How would you rate Rosecrans?

[nitrofd]

On page 318 of Dave Powell's new book The Chickamauga Campaign:Glory or the Grave,he writes:
As Strong Rosecrans partisan,Henry Cost perhaps saw a darker motive underlying Garfield's request.Garfield he noted,argued that it was Rosecrans's "duty" to go back to Chattanooga,especially if the rest of the army had also been routed.He was the only one who could "possibly save the army from complete destruction". With the benefit of hindsight,Cist understood this as a grave error,and one that would cost Rosecrans dearly,but to the mentally exhausted departmental Commander it seemed a logical choice at the time.
P.S.Garfield's request was that he should go to Thomas.

 

[67th Tigers]

You claimed Grant was inactive. He wasn't.

I believe I stated Grant's wartime career:

a. showed "massive periods of inactivity and lethargy" (5th December)
b. that Grant made no serious attempt to attack Petersburg from the Crater until April '65 (6th), and instead developed a vague plan to extend the lines NW
c. then pointed out when challenged that minor recces and CS attacks do not constitute Grant's activity, and then ennumerated Grant's actions during the period

The real key to understanding this is that Grant on the evening of the Crater (31st July '64) ordered his siege artillery to return to Washington and gave a warning order to send two corps to Washington. This was Grant finally giving up on the possibility of reaching a decision.

One should note that the telegraphic conversation between Grant, Sherman and Halleck ca. 16th July '64 has Grant opining that he (Grant) could not win in Virginia, and was only looking to hold a position that would force Lee to retain troops around Richmond and Petersburg. He thought Early with 25,000 men was on his way to reinforce Johnston, and advised Sherman to adopt a defensive posture and content himself with raiding the enemy railroads until large drafts from the east could reinforce him. As it turns out he was wrong about Early and ended up making detachments to the Valley.

However, this indicates that by mid-July at least Grant had given up on reaching a decision in Virginia. One suspects things had been heading that way for about a month. Certainly post-Crater there is essentially no significant attempt to carry the enemies defences, excepting Butler exceeding his orders for a demonstration of course which angers Grant who refuses to reinforce Butler's success. Grant engages in 35 weeks of vague on-again, off-again attempts to sever Lee's communications be extending his lines 3 miles. This of course ultimately is successful when Sheridan comes down at overruns Pickett at Five Forks.

The question is how to characterise this period? As Sheridan was ultimately successful many will try and ignore the 35 weeks of floundering. We shouldn't do this as it gives us a valuable insight into Grant's generalship. Grant had come into a(nother) situation where he was out of his depth: a battle of posts. Here he had literally no idea how to prosecute the action, hence him actually sending away his siege artillery and giving up on the idea of working deliberately against works. He falls back on the idea of cutting the enemies supply lines, which is sound but is not prosecuted well. Part of this may be a simple lack of the necessary manpower extend his lines by 3 miles.

You should stick to actually defending McClellan from real unfair attacks instead of trying to elevate him by attacking a better general. It's more honest.

I'm not "defending McClellan". I'm holistically analysing generalship during the war. Here you've made a value judgment, and are seeking to justify it. This is backwards thinking.

 

[David Moore]

So you want me to speak about the motives of a dead historian and an aged one? Wow.

And if I did, you would then attack me, of course.

As you seem to have forgotten to cite complete quotes in other instances, perhaps you can tell us why historians like you do that. I'd find that interesting. I'd also find it interesting to see why you have passed over the portions of the quote that suggest that people viewed Rosecrans as a coward and a political operator.

Citing what you say I left out would be helpful. A lot has been posted over the last few weeks.
What was left out of the Garfield quote was the following (pardon me for reposting):
"the political leaders were not not unwilling to see evil befall him [Rosecrans].
That seems important to me.
You brought up the topic of contacting authors not me.

And yet Rosecrans had been pressing for the backdating of his rank for some time, at the expense of many fellow officers, not just Grant.

