Gettysburg not a decisive turning point?

Forgive me if this has been explained above more elegantly than I'm asking, but if Lee had gotten to what we recognize as the Union line first, what would have prevented Meade from following Longstreet's recommendation to Lee in real life? Is it a case of Lincoln being the one who, in essence, is saying, "The enemy is over there. Now go fight him over there. You can't appear to back down," or would Meade have seen the situation like that for himself as Lee did? Or is it that Longstreet's idea for an end-around in real life wasn't that good, either? I really do suspect the answer I'm looking for is up-thread somewhere, so just kindly give me the post number if it is and I'll go read it again. :smile:
 
Forgive me if this has been explained above more elegantly than I'm asking, but if Lee had gotten to what we recognize as the Union line first, what would have prevented Meade from following Longstreet's recommendation to Lee in real life? Is it a case of Lincoln being the one who, in essence, is saying, "The enemy is over there. Now go fight him over there. You can't appear to back down," or would Meade have seen the situation like that for himself as Lee did? Or is it that Longstreet's idea for an end-around in real life wasn't that good, either? I really do suspect the answer I'm looking for is up-thread somewhere, so just kindly give me the post number if it is and I'll go read it again. :smile:
I think the issue is that Meade was already semi-committed to the Pipe Creek line. He had to be convinced to fight at Gettysburg based on the strength of the defensive position the AoP was holding. If they did not hold that position he likely would have been content to occupy the Pipe Creek line instead of assaulting Lee in that position. Remember, other than being a crossroads, Gettysburg had zero strategic value. Neither Meade nor Lee had to hold it for any strategic reason. It was just a convenient spot to concentrate the scattered armies.

Lincoln was not micro-managing battlefield tactics. He established goals and left it to his generals to determine how to accomplish those goals. Sometimes those goals unnecessarily hamstrung his commanders, but in terms of tactics he left that to the professionals on the field.
 
Forgive me if this has been explained above more elegantly than I'm asking, but if Lee had gotten to what we recognize as the Union line first, what would have prevented Meade from following Longstreet's recommendation to Lee in real life? Is it a case of Lincoln being the one who, in essence, is saying, "The enemy is over there. Now go fight him over there. You can't appear to back down," or would Meade have seen the situation like that for himself as Lee did? Or is it that Longstreet's idea for an end-around in real life wasn't that good, either? I really do suspect the answer I'm looking for is up-thread somewhere, so just kindly give me the post number if it is and I'll go read it again. :smile:
We do not know, exactly, what Lee was doing in Pa., in the first place. Was it a major offensive to render a decisive battle on Northern territory or, was it merely an oversized raid for supplies? From Lee's statemen, it could have been either neither or both, or something else entirely unstated. Lee was a master of clear statements that left his real intentions obscure.

Once Lee outflanked the AoP(again), it is doubtful that Washington would have allowed Meade to wait passively at Pipe Creek, while Lee was maneuvering to attack and possibly occupy Harrisburg.


P.S. I myself think that this was just what Lee hoped to accomplish. Outmaneuver Meade, threaten a vital strategic target to force the AoP into attacking the ANV at a time and place of Lee's choosing(possibly at Gettysburg or Hanover, etc).
 
But we also too quickly forget the impact of the Confederate losses at Chancellorsville. In fact, one can argue that those had more impact on Gettysburg than Gettysburg did on the ensuing campaigns. The real manpower impacts on the ANV were inflicted during the Overland Campaign and its six weeks of unending bloody contact as the armies slowly wound their way to Richmond/Petersburg.
Nice point about Chancellorsville, a great one to mull over for a while.
 
Nice point about Chancellorsville, a great one to mull over for a while.
Lee defeated Hooker with only a part of the ANV actually in the Battle at Chancellorsville, i.e., Longstreet and his men were foraging for supplies and were not present at the battle.

