Yes Assistant Secretary Fox, whose highest rank in the navy was lieutenant, making this suggestion to the Flag Officer at the end of March, after the operation was already underway. Read the Navy's testimony to the JCCW. There was never a conversation during the planning, involving competent naval officers, as to whether it was even possible to do what McClellan planned for the navy to do.
Yes, there were many. From ten months ago:
We can sequence events. Firstly I should note you are completely wrong about the origin of the Peninsula movement. The decision to move to Fort Monroe was forced on McClellan by his corps commanders, whom Lincoln had appointed to make the decision (as was disappointed). The sequence is thus
13th March
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Court-House, March 13, 1862.
A council of the generals commanding army corps at the Headquarters Army of the Potomac were of the opinion-
I. That, the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James River, upon Richmond, provided-
1. That the enemy's vessel Merrimac can be neutralized.
2. That the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac, and
3. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries in York River.
4. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace.
Unanimous.
II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with material sufficient for the supplying the army should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and the Aquia and Richmond Railroads.
Unanimous.
NOTE.- That, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice.
KEYES.
HEINTZELMAN.
McDOWELL.
A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice.
SUMNER."
Hence some degree of confusion. Months had been made preparing for an operation and at the last minute McClellan had a change of plans imposed on him. McClellan immediately moves to implement said plan, and he writes to Stanton to secure the help of the navy. Keyes had already obtained a verbal promise from Fox to knock down Yorktown (see his 7th April letter).
14th March
Welles initially rebuffs McClellan's note. He's only interested in Norfolk. Said note is handed to Lincoln (it is in the Lincoln files) and we don't know what was said but....
17th March
The Navy Dept agrees to McClellan's terms and Welles orders all available ships to concentrate at Fort Monroe. Fox has a meeting with Barnard and McDowell and agrees "to assist in the Army movement which is to take place immediately from Hampton Roads." McClellan orders his lead division embarked on receiving the news. Woodbury is sent to liase with Goldsborough.
19th March
Woodbury
reports that Goldsborough's offers of aid are not convincing, and he may be unreliable. Hence McClellan sends Barnard to Goldsborough, and kicks the matter upstairs to Stanton. McClellan suspends the order for the movement, awaiting the Navy question. Stanton tells Lincoln and Lincoln immediately writes he wishes to see McClellan at Alexandria, which will happen on the 21st.
20th March
McDowell, Lincoln, Stanton, Welles, Dahlgren, and Fox have a sit down meeting at the White House to discuss the matter, which McDowell says was "indecisive", because the Navy people disagree about whether the Navy can attack Yorktown or not. We know the hawk here was Fox, and we know Welles was against the idea. I've no idea about Dahlgren. The meeting was adjourned.
21st March
Lincoln meets McClellan in the morning at Alexandria to discuss the Navy issue. Lincoln reassures McClellan enough that McClellan un-suspends the movement and orders Porter's division embarked. Lincoln returns to Washington and continues said meeting. Again, nothing is concluded and McDowell states they're awaiting for Barnard to return.
22nd March
Barnard returns, and reiterates Goldsborough's reluctance. McClellan orders a siege train to be carried as it appears that the promises in Washington may be hollow. A previous study by Shields in January had suggested it would take 6 weeks to take Yorktown by regular approaches.
24th March
Fox sends a request to Goldsborough to attack Yorktown. He won't.
Keyes, Barnard and McDowell, the higher ups who liased with the Navy, reported that the Navy had promised to fully cooperate. Woodbury was sent to Goldsborough to liase and he
reported he was not convinced by Goldsborough's offers of aid. Hence on 20th March McClellan kicks the question up to Stanton and McClellan etc. discuss the matter in Cabinet on the afternoon of the 20th. Barnard is sent to secure Goldsborough's cooperation. On the 22nd Barnard has not returned and McClellan orders Marcy to prepare an alternative to the Navy - a siege train.
3rd April
Knowing his army will be at Yorktown on the 5th, McClellan asks Goldsborough to arrive at Yorktown on the 5th and attack it.
5th April
Four gunboats show up but refuse to attack. They are
Marblehead (5),
Wachusett (10),
Penobscot (5) and
Currituck (5).
9th April
Fox visits McClellan and spends the night. He promises to get the fleet up to destroy Yorktown, and promises to get Franklin's division released for amphibious operations.
14th April
A fifth gunboat,
Sebago, armed with rifles joins the force in the York.
16th April
Sebago engages the batteries at long range, and is not hit.
19th April
Fox repeats his request to Goldsborough to have a force run past Yorktown and attack it. He cites Lincoln's annoyance at the Navy.
21st April
Goldsborough writes a long piece of self-justification, which he'll repeat at the JCCW.
3rd May
Fox again visits McClellan. He's present at the evacuation.
7th May
Fox, having examined Yorktown,
writes Goldsborough that indeed Yorktown could easily have been attacked, and that the Navy had been "humbugged". In this his understanding is exactly that of Joe Johnston, and the fact that he quotes Johnston confirms he'd read the latters letter to Davis.
Conclusion
McClellan never "relied" on the Navy. Indeed, for all their promises he considered them unreliable. This is because he put a lot of effort into trying to secure it, including getting Presidential intervention, but never managed it. Fox desperately tried to get Goldsborough to co-operate but failed.
McClellan understood one of two things would happen - the Navy might attack as promised by Fox but denied by Goldsborough, or he might need to destroy Yorktown conventionally which was estimated to require six weeks when assessed in January and was one of the primary reasons for the initial rejection of the Peninsula.
McClellan indulged the Navy in various schemes involving Franklin to try and get their cooperation, but in early May he gave up on the Navy. He ordered Franklin ashore as part of an 8-division assault planned for 5th May, when the batteries opened fire.
When they got into Yorktown it was obvious to all that the Navy easily could have done the job, and it was embarrassing that they didn't.
At the JCCW in 1863, both Fox and Goldsborough "deny everything" in an effort to protect the reputation of the US Navy.
Misroon was removed from active service at his own request in late April. It was an "asked to resign" thing. Goldsborough had fatally weakened his standing. Whilst a run up the James towards Drewry's Bluff prevented his immediately removal, it was decided to supercede him in active command ASAP.