What's interesting is that Rosecrans denounced Halleck's clumsy effort to offer promotion to a general who would bring victory on the battlefield, saying that such an officer "would come by his commission basely in that case and deserve to be despised" (Castel w/Simpson, 207), but he had no problem with these backroom maneuvers.

We can guess what you would be saying if Grant had written such a letter.

You asked to see the letter to Lincoln in question about backdating his date of commission. Tell us: were you unaware of the letter, or did you know about it but chose to play dumb to try to trick another reader?

I was hiding it because that letter alone collapses everything else I've written about Rosecrans.
That is the singular thing about him and should replace the Lincoln " can never forget" quote at Stones River NMP.

Obviously there are other requests, but the one about rank is the interesting.


Ego; ambition.


Grant wasnt expected to show up at either. Did Rosecrans need the supervision?



Regarding Rosecrans request that his rank be back dated to 1861, Halleck had written him in march 1863 :
"last summer, at your request, I urged the government to promote you for success in the field, and, again at your request, urged that your commission be dated back to your services in West Virginia". [Official Records, Series 1 - Volume 23 (Part II), page 138] Halleck was apparently lobbying to get Rosecrans promoted long before Iuka and Corinth.

In September 1862, when Rosecrans learned he had at last been promoted to Major General, instead of appreciation, he complained about it to Halleck:
"If fighting successful battles having important results; if successfully defending a mountainous country against an active and powerful foe; if pacifying and restoring law and order to a vast region with 300 miles of mountain frontier, and the successful administration of a department deserved anything from the hands of the Government it deserved my promotion from the date of the close of those services crowned with success. But what do I find? Why, I find myself promoted junior to men who have not rendered a tithe of the services nor had a tithe of the success. I find myself ordered from the command of an army whose confidence I possess -- a separate army in the field to go and take subordinate position in a new and unformed one, where Buell, Granger, Gilbert, Schenck, Lew. Wallace, Tom Crittenden, and Bully Nelson are my seniors. Were it not a crisis for the country I would not trouble you to intercede in my behalf but would at once resign. As it is a crisis I beg you to intercede for me, that some measure of justice may be done me. If I have deserved anything for my services in Western Virginia my rank should date from the close of those services, and that is what I ask in the name of justice. "[Official Records, Series 1 - Volume 17 (Part II), page 239]
To me, he come across as a whiner.

Perhaps he was a whiner but is there validity in what he said? Grant had Washburne, one of the two or three most powerful men in congress, doing his lobbying for him especially after Shiloh, Iuka and Corinth.
Washburne made speeches on the house floor defending Grant and was the sponsor of the Lt Generalcy bill.
Rosecrans had at most Chase. He had to do his own lobbying. He felt his army was neglected by the War Dept and he felt he needed the authority manage things without them. Obtaining Spencer repeating rifles is a good example. I see in his "whining" his desire to have the power to create the army he wanted. I certainly don't see any political ambitions. Rosecrans also probably felt he was dealing with at best people ignorant of the situation in Tennessee and at worst incompetents.
Let me also restate that as strange as it may sound to you I don't think the pre 1864 Grant was particularly ambitious. He was the player rather than the author of the story. Washburne of course was the author. Grant's main desire was to not be relieved of command which was a possibility up to Vicksburg. I actually have more sympathy for Grant than you might expect. I think in 1862 he sensed he was in over his head (as Washburne's brother Gen Washburn and Joseph Medill among others felt) and probably wanted just to survive.

Grant wasn't supposed to show up at Iuka?

 

[David Moore]

I wonder whether Mr. Moore discusses these pieces of correspondence in his book. Do you, Mr. Moore?

No. Do you think they are central to the Rosecrans' military story?
I do discuss his discussions with Halleck in June Jul Aug Sept 1863. I think discussions about his military plans are more important than letter(s) about his rank date.