I think the main effect of Chancellorsville on Lee's Gettysburg campaign was that it helped inculcate the so-called 'Victory Disease', not only in the ANV, but, even more importantly, in Lee himself.
 
Th

The letters between Lee, Davis & Secretary of War spell out Lee's intentions & rational for the incursion. His order that sent Stewart into PA exist. Lee's attempt to bring up units to support the PA incursion exist. There isn't any doubt about what Lee intended to accomplish in PA.

Lee explicitly states that the manpower disparity between USA & CSA forces was at a tipping point. USA manpower resources were increasing steadily & CSA resources were in permanent decline. Lee believed that the spring of 1863 was the last chance to inflict a fatal blow on Northern morale. He explicitly said that Davis should disingenuously tell the peace movement in the North what it wanted to hear.

If Lee's intention was to just raid PA & bring back supplies, why did he not have communication back to his base & the transports assets required to take out the spoils? He did not because that wasn't his intention. We can set that red herring aside & place it where it belongs.

Lee proposed a concentration of idle units from Coastal Carolina at Culpepper VA under Gen Beauregard. Lee would enter PA. drawing the A of rhe P after him. Beauregard would threaten Washington & force the A of the P to respond. The A of NV & Beauregard would then crush the strung out A of the P between them & at minimum besiege Washington. This hammer blow would shatter Northern morale & lead to. Republican defeat in November. It was was an excellent plan; concentration of effort; clear purpose; explicit goals; high probability of success. Davis would have none of it. He didn't even provide the supporting units Lee needed to maintain contact with his base.

At a certain level, the PA incursion, the rump fragment of his plan, can be categorized as an act of desperation. In the meeting engagement at Gettysburg not one of the costly attacks he ordered achieved its tactical goals. The failure of Davis to grasp Lee's initial plan, the inaction to support the PA incursion & the complete defeat of his army left Lee no option but to resign.

Strategically, Lee was absolutely correct. The disparity between USA manpower vs dwindling CSA accelerated in 1863. The clean sweep of the board from Cumberland Gap to New. Orleans vindicates Lee's analysis. The fact of the matter was that Lee was only an army commander, it was Davis who was supreme commander. So was Lincoln, except he told Grant go win the war, tell me what I need to do to make that possible.

In very real terms, it was Lincoln & Davis that called the shots in 1863. The results speak for themselves.
Rhea, can you recommend some books on this topic? Fascinating!
 
Hum....

You yourself noted that Meade would have retreated upon Washington. At that point it does not matter if Lincoln removes him or not the Army of the Potomac is still in place to cover Washington and/or threaten Richmond. It can do both while all the while threatening Lee's lines of communication with Northern Virginia.

To begin with my point was not that Meade would have withdrawn to cover DC, per se, but that he would have had the option of withdrawing to his prepared defensive line at Pipe Creek, which would have allowed him to cover DC. Why would anyone assume that Lee would have followed him there? In what insane world would Lee have followed him there and assaulted a prepared defensive position? Even supposing he could have attacked the AoP and not only defeated them but totally annihilated that army? What good would it have done Lee? By 1863 the fortifications around DC could have repelled ANY army on the face of the earth.

In our hindsight we understand that the Confederacy was being slowly but inevitably strangled by Union forces, taking the Miss R and dividing the South in 2. Advancing on Atlanta and then on to SAvannah and eventually rampaging up the Eastern seaboard toward Richmond. But at the time the attention of the entire world was focused on the 90 sq miles between DC and Richmond. From that perspective everyone's opinion was that not only was the North NOT winning but that the South might easily prevail.

If you could have canvassed any of the militaries of Europe be it GB, France, Prussia, Austro-hungary....the unanimous opinion was that the South had every possibility of winning the war. Ditto for the same governments. The same could have been said of public opinion throughout the North. Ditto for the various state governments of the Northern states. It would have seemed to them that the South could invade the North practically at will, but every Northern attempt is repusled with ease.

