Grant and McClellan

[DanSBHawk]

Where did McClellan retreat to after Seven Pines?

The allegory for the Seven Days for Grant is his first attempt at Vicksburg, where Grant's supply base is raided by Van Dorn. Grant's response? He retreated...

These two are not very similar. The key words are "first attempt." Grant continued to make attempts throughout the winter months, while McClellan sat at Harrisons Landing doing nothing during prime months for campaigning.

 

[DanSBHawk]

How early are you talking about?
5th April, 6th April?

What kind of assault?
All along the line or targeted at a specific point?

Do you think they're right?
We know more about the situation than any one general could, because we have the records of both sides and know how strong the individual units involved were.



McClellan adopted the Peninsular campaign because of a vote by the corps commanders. The corps commanders were chosen by Lincoln and the vote was asked for by Lincoln.

The Peninsular campaign was in no way the result of insubordination.

Of course, if you go overland you still need to open up the York and James rivers - Grant himself didn't manage an attack on Richmond without using them.

It's well known that Lincoln would have preferred other options than going by way of the Peninsula.

 

[Saphroneth]

These two are not very similar. The key words are "first attempt." Grant continued to make attempts throughout the winter months, while McClellan sat at Harrisons Landing doing nothing during prime months for campaigning.

Was Grant outnumbered by the forces in Vicksburg and awaiting reinforcements promised to him urgently? Because "Grant continued to make attempts" isn't very similar if Grant outnumbered the defenders of Vicksburg.

It's well known that Lincoln would have preferred other options than going by way of the Peninsula.

Like what? He rejected the Urbanna plan, so that only leaves going overland and that means attacking Richmond is basically impossible to supply - the historical Overland depended on supplies up the York and the James.

 

[Saphroneth]

Providence Forge, May 14, 1862
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President
We think that you should order whole or major part of General McDowell's, with Shields, up the York River as soon as possible, and order Whyman's flotilla up the James River. General McClellan moves to White House tomorrow morning.
WM H. SEWARD

McClellan was told these forces would be coming to join him; aside from one division, they did not.




WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., July 4, 1862.
General McCLELLAN,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
I have seen the President and Secretary of War. Ten thousand men from Hunter, 10,000 from Burnside, and 11,000 from here have been ordered to re-enforce you as soon as possible. Halleck has been urged by the President to send you at once 10,000 men from Corinth. The President and Secretary speak very kindly of you and find no fault.
I will remain here until I hear from you.
R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.

None of them did.
It should be noted here that Lincoln's reasoning for not sending McClellan forces straight away after the Seven Days (in a message on July 2 or 3) was, explicitly, that the forces were not there to be sent. Not that McClellan had enough troops, but that the troops weren't there to be had (though this was because Lincoln considered that only troops in excess of 75,000 held to defend Washington should be sent to McClellan).
This should by itself

 

[DanSBHawk]

Was Grant outnumbered by the forces in Vicksburg and awaiting reinforcements promised to him urgently? Because "Grant continued to make attempts" isn't very similar if Grant outnumbered the defenders of Vicksburg.


Like what? He rejected the Urbanna plan, so that only leaves going overland and that means attacking Richmond is basically impossible to supply - the historical Overland depended on supplies up the York and the James.

I'm not going to go over the same ground again and again. Your theory that the Overland method could not succeed without first securing the Peninsula is just that... your theory. If a '62 Overland could not succeed for your reasons, then neither could Urbanna have succeeded for the same reasons. Also, it's a mistake to assume that it was all about getting to Richmond, rather than about fighting and defeating the confederate army.

Grant made do with what he had. And he kept trying until he succeeded. There were things he asked for in the run up to Vicksburg which he did not get. He wanted to abandon Corinth and mass on the line down the Mississippi Central RR. He wanted locomotives and permission to repair that railroad in order to use it. Washington said no. He found a way to do it in spite of not getting everything he wanted.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'm not going to go over the same ground again and again. Your theory that the Overland method could not succeed without first securing the Peninsula is just that... your theory.

