Grant Grant v Lee

[Saphroneth]

Yes he had an enormous ego but most great achievers share this trait

True.



With that in mind, something I think is worth thinking about is the strategic decisions.
It's possible to view Lee's entire military career as a series of attempts to prevent regular approaches to Richmond ("he will make this a battle of posts"). First he has a major strategic concentration ordered, then (after Johnston is wounded) he levers McClellan away from Richmond (Seven Days) with a sideline in keeping Washington from sending reinforcements (Valley campaign). He detaches as much force as possible north to move the cockpit of the war from southern to northern Virginia (the eponymous campaign) and invades the North, though this comes unstuck around 14-17 September.

After that he defends the Rappahanock line, deflecting two crossing attempts (Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville) before invading the North again (Gettysburg) which he seems to view as a success at the time. He manages to stymie a third crossing attempt (Mine Run) but the fourth (Wilderness) goes through successfully and reaches supply.

At this point Lee's goal is basically to stop Grant getting close to Richmond, and though he can't prevent Grant moving by the flank he can block the direct approach and does so (Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor). Grant has to go to the James and cross to Petersburg - something Lee can't prevent - and then Lee detaches force to threaten Washington as his last gambit to avoid a siege of Richmond and Petersburg (Early's Valley campaign). This fails, but Petersburg holds out for a total of ten months (Lee must have been relieved when Grant didn't start using heavy rifles in regular approaches).


The thing is that it's hard to see somewhere where Lee acted against this fundamental strategic principle.

OTOH, if Grant was aiming to get into Richmond, his actions in the Overland make sense (but didn't work out; no shame in that) while if Grant was aiming to cause attrition to Lee's force he should have stayed up near Spotsylvania. Grant should also have used the siege guns to batter his way into Petersburg, instead of using the men for manning harrassing mortars.



I think Lee comes out of the analysis as a better general than Grant, but the North didn't really need a better general than Lee. What they needed was a general able to operate a large army, the political will to give him that large army and keep it up to strength, and to get that army south of the Rappahanock and in supply; this Grant did and had.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Hannibal lost his war but is still remembered as a great leader several thousand years later.

Perhaps, buut, does that mean Hannible was better than Scippio ?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Okay. When does Grant beat someone who outnumbers him 2:1?

For this thread, a Moot point, isn;t it? Like asking what would Lee have done if he had the resourcesof Grant, i.e., we can neverknow. We can only know what history tells us.

However, during Grant's strategic end-around campaign against Vicksburg, moving North from the Mississippi River Landings, Grant was numerically inferior to confederate fgorces against him, but he used speed, mobility and audacity to befuddle, outmaneuver and defeat his opponents, Not unlike a Lee.

 

[Saphroneth]

However, during Grant's strategic end-around campaign against Vicksburg, moving North from the Mississippi River Landings, Grant was numerically inferior to confederate fgorces against him

Really?

Can you give me the count on that? Which forces and how the count stacks up?

If it turns out that that count includes a Confederate force some distance away but not the Union force directly opposing it, I will have a sad.

 

[wausaubob]

Based on Fuller, one would come to the conclusion that as a General commanding troops, Lee performed well. He achieved almost miracles. But by 1932 everyone was starting to think about the link between policy and strategy in terms created by Carl von Clausewitz.
That is where Grant excelled. He was a very patient politician. But when he got the edge on an opponent, he crushed him. The same thing happened inside the army, to the Confederates, and in politics after the war.
Grant's favorite subordinates were Sherman who destroyed as much property as he could in Georgia and S. Carolina, and Sheridan, who was the Irish/American of an mystical Gaelic chieftain.
Grant was a ruthless politician, and that is why there was no second Civil War. The south he left behind was incapable of fighting. Good thread, but best not to lose track of J.F.C. Fuller.
Fuller himself failed to appreciate the danger of the revival of German militarism. Or maybe he saw it and was hypnotized by it. @Saphroneth probably has read several Fuller treatises.

 

[wausaubob]

I think you have to use an entirely different definition of success for the two sides. In the case of the Union, it was a war of conquest and its aim was to re-establish Federal government control of as much geography as possible. So in that case, the fall of significant cities and ports are absolutely successes.

For the Confederate side, the goal was to remain intact, defiant and to continue resistance. Even if Johnston had won at Shiloh and Pemberton had won at Vicksburg, there would have been no expansions of the Confederate territories. They would have maintained their space and remained to fight the next attempt to subdue them. Only Lee had a remote chance (in my estimation) of actually causing the fall of important cities had he won at Gettysburg, and even then, it would have been temporary.

So, in this perspective, Shiloh was actually a success for both sides. For the Union, holding the field meant Grant secured his gains in Western Tennessee. For the Secesh, their army had demonstrated a fierce fighting ability and remained a threat, as evidenced by the uproar created by Bragg when he took this army a few months later into Kentucky.

