Grant Grant v Lee

[DanSBHawk]

That's probably because it's chopping at midnight on 30th April.
The numbers are:

30th April
Army HQ: not reported
13th Corps (- District of Arkansas): 17,696 PFD
7th Division, 17th Corps: 6,498 PFD
= 24,194 PFD

1st May
HQ + 3rd Division, 17th Corps: 6,574

These are all based on the 30th April 1863 returns in the ORs.

So you are saying that crossing 30,000 "in a single body" is not accurate?

If Pemberton had concentrated his forces, he could have outnumbered Grant at the landing.

 

[Saphroneth]

So you are saying that crossing 30,000 "in a single body" is not accurate?

I'm saying Grant crossed his troops over the night of the 30th April-1st May, and that the crossing took place over midnight.
Thus he crossed 30,000 in a single body, but people who want to present Grant as outnumbered cut in the middle of the landing.


Grant had superior numbers available to him and he'd be a total fool if he didn't concentrate enough in his first move to prevent himself being defeated in detail...

If Pemberton had concentrated his forces, he could have outnumbered Grant at the landing.

Those are the forces where some of them are more than 100 miles away? When Grant's the one picking the landing spot?

 

[DanSBHawk]

As of Gettysburg there's more soldiers in the Western combat forces than in the Eastern.

On June 30 1863 the largest three armies are the Tennessee (138,000 Present), Potomac (118,000 Present) and Cumberland (97,000 Present). The largest other departments are Gulf (42,000), Missouri (35,000), Washington (32,000), Virginia (32,000).

That's not to mention when Lincoln was dissuaded from reinforcing the Army of the Potomac in July by Halleck protesting that it would impair operations in Tennessee.

How does this show the focus of Union strategy? How many troops per square mile of the areas these armies covered? How many troops per army as compared to their confederate counterparts?

The strategy that won the war was attacking the enemy on many fronts simultaneously.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'm saying Grant crossed his troops over the night of the 30th April-1st May, and that the crossing took place over midnight.
Thus he crossed 30,000 in a single body, but people who want to present Grant as outnumbered cut in the middle of the landing.


Grant had superior numbers available to him and he'd be a total fool if he didn't concentrate enough in his first move to prevent himself being defeated in detail...


Those are the forces where some of them are more than 100 miles away? When Grant's the one picking the landing spot?

I'll go with Ballard as the Vicksburg expert.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'll go with Ballard as the Vicksburg expert.

Okay, so does Ballard cite his numbers? It looks like he cites a quote.

The fact remains that we have OR reports of the strength of the units that crossed, and as you'll see in the quote Logan crossed in "the early morning hours of May 1" so they're part of the same body.

Perhaps Ballard is counting Grant's force in "effectives", but if so then we should reduce down Pemberton's troop strength in the same way (which looks like a reduction to 71% of PFD)


The crossing was certainly an accomplishment - moving 30,000 troops PFD in one go is pretty impressive - but I cannot see the metric where one gets from the ORs, looks at the troops who moved, and concludes that the force Grant crossed with was smaller than the force Pemberton had within fifty miles.

How does this show the focus of Union strategy? How many troops per square mile of the areas these armies covered? How many troops per army as compared to their confederate counterparts?

On April 30, 1863 (which isn't quite comparable to the Union numbers, I admit) the strengths Present are:
AoNV (plus Hood and Pickett's divisions) 94,000 - this excludes Ransom, Imboden and Davidson
Army of Tennessee 68,000
Dept. of Mississippi and East Louisiana 61,000 (this isn't a field army but it faces Grant's one)
Dept. of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida 37,000
Trans-Mississippi dept. 30,000
Dept. of North Carolina (which includes Ransom's division) 27,000


What this means is that the largest Confederate field army is in the East and the largest Union field army is in the West. There's one big Confederate department after the three largest which is in the West, and two big Confederate departments after the three largest in the East.


Total Confederate strength in the West (cis-Mississippi) is 152,000 counting Maury's little Army of the Tennessee and the Dept. of the Gulf, as against 235,000 in the two big Union field armies operating there (Tennessee and Cumberland).
The Confederate main army in the East is at least 100,000 if Ransom's division is counted, and the Union field army there is 118,000 Present.

