Grant Grant v Lee

[DanSBHawk]

So you've got Grand Gulf and you've got Rodney, both possible landing locations, and if Pemberton's entire force is deployed down there you've also got the Warrenton area (which has good roads and was a site of cotton exports in the 1830s, so was presumably a functional landing place).

Grand Gulf, Rodney and Warrenton/Vicksburg are too far apart for forces at one location to contest a landing made at another location. This means that Pemberton cannot guarantee contesting a landing with more than - at most - a third of his force. Bruinsberg makes a fourth landing site some miles from Grand Gulf.

What it looks like Pemberton did was to place some troops to cover possible landing sites, but without knowing Grant's landing site ahead of time there's not really much he could have done to prevent a landing entirely. He only had so many troops to spread, and as it is it looks like he did have a few brigades close enough to at least theoretically contest the landing.

The only way Pemberton could contest the landing with his entire force, however, is if he knew ahead of time what landing site Grant would pick - and Grant himself hadn't firmed that up, so it'd be basically impossible.


Out of curiosity, if you were in Pemberton's place what would you do? We can both agree I think that he should have ensured his cavalry was around, but how would you have distributed his forces?

The landing at Grand Gulf was turned away by something like 14 pieces of artillery.

A smaller force can contest the landing and fight a delaying action. The deep ravines and the few roads could have benefited a delaying action by a smaller force.

Pemberton had too many forces assigned north of Vicksburg, and he was too slow bringing back forces that had been sent east.

 

[rbasin]

Shiloh influenced Lincoln to substitute Halleck for Grant and that prevented the US from advancing on Jackson, MS that summer.
The price paid included the permanent loss of New Orleans and Memphis, the temporary loss of Baton Rouge, and the near loss of Vicksburg.

When did Lincoln substitute Halleck for Grant?

 

[Saphroneth]

A smaller force can contest the landing and fight a delaying action. The deep ravines and the few roads could have benefited a delaying action by a smaller force.

Okay, and that's definitely possible. So how should Pemberton deploy his forces so as to - as you put it:

If Pemberton had concentrated his forces, he could have outnumbered Grant at the landing.

Or is it instead the case that Pemberton could have contested the landing and delayed Grant (with a small force), and then muster most of his disposable forces a few days later to have a fight at even odds before Grant brought 15th Corps across?
But then that just raises the additional problem, which is that Sherman moved down from his feint at Snyder's Bluff to cross over the course of several days. If Pemberton moves all his forces out of Vicksburg then Sherman could instead just land at Warrenton or otherwise close to Vicksburg.

That landing by Sherman isn't feasible if Pemberton leaves a comparatively small force in Vicksburg, but he does have to leave it and that cuts into the force he can muster to face Grant's initial landing.

Pemberton had too many forces assigned north of Vicksburg, and he was too slow bringing back forces that had been sent east.

This means that, as I understand it, your suggestion is that Pemberton should have had more of his forces around Grand Gulf to contest the landing, and then shifted more of his weight south.
Since the count I used for Pemberton's forces includes the brigade that held Snyder's bluff, then presumably Hébert's brigade has to stay where it is; ditto for a brigade or two in Vicksburg to prevent Sherman capturing an empty city. (Sherman has 17,000 troops PFD by himself, so a brigade or two is really kind of risky.)


I suppose the thing I'm wondering is really what % of his troops Pemberton should have placed in each location (roughly) when he doesn't know where the attack could come. It looks like there's a possible landing site just north of the Big Black River mouth (based on the map), and of course Sherman could be aiming to cross further north; Pemberton could in principle know of Grant's force moving south, but Grant could (and did!) feint quite heavily with one of his corps before crossing the other two pretty much in a body. This means a corps south of Vicksburg is no guarantee that's where the landing's going to happen, it's only if Pemberton can confirm that Grant has two corps south of Vicksburg that he can know that's where the landing's going to happen.

Even then, he'd have to place forces to cover landings at Rodney and Bruinsberg (at Port Gibson - perhaps 6,000 troops?), between Bayou Pierre and the Big Black River (ditto?) and north of the Big Black as well. Then he has to cover the Snyder's Bluff area and Vicksburg itself, and there's not a lot of disposable force left.


