Gettysburg not a decisive turning point?

[damYankee]

Battery Wagner, Knoxville, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Little Rock. Lee got the war out of Virginia for a few months, and the Confederacy shrank in all other places. By the time of Missionary Ridge the US was clearly dominant.

Which is why I emphasized a turning point. There were many turning points.

 

[wausaubob]

The "turning point" is a term determined only in hindsight. It also tends to be considered as a single, unique point in time, as if it were the only event that changed the eventual outcome.
News from the combatant forces was always welcome at home. And hearing that a great battle had been fought, or- in this case- two great battles had been fought with great loss no doubt was traumatic to Southerners. But I doubt if any of them said "That's it! The war is over! We lost!" in July 1863.
The argument that Vicksburg, not Gettysburg was the single "turning point", is pointless. If we must identify a "turning point" the fact that the United States forces won two major victories at almost the same time argues- again in hindsight- for the two of them to be considered together as that "turning point".

Between March 1863 and September 1863 there were a series of successes by the US. Taken altogether they were evidence that the US was getting better at war.

 

[Belfoured]

Between March 1863 and September 1863 there were a series of successes by the US. Taken altogether they were evidence that the US was getting better at war.

Just a minor supporting point. I'm not sure how "decisive" Gettysburg was from a strategic perspective in the minds of those who mattered - the Federal command (administration and military). Gettysburg, as has been noted, was the repulse of an invasion. It did not mean the demise of the CSA. Vicksburg was different - it was a citadel within the CSA and its surrender (with Port Hudson) eliminated CSA control/use of a major artery. While I don't believe in one event being the/a "turning point", I believe that Vicksburg was a lot closer to that than Gettysburg. I think your point is the germane conclusion.

 

[wausaubob]

There were only a few places in the Confederacy as important as Vicksburg. Richmond and Charleston were more important than Vicksburg.
But Vicksburg was not the only strategic change. When Meade's army turned back the attempted invasion by the Army of No. Virginia the US was able to advance at the harbor of Charleston. When Grant occupied Vicksburg., both Burnside and Steele were able to advance.
The turning point story is a simple version of what was happening and editors do have control the word count.

 

[Belfoured]

There were only a few places in the Confederacy as important as Vicksburg. Richmond and Charleston were more important than Vicksburg.
But Vicksburg was not the only strategic change. When Meade's army turned back the attempted invasion by the Army of No. Virginiat the US able to advance at the harbor of Charleston. When Grant occupied Vicksburg., both Burnside and Steele were able to advance.
The turning point story is a simple version of what was happening and editors do have control the word count.

Fair points, although I'm not sure how much Lee's repulse at Gettysburg actually fueled Gillmore's ultimately limited success at Charleston, beginning in early July. Those were a follow-on to the unsuccessful attempt by the USN in April. Gillmore had begun preparations after he replaced Hunter in early June. The end result in September was the capture of Fort Wagner. Nice but far from the end game.

 

[jackt62]

Gettysburg simply represented another moment (albiet significant), in the growing strength of Union forces that were gathering to defeat the Confederacy along wide fronts. If anything, Gettysburg might be better described as often noted, as the "high water mark" of the Confederacy. With the usual qualification of individual gains, from the summer of 1863 to 1865, CSA forces were on the ropes and never regained the initiative that once seemed promising during the second half of 1862. Southern hopes for independence always depended on a political solution driven by military gains. Once the military fortunes of the south changed significantly after 1863, the chance for any chance of independence evaporated quickly.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Between March 1863 and September 1863 there were a series of successes by the US. Taken altogether they were evidence that the US was getting better at war.

Yes, but the first half of 1864 saw a series of Confederate successes, demonstrating its ability to recover and continue resistance. Early on, Union offensives were beaten back at Olustee in Florida and the Red River in Louisiana. Nathan Bedford Forrest continued to ride rings around the Yankees in West Tennessee and northern Mississippi. And when the massive Union spring offensive began, both major Confederate armies were able to put up a ferocious resistance, inflicting heavy losses and maintaining control of the key cities of Richmond and Atlanta. Jubal Early even came within a hairsbreadth (as least as far as public opinion was concerned) of capturing Washington City itself!

I agree with those who say that Gettysburg (or, if you prefer, July of 1863) was not THE turning point, but merely A turning point. There were lots of turning points.

 

[wausaubob]

Yes, but the first half of 1864 saw a series of Confederate successes, demonstrating its ability to recover and continue resistance. Early on, Union offensives were beaten back at Olustee in Florida and the Red River in Louisiana. Nathan Bedford Forrest continued to ride rings around the Yankees in West Tennessee and northern Mississippi. And when the massive Union spring offensive began, both major Confederate armies were able to put up a ferocious resistance, inflicting heavy losses and maintaining control of the key cities of Richmond and Atlanta. Jubal Early even came within a hairsbreadth (as least as far as public opinion was concerned) of capturing Washington City itself!

I agree with those who say that Gettysburg (or, if you prefer, July of 1863) was not THE turning point, but merely A turning point. There were lots of turning points.