The issue for Lee when pursuing the course of action you advocate is that each of those locations is defended at least by Union militia...local state militia if you prefer but they still have guns and they can still shoot Confederate soldiers. This is exactly my earlier point about Lee bleeding his army against Union Militia above. Lee has a limited amount of transport, a limited number of troops and finite supplies of munitions. Even in the best case opportunity of your original conceit, capturing a large portion of the Union supply chain Lee is unlikely to want to squander it on actions of dubious political gain. He has to know that burning northern towns will require both a great effusion of blood on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia and have the potential to inspire greater resolve for vengeance on the behalf of Northerners. Most of whom even in your wildest, most exaggerated imagining he cannot touch.

So, Meade sits behind his line at Pipe Creek. In the meantime Lee burns Harrisburg, Pittsburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore. When the local militia attempts to intervene, don't you think that Lee would have seen them a thank you letter? Lee's greatest strength was his armies mobility. They did not have dedicated supply lines. They could live off the country. Have you never seen comments by the Penn populace on the ANV's soldiers lack of shoes?

New York remains inviolate. Much of the industrial plant of the Union remains inviolate. The bulk of the population of the Union remains inviolate. The Capital of the United States remains inviolate. The means to continue the war, remains inviolate.


If Meade remains behind the Pipe Creek lines NYC is just as vulnerable as any other northern city apart from LA or SF.
Lee cannot perform a reverse Sherman's March because Sherman merely had to reach the sea and he reached resupply, Lee reaches the sea and he reaches...the United States Navy. As, if he is not careful in his burnings, a war criminal, without ammunition. Facing fresh Union soldiers on land and some portion thereof the former Army of the Potomac...perhaps minus the portion that is now marching on Richmond only marginally opposed because...oh yes the Army of Northern Virginia is too busy expending its supply of men, mounts and munitions running amok in Pennsylvania.

The point of Sherman's March was to send a message that by the end of the war Union armies could go anywhere and that the Confederacy lacked the strength to stop them. The whole point of the Army of Northern Virginia is that it prevents that. If it tries running amok in Pennsylvania then it abandons its primary mission. It does not however compel the Union to surrender. Worse it increases the likelihood that the far more mobile and numerous Union armies and reserves can concentrate upon it and destroying it while enabling a bold and imaginative commander the chance to, and let me emphasize this, march a force into Richmond!

Again absolutely right. But if Lee continues to rampage throught out Penn, I guarantee you that Sherman's entire army would have been marching northward to be transported to the east to relieve the threat to DC. This means that the North instead of having taken most of Tenn and Ky out of the Confederate alliance, the border reverts to the Ohio R.

Now it is true that Union often lacked bold and imaginative command but it had deep resources, deep pockets and on its own territories entirely the advantage of interior lines and superior means of mobility that the Confederates enjoyed in the Rebel States...and sea transport which they did not but the Union did. Union superiority in arms and resources did not alone guarantee victory but meant that Lee would need a succession of victories to achieve the kind of hinge point moment the Union was so often a single triumph away from.

You are left with two possibilities. Meade stays behind his Pipe Creek lines, allowing Lee to rampage at will. If so you have the likely possibility of European intervention or a revolt of one or more Northern states who are terrified of the apparent inability of the national gov't to protect them or one or more of the European states (GB and'/or FR) diciding that enough is enough and using their power to end the conflict.

OR Meade leaves his line and opposes Lee on an open field. If he does so who would you bet on--Lee or Meade.???!!!!!
 
We do not know, exactly, what Lee was doing in Pa., in the first place. Was it a major offensive to render a decisive battle on Northern territory or, was it merely an oversized raid for supplies? From Lee's statemen, it could have been either neither or both, or something else entirely unstated. Lee was a master of clear statements that left his real intentions obscure.

Once Lee outflanked the AoP(again), it is doubtful that Washington would have allowed Meade to wait passively at Pipe Creek, while Lee was maneuvering to attack and possibly occupy Harrisburg.