What this means is that Grant put Pemberton in a situation where there are no really good options.
This is a much better kind of generalship than the kind of generalship where you risk everything on a situation where the enemy could slaughter your army if they do the moderately sensible thing - because if they do the moderately sensible thing, you've just crippled the campaign.


It's true that big risks can lead to big payoffs, but if you have the larger force there's no need for a big risk...

When did Lincoln substitute Halleck for Grant?

I think that's the wrong person? It's attributed to me in your quote but it was @wausaubob who wrote it - possibly a code error?

 

[wausaubob]

When did Lincoln substitute Halleck for Grant?

I think that when General Halleck took personal command of the assembled armies at Shiloh, that was from orders from Lincoln and McClellan to keep Grant sidelined until the heat blew over. Halleck got what he wanted, a high command that he had never earned, and the road to the White House seemed open. Halleck thought he would follow in Scott's footsteps, but win, where Scott had lost.
\

 

[wausaubob]

I forgotten what Fuller wrote about Vicksburg. My recollection is that Fuller was of the opinion that Grant was modern, because if you created a weapons system or a logistical system for him, he used it and stayed with it until he learned how to use it most effectively. I think Fuller begins the re-evaluation of Grant that noted that Grant spent very little time excusing his mistakes and spent much more time finding better commanders and better operational plans.

 

[wausaubob]

However Grant stated he succeeded because he never made proclamations about policy. He took policy as a given and tried to influence strategy. I think in the end, Grant and Sherman arranged strategy so that the Confederates got about as thorough a smashing as possible. Texas, Indian territory and Arkansas were largely spared.

 

[rbasin]

I think that when General Halleck took personal command of the assembled armies at Shiloh, that was from orders from Lincoln and McClellan to keep Grant sidelined until the heat blew over. Halleck got what he wanted, a high command that he had never earned, and the road to the White House seemed open. Halleck thought he would follow in Scott's footsteps, but win, where Scott had lost.
\

But Halleck had already made plans to go take command before the battle.

Are you stating that Halleck wanted to be president?

 

[rbasin]

Sorry, Saphroneth. That's weird.

 

[wausaubob]

But Halleck had already made plans to go take command before the battle.

Are you stating that Halleck wanted to be president?

Halleck was an influential figure in Whig politics. He had connections on both coasts. Military accomplishments would have sealed the deal. Yes, Halleck was protecting William Sherman, whose brother was a Senator from: Ohio.
Halleck's problem was that he came East, everything in the east fell apart, and eventually Grant captured Vicksburg by avoiding Halleck's control.
The Civil War record, and histiography it is full of comments that Halleck was wrong about virtually everything.

 

[rbasin]

Halleck was an influential figure in Whig politics. He had connections on both coasts. Military accomplishments would have sealed the deal. Yes, Halleck was protecting William Sherman, whose brother was a Senator from: Ohio.
Halleck's problem was that he came East, everything in the east fell apart, and eventually Grant captured Vicksburg by avoiding Halleck's control.
The Civil War record, and histiography it is full of comments that Halleck was wrong about virtually everything.

wow.

 

[damYankee]

Out of interest, in what way do you think that holding the destruction of Lee's army as the priority affect Grant's manoeuvres or decisions?

Previous commanders of the AoP focused on the capture and destruction of Richmond. It was the perfect setup for Lee, he knew the objective.
After the Battle of the Wilderness there was a telling moment when the utmost forces withdrew, but instead of turning and marching his troops back to DC, he turned towards Lee.
Grant's made Lee's army the priority, and retreat was not an option. The night before Lee surrendered Gen. Wise meet with Lee, he was stunned that Lee still thought he could continue to fight, Wise scolded him, and told him there was no CSA, he told Lee, "you are the only reason these men fight, And every drop of blood spilled is on your hands"
Wise understood what Grant did, with Sherman having his way in Georgia, So. Carolina and N. Carolina it was impossible for Southern states to send any more reinforcements, Lee was the CSA. Destroy the ANV and the South is finished.

 

[Saphroneth]

Previous commanders of the AoP focused on the capture and destruction of Richmond. It was the perfect setup for Lee, he knew the objective.