Shiloh influenced Lincoln to substitute Halleck for Grant and that prevented the US from advancing on Jackson, MS that summer.
The price paid included the permanent loss of New Orleans and Memphis, the temporary loss of Baton Rouge, and the near loss of Vicksburg.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Really?

Can you give me the count on that? Which forces and how the count stacks up?
If it turns out that that count includes a Confederate force some distance away but not the Union force directly opposing it, I will have a sad.

A good sign of good generalship, is misdirection, i.e., 'hit 'em where they aint' a sign oftern used to describe Lee's 'genius' as a general.

 

[BillO]

Perhaps, buut, does that mean Hannible was better than Scippio ?

Yes it does.

 

[Saphroneth]

A good sign of good generalship, is misdirection, i.e., 'hit 'em where they aint' a sign oftern used to describe Lee's 'genius' as a general.

The reason why I brought this up is that my understanding is that Grant had superior forces, and that usually when there's the count which is used to claim Grant was outnumbered it's done mendaciously.

Per 67th:



Grant crossed the following:

30th April
Army HQ: not reported (and engineers, but not taken into account here)
13th Corps (- District of Arkansas): 17,696 PFD
7th Division, 17th Corps: 6,498 PFD
= 24,194 PFD

1st May
HQ + 3rd Division, 17th Corps: 6,574
= 30,768

It is with these 30,768 men Grant knocks away Bowen's 2 brigade division at Port Gibson.

6-7th May
Main Body, 15th Corps (exc/2nd Division): 11,136
= 41,904 PFD

11th May
2nd Division, 15th Corps: 5,917 (relieved from previous duty by troops from 16th Corps)
= 47,821 PFD

13th May (crosses river)
3rd Division, 17th Corps: 6,498
= 54,319 PFD


Now, Pemberton had five military districts. Of these, 1st and 5th districts are 130+ miles north and guarding against 16th Corps (so we should count 16th corps as well if we count them) and 3rd district is 130 miles south and guarding against Banks (so we should count him if we count them).

However, reinforcements from them to the Vicksburg area should be counted.



In the Vicksburg defences and covering field forces: 29,719
Johnston's Forces in vicinity of Jackson ca. 14th May: 7,580

Total in the field, including Gist ca. 14-16 May:37,299

Reinforcements received afterwards: 13,527

Grand Total, Confederate Forces in the Campaign: 50,826 (for duty, mixed timings hence estimate)



In other words, the PFD force Grant had across the river by 14th May exceeds the strength of the Confederate forces for the entire campaign.


This is why I asked how you're counting them.

 

[Saphroneth]

To be clear, the same logic is why we say Lee was outnumbered by a certain amount during Chancellorsville. We count Lee's force facing Fredericksburg and we also count the Union force in Fredericksburg; we don't however count the garrison of Washington.

 

[OpnCoronet]

After running the batteries at Vicksbug, Grant begain his move North on the East side of the Mississippi River, with inferior forcesto thos available to Pemberton and later Johnston, if they handled their jobs right, they did not and as a result Grant achieved local superiority at the point of viital military importance, ala lee.

It is true that Grant was eventually able to expand his army much faster and much bigger as the campaign progressed and Pemberton and Johnston negated their origiinal superioriority of forces.

 

[Saphroneth]

After running the batteries at Vicksbug, Grant begain his move North on the East side of the Mississippi River, with inferior forcesto thos available to Pemberton and later Johnston, if they handled their jobs right, they did not and as a result Grant achieved local superiority at the point of viital military importance, ala lee.

So when are you counting?

You seem to be comparing Grant's forces just after he crosses part of his army with Pemberton's entire department - when that department's about three hundred miles wide and it'd take three weeks to march across following a good road.

Grant crosses 30,768 men in a single body during one crossing, and the entire force in Vicksburg at the time is 29,719.
So. How are you counting?

 

[Georgia Sixth]

I would respectfully disagree. The Achilles heel of the Confederate economy is exporting bulky agricultural exports to Western Europe. By middle 1862 the English as well has the French have a " cotton famine" and have to layoff workers. The blockade can only grow tighter very time as the Union capture's more ports and the Union Navy grows larger. President Davis even acknowledged in a letter during the war that there are simply not enough Confederate soldiers to secure the few vital deep water ports.
Leftyhunter

Totally agree that the CSA was hopelessly outclassed and outnumbered in navy ships, both saltwater and brown water. Perhaps I misunderstood the OP. I thought it pertained strictly to in the field matters rather than big picture strategic issues. The window of time in which southern ports were open would close increasingly fast as the war progressed and there was no way they could stop it without serious foreign help.

 

[Georgia Sixth]

Shiloh influenced Lincoln to substitute Halleck for Grant and that prevented the US from advancing on Jackson, MS that summer.
The price paid included the permanent loss of New Orleans and Memphis, the temporary loss of Baton Rouge, and the near loss of Vicksburg.