 

[nitrofd]

You said you hid the letter because it collapse everything you wrote about him.well that sure sums it up selective history not the whole story.Time Magazine made Hitler their man of the year so if that is all you know of him does that make him a nice guy.selective history,you said it will collapse everything you wrote.debate score now CivilWarTalk 100,David Moore 0.

 

[David Moore]

I just download a free book from amazon titled "The Army of the Cumberland" by Henry Cist..I think I need to read something new.

That book is the source for the dressing down story about Rosecrans and Wood on Sept 20 1863 . Read it with a critical eye. It is overall positive about Rosecrans

 

[DanSBHawk]

You only see in this Rosecrans asking that his rank predate Grant's. There are other requests as well. Why would Rosecrans ask that he outrank Grant? Perhaps his experiences serving under Grant and fighting two battles under him in Mississippi in 1862 had something to do with it. Who wants to fight under a commander who doesn't show up for the battles? Also note Rosecrans wants to replace an aide who went on a bender. That telegram was about more than antedating his commission.

Rosecrans was not under Grant in March '63 when he wrote the letter. I'd say he was hoping to be placed over Grant.

The aide story had something to do with giving Don Piatt's brother-in-law a job.

 

[DanSBHawk]

No. Do you think they are central to the Rosecrans' military story?
I do discuss his discussions with Halleck in June Jul Aug Sept 1863. I think discussions about his military plans are more important than letter(s) about his rank date.

You think Washburne is more central to the Rosecrans "military story" than Rosecrans personal correspondence with Lincoln?

 

[DanSBHawk]

I was hiding it because that letter alone collapses everything else I've written about Rosecrans.
That is the singular thing about him and should replace the Lincoln " can never forget" quote at Stones River NMP.

What?

 

[Horace Porter]

No. Do you think they are central to the Rosecrans' military story?
I do discuss his discussions with Halleck in June Jul Aug Sept 1863. I think discussions about his military plans are more important than letter(s) about his rank date.

I certainly think that a book supposedly about Rosecrans that spends so much time on Elihu B. Washburne, Ulysses S. Grant, and the politics of command should include rather well-known evidence about Rosecrans's own wirepulling endeavors.

That it does not would define an author as incompetent and ignorant at best and at the worst dishonest and dishonorable.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Perhaps he was a whiner but is there validity in what he said? Grant had Washburne, one of the two or three most powerful men in congress, doing his lobbying for him especially after Shiloh, Iuka and Corinth.
Washburne made speeches on the house floor defending Grant and was the sponsor of the Lt Generalcy bill.
Rosecrans had at most Chase. He had to do his own lobbying. He felt his army was neglected by the War Dept and he felt he needed the authority manage things without them. Obtaining Spencer repeating rifles is a good example. I see in his "whining" his desire to have the power to create the army he wanted. I certainly don't see any political ambitions. Rosecrans also probably felt he was dealing with at best people ignorant of the situation in Tennessee and at worst incompetents.

The letters I quoted from Rosecrans and from Halleck are not about his army; they are about him personally. They dont have to do with the situation in Tennessee, they have to do with himself.

 

[David Moore]

You think Washburne is more central to the Rosecrans "military story" than Rosecrans personal correspondence with Lincoln?

I didn't say that. That is but one letter, apparently the most important letter to some on this site, exchanged between Lincoln and Rosecrans.

I certainly think that a book supposedly about Rosecrans that spends so much time on Elihu B. Washburne, Ulysses S. Grant, and the politics of command should include rather well-known evidence about Rosecrans's own wirepulling endeavors.

That it does not would define an author as incompetent and ignorant at best and at the worst dishonest and dishonorable.