That means that the Army of Northern Virginia alone is bigger compared to the Army of the Potomac than just about everything in the West compared to the Union field armies there.

 

[Virginia Dave]

I would love to have seen a chess match between the two. Both equal at the beginning. Of course all the speculation doesn't mean a lot when you look at the outcome. Also, answering the question what was better for America should be put into the equation. Maybe that has been discussed in another forum. I forgot to check. Still I enjoy all the points that were made. I really learn a lot here and am glad that I found this site. Thanks everyone for you comments in this thread.

 

[Saphroneth]

Also, answering the question what was better for America should be put into the equation. Maybe that has been discussed in another forum.

The best outcome for America would probably be the peace that resulted in emancipation with the smallest number of casualties, followed by a properly implemented reconstruction.

 

[Saruman]

If Pemberton had taken Bowens warnings seriously and concentrated his troops, and opposed the landing, he would have enjoyed a significant numerical advantage against Grant. But the multiple diversions by Grant, with cavalry and with Sherman north of Vicksburg, worked to distract and scatter the confederates.

To be fair to Pemberton, he had very little cavalry. Joe Johnston had sent it all to Tennessee. Pemberton was effectively blind and had to scatter his infantry to protect the entire state of Mississippi's assets.

 

[Saphroneth]

Grant's actions in the operations against Vicksburg, in terms of crossing his troops (a single body at the start large enough to resist attack, then feeding in extra troops as they become available) are militarily correct. The diversions are good military sense, too.

If you have enough troops to do this sort of thing, you do it - there's no point leaving troops which are available and which you could supply out of the battle doing nothing. Given the same resources, if he'd crossed only 15,000 or 23,000 PFD instead of 30,000 PFD on the first night he'd have been a lesser general.


It's fact that he wasn't outnumbered unless you count very oddly. That's also okay and doesn't make him a bad general - it makes him a good one at using the resources he had.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Okay, so does Ballard cite his numbers? It looks like he cites a quote.

The fact remains that we have OR reports of the strength of the units that crossed, and as you'll see in the quote Logan crossed in "the early morning hours of May 1" so they're part of the same body.

Perhaps Ballard is counting Grant's force in "effectives", but if so then we should reduce down Pemberton's troop strength in the same way (which looks like a reduction to 71% of PFD)


The crossing was certainly an accomplishment - moving 30,000 troops PFD in one go is pretty impressive - but I cannot see the metric where one gets from the ORs, looks at the troops who moved, and concludes that the force Grant crossed with was smaller than the force Pemberton had within fifty miles.




On April 30, 1863 (which isn't quite comparable to the Union numbers, I admit) the strengths Present are:
AoNV (plus Hood and Pickett's divisions) 94,000 - this excludes Ransom, Imboden and Davidson
Army of Tennessee 68,000
Dept. of Mississippi and East Louisiana 61,000 (this isn't a field army but it faces Grant's one)
Dept. of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida 37,000
Trans-Mississippi dept. 30,000
Dept. of North Carolina (which includes Ransom's division) 27,000


What this means is that the largest Confederate field army is in the East and the largest Union field army is in the West. There's one big Confederate department after the three largest which is in the West, and two big Confederate departments after the three largest in the East.


Total Confederate strength in the West (cis-Mississippi) is 152,000 counting Maury's little Army of the Tennessee and the Dept. of the Gulf, as against 235,000 in the two big Union field armies operating there (Tennessee and Cumberland).
The Confederate main army in the East is at least 100,000 if Ransom's division is counted, and the Union field army there is 118,000 Present.

That means that the Army of Northern Virginia alone is bigger compared to the Army of the Potomac than just about everything in the West compared to the Union field armies there.

Here is Timothy Smith, another excellent historian who specializes in the Western theater, in his Champion Hill book.

 

[Saphroneth]

Here is Timothy Smith, another excellent historian who specializes in the Western theater, in his Champion Hill book.

