Grant and McClellan

[Saphroneth]

Do I know the specific ratios of Federal to Confederate troops in 1862 versus 1864? No, I honestly cannot say.

Okay, then. If you still believe that it is the case that McClellan squandered an opportunity where the enemy army was small enough to attack, please give me your best example.
Note that I don't want every example, and I don't actually want the army sizes in question if you don't have them. What I would like, @HeftyLefty04 , is the example of the situation in the Civil War where you think the case that "McClellan wasted an opportunity" is the strongest.

The reason why I've phrased it like this is that, hopefully, this will allow you to pick the example of which you are the most confident. This will allow us to examine this specific case in detail, and to potentially compare it to one or another of Grant's battles.

 

[Yankeedave]

Here's the thing, though. As of the point when the Confederates abandoned the Yorktown position, there were 50,000 infantry effectives in the position plus about 3,000 cavalry and about 5,000 artillery; that's 58,000 effectives, and it's not a simple thing to convert effectives to the Union measure of strength (PFD) but PFD could be perhaps 1/4 higher than effectives as a general rule. That means the strength PFD of the Confederate army at the beginning of the move up the Peninsula is circa 70,000 PFD.

The Union force is circa 100,000 PFD.

The Union force during this movement is the larger one, but it's not much larger. In the awful weather McClellan has to be careful during his marches because if he's caught out of position Johnston can punish an isolated corps, and indeed this is exactly Johnston's plan.

During the move up the Peninsula McClellan moves his logistics base a couple of times, and also prevents the Williamsburg line being used for anything more than a delaying action by way of an outflanking move to Eltham's Landing. He reaches Bottom's Bridge on the 17th, twelve days after the Yorktown line is abandoned - which you may say is slow, but consider that there's a large enemy army involved and McClellan has managed to avoid them fighting more than one major delaying action (which is Williamsburg). The roads on the Peninsula are also terrible, especially in a year when there's epic storms right through to June (some of them shut down all unloading at Fort Monroe for several days) and the wagon trains were having trouble moving more than a few miles a day (which obviously means the army is delayed to that kind of speed).

After that most of the remaining time cost is bridging the Chickahominy and more dealing with the awful weather, which takes things up to 31 May and Seven Pines. This is followed by about three and a half weeks of "more awful weather" and waiting for the reinforcements McClellan has been promised - at this point the army in Richmond is circa 90,000 PFD in strength and has the benefit of heavy fortifications if McClellan just charges ahead, it is not possible to attack hastily.

So what should McClellan have done? All moving faster would do would be risking Johnston catching a corps out of position and mauling it, while Johnston is operating on friendly ground and can always move at least as fast as McClellan. Naturally if Johnston makes a mistake McClellan can punish it as well, but it's best not to assume incompetence in your enemy.

Kinda agree. But let me say McClellen can have any amount of men, but only so many will fit on a front. Or down a rain drenched sand road-ish quagmire. Has to swing a flank force. Maybe to the right. With a year and a half of practice it may be successful.

 

[Saphroneth]

Kinda agree. But let me say McClellen can have any amount of men, but only so many will fit on a front. Or down a rain drenched sand road-ish quagmire. Has to swing a flank force. Maybe to the right. With a year and a half of practice it may be successful.

On good roads, the normal calcuation is that a corps of ca. 30,000 men is what will fit down a road in a day in practice, which is why a corps is that size. That's allowing for the formation to get stretched out a bit, and what it means is that a balanced force with artillery is about a mile of column for 2,000 men plus their share of the corps transport, artillery etc. If they're closed up it's more like a mile for every 4,000 to 5,000 men, but if they're closed up like that they actually can't move as fast.

It happens that looking at the ORs atlas I can see at least one place where there's literally only one road up the Peninsula, and after Barhamsville it looks like there's two "good" roads by Peninsula standards. Assuming that the possible march speed was about six miles per day for the force as a whole (this assumption basically means that about 1/4 of the days were rained off and the other three were about that speed) then you have two columns, each of about 50,000 men, going up the roads north of Barhamsville, and each one is about twelve miles long (they'd be about twenty-five if they were marching over good going and spreading out a lot more).

