Grant and McClellan

I don't think you understand that the Army and Navy are separate entities.
I don't think you understand the concept of "joint operations."

Also, it seems that in every link that you provide, all the Navy ever promised was cooperate in the reduction of Yorktown, not reduce it all on their own.

And the Navy did cooperate in the reduction of Yorktown and Gloucester, as seen in the preparations of a landing on the Severn or below Gloucester.

So in summary, the Navy did everything that it promised and if anything more had been erroneously expected, it was due to unrealistic expectations by an army commander who did not plan properly and who was too timid to assault.
 
Also, it seems that in every link that you provide, all the Navy ever promised was cooperate in the reduction of Yorktown, not reduce it all on their own.
What about mention of an attack between Yorktown and Gloucester? There's nothing between them but the York river...

What about "Attack Yorktown in the vessels and land there"? To "Attack Yorktown in the vessels" can't mean anything but to use the vessels to attack Yorktown; they have guns.


unrealistic expectations by an army commander who did not plan properly and who was too timid to assault.
So, Keyes?
McClellan ordered a bayonet assault on the 5th, so he's not "too timid" to assault, and it's Keyes who was the one who verified that the Navy would be doing something which he believed (letter on the 7th) to include bombarding Yorktown.
 
Incidentally, @DanSBHawk , do you have any idea of how to get over the Rappahanock without an amphibious move; that is, going Overland? The best I can come up with involves expanding the rail line to Culpeper coupled with a Fredericksburg operation, but it's going to take months of prep work - it's likely to be significantly slower to get to the outskirts of Richmond than just doing the historical Peninsular operation even with all the delays.
 
What about mention of an attack between Yorktown and Gloucester? There's nothing between them but the York river...

What about "Attack Yorktown in the vessels and land there"? To "Attack Yorktown in the vessels" can't mean anything but to use the vessels to attack Yorktown; they have guns.



So, Keyes?
McClellan ordered a bayonet assault on the 5th, so he's not "too timid" to assault, and it's Keyes who was the one who verified that the Navy would be doing something which he believed (letter on the 7th) to include bombarding Yorktown.
The understanding by the Navy was that Gloucester would be neutralized first.

And if Gloucester had been neutralized, I wonder if McClellan would have had the guts to propose a true "joint" attack? Would he have ordered an general attack along the entire line while the Navy shelled Yorktown? Or would he have just sat there expecting the Navy to clear the way? I suspect the latter.
 
The understanding by the Navy was that Gloucester would be neutralized first.
In which case the flaw is in Washington, because McClellan could not have expected his amphib formation to be stripped away. But once the amphib formation was stripped away, for there to be a period when the naval squadron wouldn't so much as get close enough to Yorktown to risk fire is... odd, especially when Missroon is lying about his ship having been hit in a previous skirmish.




And if Gloucester had been neutralized, I wonder if McClellan would have had the guts to propose a true "joint" attack? Would he have ordered an general attack along the entire line while the Navy shelled Yorktown? Or would he have just sat there expecting the Navy to clear the way? I suspect the latter.
Hold on.

Firstly, your idea of "joint" operations seems to be that both the Army and the Navy are doing something at the exact same time, rather than the Army helping the Navy and/or the Navy helping the Army. (In this case the Navy would be helping the Army by shelling Yorktown from a point Yorktown cannot reply, which would render it impractical to hold; the advance of the Army would then help the Navy by rendering Norfolk Navy Yard impractical and by clearing the batteries on the left bank of the James. That's joint operations.)

Secondly, if the shelling is going to render Yorktown impractical anyway then to launch an attack is pointless - it's wasting lives to no purpose.

And thirdly, why is it that "guts" are associated with an attack all along the line when Yorktown would already be being bombarded such as to render it untenable as a fortification? It's usually considered rank stupidity to attack a fortified line unnecessarily when you're not gaining anything from it at all, even time.


To use an example from Grant's time, Fort Henry was neutralized purely by naval bombardment (before Grant even got there); the plan at Fort Donelson once the navy turned out to not be able to bombard it effectively was a siege, where Grant did not attack concurrently with the bombardment because the bombardment if successful would have rendered the casualties of the assault effectively meaningless.
 
I don't think you understand the concept of "joint operations."

Also, it seems that in every link that you provide, all the Navy ever promised was cooperate in the reduction of Yorktown, not reduce it all on their own.

What do you think cooperate means? Chant from the side-lines? Or perhaps actually use their guns...