Unfortunately for the Confederacy, when Grant took over, there were 8 months until the Presidential election, not just 3. The Confederates usually did well in the warm weather. But the calendar still had 12 months in it.

 

[damYankee]

I googled the question and found some interesting but not surprising opinions, many do make the argument that with the high losses on both sides, Gettysburg was the high mark.
Jennifer Murray, a history professor at Oklahoma State University and author of On a Great Battlefield: The Making, Management, and Memory of Gettysburg points out that it was also the end of Lee's image of invincibility., Murray states;
"Lee says more than once that he believes his men would be invincible," Gettysburg shattered that image.

 

[speedylee]

Gettysburg simply represented another moment (albiet significant), in the growing strength of Union forces that were gathering to defeat the Confederacy along wide fronts. If anything, Gettysburg might be better described as often noted, as the "high water mark" of the Confederacy. With the usual qualification of individual gains, from the summer of 1863 to 1865, CSA forces were on the ropes and never regained the initiative that once seemed promising during the second half of 1862. Southern hopes for independence always depended on a political solution driven by military gains. Once the military fortunes of the south changed significantly after 1863, the chance for any chance of independence evaporated quickly.

I enjoyed reading your post.

We too quickly forget the impact of the Confederate losses at Gettysburg. The most important Confed army suffered tremendous losses among its officer corps. Its leadership was severely impacted. The AoNV remained a potent force, but it was not the army it had once been.

Your point about "Southern hopes for independence ... a political solution," is excellent. After Gettysburg, that wasn't going to happen.

 

[Belfoured]

I enjoyed reading your post.

We too quickly forget the impact of the Confederate losses at Gettysburg. The most important Confed army suffered tremendous losses among its officer corps. Its leadership was severely impacted. The AoNV remained a potent force, but it was not the army it had once been.

Your point about "Southern hopes for independence ... a political solution," is excellent. After Gettysburg, that wasn't going to happen.

But we also too quickly forget the impact of the Confederate losses at Chancellorsville. In fact, one can argue that those had more impact on Gettysburg than Gettysburg did on the ensuing campaigns. The real manpower impacts on the ANV were inflicted during the Overland Campaign and its six weeks of unending bloody contact as the armies slowly wound their way to Richmond/Petersburg.

 

[tony_gunter]

Champion Hill was the turning point, it was the decisive battle of the Vicksburg Campaign... from this victory Grant was allowed to move East and confront Lee.

To be fair, Champion Hill was kind of a foregone conclusion after Raymond. Coordinating with reinforcements headed to Raymond was the last hope for Pemberton to not be forced into a meeting engagement against unfavorable odds, a siege, or into abandoning the city altogether.

 

[tony_gunter]

But I doubt if any of them said "That's it! The war is over! We lost!" in July 1863.

They should have tho … not only did the Confederates lose Pemberton's army, but the entire Mississippi Valley was open to recruiting freedmen into the Federal Army. We are talking about a potential 70,000 man shift in manpower. That's not even counting the economic impact.

Vicksburg doomed any Confederate hopes for victory.

 

[wausaubob]

But we also too quickly forget the impact of the Confederate losses at Chancellorsville. In fact, one can argue that those had more impact on Gettysburg than Gettysburg did on the ensuing campaigns. The real manpower impacts on the ANV were inflicted during the Overland Campaign and its six weeks of unending bloody contact as the armies slowly wound their way to Richmond/Petersburg.

Great minds think alike. I think the combined attritional effect of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were more than the Conf army could stand. It rarely fought in the open after those two battles and never tried to advance on US artillery after July 1863. The affect was clear by Fort Steadman. I think the Confederate surprise attack was highly efficient. But once the US artillery zeroed on the Confederate soldiers, many of them gave up rather try to recross no-mans land while being shelled.
In the west the equivalent was most likely the Tullahoma campaign ending in the rout of the Confederate position at Missionary Ridge.

 

[RedRover]

But we also too quickly forget the impact of the Confederate losses at Chancellorsville. In fact, one can argue that those had more impact on Gettysburg than Gettysburg did on the ensuing campaigns. The real manpower impacts on the ANV were inflicted during the Overland Campaign and its six weeks of unending bloody contact as the armies slowly wound their way to Richmond/Petersburg.

William Royall, CSA veteran, post-war, states Lee's army at Gettysburg was not in particularly good condition:

"It has been generally supposed that Lee had in his Gettysburg campaign the finest army that he ever commanded. He had veteran troops, it is true, troops that had become accustomed to cooperating with each other, and so far as that goes to make a fine army, his army was up to a high mark. But his troops had been starved and frozen until men and beasts had wasted much of their strength, and they were far from possessing that stamina, physical and moral, which naturally belonged to them..."

