Gettysburg not a decisive turning point?

[CavRTO]

In some ways, Gettysburg was the "bridge too far" for Lee and the ANV. Aside from Ewell and Hill, less than stellar performances must be ascribed to many of the main players including Lee himself, Stuart, Anderson, Heth, Mahone, perhaps Longstreet and Rodes, to name some of the most prominent. Whether it was the jolt provided by Jackson's demise and subsequent Corps reorganization, faulty strategic planning, lack of effective command, control, and intelligence functions, or a combination of the above, Gettysburg was indeed the "high water mark" for Lee's ANV, which began a long, slow transformation from a bold aggressive force to one that was forced to fight mostly defensively until its final demise at Appomattox.

Lee ran into the same problems that the union army experienced in the beginning of the war. Invading a hostile territory, lack of knowledge of the terrain, no maps, poor road conditions, especially during inclement weather, etc.

 

[wausaubob]

In some ways, Gettysburg was the "bridge too far" for Lee and the ANV. Aside from Ewell and Hill, less than stellar performances must be ascribed to many of the main players including Lee himself, Stuart, Anderson, Heth, Mahone, perhaps Longstreet and Rodes, to name some of the most prominent. Whether it was the jolt provided by Jackson's demise and subsequent Corps reorganization, faulty strategic planning, lack of effective command, control, and intelligence functions, or a combination of the above, Gettysburg was indeed the "high water mark" for Lee's ANV, which began a long, slow transformation from a bold aggressive force to one that was forced to fight mostly defensively until its final demise at Appomattox.

I think the operation was brilliantly executed, with the possible exception that Stuart under estimated the US Army and got his divisions too far east.
The problem for the Confederates was the rapidly rising professionalism of both the US soldiers and the US command structure. The US fought better and made fewer mistakes. Chancellorsville foreshadowed Gettysburg.

 

[wausaubob]

Lee ran into the same problems that the union army experienced in the beginning of the war. Invading a hostile territory, lack of knowledge of the terrain, no maps, poor road conditions, especially during inclement weather, etc.withoul

Without a railroad network and an adequate number of steam locomotives to keep his army fed!

 

[jackt62]

The problem for the Confederates was the rapidly rising professionalism of both the US soldiers and the US command structure. The US fought better and made fewer mistakes. Chancellorsville foreshadowed Gettysburg.

Quite true. At the same time that the ANV was beset by internal problems that weakened its operations, it faced an opponent that was continuing to strengthen its tactical doctrines, logistical support, and knowledge gained by the experience of its officers and enlisted ranks.

 

[jackt62]

I think the operation was brilliantly executed, with the possible exception that Stuart under estimated the US Army and got his divisions to far east.

I would say that the Gettysburg campaign was brilliantly executed from its opening moves until the ANV arrived in front of Gettysburg. Then things began to fall apart rapidly. Stuart was probably not alone in underestimating the enemy, although in his case, the results were particularly harmful.

 

[jackt62]

Lee ran into the same problems that the union army experienced in the beginning of the war. Invading a hostile territory, lack of knowledge of the terrain, no maps, poor road conditions, especially during inclement weather, etc.

With a key difference being that Union forces were able to quickly develop and make use of an integrated system of waterways and railroads, a critical component that allowed for a steady northern advance through the southland.

 

[wausaubob]

Quite true. At the same time that the ANV was beset by internal problems that weakened its operations, it faced an opponent that was continuing to strengthen its tactical doctrines, logistical support, and knowledge gained by the experience of its officers and enlisted ranks.

Progress for the US infantry was slow but steady. But the US cavalry was better mounted and more experienced by mid 1863. The US artillery was making rapid and lethal progress.

 

[wausaubob]

With a key difference being that Union forces were able to quickly develop and make use of an integrated system of waterways and railroads, a critical component that allowed for a steady northern advance through the southland.

Anywhere in the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania theater the US railroad system could restore a damaged railroad in very short time. The US army was never farm from a railroad system that followed it everywhere.

 

[Belfoured]

Progress for the US infantry was slow but steady. But the US cavalry was better mounted and more experienced by mid 1863. The US artillery was making rapid and lethal progress.

As an "artillery guy" I need to point out that the gunners were already very good - the other arms were "catching up".

 

[wausaubob]

As an "artillery guy" I need to point out that the gunners were already very good - the other arms were "catching up".

The Confederates agreed with that evaluation.

 

[Belfoured]

The Confederates agreed with that evaluation.

Cuing D.H. Hill .....