And the Navy did cooperate in the reduction of Yorktown and Gloucester, as seen in the preparations of a landing on the Severn or below Gloucester.

They started cooperating when Cmdr Wm Smith replaced Missroon. Before then they were refusing every request, including covering the proposed Severn landings, which they managed to find excuses to back out of. When it was clear to McClellan that the Navy had no intention of covering a landing at Severn, he brought Franklin ashore as a second wave assault division for the planned grand assault.
 
"The night before the Sebago arrived at the Cheeseman's Creek anchorage, McClellan had asked that the squadron shell the Confederate picket stations on the shore below Gloucester. Missroon excused himself, remarking that he was unwilling to risk such fragile ships to certain destruction in a contest with fifty heavy cannon".
-Reed, Combined Operations.

Ltc. O.C.Badger complained that Missroon refused to let him fire the Anacostia's 9" guns even at night.


What kind of support exactly does this indicate that the Navy is willing to give McClellan?


Also, still waiting on that choice of which option to use to get over the Rappahanock...
 
They started cooperating when Cmdr Wm Smith replaced Missroon. Before then they were refusing every request, including covering the proposed Severn landings, which they managed to find excuses to back out of.

Absolutely wrong. Goldsborough and Missroon cooperated as effectively as thought possible. The worst that can be said about Missroon is that he was as lacking in boldness as the army commander.

Here is a report from Missroon concerning a request from McClellan on April 6th:

"Report of Commander Missroon, U. S. Navy, regarding movements in
cooperation with the army against Confederate defenses in York River.
U. S. S. Wachusett,
At anchor between Sand Box and Wormley's Creel; April 8,1862.


Sir: I reached this anchorage, after a passage of four hours, at
11:10 a. in. on the 5th instant, after having dispatched the Penobscot,
with the Currituck, to Ship Point.
Lieutenant Commanding Clitz found the battery at that place in
possession of our troops. The Currituck was left thereupon the requi-
sition of General McClellan for "a small gunboat to remain till the
post should be well occupied." The Penobscot reported to me at this
place (where I found the Marblehead) a few hours after.
On the same day 1 received a communication from General McClellan
asking such assistance as we might be able to render, about noon on
the 6th, by throwing shell into Yorktown, if it could be done without
seriously exposing the vessels, in order to divert the enemy.
Arrange-
ments were made accordingly to proceed at the time intimated to
attack at long shell range the nearest water battery in view at the
time, if not prevented by intervening works, and which is situated an
eighth of a mile or more in advance than represented in the sketch we
possess of the enemy's works.
To reach Yorktown it was necessary to dislodge the gunners from
that water battery, which has lately been very much increased in
dimensions, as shown by the addition of new earth, as have all the
fortifications both at Yorktown and Gloucester Point. At the latter
place additional and more elevated works have been erected than those
of which we had information.
The position of the masked battery having now become an object
of much concern, as on it would depend our first advance, and the day
being hazy, a clearer inspection at early dawn on the following day,
6th, revealed the four large columbiads but indistinctly, of which we
had notice, behind some mere fringe wood, near the position represented
in the sketch of the enemy's works. To assure myself of the strength
of this battery, and to get our own longest ranges, I ran in about noon
of the Oth with the Wachusett, Penobscot, and Marblehead and threw in
a few shells from each of these vessels, several of which falling among
them. The enemy opened from a concealed rifle cannon of heavy caliber
under the masked battery, which threw near and far beyond us, but
withheld the fire of the columbiads, which were manned at the time, in
expectation of our nearer approach, when the vessels immediately
withdrew just out of range, having accomplished in several particulars
the object of the movement.
This work is very formidable, both from its heavy cannon, its exten-
siveness, and its very elevated position, which enables it to throw a
plunging fire upon the decks of these gunboats, as well as a horizontal
fire from its rifle cannon.
The contemplated movements of General McClellan about noon of
the 6th were not, however, made by him."


The Navy cooperated, McClellan failed to do as promised.
 
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Another report from Missroon of actions taken mostly after the 13th. A lot of shooting for someone who supposedly refused to fire.

Report of Commander Missroon, IT. S. Navy, regarding the shelling of the
York River batteries by the vessels under his command.