... but one substanciated by the facts.

If a '62 Overland could not succeed for your reasons, then neither could Urbanna have succeeded for the same reasons. Also, it's a mistake to assume that it was all about getting to Richmond, rather than about fighting and defeating the confederate army.

Nope. It had a working base of operations.

Grant made do with what he had.

Really? How many tens of thousands of reinforcements did he need again?

 

[Saphroneth]

If a '62 Overland could not succeed for your reasons, then neither could Urbanna have succeeded for the same reasons.

The whole point of the Urbanna operation was to turn the Confederates out of northern Virginia by means of a base at Urbanna, thus gaining access to Fredericksburg. Thus it uses first Urbanna as the base of operations, then it uses Fredericksburg (and the rail line).
It's fundamentally a way to get across the Rappahanock by landing behind it. It also offers the possibility of cutting off Johnston's retreat to Richmond, or at least the retreat of a part of his army, but that's sort of a bonus.

Also, it's a mistake to assume that it was all about getting to Richmond, rather than about fighting and defeating the confederate army.

But when Grant fought the Confederate army, he did not defeat it; he did inflict casualties, but he took more than he recieved by about 60%. And when he was facing the enemy at Spotsylvania he fought them, but he then disengaged to move to the south and east.

When he fought the enemy at the North Anna, he then disengaged to move to the south and east.

When he fought the enemy at Cold Harbor, he then disengaged to move to the south.

Why did he disengage and move away, rather than staying closer to his own base of supply and continuing to fight the enemy? If the objective was to go after Lee wherever he may be found, he's right there.

Of course, when Grant fought the enemy at The Wilderness he then moved east to open his supply lines...

If a '62 Overland could not succeed for your reasons

It's worth realizing that if the Overland Campaign had been conducted, exactly the same and with the same casualty results, in 1864 but with the Federal and Confederate forces available that there had been to McClellan and Johnston/Lee respectively, what you end up with is a Federal army of 65,000 (120,000 PFD - 55,000 casualties) on the banks of the James river in June 1862. The Confederate army is of 67,000 (112,200 as of just before the Seven Days + 7,800 casualties in historical Peninsula - 33,000 casualties in historical Overland - 20,000 still holding Yorktown and Norfolk) and is well supplied; the Union army has literally no way to gain supplies and will shortly starve.

This is why the 1862 Overland is not plausible. It relied on large troop reinforcements apparently not available in 1862 and it also relied on water supply up the York and James.

Grant made do with what he had. And he kept trying until he succeeded. There were things he asked for in the run up to Vicksburg which he did not get. He wanted to abandon Corinth and mass on the line down the Mississippi Central RR. He wanted locomotives and permission to repair that railroad in order to use it. Washington said no. He found a way to do it in spite of not getting everything he wanted.

And how many troops did he have, relative to the number of troops he faced? Either your argument is that a general can always win if they just try hard, no matter how poorly supplied (in which case we might ask why one couldn't just give Grant a rifle, one round and point him at Richmond) or we need to assess the situations in a way which is comparable.

Certainly I imagine that McClellan would probably have committed blasphemy for Grant's Vicksburg force ratio, let alone Grant's Overland force ratio - give McClellan an extra 30,000 troops in June 1862 and Richmond is completely untenable within months, let alone 50,000.

 

[Saphroneth]

Your theory that the Overland method could not succeed without first securing the Peninsula is just that... your theory

Let's try something else, actually.

In what ways would the 1862 Overland you imagine have to differ from the 1864 one, in order to be successful?
Obviously it would be easy for me to go into detail how conducting exactly the same marches and battles with the same battle results and march distances kills the Army of the Potomac in 1862, but I think it would be interesting to examine what kind of changes would need to be made - and whether we might actually be talking at cross purposes about what "Overland" is supposed to mean.
Naturally, if you've explained this in the past and I've forgotten about it, feel free to post a link to your prior post; this would have the benefit of showing those in the thread following along that you have in fact addressed these concerns.