What this means is that the Army of the Potomac on the march would take three days to go past, or four if there was a rainstorm one day.

My understanding though is that there's another constraint, which is that the supply wagons could only do a few miles per day on the secondary roads - specifically the food supply wagons. If "a few miles per day" has to include the journey to the supply base and back, then we start to see why McClellan was so concerned with moving his supply bases up the Chickahominy - Slatersville on the main road up the Peninsula from Williamsburg was about eight road miles from Eltham's Landing, and at that point the round trip for supply wagons is four days (which is about the limit for what we're told the army could manage, from the French Princes). It was also about five road miles from Cumberland (the next landing point I can see on the map).

It'd be a pretty easy march in good weather on well-drained roads, but that situation didn't obtain.

Fortunately there's a rail line from White House Landing to Richmond, which makes it a good supply base for moving across the Chickahominy river. Unfortunately it also has disadvantages unless you have enough men to cover the Chickahominy-Pamunkey distance...

 

[Yankeedave]

Six miles a day till you hit Longstreet. And the point is at point of contact they met square. They each fit into the same square space.
Union could dominate with artillery and the ability to be amphibious. Although the tactical battle of White House landing was a joke, strategicly McClellen won because it turned the confederates out of their works.

 

[Saphroneth]

Although the tactical battle of White House landing was a joke, strategicly McClellen won because it turned the confederates out of their works.

Eltham's Landing, if I remember rightly. White House Landing was a supply point he moved to a couple of weeks later.

And yes, there wasn't enough shipping to move more than one division up the York at a time. Originally the whole of First Corps had amphibious shipping so could have been moved all at once, which would have offered the prospect of trapping the Confederate rearguard at Williamsburg, but the shipping all got discharged when First Corps got taken from McClellan as I understand it.

I should also clarify that the landing at Elthams didn't turn the Confederates out of the Yorktown/Warwick line - it turned them out of the Williamsburg line. While Yorktown was held by the Confederates it blocked the York river to transports (that's sort of the point) but McClellan's artillery once set up caused Johnston to evacuate the Warwick line - which is not bad, really, given how strong the line was and that basically the entire Confederate field army was in it.

Union could dominate with artillery and the ability to be amphibious.

Well, sort of - if the Union can set up their artillery they can win a slug fest.

The whole Peninsular Campaign is actually set up to exploit all the Union's advantages - it relies on the idea of recruiting enough troops to gain an advantage over the Confederate army while also leaving Washington defended, it exploits the Union command of the sealanes, and it makes use of the Union siege train to break through heavy Confederate fortifications.
McClellan's previous concept of operations, the Urbanna, relied more on the amphibious aspect to fight a battle in central Virginia between the Rappahanock and the York, but that got nixed by the corps commanders in a vote Lincoln asked for so that couldn't be done.

Even with all the weather delays, the lack of Navy cooperation in attacking Yorktown itself, the loss of several divisions and at least one case of military maps being completely incorrect, the Union force started landing at Fort Monroe in late March and three months later it had gone through three defensive lines, marched to within single-digit miles of Richmond and was actually in the process of storming the outer defences when Lee launched his flanking attack. This is not bad at all, especially given that after McClellan was relieved it took four attempts and eighteen months just to get back south of the Rappahanock again!

 

[Yankeedave]

Yes. The whole gradual prices of its investment form clearing the river down Ft Monroe. The taking of the quaker guns... Difficult process that and with a trained but green army operating in enemy territory. Trying to coordinate naval and land forces. Flanking along the river exposed the Quaker guns. Good accomlpishments of a a goal. Clear it for the move to the Peneinsula by March.