Yes, the loss of New Orleans -- which can not be under emphasized for its importance -- was the most dramatic indirect result of the Shiloh campaign. Interesting to note that New Orleans would have been lost even if the CSA had won that battle. The troops were stripped from the coastal defenses as there weren't enough men to field an army against Grant otherwise. The south was hopelessly outnumbered and this is a prime example. In this regard, the "lost cause myth" is true. What the myth fails to state is that going to war in the first place was a stupid idea.

 

[leftyhunter]

Totally agree that the CSA was hopelessly outclassed and outnumbered in navy ships, both saltwater and brown water. Perhaps I misunderstood the OP. I thought it pertained strictly to in the field matters rather than big picture strategic issues. The window of time in which southern ports were open would close increasingly fast as the war progressed and there was no way they could stop it without serious foreign help.

True enough. My main point was the Confederate economy didn't have time for a slow war of attrition . Cash crop farmer didn't want to raise food crops even though there were desperately needed. Each year exporting crops became more difficult.
Also the Union could trace their looses in a war of attrition the Confederacy can not.
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

The south was hopelessly outnumbered and this is a prime example. In this regard, the "lost cause myth" is true.

I would rather say that the South was badly outnumbered and that they practiced a pretty ruthless triage to mitigate this. They enacted a draft much sooner than the US did, and on top of that they focused manpower according to the zones of greatest importance - Richmond was the first priority and the entire West was secondary.

This is why in June 1862 they had an army at Richmond that actually outnumbered what McClellan had, albeit only because of dilligent efforts to prevent Union reinforcements to him.


If I had to define the biggest difference between Union and Confederate strategy it would be that, and I think the Confederate approach was superior; in this light it's possible to see Grant's success as being the point where the relative Union manpower superiority became great enough that even with their focus on the West they could still fight an offensive campaign against the East-focused Confederacy in the East.

If you swapped their focus around, OTOH, Richmond falls in 1862 and quite possibly half the Eastern Seaboard too.

 

[DanSBHawk]

So when are you counting?

You seem to be comparing Grant's forces just after he crosses part of his army with Pemberton's entire department - when that department's about three hundred miles wide and it'd take three weeks to march across following a good road.

Grant crosses 30,768 men in a single body during one crossing, and the entire force in Vicksburg at the time is 29,719.
So. How are you counting?

I don't know where you get your numbers, but Michael Ballard has Grants initial numbers at the crossing at less than 23,000.

If Pemberton had taken Bowens warnings seriously and concentrated his troops, and opposed the landing, he would have enjoyed a significant numerical advantage against Grant. But the multiple diversions by Grant, with cavalry and with Sherman north of Vicksburg, worked to distract and scatter the confederates.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I would rather say that the South was badly outnumbered and that they practiced a pretty ruthless triage to mitigate this. They enacted a draft much sooner than the US did, and on top of that they focused manpower according to the zones of greatest importance - Richmond was the first priority and the entire West was secondary.

This is why in June 1862 they had an army at Richmond that actually outnumbered what McClellan had, albeit only because of dilligent efforts to prevent Union reinforcements to him.


If I had to define the biggest difference between Union and Confederate strategy it would be that, and I think the Confederate approach was superior; in this light it's possible to see Grant's success as being the point where the relative Union manpower superiority became great enough that even with their focus on the West they could still fight an offensive campaign against the East-focused Confederacy in the East.

If you swapped their focus around, OTOH, Richmond falls in 1862 and quite possibly half the Eastern Seaboard too.

Their were times during the Peninsula campaign that the federals enjoyed a numerical advantage.

There was never a time during the war that Union strategy focused more on the West versus the East.

 

[Saphroneth]

I don't know where you get your numbers, but Michael Ballard has Grants initial numbers at the crossing at less than 23,000.

That's probably because it's chopping at midnight on 30th April.
The numbers are:

30th April
Army HQ: not reported
13th Corps (- District of Arkansas): 17,696 PFD
7th Division, 17th Corps: 6,498 PFD
= 24,194 PFD

1st May
HQ + 3rd Division, 17th Corps: 6,574

These are all based on the 30th April 1863 returns in the ORs.

 

[Saphroneth]

There was never a time during the war that Union strategy focused more on the West versus the East.

As of Gettysburg there's more soldiers in the Western combat forces than in the Eastern.

On June 30 1863 the largest three armies are the Tennessee (138,000 Present), Potomac (118,000 Present) and Cumberland (97,000 Present). The largest other departments are Gulf (42,000), Missouri (35,000), Washington (32,000), Virginia (32,000).

That's not to mention when Lincoln was dissuaded from reinforcing the Army of the Potomac in July by Halleck protesting that it would impair operations in Tennessee.