If you'd rather, I'd be happy to explain the mechanics of an Urbanna campaign and how it is logistically supportable, albeit unspectacular in terms of results if the rains are as awful as historical.

 

[DanSBHawk]

This is why the 1862 Overland is not plausible. It relied on large troop reinforcements apparently not available in 1862 and it also relied on water supply up the York and James.

If your theory insists that an overland campaign to capture Richmond is impossible without possession of the York and James, then by your logic the Urbanna plan was just as impossible.

I would never say that an 1862 overland campaign would have been identical to the 1864 overland campaign. Those two years gave the confederates time to develop their defenses so that by 1864 a lot more Union soldiers were going to end up killed and wounded.

 

[Saphroneth]

If your theory insists that an overland campaign to capture Richmond is impossible without possession of the York and James, then by your logic the Urbanna plan was just as impossible.

Well, the 1862 Overland is basically impossible for a number of reasons relating to supply - but the Urbanna plan offers the near certainty of turning the Confederates off the Rappahanock (at which point you have a much better situation, it's as if Fredericksburg had been a success) and you can develop plans from there. It also offers the possibility of using the supply base at Urbanna to operate against Gloucester, which is a way of getting the York opened.
The original plan was conceived when Johnston's force was way up near Manassas, so to react would take a great deal of time and he could be pressured on his way down by the other half of the Army of the Potomac.

I would never say that an 1862 overland campaign would have been identical to the 1864 overland campaign. Those two years gave the confederates time to develop their defenses so that by 1864 a lot more Union soldiers were going to end up killed and wounded.

That's not what I mean. In the first place, none of the Confederate defensive positions in the 1864 Overland were permanent works - they were all extemporized. Grant doesn't reach permanent works until after crossing the James.

What I mean is, how are the operational movements different? For a start, historically the Confederates wrecked the Orange and Alexandria so it took months of work before a large army could be sustained at Culpeper; there also weren't yet enough wagons for an army of the size Grant took to make the length of march it took Grant to get from leaving rail supply north of the Rapidan to gaining water supply east of Fredericksburg. These are problems that may be possible to solve, but they mean the ops plan has to be modified to take them into account - do you open with a Fredericksburg instead of a Wilderness? Do you split your forces to go after both?

There's also the fact that at one point Lincoln refused to send troops to McClellan in 1862 on the grounds that he didn't have more than 75,000 troops defending the capital at that point (and that therefore the capital was not adequately defended to send extra troops down to McClellan). It's possible that he would release more troops if Grant's line of advance is such that he remains in between Richmond and Washington at all times, but there's a tradeoff involved as it means that your line of advance is restricted (you have to go down the FR&P RR).

 

[67th Tigers]

There were generals of both sides who were there, and who thought the Yorktown line would have fallen if assaulted early in the campaign.

Perhaps. Certainly Magruder, multiplying McClellan's force by four to 200,000, and halving his own down to 11,000 (by refusing to acknowledge the strong reinforcements received 28th March onwards), claimed weakness. However, it largely appears he was trying to get more troops out of Richmond. It had previously been agreed that in addition to the brigades of Colston (1,750), Wilcox (2,892), Cobb (3,104) and the 14th and 26th Alabama and 46th Virginia (1,340), that Johnston would send 5 brigades to Magruder. These brigades were Early's Division (7,711) and DH Hill's new division (5,135).

Magruder (under-)rates his force at 31,500 on 11th April. This strength is effectives, excludes his cavalry and some artillery, and is an understatement due to assuming each of the new brigades was 2,000. The question of course is how quickly the reinforcements reached him. Going down to the level of regimental histories, and using the 20th May "effective strength" we find:

(NB: numbers exclude cavalry such as the Wise Legion Cavalry, and some artillery)

In context - on 5th April there were as many defenders of Yorktown as there were of Vicksburg at the beginning of the siege, and unlike Vicksburg that number increased rapidly.

However, no-one with good knowledge of the real situation ever opined that McClellan could have taken Yorktown by assault. Quite the opposite.