 

[Saphroneth]

Yes. The whole gradual prices of its investment form clearing the river down Ft Monroe. The taking of the quaker guns... Difficult process that and with a trained but green army operating in enemy territory. Trying to coordinate naval and land forces. Flanking along the river exposed the Quaker guns. Good accomlpishments of a a goal. Clear it for the move to the Peneinsula by March.

I'm not quite sure what you're referring to here. Would you be able to be a bit less oblique?

 

[Yankeedave]

I am not being oblique. After clearing Western Virginia McClellen then cleared northern Virginia. The Peninsula campaign is another story. And I'll clear myself now: Lincoln promised troops from d.c. Environs, Fredericksburg, Northern Virginia etc, when McClelllen takes Hanover Junction.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Indeed, and it's worth remembering that the movement on Forts Henry and Donelson were McClellan's ideas. Halleck objected that he wasn't ready and reluctantly obeyed for the movement on Ft Henry. Grant did not want to move on Ft Donelson, but put it to his division commanders. To his dismay, all three argued for a movement on Donelson, and Grant couldn't look weak in front of them. In front of Donelson, Grant is paranoid, claiming he's heavily outnumbered and wanting to retreat, but again, the division commanders basically ignore him and then suddenly the garrison surrendered...

Every sentence in this post is untrue.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It may also be worth considering what alt-Shiloh looks like if it's McClellan doing it. Cautious old McClellan, goes the caricature, but then the Union forces dig in for the night and Shiloh basically involves either:

1) The Union forces unite without issue and march on Corinth.
2) The Confederates attack dug-in Union troops and suffer badly.

Both of which are better than the historical outcome...

When McClellan had a force deep in confederate territory, he retreated for seven days. Grant held his ground at Shiloh.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Post-war, Grant wrote sympathetically that McClellan was not given a chance to learn and make mistakes at a lower command level. That Mac was promoted too quick, beyond his abilities. If Grant had been given an early high command in the east, chances are he would have had a rough time as well as he developed the necessary skills.

I can't say Grant would have done better in McClellans shoes early in the war, but it's hard to imagine he would have done any worse. One thing Grant did better than McClellan throughout the war was to respect his superiors and appreciate the political necessities of fighting a war.

 

[Saphroneth]

I am not being oblique. After clearing Western Virginia McClellen then cleared northern Virginia.

Ah, I see.

When McClellan had a force deep in confederate territory, he retreated for seven days. Grant held his ground at Shiloh.

When McClellan had his flank turned and his supply base blown away, he retreated until his supply base was open.
When Grant had his supply base blown away (Holly Springs), he retreated until his supply base was open.

A large army needs a source of supply. Holding one's ground doesn't generate food from thin air.

Also, depending on how you count*, either McClellan's tac retreats with at least part of his army began on the second day of the Seven Days (night of 26-27 June) and ended when he reached Harrisons Landing on the night of the 1st-2nd (which is the nights of the 26,27,28,29,30,1) or the counting might not start until McClellan's main body starts retreating which it doesn't do until the night of the 27th.
Depending on how you define it there might also be a day in the middle there where he doesn't "count" as retreating because he honestly planned to hold the Glendale line; I don't think Grant ever had a situation where he was holding a line against an enemy offensive and one of his corps commanders just quit the field overnight.

The Seven Days is not just McClellan running away because he got spooked. On all the dates where he's moving it's because of a positive threat to the flank of the forces involved or to the supply base of his army; that's why he doesn't retreat after Seven Pines, because at that point his supply base is not threatened.



*the point here is that the Seven Days is operationally complex, it's not just McClellan immediately deciding to retreat and not stopping for a week

 

[Saphroneth]

I can't say Grant would have done better in McClellans shoes early in the war, but it's hard to imagine he would have done any worse.

Really? How would Grant have gotten through the Yorktown line to open up the James and York rivers? That involved a skill McClellan had that Grant never displayed at any point even when the opportunity was there.

 

[67th Tigers]

Do I know the specific ratios of Federal to Confederate troops in 1862 versus 1864?