P.S. I myself think that this was just what Lee hoped to accomplish. Outmaneuver Meade, threaten a vital strategic target to force the AoP into attacking the ANV at a time and place of Lee's choosing(possibly at Gettysburg or Hanover, etc).
Au contraire, I think we do. Lee's intention was to move the destruction of war from his beloved VA and move it to the Northern states. Let them feel to destruction and devastation of war. Let them start pressuring their govt's to start ending the war.
 
To begin with my point was not that Meade would have withdrawn to cover DC, per se, but that he would have had the option of withdrawing to his prepared defensive line at Pipe Creek, which would have allowed him to cover DC. Why would anyone assume that Lee would have followed him there? In what insane world would Lee have followed him there and assaulted a prepared defensive position? Even supposing he could have attacked the AoP and not only defeated them but totally annihilated that army? What good would it have done Lee? By 1863 the fortifications around DC could have repelled ANY army on the face of the earth.

In our hindsight we understand that the Confederacy was being slowly but inevitably strangled by Union forces, taking the Miss R and dividing the South in 2. Advancing on Atlanta and then on to SAvannah and eventually rampaging up the Eastern seaboard toward Richmond. But at the time the attention of the entire world was focused on the 90 sq miles between DC and Richmond. From that perspective everyone's opinion was that not only was the North NOT winning but that the South might easily prevail.

If you could have canvassed any of the militaries of Europe be it GB, France, Prussia, Austro-hungary....the unanimous opinion was that the South had every possibility of winning the war. Ditto for the same governments. The same could have been said of public opinion throughout the North. Ditto for the various state governments of the Northern states. It would have seemed to them that the South could invade the North practically at will, but every Northern attempt is repusled with ease.



So, Meade sits behind his line at Pipe Creek. In the meantime Lee burns Harrisburg, Pittsburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore. When the local militia attempts to intervene, don't you think that Lee would have seen them a thank you letter? Lee's greatest strength was his armies mobility. They did not have dedicated supply lines. They could live off the country. Have you never seen comments by the Penn populace on the ANV's soldiers lack of shoes?




If Meade remains behind the Pipe Creek lines NYC is just as vulnerable as any other northern city apart from LA or SF.


Again absolutely right. But if Lee continues to rampage throught out Penn, I guarantee you that Sherman's entire army would have been marching northward to be transported to the east to relieve the threat to DC. This means that the North instead of having taken most of Tenn and Ky out of the Confederate alliance, the border reverts to the Ohio R.



You are left with two possibilities. Meade stays behind his Pipe Creek lines, allowing Lee to rampage at will. If so you have the likely possibility of European intervention or a revolt of one or more Northern states who are terrified of the apparent inability of the national gov't to protect them or one or more of the European states (GB and'/or FR) diciding that enough is enough and using their power to end the conflict.

OR Meade leaves his line and opposes Lee on an open field. If he does so who would you bet on--Lee or Meade.???!!!!!
As long as Meade remains with an army then Lee has a problem. As long as Lee remains in the North then Richmond has a problem. As you note the Union simply has more armies to play with. Where you err is in assuming the Union will dance to your tune. We cannot work on the assumption they will make perfect decisions but we can see from the depth of resources they had the greater capacity to absorb mistakes.

Lee's rampage will not compel surrender. The Confederates would prove resilient in the face of damage there is little reason to presuppose the Unionists would not prove equally reluctant to yield. Indeed the difference is greater here as the Union had shown it could damage the key territories of the Confederacy while as I have pointed out even in his wildest dreams Lee had to know New York remained inviolate.

Lee's issue is that while he could beat the local militia opposing him at every turn he would still be expending ammunition and men and horses. All of which he had only finite supply.

The point being victory at Gettysburg does not change Lee's strategic dilemma. He had the forces to protect Richmond or attack in the north but not both, worse he had only limited means to recoup losses to those forces. The depths of Union reserves were much and away greater.
 