Johnston, on arriving, found the position so strong that it had no need Longstreet's and GW Smith's divisions, and recommended utilising them elsewhere.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That's not what I mean. In the first place, none of the Confederate defensive positions in the 1864 Overland were permanent works - they were all extemporized. Grant doesn't reach permanent works until after crossing the James.

Not only were the '64 defensive works more developed compared to '62, but also the confederates were much more likely to be fighting from behind their works rather than out in the open as they did in '62.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Perhaps. Certainly Magruder, multiplying McClellan's force by four to 200,000, and halving his own down to 11,000 (by refusing to acknowledge the strong reinforcements received 28th March onwards), claimed weakness. However, it largely appears he was trying to get more troops out of Richmond. It had previously been agreed that in addition to the brigades of Colston (1,750), Wilcox (2,892), Cobb (3,104) and the 14th and 26th Alabama and 46th Virginia (1,340), that Johnston would send 5 brigades to Magruder. These brigades were Early's Division (7,711) and DH Hill's new division (5,135).

Magruder (under-)rates his force at 31,500 on 11th April. This strength is effectives, excludes his cavalry and some artillery, and is an understatement due to assuming each of the new brigades was 2,000. The question of course is how quickly the reinforcements reached him. Going down to the level of regimental histories, and using the 20th May "effective strength" we find:

View attachment 301084
(NB: numbers exclude cavalry such as the Wise Legion Cavalry, and some artillery)

In context - on 5th April there were as many defenders of Yorktown as there were of Vicksburg at the beginning of the siege, and unlike Vicksburg that number increased rapidly.

However, no-one with good knowledge of the real situation ever opined that McClellan could have taken Yorktown by assault. Quite the opposite.

Johnston, on arriving, found the position so strong that it had no need Longstreet's and GW Smith's divisions, and recommended utilising them elsewhere.

We'll never know because McClellan never made a serious attempt.

 

[Saphroneth]

Not only were the '64 defensive works more developed compared to '62, but also the confederates were much more likely to be fighting from behind their works rather than out in the open as they did in '62.

Well, in 1862 in the east you have:

Yorktown line - Confederates dig in on a heavy defensive position
Williamsburg - Confederate plans to dig in here are stymied by the outflanking move to Eltham's Landing
Seven Pines - Confederate attack, Confederates then retreat to the defensive works around Richmond
Seven Days - mostly Confederate attack, but the fixing forces in Richmond are dug in
Second Bull Run - during the phase when the Confederates are defending they're doing so in good defensive positions
South Mountain - Confederates defending mountain gaps
Harpers Ferry - Confederate attack
Antietam - Confederates do not dig in as such, but the terrain is good for defense (e.g. Sunken Road) and they hold it
Fredericksburg - Confederates dig in

So it looks like a lot of the "Confederates are more likely to be fighting behind works in 1864" is simply that they're more likely to be attacking in 1862 - which is probably related to how they're more numerous.


Anyway. I'll give you another chance to outline how you think the ops moves in the Overland would need to be different, because otherwise I'll assume that Grant mounts fundamentally the same ops moves.

We'll never know because McClellan never made a serious attempt.

This is a very odd way of thinking. Surely this means that you would consider any commander who was faced with a defensive position and didn't charge into it head-on to be inferior, no matter the relative force ratios?
Does that then mean that you consider Pickett's Charge an excellent example of good generalship, and that Meade at Gettysburg was a flawed commander because he didn't make the charge?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Well, in 1862 in the east you have:

Yorktown line - Confederates dig in on a heavy defensive position
Williamsburg - Confederate plans to dig in here are stymied by the outflanking move to Eltham's Landing
Seven Pines - Confederate attack, Confederates then retreat to the defensive works around Richmond
Seven Days - mostly Confederate attack, but the fixing forces in Richmond are dug in
Second Bull Run - during the phase when the Confederates are defending they're doing so in good defensive positions
South Mountain - Confederates defending mountain gaps
Harpers Ferry - Confederate attack
Antietam - Confederates do not dig in as such, but the terrain is good for defense (e.g. Sunken Road) and they hold it
Fredericksburg - Confederates dig in

So it looks like a lot of the "Confederates are more likely to be fighting behind works in 1864" is simply that they're more likely to be attacking in 1862 - which is probably related to how they're more numerous.