 

[OpnCoronet]

To me, Gettysburg, along with Vicksburg, constitute singular decisive battles from whose results the character of the war changed from one of maneuvering for position , to one of direct movements against the main centers of enemy resistance to Federal authority, i.e., Gettysburg exhausted the offensive power of the ANV and Vicksburg, enabled Union forces in the West to concentrate on a single strategic objective that the confederacy could not afford to lose.

Without those two victories, Union forces would have been forced to continue their attempts to establish positions from which the full weight of Union war making powers could be focused on vital confederate strategic positions, the loss of which could not be endured by the confederacy.

Whether all this constitutes a 'Turning Point' of the war, is, to me, probably a matter of being a 'play on words' .

 

[WJC]

They should have tho … not only did the Confederates lose Pemberton's army, but the entire Mississippi Valley was open to recruiting freedmen into the Federal Army. We are talking about a potential 70,000 man shift in manpower. That's not even counting the economic impact.

Vicksburg doomed any Confederate hopes for victory.

Hindsight....

 

[wausaubob]

The impact on small arms development of both battles was profound. At Gettysburg it seemed as if many US soldiers had abandoned a weapon that was not satisfactory, for a gun they took from a wounded comrade or a Confederate casualty. At Vicksburg the US soldiers knew the difference between a weapon that worked and the pieces of junk the quartermaster had issued to them. Grant noted the US soldiers filtered through the arms surrendered by the Confederates. These two results, in separate theaters, compelled some response to get better weapons in the hands of the soldiers and troopers.

 

[th'anchoriticsybarite]

Gettysburg was in nowhere PA, a location without a scintilla of strategic value. Vicksburg's fall resulted in the capture of two CSA armies. With Vicksburg & Port Hudson's capture, the Mississippi River was open for trade & military movements. The CSA was cut in half. At the same time, the Tullahoma Campaign in Middle Tennessee removed that vital source of horses, mules, hogs & corn from CSA control. It also opened the gate for the capture of Chattanooga & breaking Lee's direct RR connection with his base in Dalton GA. I suggest that a wider reading of the history is in order.

Let us indulge in a little what if.

First of all G'burg is a crucial strategic position. IF.....

What if on day one the Confederates are just a little more effective and they manage to reach the Culps Hill---Little Big top line? Had they managed to occupy this position on day one they would have gained tremendous stategic advantage.

Much had been made of Meade's orders to fortify the fall back position and protect DC. Accepting this one has to ask the question of why would Lee have even considered attacking any such position. Lee knew full well that he did not have the capacity to penetrate DC's defenses.

If Meade attacks he can defend the Cematary Hill line position. And with relative ease.. Either way Meade is likely to be releived and it really doesn't matter who replaces him, one of the existing Corp commanders of the AoP or Grant. Doesn't matter.

Lee has the opportunity to take Harrisburg, take Baltimore, Philidelphia and even threaten NYC. War over.

But even on Day 2. If Lee manages to rupture the Union line on Semintary Ridge by taking the Ridge itself. Or if Ewell's men had had the forsight to ignore the Union troops on Culp's Hill and had simply penetrated just a few hundred yards and seen the almost undefended Union supply train.

But even accepting everything as it happened. On day 3 had Stuart had the mental acuity to deploy his cavalry into line and not column. He could have swept Custer and the Union cavalry from rthe field on Dya 3 and haveing done so could have destroyed the Union supply train, and therefore forced the Union army which had essentially won the battle of G'burg to fall back and allow Lee free access to Pennsylvania.

 

[RodentRevolution]

Let us indulge in a little what if.

First of all G'burg is a crucial strategic position. IF.....

What if on day one the Confederates are just a little more effective and they manage to reach the Culps Hill---Little Big top line? Had they managed to occupy this position on day one they would have gained tremendous stategic advantage.

Much had been made of Meade's orders to fortify the fall back position and protect DC. Accepting this one has to ask the question of why would Lee have even considered attacking any such position. Lee knew full well that he did not have the capacity to penetrate DC's defenses.

If Meade attacks he can defend the Cematary Hill line position. And with relative ease.. Either way Meade is likely to be releived and it really doesn't matter who replaces him, one of the existing Corp commanders of the AoP or Grant. Doesn't matter.

Lee has the opportunity to take Harrisburg, take Baltimore, Philidelphia and even threaten NYC. War over.

But even on Day 2. If Lee manages to rupture the Union line on Semintary Ridge by taking the Ridge itself. Or if Ewell's men had had the forsight to ignore the Union troops on Culp's Hill and had simply penetrated just a few hundred yards and seen the almost undefended Union supply train.