That probably is Pemberton's strength in Present, but you have to compare army strengths by comparable metrics.

Would you prefer we use PFD or Present?

And, once that's decided, will you accept the strength totals direct from the ORs in that category?

 

[DanSBHawk]

That probably is Pemberton's strength in Present, but you have to compare army strengths by comparable metrics.

Would you prefer we use PFD or Present?

And, once that's decided, will you accept the strength totals direct from the ORs in that category?

You can play with the numbers any way that you would prefer. I am listing credible sources that back up what the above poster wrote. That Grant's initial force was outnumbered by the confederate forces, had they been concentrated against him.

If Pemberton had cavalry available for gathering intelligence, rather than chasing Grierson or Streight or whatever, perhaps he would have been able to learn of Grants crossing in time, and concentrate his forces and contest the landing with equal or superior numbers.

 

[Saphroneth]

You can play with the numbers any way that you would prefer. I am listing credible sources that back up what the above poster wrote. That Grant's initial force was outnumbered by the confederate forces, had they been concentrated against him.

But you're listing two different books for the different numbers for Grant and Pemberton.
Surely the ORs are a suitable primary source? We can look at them and find the PFD and Present numbers for the troops in Grant's initial crossing force and the troops in Vicksburg.


I mean, there shouldn't be anything "playing with the numbers" if we make a good-faith attempt to establish what troops were at Vicksburg when Grant crossed and what their strength is in the ORs - Present or PFD, your choice. If we have a dispute about what qualifies, that's one thing, but we have the ORs to do primary research from.

If Pemberton had cavalry available for gathering intelligence, rather than chasing Grierson or Streight or whatever, perhaps he would have been able to learn of Grants crossing in time, and concentrate his forces and contest the landing with equal or superior numbers.

So I want to question this. How exactly would cavalry recon allow Pemberton to find out about Grant's crossing and contest the landing with equal or superior numbers?

Certainly cavalry would allow Pemberton to find out about the crossing as it happened, but Grant's troops landed forty miles of marching from Vicksburg itself - how many of Pemberton's troops were within a day's march of the landing site and able to possibly contest it? Surely it wasn't all of them.

I will concede that Pemberton (or more likely John S. Bowen) would have been able to contest the landing with the troops he had close enough, and that attacking before Grant was established would have been very disruptive to his plans. But that's a couple of brigades (Green, Baldwin, possibly a third, not Tracy as he arrived on the 2nd), not the same as "equal or superior numbers"

 

[DanSBHawk]

But you're listing two different books for the different numbers for Grant and Pemberton.
Surely the ORs are a suitable primary source? We can look at them and find the PFD and Present numbers for the troops in Grant's initial crossing force and the troops in Vicksburg.


I mean, there shouldn't be anything "playing with the numbers" if we make a good-faith attempt to establish what troops were at Vicksburg when Grant crossed and what their strength is in the ORs - Present or PFD, your choice. If we have a dispute about what qualifies, that's one thing, but we have the ORs to do primary research from.



So I want to question this. How exactly would cavalry recon allow Pemberton to find out about Grant's crossing and contest the landing with equal or superior numbers?

Certainly cavalry would allow Pemberton to find out about the crossing as it happened, but Grant's troops landed forty miles of marching from Vicksburg itself - how many of Pemberton's troops were within a day's march of the landing site and able to possibly contest it? Surely it wasn't all of them.

I will concede that Pemberton (or more likely John S. Bowen) would have been able to contest the landing with the troops he had close enough, and that attacking before Grant was established would have been very disruptive to his plans. But that's a couple of brigades (Green, Baldwin, possibly a third, not Tracy as he arrived on the 2nd), not the same as "equal or superior numbers"

A "day's march?" Pemberton had received reports of Grant moving south on the Louisiana side for a month. He had plenty of time to investigate and stage troops within reinforcing distance of a contested landing south of Vicksburg.

 

[damYankee]

The argument will never be conclusive if the goal is to determine which was better. Both faced difficult challenges and deserve to be studied without judgement.