Anyway. I'll give you another chance to outline how you think the ops moves in the Overland would need to be different, because otherwise I'll assume that Grant mounts fundamentally the same ops moves.




This is a very odd way of thinking. Surely this means that you would consider any commander who was faced with a defensive position and didn't charge into it head-on to be inferior, no matter the relative force ratios?
Does that then mean that you consider Pickett's Charge an excellent example of good generalship, and that Meade at Gettysburg was a flawed commander because he didn't make the charge?

I have no idea what Grant might have done differently in '62. I've already said he may have had a rough time of it as he would have been new to high command. Perhaps he would have focused on bringing the confederates to battle, rather than getting to Richmond.

Sometimes a bold head-on assault succeeds. See Missionary Ridge or Fort Donelson. As I said, people with first hand knowledge of the Yorktown situation believed an assault could have succeeded.

 

[Saphroneth]

Sometimes a bold head-on assault succeeds. See Missionary Ridge or Fort Donelson.

Fort Donelson succeeded because the enemy had attempted to sally and had not yet reoccupied their defensive works.
Missionary Ridge is a successful attack but it's against troops who hadn't entrenched.

I'm not aware of a situation where McClellan's enemy makes that kind of unforced error.

As I said, people with first hand knowledge of the Yorktown situation believed an assault could have succeeded.

For clarity, can you explain who? I've found Magruder, whose estimates of McClellan's strengths were hugely off, but nobody apart from that.

I have no idea what Grant might have done differently in '62.

Would it help if I reduced the questions to really simple ones?


First question - how does he cross the Rappahanock/Rapidan line? The choices here are to go to Rapidan town itself to open up the rail line, or to cross at a ford east of that (which for simplicity I'll reduce to "Germanna Ford" as it's the one used twice historically), or to cross at Fredericksburg.

Depending on the answer there may be a second question about how he manages it, largely to do with supply as the O&A railroad took months to repair.

In case you're wondering, by the way, all three of these options are difficult and impractical. There's no obvious easy answer...

ED: well, there is an easy answer, which is recruit three times as many troops as the Confederacy and do all the options at once. That was McClellan's Strategy of Overwhelming, but recruiting got closed and so thre's no more troops in the pipeline.

 

[DanSBHawk]

CF Smith's assault at Donelson was at a fortified position which was suspected of being undermanned. Missionary Ridge should have been a very strong defensive position for the confederates.

McClellan outnumbered the confederate defenders on the Yorktown line and the defensive works were weak according to Johnston. And yet McClellan never made a determined attempt to take it, so we will never know if it would have immediately fallen.

Look at previous threads for the links and references to the firsthand accounts of people who claimed an assault could have succeeded. I'm not going to look that all up again. And I've already said that I have no idea what Grant would have done differently. But he was able to work well with his superiors and with peers, such as the Navy, so that much of the drama and misunderstandings of '62 may not have happened under Grant.

 

[Saphroneth]

CF Smith's assault at Donelson was at a fortified position which was suspected of being undermanned.

Yes, and that turned out to be correct. We know the manning levels of the Yorktown line.

Missionary Ridge should have been a very strong defensive position for the confederates.

But they hadn't dug in; at Yorktown the line was dug in, and there were defiles (the dams), and it was screened by a flooded river.

McClellan outnumbered the confederate defenders on the Yorktown line

But not by much - not enough to make an assault easy.
Can you give an example of a dug-in army which was broken through by assault at similar force ratios to the Yorktown line? Indeed, I'd say that if McClellan could have broken into the Yorktown line then Grant should have been able to break into Vicksburg, because the force densities are similar if not greater at Yorktown.

Look at previous threads for the links and references to the firsthand accounts of people who claimed an assault could have succeeded. I'm not going to look that all up again.