'Pressuring the gov't to start ending the war' was the objective from T's post. Not surrender.
 
Au contraire, I think we do. Lee's intention was to move the destruction of war from his beloved VA and move it to the Northern states. Let them feel to destruction and devastation of war. Let them start pressuring their govt's to start ending the war.
Yes Lee did have a mish-mash of many differing purposes that he statements for public (and Presidential) consumption, but Lee's actions I think, could lead to other conclusions. Just for an instance, it was a risky move to conduct a major invasion of enemy territory while in the process of reorganizing your whole army, with 2/3's of his corps commanders new not only to their commands but also their jobs as corps commanders, i.e., I believe he had a much bigger purpose in mind than a glorified raid for supplies. A purpose that originally required stripping other depts of their troops to forma a whole new army to cover Richmond, while he was away in Pa.
 
As long as Meade remains with an army then Lee has a problem. As long as Lee remains in the North then Richmond has a problem. As you note the Union simply has more armies to play with. Where you err is in assuming the Union will dance to your tune. We cannot work on the assumption they will make perfect decisions but we can see from the depth of resources they had the greater capacity to absorb mistakes.

Lee's rampage will not compel surrender. The Confederates would prove resilient in the face of damage there is little reason to presuppose the Unionists would not prove equally reluctant to yield. Indeed the difference is greater here as the Union had shown it could damage the key territories of the Confederacy while as I have pointed out even in his wildest dreams Lee had to know New York remained inviolate.

Lee's issue is that while he could beat the local militia opposing him at every turn he would still be expending ammunition and men and horses. All of which he had only finite supply.

The point being victory at Gettysburg does not change Lee's strategic dilemma. He had the forces to protect Richmond or attack in the north but not both, worse he had only limited means to recoup losses to those forces. The depths of Union reserves were much and away greater.
Invading the north has several advantages.
  1. It strengthens confederate morale and weakens that of the Union.
  2. Confederate soldiers can live off the land and consume the opponents' resources rather than their own while relieving pressure from southern farmers and allowing harvests etc from the Shenandoah valley to be gathered.
  3. A major victory on Northern soil would hopefully help in gaining foreign recognition.
 
That was not really Lee's purpose in invading the north, according to the historic record. The invasion was originally proposed as an alternative to sending troops to help relieve Vicksburg, in the hopes that an invasion would somehow shake loose Grant, which seems rather far fetched in hindsight. In his report he states that his purpose was to transfer operations to Pennsylvania and to stymy Union plans for its summer campaign. It has been stated his purpose in transferring the seat of war to Pennsylvania was to give Virginia a chance to put in crops and to live off Pennsylvania farmers for the season. In fact, Lee further states in his report that is was not his intent to have a general battle in the North, unless attacked. Based on the historic record it seems Lee viewed the entire campaign as a raid for supplies, and he was not seeking some kind of war winning battle on northern soil. Now, I dont doubt he would have liked such an event and when battle was joined, yes, he was looking for his Cannae. But I dont see any evidence that he intended this invasion for that purpose.

So no, I dont think Lee ever had any hope of marching on DC. I was merely pointing out that Lee had bled his army dry over three days for no strategic purpose other than hoping for a miraculous annihilation of the AoP, which was never going to happen. And even if somehow, miraculously, Pickett's Charge had been successful and he had broken the Union line, he still would have had to retreat back to Virginia, which would have made the result look like a Union victory since the invasion would have been repulsed with bloody casualties inflicted on him. He was in a no win situation.
I agree that the principal plan was to remain on the tactical defensive, if possible, barring a sufficient opportunity presented itself. His communications with the government though reveal that this was a situation which he hoped may present itself. Lee always had a very good feel for the grand picture that way. He knew abundantly well that the war was not going well at all for the Confederate nation and that major successes needed to be attained, on a grand scale, if the Confederate nation was to have any hope for survival.