But when Grant manoeuvres it's always trying to get around Lee's flank and get between him and Richmond. If all Grant wanted was to pound on Lee then he could have done that up around Spotsylvania all summer, closer to his own base and further from Lee's.

Similarly, it's not like having Richmond as the objective would lead to more decisions to retreat than otherwise. Grant got over the Rappahanock successfully, that's the difference...

After the Battle of the Wilderness there was a telling moment when the utmost forces withdrew, but instead of turning and marching his troops back to DC, he turned towards Lee.

Primary source please? I've seen this story before but never been able to trace it back as far as the 19th century; I suspect it's a later invention.

 

[damYankee]

But when Grant manoeuvres it's always trying to get around Lee's flank and get between him and Richmond. If all Grant wanted was to pound on Lee then he could have done that up around Spotsylvania all summer, closer to his own base and further from Lee's.

Similarly, it's not like having Richmond as the objective would lead to more decisions to retreat than otherwise. Grant got over the Rappahanock successfully, that's the difference...



Primary source please? I've seen this story before but never been able to trace it back as far as the 19th century; I suspect it's a later invention.

You are not going to argue with the facts, try as you might, Richmond had been the objective previously, and every Union commander had made a practice of engage, but not pursue, Grant pressed Lee. Every battle that took place after the Wilderness was for all practical purposes one skirmish in a larger overall maneuver,
Stay on Lee, run him into the ground.
It was the surrender of Lee at Appomattox that ended the war, Jefferson Davis was not an issue, the South could have fought on without Davis, but not without Lee.

 

[Saphroneth]

You are not going to argue with the facts, try as you might, Richmond had been the objective previously, and every Union commander had made a practice of engage, but not pursue

So in which pre-Grant battle should the Union commander have pursued?

In which Grant battle did the Union commander pursue? None of his battles enter the pursuit phase until the Appomattox campaign.

Grant pressed Lee. Every battle that took place after the Wilderness was for all practical purposes one skirmish in a larger overall maneuver,
Stay on Lee, run him into the ground.

This isn''t what happened, though. At the end of Spotsylvania the two armies are facing one another, and Grant is the one who moves south first; after the fighting at the North Anna the two armies are facing one another, and Grant is the one who moves south first; after Cold Harbor Grant disengaged and moved south to the James.

This is the pattern for the Overland campaign. Grant moves, Lee beats him to the critical terrain and entrenches, Grant attacks it until it's obvious he's making no headway, Grant moves away from Lee again.

The Wilderness is different, but it's different because Grant is crossing the Rappahanock and Lee is trying to knock him back across like he did to Hooker. Grant keeps moving east and gets out of the Wilderness before re-establishing supply from Fredericksburg and Port Royal (not long before his supplies run out).

 

[Don Dixon]

But when Grant manoeuvres it's always trying to get around Lee's flank and get between him and Richmond. If all Grant wanted was to pound on Lee then he could have done that up around Spotsylvania all summer, closer to his own base and further from Lee's."

Based upon the Confederate political, economic, and logistical situation in 1864, Lee absolutely had to protect Richmond, and that was pretty clear to Grant. If he could get between Lee and Richmond, Lee would be forced into a decisive battle, ideally on ground of Grant's choosing; both to protect Richmond and because Grant would be astride his supply lines. Grant's real target was always the Army of Northern Virginia. Richmond was simply a vehicle for forcing the decisive battle.

Regards,
Don Dixon

 

[Saphroneth]

Based upon the Confederate political, economic, and logistical situation in 1864, Lee absolutely had to protect Richmond, and that was pretty clear to Grant. If he could get between Lee and Richmond, Lee would be forced into a decisive battle, ideally on ground of Grant's choosing; both to protect Richmond and because Grant would be astride his supply lines. Grant's real target was always the Army of Northern Virginia. Richmond was simply a vehicle for forcing the decisive battle.

But at that point "your target is the enemy army" as opposed to "your target is Richmond" means nothing for Grant's actual operations. Grant's trying to get on the inside track to Richmond, Lee's trying to protect Richmond, and the bit about what the target is doesn't actually effect anything except maybe Grant's willingness to suffer enormous casualties attacking strong enemy positions rather than just outflanking them.