Can't you at least search your own material? You're more likely to know the terms to use.

There's a mention of WF Smith having thought he could penetrate the line and that Hancock was involved, but it's not in the ORs - it isn't mentioned until 1881 (by Smith) and Hancock denied it when asked to confirm. This is very dubious as it's two decades after the event and of the two people involved one of them said it didn't happen!
Hancock's report does exist in the ORs, but it's actually two reports mixed together (one of his recce on the 6th where he couldn't approach the Garrow Ridge and one of his recce on the 9th when he could).



Ah, found your post where you quote people. You quoted:




Joe Johnston (confederate):
"No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."

John Magruder (confederate):
"to my utter surprise he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault."

E.D. Keyes (union):
"My impression now is, that, if the whole army had been pressed forward, we should have found a point to break through."

S. Heintzelman (union):
"I think, if I had been permitted when I first landed on the Peninsula to advance, I could have isolated the troops in Yorktown, and the place would have fallen in a few days."

A.S. Webb (union):
"Thus a fair opportunity to break the Warwick line was missed. Had the same effort been made when the army first reached the line, there can be little doubt that success would have attended it."

E.P. Alexander (confederate):
"Another opportunity as good as that offered McDowell at Bull Run was here offered to McClellan, who could have rushed the position anywhere. He contented himself, however, with some cannonading and sharp-shooting."


To take these Confederate first:

Johnston's information is based on Magruder's reports.
Magruder was claiming McClellan's army was between 100,000 and 200,000, and that he himself had only 5,000 to cover the full length of the Warwick; this is false.
E.P.Alexander arrived with Johnston, and the quote you give is from 1907 in a book in which he claims that the force in Yorktown on April 5th was only 13,000 and that the length of the line is 12 miles; this is also false. (On the 5th he had Rains, Crump and a few pickets not on the line, which gave him about 13,000 infantry exclusive of Ward and Rains and also about 1,600 artillery effectives exclusive of them, though of these 720 are the heavy artillery reserve and may also be in Yorktown) The Yorktown line is also self-evidently not 12 miles long.

Since all the Confederates are working from false information on this matter, we can disregard them.

Keyes' quote is later on - at the time he said that fifteen divisions wouldn't be enough and when ordered to attack the line "if only with the bayonet" on the 5th he refused.

Heintzelman's quote is saying that he thought he could have taken Yorktown in late March (which is when he first landed on the Peninsula, with two divisions). He like Keyes was surprised by the strength of the defences.

And A.S.Webb is talking about Garrows Chimney, which wasn't discovered by anyone until the 9th of April; it's thus hindsight.


Nobody on the Union side claimed at the time that the line could easily be breached.


I should also note by the way that you didn't actually source any of those, and I couldn't verify the Keyes quote with Google. This conceals for example that the EP Alexander quote is from a book from 1907.
Here's my own much longer Keyes quote:





MY DEAR SENATOR: The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that four army corps should be employed, and that the Navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River.

To-day I have learned that the First Corps, which by the President's order was to embrace four divisions and one division (Blenker's) of the Second Corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations and from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the Navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James River for fear of the Merrimac.

The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major-General McDowell and Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by Major-General McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base.

This army being reduced by 45,000 troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the Navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.

(Keyes, writing to Ira Harris on the 6th or 7th April. Note that he was one of the ones who voted for the plan, as he states)

But he was able to work well with his superiors and with peers, such as the Navy, so that much of the drama and misunderstandings of '62 may not have happened under Grant.

Well, if the local navy commander on the York was willing to fulfil the Navy's promise of support, then yes there would have been an easy way to get through Yorktown. But that's not really dependent on McClellan vice Grant as such.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The source for Keyes I believe was his testimony to the JCCW. I believe I just said "first-hand accounts." I didn't say whether it was at the time or later. At the time, subordinates tend to reflect the timidity or boldness of their leader.

Johnston also inspected the works first hand, if I remember, before making his "no one but..." remark.