But even accepting everything as it happened. On day 3 had Stuart had the mental acuity to deploy his cavalry into line and not column. He could have swept Custer and the Union cavalry from rthe field on Dya 3 and haveing done so could have destroyed the Union supply train, and therefore forced the Union army which had essentially won the battle of G'burg to fall back and allow Lee free access to Pennsylvania.

Except that Lee does not have free access to Pennsylvania. Oh sure he can bleed his troops against Pennsylvania militia in a kind of win every battle but lose the war. All the time though he has a powerful Union field army sitting across his lines of communication with northern Virginia. Lee is going to be having to think about retreat. After all he has to cover Richmond just as much as the Union have to cover Washington, he also has to preserve his army which will become increasingly awkward on hostile territory.

So regardless of the outcome we would mostly likely see Lee retreat. In one of your scenarios the only difference is that Lee does so with his reputation further enhanced by a win at Gettysburg. So Gettysburg does not come to be seen as decisive. In Our Time Line it merely made obvious that Lee had reached his culmination point but could be spun for Union morale. Here Union morale is not further enhanced but neither is its war fighting capacity all that much diminished. Conversely Lee may still be faced with irrecoverable losses from his already smaller and more strained pool of manpower, munitions and mounts.

In this timeline we shall likely be discussing some other battle as decisive with much the same dedication as IOTL Gettysburg.

 

[ramkuma]

I read an article today in the Civil War Monitor about Presidential speeches at Gettysburg which contains the statement that "most historians argue that Gettysburg was not a decisive turning point in the war", noting that Lee was able to "retreat without harassment" and the war continued for 2 years. I am curious what others think of this opinion. Does it accurately express a current historical perspective?

Nonsense. Lee failed to draw the Feds sufficiently away from Richmond and failed to win a decisive victory which could have turned the tide of war. It was his last gamble.

 

[Irishtom29]

Let us indulge in a little what if.

First of all G'burg is a crucial strategic position. IF.....

If the Kyrellian Armada observing from the Rings of Saturn had intervened.

 

[th'anchoriticsybarite]

Except that Lee does not have free access to Pennsylvania. Oh sure he can bleed his troops against Pennsylvania militia in a kind of win every battle but lose the war. All the time though he has a powerful Union field army sitting across his lines of communication with northern Virginia. Lee is going to be having to think about retreat. After all he has to cover Richmond just as much as the Union have to cover Washington, he also has to preserve his army which will become increasingly awkward on hostile territory.

So regardless of the outcome we would mostly likely see Lee retreat. In one of your scenarios the only difference is that Lee does so with his reputation further enhanced by a win at Gettysburg. So Gettysburg does not come to be seen as decisive. In Our Time Line it merely made obvious that Lee had reached his culmination point but could be spun for Union morale. Here Union morale is not further enhanced but neither is its war fighting capacity all that much diminished. Conversely Lee may still be faced with irrecoverable losses from his already smaller and more strained pool of manpower, munitions and mounts.

In this timeline we shall likely be discussing some other battle as decisive with much the same dedication as IOTL Gettysburg.

In a perfect world you could not be more correct. Meade is in an almost perfect position to threaten Lee's line of communication and retreat. Therefore he must and should withdraw to protect his army from being cut off in enemy territory.

The problem is if Meade even in his wildest dream even considered such a course of action, Lincoln would have relieved him. Lincoln was obsessed with the idea that given that the AoP was hugely larger than the ANV, they should simply butt heads and let the bigger (Northern) army win. Even Grant when given the top slot had to prove to his commander that he was willing to fight tooth and nail against Lee in the Wilderness and Overland Campaigns, proving his determination to fight was given the latitude to make the great strategic move flanking Lee's army and move against Petersburg.

In the real world if Lee had been able to attain the fishhook line and defend it against Meade. Meade would have been repulsed much the same as Lee and had to move back to the Pipe Creek defenses. Doing so would have lead to Meade's relief by someone....?

One fact that has to be accepted, is that by 1863 Lee knew that the defenses of DC were impregnable to his and probably any other army on the face of the earth. There is therefore no reason for him even to consider advancing and attacking the Pipe Creek line. Instead he could have used the one strategic advantage he had over the AoP--his mobility.

Harrisburg could have been burned with relative ease. Ditto for Pittsburg. Philly and Baltimore well within reach. Politically this could have lead to a movement in the North to come to a negotiated settlement.