What's more, there's a clear trend and it's that Grant's moves are if anything counterproductive. At Spotsylvania the casualty ratio is roughly 3:2 Union:Confederate; at the North Anna it's 8:3; at Cold Harbor it's 12:5, and at Second Petersburg it's about 12:4. The exchange ratio is getting worse and Grant's army's morale is shot; by Cold Harbor you have entire divisions advancing only a few steps because the campaign has beaten it into them that attacking is suicidal.


Honestly, if you want to cause the most trouble for the Confederate army what you want to do is regular approaches with your base at White House Landing on the Pamunkey and a strong entrenched position from the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy with about half your army, using the other half to make the regular approaches. With Grant's army he's got enough to cover the whole of the line, and Lee's options are then to either attack into strong Union positions north of the Chickahominy (which historically lead to great slaughter in 1862), do the same south of the river, or let Grant use heavy artillery to batter his way through the trench lines one at a time and take Richmond.

That is, you give Lee the choice between attacking your entrenchments or letting you blast your way into Richmond; neither is a good option. Historically Lee had the option of "letting Grant attack his entrenchments" which made the power of entrenchment work for him.

 

[Saphroneth]

There does seem to be another alternative, though, which is to divide the army. Aside from the cavalry raid (which may have done as much harm as good by depriving Grant of scouting, much as Stuart during Gettysburg) Grant mostly moved his army as a contiguous mass and so Lee could match him by moving his army as a similar mass. But once dug-in half the Federal army - being about the same in numbers as the entire Confederate army - should be largely safe from attack, so it should be possible to move the other half of the Federal army south to try and turn the Confederate position or get between them and Richmond.

Move half the army down towards Hanover Junction by parallel roads and leave the other half dug in around Spotsylvania; what can Lee do? He has many options but none of them are great.

 

[damYankee]

So in which pre-Grant battle should the Union commander have pursued?

In which Grant battle did the Union commander pursue? None of his battles enter the pursuit phase until the Appomattox campaign.


This isn''t what happened, though. At the end of Spotsylvania the two armies are facing one another, and Grant is the one who moves south first; after the fighting at the North Anna the two armies are facing one another, and Grant is the one who moves south first; after Cold Harbor Grant disengaged and moved south to the James.

This is the pattern for the Overland campaign. Grant moves, Lee beats him to the critical terrain and entrenches, Grant attacks it until it's obvious he's making no headway, Grant moves away from Lee again.

The Wilderness is different, but it's different because Grant is crossing the Rappahanock and Lee is trying to knock him back across like he did to Hooker. Grant keeps moving east and gets out of the Wilderness before re-establishing supply from Fredericksburg and Port Royal (not long before his supplies run out).

But when Grant manoeuvres it's always trying to get around Lee's flank and get between him and Richmond. If all Grant wanted was to pound on Lee then he could have done that up around Spotsylvania all summer, closer to his own base and further from Lee's.

Similarly, it's not like having Richmond as the objective would lead to more decisions to retreat than otherwise. Grant got over the Rappahanock successfully, that's the difference...



Primary source please? I've seen this story before but never been able to trace it back as far as the 19th century; I suspect it's a later invention.

On February 29, 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was appointed General-in-Chief of the Union Army, and the war is starting over. As soon as Grant received the news, he met with General Sherman. Grant's plan was that Sherman would go after Joe Johnston while he would go after Robert E. Lee, the General of the Confederates. Grant once said: "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on." Grant's strategy was different from all the others. He believed the Union should focus on the Confederate army and not the Confederate capital.
http://www.kawvalley.k12.ks.us/schools/rjh/marneyg/archived_projects/2000Projects/00usgrantbe.htm

 

[damYankee]