As stated in previous threads, the navy never promised to reduce Yorktown by naval gunfire. McClellan planned on that without sufficient planning and communication with the navy.

 

[Saphroneth]

As stated in previous threads, the navy never promised to reduce Yorktown by naval gunfire. McClellan planned on that without sufficient planning and communication with the navy.

Fox, on the 24th March:


Navy Department,
March 24, 1862
Flag Officer L. M. Goldsborough
My dear Sir

Gen'l Barnard has informed you of the plan of operations and the desire the Army has to have you strike a blow for them. I told the President that it must be left entirely to your judgment bearing in mind that your first duty was to take care of the Merrimac. He agrees to that, at the same time I don't like to have the Army say that the Navy could not help them, so we are ordering everything we can raise to report to you. The Sebago and Marantanza, (similar to the Octorara) will probably be in line, so will the Galena, iron clad vessel and you can probably bring back some of the North Carolina fleet, though they amount to very little. The Pawnee is ordered up from Du Pont's squadron. The St. Lawrence was ordered into the Potomac, in my absence, you can make what use you wish of her. Please send back the yard boats, and Potomac flotilla craft as fast as you can as they are much required here. If Burnside gets to Beaufort and the Nashville is destroyed, I fancy one sailing vessel will be enough off that port, so altogether you will have considerable of a force such as they are, before the army, is ready. If it is not enough I will take care to explain it, but if you can, I should like to see you knock down the town for them, they consider it as saving several months in the campaign. We want the Octorara to go South after this matter and the Merrimac is decided. The Propeller and Mail she has, better go by the Rhode Island.




The idea was definitely there and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy was mentioning it. His later testimony that it was never understood that the Navy was expected to reduce Yorktown can only be seen as suspicious on this basis, as the idea is present two weeks before McClellan reaches the Yorktown line.
Also see the later point on this matter.

Johnston also inspected the works first hand, if I remember, before making his "no one but..." remark.

But he wasn't there to see how many troops were in the defences on the 5th and the 6th. If there really were 5,000 troops to cover the whole of the Warwick line then making a rush is possible; if there were 13,000 troops on the 5th with more arriving on the 6th it looks very difficult indeed.

The source for Keyes I believe was his testimony to the JCCW. I believe I just said "first-hand accounts." I didn't say whether it was at the time or later.

But then that means that Keyes held both positions, that the line was impregnable and that it could easily be forced. Why did he change his mind, and why should we trust one view rather than the other?

Speaking of testimony to the JCCW, Keyes is absolutely clear both in his JCCW testimony and his memoirs that he refused to consent to the Peninsular Campaign until he had recieved confirmation from the Navy that "the Navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester"; he is also clear that that confirmation was recieved from the Navy. So the plan was not agreed to until the Navy had confirmed that they were in a condition to cooperate with an attack up the York river (which is the only thing between Yorktown and Gloucester).




Keyes does state that "my impression now is that if the whole army had been pressed forward, we should have found a point to break through", but he states also of Yorktown that "in looking at the works after we got possession, I should say that in making an assault our loss would have been very great".
He does not state where the point that the line might be broken is, and he is clear multiple times that it is his opinion only that they could have broken through; in fact, when asked specifically whether they could have penetrated the lines (even with hindsight) he is clear that he will not say it was impossible, and that it was his opinion that it might have been done.


What it looks like to me is that Keyes (and Webb, and for that matter Magruder) are thinking of the Garrows approach, which is certainly the weakest point on the line. But to come across that point on the 5th or the 6th is a matter of pure chance, as neither of the roads up the Peninsula leads there.

Keyes also does not mention in his JCCW testimony that he was ordered to make a strongly pressed attack on the 5th of April, and he states that "I did not see any propriety in ordering an assault against such very strong works" in relation to Lees Mill. Thus at the time Keyes considered the position basically impregnable by land.

When asked directly "why was not the attempt made to carry those works immediately on the arrival of the army in full force upon the peninsula", Keyes makes no mention of the order he had to make a direct bayonet assault. This is an odd omission.