 

[Saphroneth]

A "day's march?" Pemberton had received reports of Grant moving south on the Louisiana side for a month. He had plenty of time to investigate and stage troops within reinforcing distance of a contested landing south of Vicksburg.

Okay?

Grant has freedom of action to land anywhere within a fairly wide stretch of the river. If Pemberton places all (or, say, half) of his troops around Bruinsberg then there's nothing to stop Grant landing around Grand Gulf - which is the other side of the North Fork from Bruinsberg. If he puts enough troops around Grand Gulf and Bruinsberg then he could face a landing at Rodney (further south) or even Warrenton (much further north) - steaming is faster than marching.

I suspect (but I don't know for sure) that the reason why some of Pemberton's troops were down as far as Port Gibson is that he did spread his troops out, but spreading your troops out over a forty-mile frontage means that nowhere do you have all your force concentrated.



Note that what Grant is doing here is good strategy. He is using his superior numbers to pressure along the whole of the river that Pemberton has to defend (aided by Banks doing much the same thing) and is then crossing a force large enough to take care of itself in a concentrated block - and making the decision about whether to land at Grand Gulf or Bruinsberg at the last minute based on how defended Grand Gulf is.
He also doesn't have his entire force west of the Mississippi moving in a single body, it's strung out, and this makes it harder for Pemberton to be sure where Grant's centre of gravity is until he actually crosses.

As the aggressor Grant has the initiative, and he has a superior total force and (because of his control of the Mississippi) better mobility. For him to have failed to cross a force large enough to take care of itself would have been an indicator of poor strategy.

Once he has this beach-head, he reinforces it quickly as the rest of his moving column arrives, and the force quickly grows to the extent it's larger than Pemberton's force in Vicksburg and all the reinforcements Johnston can scrape together to be a potential relieving force.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant has freedom of action to land anywhere within a fairly wide stretch of the river. If Pemberton places all (or, say, half) of his troops around Bruinsberg then there's nothing to stop Grant landing around Grand Gulf - which is the other side of the North Fork from Bruinsberg. If he puts enough troops around Grand Gulf and Bruinsberg then he could face a landing at Rodney (further south) or even Warrenton (much further north) - steaming is faster than marching.

"Anywhere?" Not really. It would have to be a suitable landing spot with suitable roads leading from it. The terrain in that area limits the options. I believe the main options considered beforehand were Grand Gulf and Rodney. Grant learned about Bruinsberg from a local.

Pemberton did not take the threat seriously enough until it was too late.

 

[Saphroneth]

"Anywhere?" Not really. It would have to be a suitable landing spot with suitable roads leading from it. The terrain in that area limits the options. I believe the main options considered beforehand were Grand Gulf and Rodney. Grant learned about Bruinsberg from a local.

So you've got Grand Gulf and you've got Rodney, both possible landing locations, and if Pemberton's entire force is deployed down there you've also got the Warrenton area (which has good roads and was a site of cotton exports in the 1830s, so was presumably a functional landing place).

Grand Gulf, Rodney and Warrenton/Vicksburg are too far apart for forces at one location to contest a landing made at another location. This means that Pemberton cannot guarantee contesting a landing with more than - at most - a third of his force. Bruinsberg makes a fourth landing site some miles from Grand Gulf.

What it looks like Pemberton did was to place some troops to cover possible landing sites, but without knowing Grant's landing site ahead of time there's not really much he could have done to prevent a landing entirely. He only had so many troops to spread, and as it is it looks like he did have a few brigades close enough to at least theoretically contest the landing.

The only way Pemberton could contest the landing with his entire force, however, is if he knew ahead of time what landing site Grant would pick - and Grant himself hadn't firmed that up, so it'd be basically impossible.


Out of curiosity, if you were in Pemberton's place what would you do? We can both agree I think that he should have ensured his cavalry was around, but how would you have distributed his forces?

 

[damYankee]

Once the destruction of Lee's army became the priority how could the outcome have been any different?

 

[Saphroneth]

Once the destruction of Lee's army became the priority how could the outcome have been any different?

Out of interest, in what way do you think that holding the destruction of Lee's army as the priority affect Grant's manoeuvres or decisions?