Well, others (myself included) have examined this at length.

However, I don't think it's a cliche to say that McClellan truly saw two Confederates for every one.

It is a cliche, and it simply isn't true. McClellan's estimates of enemy forces is incredibly accurate for most of his military operations. It strayed on the high side ca. June '62 due to three faulty inputs:

1. Babcock's orbat estimates had acquired 36 extra infantry regiments (i.e. 25,000 men)
2. Banks in the Valley was estimating Jackson at 30,000, rather than the true ca. 20,000
3. Western intelligence had lost track of Beauregard's army when they left Corinth, and simply knew they were heading east. It was assessed 20,000 troops under Beauregard were reinforcing Richmond.

Similarly, McClellan's estimates of Lee's strength at Antietam were fairly accurate. However, Lee's army was much larger than commonly acknowledged. His army started disintegrating and a large part of it wasn't at Antietam due to straggling.

His painfully slow movement up the Virginia Peninsula and his overcautious approach to the prospect of a significant, head-on clash with the enemy are indicative of this.

McClellan's army only met Johnston's army once on an open field during the advance' at Seven Pines. McClellan pitched in. The other two confrontations, on the Warwick Line and one the Richmond line, saw the enemy dug into very heavy fortifications. In the former case they were behind a river.

Federals did outnumber Confederates by a sizeable margin on the Peninsula; thus, McClellan's retreats in the Seven Days Battles can hardly be justified.

No, they did not. Over the course of the campaign it was roughly even, but moving in the rebels favour. By the time of the Seven Days Lee actually outnumbered McClellan by some margin.

Is it certain that Richmond would have been taken if he were more aggressive? Of course not. But this is a "What if" thread.

Well, of course Grant couldn't do it in 1864 either...

As for Antietam, McClellan did not trap Lee after the battle was over; there is nothing else to say other than he let the ANV slip away. Do you know what was behind the Confederates? The Potomac River. McClellan had the entire Army of Northern Virginia sandwiched between a major body of water and the much larger Army of the Potomac. A significant advantage in manpower combined with superior geographic positioning would have enabled the Federals to destroy Lee. Again, I certainly cannot say that a decisive defeat of the ANV would have ensured a Union victory overall, but I do believe that a more aggressive pursuit of Lee's forces would have changed the course of events in the Eastern Theater significantly in the favor of Federal forces.

Where were Lee's trains and over heavy vehicles that were difficult to move over a river? They were on the Virginia side of the river. The trains of Longstreet, DH Hill and the army reserve trains were at Hagerstown on the day of South Mountain, and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. Federal cavalry escaping from Harper's Ferry actually captured part of Longstreet's reserve ordnance train on the Maryland side at Williamsport as they lined up to ford the river. Jackson's and McLaws' trains had crossed days earlier, and Walker's trains also at a different point.

Thus, all Lee had to cross was not his heavy equipment, but rather just his fighting echelon. It took him roughly 8 hours to cross the whole army whereas with trains it took Lee 3 days to cross into Maryland using two fords. Thus you can see just how much of the time was spent moving the trains over.

 

[67th Tigers]

When McClellan had a force deep in confederate territory, he retreated for seven days. Grant held his ground at Shiloh.

Where did McClellan retreat to after Seven Pines?

The allegory for the Seven Days for Grant is his first attempt at Vicksburg, where Grant's supply base is raided by Van Dorn. Grant's response? He retreated...

 

[DanSBHawk]

Really? How would Grant have gotten through the Yorktown line to open up the James and York rivers? That involved a skill McClellan had that Grant never displayed at any point even when the opportunity was there.

There were generals of both sides who were there, and who thought the Yorktown line would have fallen if assaulted early in the campaign.

But regardless of that, if Grant had been in charge there may not have been a peninsula campaign. He would have been a better subordinate to the civilian leadership, and more mindful of their concerns.