U. S. S. Wachusett,
York River, April 30, 1862.
Sir: I have the honor to report to you that at the request of General
McClellan "to annoy the enemy by firing a few shells by day and night," these vessels have been engaged in that duty almost daily, when permitted by circumstances to do so, and by the limit prescribed by their
store of ammunition, especially since the 13th instant.
On the 14th instant all the vessels shelled very effectively the woods
on Gloucester, where the enemy were erecting a battery abreast the
anchorage, and soon drove them away; we have since learned that the
six companies engaged there were that night withdrawn to Yorktown
and the intended work abandoned.
On the 15th the Anacostia and Sebago, each mounting a rifled cannon
of long range, arrived at this anchorage and were immediately brought
into requisition. They both shelled very effectively the attempted
extension of the main works on Gloucester and caused the enemy to
desist from their work, killing an officer in charge, his horse, and 2 men,
as we have since learned. The shelling on that point was renewed
early on the morning of the 16th. On the same day the Sebago threw
her shells into Yorktown, narrowly escaping the well-directed shots
from the enemy's heaviest rifled cannon; she resumed the firing at
midnight.
On the 17th she again threw her shell at Yorktown and Gloucester.
On the 20th the Sebago threw her rifle shell with precision upon the
Gloucester works.
On the 21st she again shelled the enemy. On the 24th, the enemy
being at work again upon an extension of his works on Gloucester, the
Sebago's rifled gun did good execution, completely driving them away
from it.
On the 25th the Maratanza commenced on Gloucester and Yorktown,
throwing her rifle shell into the rebel camp and water battery with fine
effect, causing great commotion, and it is believed, from the activity of
the ambulance and its subsequent direction to the hospital, to have
caused the enemy some casualties.
On the 26th she again operated on two occasions during the day,
successfully lodging her shell in the immediate vicinity of the magazine
in the water battery in Yorktown and enemy's camp.
The Sebago also threw her shell into Yorktown with accuracy on the
same day.
On the 27th the Sebago and the Maratanza both operated effectually
on the Yorktown works, bursting their shells on the ramparts, camps,
and in the water battery. At midnight the Maratanza again annoyed the enemy by her shells.
On the 29th the Maratanza drove off by her shells a working party
of the enemy from the fortifications on Gloucester, and on the same
day she and the Sebago were ordered to shell a steamer plying between
Yorktown and Gloucester. The fire of the former is believed to have
struck the steamer, when she ran up York River. The Sebago then
threw several shell, which exploded in the midst of the camp at York-
town, evidently doing much damage.
The services of both these vessels are now suspended by the want of
shells, the one having twenty and the other but sixteen on hand. On
the 5th of April, at the request of General McClellan to " get some shells
into Yorktown," the Wachusett, Marblehead, and Penobscot were run
within long range of the nearest works of the enemy on the following
day, with a view first to ascertain the locality of a masked battery said
to contain X-inch columbiad cannon. These vessels discharged several
shell, which, on taking effect, the fire was replied to by several shots
from a rifle cannon of long range, when the vessels withdrew under
the impression that the position of the supposed battery had been
unmasked. This, it would now seem, was not the masked work we
looked for.
Since then the Marblehead and Penobscot have rendered good service
in discharging Xl-inch shell into Yorktown and Gloucester on all suit-
able occasions undercover of night, and with impunity,so far, to themselves. On the night of the 28th instant the fire of the enemy passed
over the Marblehead without inflicting injury.
The number of shells expended in each of these operations has been
by necessity carefully limited by our stock on hand. It has now
become so much reduced that I am admonished to desist in a great
degree from the further expenditure of the 100-pounder (rifle) shell till
a fresh supply be received and now expected within two days. In the
meantime we can only use the gunboats with Xl-inch guns under cover
of night. Solid shot would be a useless waste, as they do not effect the
object in view.
As 1 shall this day relinquish this vessel to my successor,I would beg
to say that she is not well suited to service in this narrow river. Her
great length prevents her movement with that facility which would
tend to her benefit when under the enemy's fire, and she is so extremely
crank that her heavy cannon when "run out" to battery careens her so
much as [to] render useless the sights of her guns, as well as to impair
their extreme ranges. A small gunboat with a 100-pounder rifle gun
would be infinitely more serviceable.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. S. Missroon,
Commander. .
 
Absolutely wrong. Goldsborough and Missroon cooperated as effectively as thought possible. The worst that can be said about Missroon is that he was as lacking in boldness as the army commander.

The Navy cooperated, McClellan failed to do as promised.

Or, Goldsborough and Missroon cooperated as much, or as little, as they wanted, contrary to the wishes of Lincoln and McClellan, and the orders of Fox. It was later found out that they were completely wrong, and McClellan was completely right.

So, yes, they cooperated amongst themselves to do nothing and left all the work to the army. Until that is Missroon was binned and replaced with a competent commander who found he could cooperate fully.

