lee did. Yet apparently to you McClellan wasn't "boldly doing nothing." However, when shown events when Grant was attacked, you comment that Grant was "boldly doing nothing." You have a double standard, and really, that's all we need to know right now.
 
How does how we rate Rosecrans windup talking about lil.mac.

Illustrating a double standard. His hero gets attacked in the Seven Days, yet there's no claim of "boldly doing nothing." Grant gets attacked and he's "boldly doing nothing."

And, as Horace Porter [the poster, not the historical figure] said, Rosey's defenders can't simply talk about Rosey. They have to denigrate Grant.
 
I would ask the moderator to not shut this down until DanSBHawk replies or says he won't reply.
I took some time to respond to the questions posed to me regarding the telegram sent to Lincoln.
For my part I will not post anything on here until DanSBHawk has posted.
Well thanks, but I think you are making a completely different point. My point concerned Rosecrans asking Lincoln to pull strings for him personally. I could have snipped that sentence about rank out of the letter but wanted to show it in context.

As far as the rest of the letter, I agree that Rosecrans asked Lincoln for intervention on worthwhile war-related issues. I think the bigger point though, is that Rosecrans was even writing to Lincoln directly. You've made the case that Washburne exerted political influence for the benefit of Grant. There was no person in DC with greater political influence than Lincoln, and Rosecrans corresponded with him many times in '63. Lincoln wrote back many times, and encouraged and placated and pledged support.

I don't believe that Grant jumped the chain of command and appealed to the president directly during this period of the war, on the scale that Rosecrans did. In fact, Lincoln made a crack about Grant not being much of a letter writer.

So Rosecrans had support from the political establishment and he actively solicited favors based on that support. For both personal gain and for military reasons.
 

Learn About Us
About CivilWarTalk
Contact the Webmaster
Meet the Staff
Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
Register
Browse Forums
View Today's Discussions
Search the Forum
Get Help
FAQ
Student Guide
Forum Rules & Etiquette
Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top