 

[Saphroneth]

There were generals of both sides who were there, and who thought the Yorktown line would have fallen if assaulted early in the campaign.

How early are you talking about?
5th April, 6th April?

What kind of assault?
All along the line or targeted at a specific point?

Do you think they're right?
We know more about the situation than any one general could, because we have the records of both sides and know how strong the individual units involved were.

But regardless of that, if Grant had been in charge there may not have been a peninsula campaign. He would have been a better subordinate to the civilian leadership, and more mindful of their concerns.

McClellan adopted the Peninsular campaign because of a vote by the corps commanders. The corps commanders were chosen by Lincoln and the vote was asked for by Lincoln.

The Peninsular campaign was in no way the result of insubordination.

Of course, if you go overland you still need to open up the York and James rivers - Grant himself didn't manage an attack on Richmond without using them.

 

[67th Tigers]

But regardless of that, if Grant had been in charge there may not have been a peninsula campaign. He would have been a better subordinate to the civilian leadership, and more mindful of their concerns.

So he'd be sitting in the Washington defences?

I say that because without McClellan's operations clearing the York and James rivers, or the McClellan-Burnside operation to occupy Fredericksburg, there is no way of supplying an army across the Rappahanock.

 

[Saphroneth]

As a quick reminder, McClellan ordered an assault on the Yorktown line on the 5th of April. Both his columns of march were ordered to attack with all their force as soon as they arrived (Keyes being told to attack "if only with the bayonet", and what happened was that unexpectedly strong Rebel artillery barraged them as they approached and the columns weren't able to advance through it. McClellan is an army commander and he must transmit orders to subordinates rather than mounting a charge at the head of the army.

On the 6th the troops have had time to deploy and could make a proper approach march, but the Yorktown line is also being rapidly reinforced and nobody has a good idea of the geography of the middle section. The only options are basically to throw troops at the two known strong points of contact and see what happens, or to await a proper recce.

Now, it happens that we know where the point on his line that Magruder considered the most vulnerable was. This is him at 10pm on the 6th:

They discovered a weak point, where numbers must prevail. It is in wood, in our center. We will work day and night to strength it.

If Magruder is correct in his guess that the Union has, as he says, "discovered a weak point" then we should be able to find a Federal report on the 5th or 6th specifically pointing at a point in the centre of the Confederate line.




We also know that Magruder listed his own force on the 11th of April as being 31,500 men, and that he said McClellan's force had been estimated at "between 100,000 and 200,000" on the same date. In fact on this date McClellan's force at the Warwick line had just had Casey march to join it and Richardson and Hooker had only just landed at Ship Point - so the sum total of McClellan's force in PFD including the troops at Ship Point is about 90,000 - while on that same date Magruder's total force in Effectives was:
Type total_effectives
1: Inf 28256
2: Art 3725
3: Legion 594
4: Cav 1748

For a total of 34,300 effectives by end-April regimental/battery strengths. So clearly when Magruder is estimating strengths he's at most using "effectives" for his own, not larger numbers, but when he estimates McClellan's strength he's overestimating by between 10% and 120%.

 

[Saphroneth]

I say that because without McClellan's operations clearing the York and James rivers, or the McClellan-Burnside operation to occupy Fredericksburg, there is no way of supplying an army across the Rappahanock.

Well, theoretically speaking you could push over the Rapidan (which worked one time out of three when Federal armies tried going that way) and turn the enemy out of Fredericksburg, then push up the Fredericksburg and Richmond rail road (which would mean winning the battle of the North Anna*) before trying to fight your way over the South Anna and then the tributaries of the Chickahominy, and finally coming to the Richmond fort line.
But I'm sure Grant in 1862 can manage what wasn't done in 1864 by a general I have down here as "Grant".


*I assume you'd also need to fight at Spotsylvania somehow, as otherwise Grant doing it was pretty pointless; but if Lee or Johnston is dug in at Spotsylvania it's not as if Grant can just ignore them if his only supply is the R&FRR.