Goldsborough only realised he needed to cooperate following the failure at Ft Darling. Until then he just thought of the army as people to occupy what he'd shelled, and he'd only shell the things that threatened his ships.
 
Another report from Missroon of actions taken mostly after the 13th. A lot of shooting for someone who supposedly refused to fire.

Report of Commander Missroon, IT. S. Navy, regarding the shelling of the
York River batteries by the vessels under his command.

U. S. S. Wachusett,
York River, April 30, 1862.
Sir: I have the honor to report to you that at the request of General
McClellan "to annoy the enemy by firing a few shells by day and night," these vessels have been engaged in that duty almost daily, when permitted by circumstances to do so, and by the limit prescribed by their
store of ammunition, especially since the 13th instant.

Or, from the 5th to the 14th, the Navy basically didn't fire a shot...

On the 14th instant all the vessels shelled very effectively the woods
on Gloucester, where the enemy were erecting a battery abreast the
anchorage, and soon drove them away; we have since learned that the
six companies engaged there were that night withdrawn to Yorktown
and the intended work abandoned.
On the 15th the Anacostia and Sebago, each mounting a rifled cannon
of long range, arrived at this anchorage and were immediately brought
into requisition. They both shelled very effectively the attempted
extension of the main works on Gloucester and caused the enemy to
desist from their work, killing an officer in charge, his horse, and 2 men,
as we have since learned. The shelling on that point was renewed
early on the morning of the 16th. On the same day the Sebago threw
her shells into Yorktown, narrowly escaping the well-directed shots
from the enemy's heaviest rifled cannon; she resumed the firing at
midnight.

On the 15th, the Sebago fired ca. 9 rounds between midday at the Gloucester battery from long range from midday to 1600, firing one round every half hour from extreme range.

The Anacostia engaged between 2300 and 0100 of the 15th-16th, and fire 12 times from extreme range, 11 rounds at the Yorktown wharves and once at Gloucester.

On the 16th, the Sebago closed to 2.5 miles from Yorktown and engaged the batteries with her rifle. The enemy return fired with 2 rifles, and Missroon ordered her to immediately withdraw. That night she fired 2 shells at Gloucester.

On the 17th she again threw her shell at Yorktown and Gloucester.

She fired one shell at Gloucester Pt, 2 at Green Pt, and during the night twice went to about 2.5 miles from Yorktown, loosed off a single round from each gun, turned and retreated.

On the 20th the Sebago threw her rifle shell with precision upon the Gloucester works.

No she didn't. Her log shows during the day she fired six shells from extreme range against the camp at Yorktown, in daylight hours.

On the 21st she again shelled the enemy.

Yes, 14 rounds, from extreme range.

Missroon is very satisfied with the fact that he's throwing the odd harassing shell from extreme range. Of course, he's still refusing to actually engage the enemy works proper. He considers actually attacking and exchanging fire would destroy his force. Since the enemy rifles can only throw shells ca. 2.5 miles, his ships don't come within three miles when harassing.

On the 24th, the enemy being at work again upon an extension of his works on Gloucester, the Sebago's rifled gun did good execution, completely driving them away from it.

Indeed, and again it was long range harassing fire.

On the 25th the Maratanza commenced on Gloucester and Yorktown, throwing her rifle shell into the rebel camp and water battery with fine effect, causing great commotion, and it is believed, from the activity of the ambulance and its subsequent direction to the hospital, to have caused the enemy some casualties.

Her log says she fired 4 rounds at Gloucester Point, and 5 at the Yorktown water battery, all from extreme range.

On the 26th she again operated on two occasions during the day, successfully lodging her shell in the immediate vicinity of the magazine in the water battery in Yorktown and enemy's camp. The Sebago also threw her shell into Yorktown with accuracy on the
same day.

The Maratanza fired 6 rounds at Gloucester Pt and 1 at Yorktown. The Sebago 6 rounds at Yorktown, one of which didn't even reach the range being so incredibly extreme.

On the 27th the Sebago and the Maratanza both operated effectually on the Yorktown works, bursting their shells on the ramparts, camps, and in the water battery. At midnight the Maratanza again annoyed the enemy by her shells.

The Maratanza fired 14 shells. The Sebago fired 11 shells at Yorktown. Same story, extreme range harassing fire.