So Mr Porter may I infer that I am in varying degrees incompetent, ignorant, dishonest and dishonorable?
Still no thoughts on the Palmer quote? Or the Meigs letter I posted? Or the Bowman letter about Grant I posted? Or thoughts on why the phrase "the political leaders were not unwilling to see evil befall him" is not cited very often? Did you think I did a good thing is citing both letters in their entirety exchanged between John R Young and Garfield? Do you applaud my efforts to go to libraries and discover primary source items related to Rosecrans?
I fear my (perceived) personal traits have disgusted you so much that you have forgotten (in relation to me) why we are all on this site which is to learn and exchange information and ideas (especially new ones) about the CW ?
Perhaps you should block me.

 

[David Moore]

The letters I quoted from Rosecrans and from Halleck are not about his army; they are about him personally. They dont have to do with the situation in Tennessee, they have to do with himself.

What did he want? Personal in a political or military sense?

 

[David Moore]

What?

Trying to be sarcastic in the first sentence.
The second sentence refers to the fact that this quote from Lincoln:
"I can never forget, whilst I remember anything, that about the end of last year, and beginning of this, you gave us a hard earned victory which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over."
is prominently displayed in the Stones River Battlefield Visitor Center.
I was suggesting maybe Mr Baldwin and Mr Porter might want to substitute the quote from the Rosecrans letter they find so central to his story for the one above.

 

[David Moore]

You said you hid the letter because it collapse everything you wrote about him.well that sure sums it up selective history not the whole story.Time Magazine made Hitler their man of the year so if that is all you know of him does that make him a nice guy.selective history,you said it will collapse everything you wrote.debate score now CivilWarTalk 100,David Moore 0.

I was being sarcastic or at least trying to be..

 

[David Moore]

Rosecrans was not under Grant in March '63 when he wrote the letter. I'd say he was hoping to be placed over Grant.

The aide story had something to do with giving Don Piatt's brother-in-law a job.

I have little doubt he wanted to be over Grant especially after his experience in Mississippi in 1862.
He requested to be transferred from under Grant after Corinth. Wouldn't he want to avoid being put under him again?
I have little doubt Rosecrans had severe doubts about Grant, as did Joseph Medill and Gen Washburn among others.
Who chooses to serve under someone whom he considers less capable?
Whether you think he was right or wrong Rosecrans did have a history with Grant on which to base his opinions.

Was Rosecrans the only general who may have tried to find a military position for someone he knew?
I'll try to find some more info on Piatt's in law.

 

[nitrofd]

I was being sarcastic or at least trying to be..

B.S.

 

[Horace Porter]

I was being sarcastic or at least trying to be..

To the contrary ... it was the most honest and revealing thing you've said. We now know better how to assess your work. You omit or overlook that which casts your hero in a poor light. This best explains your omission of Rosecrans's efforts to have his rank backdated in a book which, although it is supposed to be about Rosecrans, has more than a chapter (by your own admission) on Elihu B. Washburne's actions on behalf of Ulysses S. Grant.

A courageous biographer would have told the truth about Rosecrans ... the whole truth. A competent biographer would have included the correspondence on rank that finally reached the desk of the president.

 

[Horace Porter]

I didn't say that. That is but one letter, apparently the most important letter to some on this site, exchanged between Lincoln and Rosecrans.

So Mr Porter may I infer that I am in varying degrees incompetent, ignorant, dishonest and dishonorable?
Still no thoughts on the Palmer quote? Or the Meigs letter I posted? Or the Bowman letter about Grant I posted? Or thoughts on why the phrase "the political leaders were not unwilling to see evil befall him" is not cited very often? Did you think I did a good thing is citing both letters in their entirety exchanged between John R Young and Garfield? Do you applaud my efforts to go to libraries and discover primary source items related to Rosecrans?
I fear my (perceived) personal traits have disgusted you so much that you have forgotten (in relation to me) why we are all on this site which is to learn and exchange information and ideas (especially new ones) about the CW ?
Perhaps you should block me.

Just another effort to silence your critics. We now have a much better way to assess your work.

 

[NedBaldwin]

What did he want?

He says what he wants in the letter I quoted.

Personal in a political or military sense?

I dont understand this question.