Now, the notion that the attacks on July 2nd and 3rd were without strategic purpose is just not reconcilable with the evidence to me. Once the Army of Northern Virginia didn't control the road network out of Gettysburg, as it was assumed that they would be able to, the whole operation had been gutted and effectively been put in a box. Lee sometimes had a tendency, for good reason, to overreach a little bit and the situation he then found himself in was a badly exposed one, operating on a long tenuous supply line with an inferior force (substantially so), without good avenues of maneuver, with guerrillas operating in his rear and the Susquehanna Department which had raised and equipped 30,000 men in several weeks operating on his flank. It was a very dangerous position to even just pull back from, as to get his supply trains back, they were going to have to move back largely around the corner of the range, which takes additional times, while Federal forces could make forward forays against his lines of supply and communication via shorter routes.

Lee would ultimately come to the assessment though that the position of the U.S. Army could be broken at Gettysburg, which would alleviate many problems for him if he were right.
 
Saying the Battle of Gettysburg was the "Turning Point" of the civil war is a bit ambiguous. The South lost the War the day they fired on Fort Sumter, they never had the manpower, industrial resources or the financial capacity to wage a war.

Those that consider fighting the battles as a key to establishing Southern Independence I would consider the appointment of U.S. Grant as Lieutenant General a true turning point of the Civil War. Grant instituted an all fronts offensive fighting policy that denied the South the typical after battle retreats, regroupings, reorganizations and new commander appointments the North would normally go through. Grants fighting strategy and aggressiveness doomed the South.
 
Saying the Battle of Gettysburg was the "Turning Point" of the civil war is a bit ambiguous. The South lost the War the day they fired on Fort Sumter, they never had the manpower, industrial resources or the financial capacity to wage a war.
Really? Anyone can pick a winner after the race is over. What odds would you have given North Vietnam in 1955? Or would you say the USA lost the war in 1955?
 
Those that consider fighting the battles as a key to establishing Southern Independence I would consider the appointment of U.S. Grant as Lieutenant General a true turning point of the Civil War. Grant instituted an all fronts offensive fighting policy that denied the South the typical after battle retreats, regroupings, reorganizations and new commander appointments the North would normally go through. Grants fighting strategy and aggressiveness doomed the South.
There is no question that the appointment of Grant as Commander in Chief represented a critical point in the war at which the United States finally found a viable, winning strategy for victory. The policy of concentrating force in time and space and striking southern infrastructure was the correct recipe that brought about the downfall of the Confederacy. But of course, Grant's appointment, while important, was simply one building block in the Union victory. By that time of the war, the Confederacy had failed to develop a realistic strategy for attaining independence, had bled its manpower and resources to dangerous levels, and was confronting the growing strength of northern industry and management. Assuming that the Confederacy ever had a rational expectation of attaining independence (another discussion), that expectation was most likely achieved within the first year or two of the war. By Grant's appointment in 1864, that train had already left the station.
 
Gettysburg was the Shiloh of the eastern theater. Enormous resources were committed to the attempted invasion of Pennsylvania.
The battle that occurred in south Pennsylvania, had no strategic result, but was a tactical victory for the US, much like Shiloh.
But the opportunity for reinforce Joe Johnstone in Mississippi passed by. The garrisons at Vicksburg and Port Hudson surrendered.
In short order, Steele occupied Little Rock, Burnside made it to Knoxville, Rosecrans rolled Bragg's force out of Tennessee, making Andrew Johnson look darn prescient, and the Confederates had to evacuate battery Wagner, which allowed US blockade ships to enter Charleston's outer harbor. For the next 6 month no blockade runners entered Charleston.
History credits the Confederacy with stumbling on for 21 months after Gettysburg. But the cost of that resistance was enormous sacrifices of men and material made by the Confederate population in the 5 Atlantic states and Alabama.
 

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