Today we can see the grand strategy of bisecting the South by taking New Orleans and Vicksburg. Then further quartering the South by taking Chattanooga and Atlanta and Savannah. TODAY we can see how the North used its superiority to keep slicing and dicing the South to make it more and more unable to defend itself. At the time the eyes of the North and the South as well as the rest of the world was focused on that narrow strip between DC and Richmond. The only factor worth considering was that specific area.

 

[RodentRevolution]

In a perfect world you could not be more correct. Meade is in an almost perfect position to threaten Lee's line of communication and retreat. Therefore he must and should withdraw to protect his army from being cut off in enemy territory.

The problem is if Meade even in his wildest dream even considered such a course of action, Lincoln would have relieved him. Lincoln was obsessed with the idea that given that the AoP was hugely larger than the ANV, they should simply butt heads and let the bigger (Northern) army win. Even Grant when given the top slot had to prove to his commander that he was willing to fight tooth and nail against Lee in the Wilderness and Overland Campaigns, proving his determination to fight was given the latitude to make the great strategic move flanking Lee's army and move against Petersburg.

In the real world if Lee had been able to attain the fishhook line and defend it against Meade. Meade would have been repulsed much the same as Lee and had to move back to the Pipe Creek defenses. Doing so would have lead to Meade's relief by someone....?

One fact that has to be accepted, is that by 1863 Lee knew that the defenses of DC were impregnable to his and probably any other army on the face of the earth. There is therefore no reason for him even to consider advancing and attacking the Pipe Creek line. Instead he could have used the one strategic advantage he had over the AoP--his mobility.

Harrisburg could have been burned with relative ease. Ditto for Pittsburg. Philly and Baltimore well within reach. Politically this could have lead to a movement in the North to come to a negotiated settlement.

Today we can see the grand strategy of bisecting the South by taking New Orleans and Vicksburg. Then further quartering the South by taking Chattanooga and Atlanta and Savannah. TODAY we can see how the North used its superiority to keep slicing and dicing the South to make it more and more unable to defend itself. At the time the eyes of the North and the South as well as the rest of the world was focused on that narrow strip between DC and Richmond. The only factor worth considering was that specific area.

Hum....

You yourself noted that Meade would have retreated upon Washington. At that point it does not matter if Lincoln removes him or not the Army of the Potomac is still in place to cover Washington and/or threaten Richmond. It can do both while all the while threatening Lee's lines of communication with Northern Virginia.

The issue for Lee when pursuing the course of action you advocate is that each of those locations is defended at least by Union militia...local state militia if you prefer but they still have guns and they can still shoot Confederate soldiers. This is exactly my earlier point about Lee bleeding his army against Union Militia above. Lee has a limited amount of transport, a limited number of troops and finite supplies of munitions. Even in the best case opportunity of your original conceit, capturing a large portion of the Union supply chain Lee is unlikely to want to squander it on actions of dubious political gain. He has to know that burning northern towns will require both a great effusion of blood on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia and have the potential to inspire greater resolve for vengeance on the behalf of Northerners. Most of whom even in your wildest, most exaggerated imagining he cannot touch.

New York remains inviolate. Much of the industrial plant of the Union remains inviolate. The bulk of the population of the Union remains inviolate. The Capital of the United States remains inviolate. The means to continue the war, remains inviolate.

Lee cannot perform a reverse Sherman's March because Sherman merely had to reach the sea and he reached resupply, Lee reaches the sea and he reaches...the United States Navy. As, if he is not careful in his burnings, a war criminal, without ammunition. Facing fresh Union soldiers on land and some portion thereof the former Army of the Potomac...perhaps minus the portion that is now marching on Richmond only marginally opposed because...oh yes the Army of Northern Virginia is too busy expending its supply of men, mounts and munitions running amok in Pennsylvania.

The point of Sherman's March was to send a message that by the end of the war Union armies could go anywhere and that the Confederacy lacked the strength to stop them. The whole point of the Army of Northern Virginia is that it prevents that. If it tries running amok in Pennsylvania then it abandons its primary mission. It does not however compel the Union to surrender. Worse it increases the likelihood that the far more mobile and numerous Union armies and reserves can concentrate upon it and destroying it while enabling a bold and imaginative commander the chance to, and let me emphasize this, march a force into Richmond!

Now it is true that Union often lacked bold and imaginative command but it had deep resources, deep pockets and on its own territories entirely the advantage of interior lines and superior means of mobility that the Confederates enjoyed in the Rebel States...and sea transport which they did not but the Union did. Union superiority in arms and resources did not alone guarantee victory but meant that Lee would need a succession of victories to achieve the kind of hinge point moment the Union was so often a single triumph away from.