First, Grant understood that war could not be a seasonal activity. Until 1864, wars were conducted when the seasons best permitted, or when men could be away from their farms. Grant waged war year-round, recognizing that "total" war would cause, among other things, civilian discomfort and reduce the political will of the enemy. Under Grant, Union armies did not retire to winter quarters to refit and reorganize, and they would require their enemies to remain in the field against them. But total warfare was more a strategic than operational change. Second, Grant recognized that a high tempo of operations reduced or eliminated the enemy's ability to use advantages such as interior lines of communications. Speed over time is tempo.6 Until Grant took command, the South could count on reprieves during periods of Union inactivity to refit and restore their logistic and supply bases. Or needing men in one location, the South could use interior lines to move men to meet the current threat. Grant's operational tempo bankrupt Lee and other Southern generals of their supplies and their morale, and their ability to concentrate against one army while delaying or holding against another. Grant used maneuver in order to increase tempo as well as to place his forces. Indeed, Grant's use of maneuver was every bit as important to his generalship as it was to those given more credit for using maneuver – Confederate General Robert E. Lee, Union Major General William T. Sherman and especially Confederate Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson.
As a result of Grant's innovations, by the end of the war, Confederate troops were typically hungry, shoeless, poorly mounted, and generally forlorn. Their Union counterparts were unhappy with the war continuing, but they were generally sure of ultimate victory, well fed, well supplied and increasingly well led. Grant cannot be given credit for the Union supply lines or food preparation, but his activity, his understanding of war and, most of all, his understanding of operations in the field forever changed the nature of war.
Clearly Grant was a military genius, or at least particularly gifted, with respect to strategy. Grant's strategic view was put into action and led to the end of the war in just over one year from the time he assumed overall command of Union armies. Operationally, he was just as effective. During the four years of the war, troops under Grant's immediate command received the surrender of three Confederate armies and two were put to flight in total disarray.7 But tactically speaking, after Ft. Donelson, in February 1862, Grant seldom had a direct effect on tactics. As a field army commander and then as General-in-Chief of all Union armies, Grant's domain lie in strategy and operations. While many view Grant as a butcher,8especially after the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, Grant used maneuver to place his forces in optimum positions to attack his Confederate opponents. The aforementioned attacks by the Army of the Potomac were usually the result of that Army's well known characteristic of being late, as opposed to lack of maneuver by Grant.9
The South's foremost general and perhaps the best known military figure of the war, Robert E. Lee, described his responsibility in operational terms, "I plan and work…to bring the troops to the right place at the right time." Lee thought that interfering with his brigade and division commanders would do more harm than good.10
Operationally, Grant sought Lee's goal – to place his men where they could be successful tactically. The record shows that Grant did precisely that, though his subordinates often failed to capitalize on his work. Grant used maneuver extensively, and, until late in the war, always sought to win the battle outright by capturing the enemy force intact. This appears to have been innately learned, since Grant denies having read the standard books on tactics11 or the military pronouncements of the French general, Henri Jomini, or the American Thomas Mahan, whose tactical doctrine dominated Civil War thinking.12
There is no evidence that Grant ever wanted to win the war by attrition as his mostly-Southern critics claim, nor is there any indication that Grant believed frontal attacks alone were the answer. But there were many experiences that undoubtedly affected his decision-making as Grant grew into his assignment as General-in-Chief.
https://ehistory.osu.edu/articles/us-grant-and-operations-0

 

[Saphroneth]

Grant once said: "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on."

This is unbearably simple and reminds me more than a little of Pope saying that lines of retreat and bases of supply were nonsense; Pope of course proved he meant it, while Grant's operations are more sophisticated than that.

First, Grant understood that war could not be a seasonal activity. Until 1864, wars were conducted when the seasons best permitted, or when men could be away from their farms.

And this is plain silly. In 1862 the Confederate army of Northern Virginia and the Union main armies remained continuously operative and in the field the whole year round with major concentrations or clashes of strength in April, May, June, July, August, September, November and December, while in 1864 all the major engagements took place in May and June - the classic campaigning season.

Worse, the article implies by the phrase "until 1864, wars were conducted..." that Grant was the one who invented the idea of a war having major fighting outside the typical periods of spring and autumn. Which is silly - Grant's army went into comparative inactivity over the winter like everyone else did, it's just that it did it in siege lines; conversely, Wellington's invasion of France was conducted over the winter of 1813-14.
It's harder to fight in the winter; this doesn't mean it wasn't done.