On the 29th the Maratanza drove off by her shells a working party
of the enemy from the fortifications on Gloucester, and on the same
day she and the Sebago were ordered to shell a steamer plying between
Yorktown and Gloucester. The fire of the former is believed to have
struck the steamer, when she ran up York River. The Sebago then
threw several shell, which exploded in the midst of the camp at York-
town, evidently doing much damage.

This misses the Maratanza firing 12 harassing shots on the 28th. On the 29th she fired 8 shells at Gloucester. There was then an engagement against a rebel supply steamer. She then fired 2 shots against Yorktown, and Sebago also fired a few shots at Yorktown.

Wachusett, Marblehead, and Penobscot

The logs of the Wachusett, and Marblehead are available and tell the story of the odd long range harassing shot. As Missroon notes in his outgoing letter, he would let ships go closer than extreme range of 11" shell, i.e. two miles. This is generally pathetic.

The basic story of the Navy is that they did nothing for the first ten days, and then McClellan manages to talk Missroon into at least firing the odd harassing shot to embarrass the enemy. Missroon isn't keen, and keeps his captains on a tight leash with continual orders to retreat. Missroon is pushed into submitting his resignation, and on 1st May Cmdr William Smith takes over. Before Smith can arrange to do anything, McClellan forces Joe Johnston to retreat, because one of the first shots from Battery No. 1 does what the Navy has been failing to do for a fortnight - it lands a shell on the wharf and destroys it, cutting off Johnston's means of supply.
 
It does seem a little odd to not really risk coming within smoothbore range for most of the gunboats. We see the use of the 11" guns and the rifles, generally at very long range, but nothing else (thus why O.C. Badger complains that Missroon forbade the use of the 9" guns, presumably shorter ranged) and there's no attempt to run the guns even at night - which was already accepted practice.

It's interesting that at one point Missroon describes the firing on the 6th as an effort to "get some shells into Yorktown" while in another case he specifices it as part of a cooperative attack to which the Army does not contribute. I can't seem to find anything about what the movement was meant to be, though, and if it was an advance of skirmishers it's possible that it got missed.

It's hard to view Missroon as fully reliable, though, because we have a clear case he was mendacious in his missives to McClellan. Misroon told McClellan that the Sebago took two direct hits from the masked battery, but his official report states that she was not hit.
 
It does seem a little odd to not really risk coming within smoothbore range for most of the gunboats. We see the use of the 11" guns and the rifles, generally at very long range, but nothing else (thus why O.C. Badger complains that Missroon forbade the use of the 9" guns, presumably shorter ranged) and there's no attempt to run the guns even at night - which was already accepted practice.

Yes, the 9" is shorter ranged, but also they're on broadside mounts so lack the elevation of the chasers. Max range of a broadside 9" is about 1.5 miles, and the harassing shots were all fired ca. 2-2.5 miles out.

It's interesting that at one point Missroon describes the firing on the 6th as an effort to "get some shells into Yorktown" while in another case he specifices it as part of a cooperative attack to which the Army does not contribute. I can't seem to find anything about what the movement was meant to be, though, and if it was an advance of skirmishers it's possible that it got missed.

It was neither. The logbooks of the ships are clear that they believed there was a masked battery downstream of Yorktown (i.e. the beach battery I believe), and they were just trying to provoke a return shot. As soon as they got one they retreated out of range. Missroon was looking for an excuse not to approach Yorktown.
 
Bottom line, it's hard to imagine Grant would have done any worse in his place.
Ah, speaking of the comparison - do you feel Grant would have gone Overland? I believe you've said so, so how would Grant have got over the Rappahanock?
 
So I thought it might be useful to use maps to shape the discussion here, and show why McClellan retreated after each of the Seven Days battles in which that happened.

I will for now ignore Oak Grove, Garnetts Hill and Golding's Farm, as they'll be covered later.


First we have Mechanicsville. In the battle of Mechanicsville the Union troops were dug in a little to the east of Mechanicsville itself, along a creek (Beaver Dam Creek). There were four bridges that the Confederate troops inside Richmond could use to sally, which are numbered 1 to 4 on this diagram.
View attachment 300650

Bridges 1 and 2 are crossings directly into Union troop positions and are not possible for them, but they're not possible because of where the Union troops are deployed.
Bridge 3, the Mechanicsville Bridge, is covered by Union guns (and can be easily reached by troops in Mechanicsvile) so it's not possible to mount a major movement over it.
Bridge 4, the Meadow Bridge, is too far away from the Union positions to be covered. It's the bridge which is used by the Confederate troops to mount the Battle of Mechanicsville, and they run into Beaver Dam Creek and suffer badly.

But there's also another route, and that's marked here as 5. That turns the entire Union defensive position at Mechanicsville (McClellan couldn't cover Tolopatamoy Creek as well because he didn't have the troops for it) and Jackson takes it. At this point the choice is to retreat or have that entire force turned and cut off, as at this point the Union troops holding the line north of the river are opposite Confederate positions - they need to fall back to Gaines Mill (near the Union-controlled bridges).


The second battle is Gaines Mill. This was a Union tactical defeat, but even had it been a victory McClellan would have needed to react in some way, and here's why:

View attachment 300652

On the far right of the map is White House Landing, the Union supply base on the Pamunkey river. As you can see troops from Jackson's flanking force are making their way towards it, and even if they don't take White House Landing they can still cut the railway line.
It's possible if the line had held north of the river that an action could have been mounted to regain the supply line, but once the line broke it was impossible - to do so would have meant an assault crossing of the Chickahominy river against a massive Confederate force of sixteen brigades (Longstreet, DH Hill and AP Hill) plus the elements of Jackson's nine-brigade force not going after the supply line itself.

With the supply line gone, McClellan now has to set up a new supply line from the James river instead. He had a discussion with his corps commanders, who all agreed that rather than remaining in place until a new supply line was set up he should move south of the White Oak and stretch his left flank to the James.


Savage's Station happens next, and it's a rearguard action - Sumner is the army rearguard while the rest falls back. To turn around and stop retreating because the rearguard action was "inconclusive" is foolish.


Next up is Glendale, and for this I'm using one of 67th's maps rather than my own:

View attachment 300656

This is actually a pretty long battle line. As you can see the Union army has stretched out its flank to reach the James, and specifically to reach the Malvern Hill area to cover the new supply point. There's an argument going on with the Navy about whether the supply ships will be unloading at Haxhall's Landing (McClellan) or Harrisons Landing (further downriver, compromise) or a very long way further downriver at the mouth of the Chickahominy, but the Glendale position is where McClellan has retreated to by the 30th of June and it's the line he intends to hold.

Unfortunately, on the night of the 30th Franklin quit his position without orders. With the line so long and stretched out this left a gap, and the result was a kind of mad scramble for a defensible position at Malvern Hill (which was already the left of the line). Malvern is a great bastion but it's no good as an isolated position, because it has no protected supply unloading point in and of itself.


For why McClellan retreated after Malvern Hill we need one more map, and that's the map showing Lee's plan. Lee did not actually intend to attack head-on at Malvern:


View attachment 300654
His plan, as can be seen, was to envelop Malvern with the use of Longstreet. Magruder was not intended to attack, and possibly didn't initially intend to himself.


With the Navy refusing to escort transports any further upriver than City Point on the James (where there were batteries), McClellan needs to have contact with Harrisons Landing for his supply base. To hold a line containing both Malvern Hill and Harrisons Landing is basically not doable, the army would be too stretched, and so after the battle ends at dark on the 1st McClellan chooses to retreat overnight to Harrisons Landing.

It's only once back there that he's finally in supply; if McClellan had attacked on the 2nd it would have been with hungry troops, some of whom haven't eaten for days and who have empty cartridge pouches, against troops who've had the night to recover and stiffened by a number of brigades who didn't assault at all on the 1st.



Now, I said I'd get back to Oak Grove, Garnetts Hill and Goldings Farm, and here's why - those are the battles of the Seven Days where McClellan is attacking. They're also first, and they're south of the Chickahominy and launched while he's still in supply.
McClellan's intent with these battles is to take high ground to set up his heavy artillery, and to use that heavy artillery to blast his way through the Richmond defences - neutralize the artillery in the defensive embrasures, then suppress the infantry while his own infantry move up for an assault. This is the only way to actually take Richmond itself without a proper, surround-them-and-starve-them-out siege, and it takes a certain number of troops - which mean that McClellan doesn't have the troops available to hold Tolopatamoy Creek.

You may ask why he's in such a vulnerable position, and the answer is that his supply point at White House Landing on the Pamunkey is one he's been ordered to take up. With the supply point on the Pamunkey it's the only option that allows one to attack Richmond with the available forces, and with the supply base on the Pamunkey the only way to have Richmond under attack without the Seven Days inevitably following whenever Jackson is called down is to give McClellan some extra troops to cover the Tolopatamoy. Not at all coincidentally, McClellan had been promised those reinforcements back in May and had been waiting a month in vain for them.
Do you know where you found that first map? I love the detail on it.
 
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