Battery commander John C. Haskell had a good deal to say about the army's condition at Gettysburg, and its failure:

"The battle of Gettysburg will, no doubt, rank as the turning point of the war though perhaps it may better be called the breaking-point of the South's resources. For months our men had been on rations such as no troops ever campaigned on and did a tithe of the work ours were called on to do. Corn meal and damaged bacon were the staples, often so damaged that to live on them insured disease. Medicines, chloroform especially, had got so scarce that small operations as painful as great ones were done without it. Much of that which was used was of such bad quality that it was used as only a choice of evils.
Delicacies for the sick were unheard of. They lived on damaged bacon or lean beef or went hungry. Clothes and shoes were scant and insufficient, except for those which were taken from our friends, the enemy. Overcoats would have been almost unknown but for them, though for that matter would have fared badly for everything but for their contributions. Certainly half of our muskets and two-thirds of our artillery were forced contributions from them, while Banks, who commanded the United States troops in the Valley in 1862, was better known as and better deserved the title of Jackson's commissary than as the commander of his troops."

I think we were weighted by first, a demoralized army, and for this I hold General Lee largely responsible. He had an apparent antipathy to anything partaking of pomposity and the vanity of war, but he had an utterly undue regard for the value of the elementary teaching of West Point and for the experience gained by the very small police duty of our miniature regular army. He failed to realize that while a military school is excellent for the training of drill masters, who are most necessary, it teaches little of military science in comparison with the hard experience of a single campaign. When an army is confined for military leaders to a handful of lieutenants, who have never seen more than a regiment, probably not more than a company, in action, and never have had to deal with harder problem in the maintenance of their men than how to get a wagon train from the nearest railroad station, it is apt to be hurt by the restriction. And it was often difficult to get past the incompetents, who went in as drill masters and were then pushed up by the ability of their men, who were of a class few armies have ever seen, to become commanders of large operations.

A further, crushing weight was that we had among our division commanders more than one or two, who were far inferior to a number of their regimental officers. And not only did the incompetency of these generals hold back their commands, but the men and officers, both of whom by this time appreciated the true value of their commanders, were getting tired of sacrificing themselves under leaders who did them no credit and whom they distrusted. It is very near the literal truth that an army of sheep, led by a lion, will defeat an army of lions with a sheep for a commanders. We had too many sheep commanders."

Col. J.C. Haskell.


Col. Robert Tansill, CSA agreed with Haskell about a lack of competent commanders:

"It may, I think, be safely asserted, that not one half of the generals in the army were capable of performing the duties pertaining to their rank, and some had not sufficient military intelligence to qualify them for the first sergeant of a company of a regular army. The President in making such appointments doubtless believed that he was doing right...but this does not prevent those not blinded by such strange hallucinations from seeing the barbarity of the one and the great evil and absurdity of the other. And, strange to say, that while such appointments were made the country was filled with young men of military education, mental ability, and experience; many of whom were graduates of West Point, and had sacrificed their commissions for the South, but were retained in subordinate or nominal situations. In consequence of this unpromising state of things, the military instruction of the army was so imperfect that all the advantages to be derived from grand tactical maneuvers in battles, from which such signal success is often obtained, were entirely lost to the army, as it was incapable of making such essays with the least prospect of success, and without the risk of total ruin....It may be well to observe that I am not a graduate of any military institution, but I have been a soldier for thirty three years , yet I have too often been made sensible of my own deficiences in professional learning not to know its great importance , and appreciate it in others."

The campaign to Maryland in 1862, and that to Pennsylvania in 1863, had also a most pernicious effect army and the country. I shall refrain from discussing the strategy or policy of these operations, as I should have to make reflections in which I have no disposition to indulge. They were doubtless undertaken with the best intentions, but they were great faults. Nothing but the consummate ability of General Lee, and the intrepid valor of his troops, saved the army from utter destruction.


General Lee wrote Hood before Gettysburg regarding the lack of competent commanders:

 

[Belfoured]

William Royall, CSA veteran, post-war, states Lee's army at Gettysburg was not in particularly good condition:

"It has been generally supposed that Lee had in his Gettysburg campaign the finest army that he ever commanded. He had veteran troops, it is true, troops that had become accustomed to cooperating with each other, and so far as that goes to make a fine army, his army was up to a high mark. But his troops had been starved and frozen until men and beasts had wasted much of their strength, and they were far from possessing that stamina, physical and moral, which naturally belonged to them..."

Battery commander John C. Haskell had a good deal to say about the army's condition at Gettysburg, and its failure:

"The battle of Gettysburg will, no doubt, rank as the turning point of the war though perhaps it may better be called the breaking-point of the South's resources. For months our men had been on rations such as no troops ever campaigned on and did a tithe of the work ours were called on to do. Corn meal and damaged bacon were the staples, often so damaged that to live on them insured disease. Medicines, chloroform especially, had got so scarce that small operations as painful as great ones were done without it. Much of that which was used was of such bad quality that it was used as only a choice of evils.
Delicacies for the sick were unheard of. They lived on damaged bacon or lean beef or went hungry. Clothes and shoes were scant and insufficient, except for those which were taken from our friends, the enemy. Overcoats would have been almost unknown but for them, though for that matter would have fared badly for everything but for their contributions. Certainly half of our muskets and two-thirds of our artillery were forced contributions from them, while Banks, who commanded the United States troops in the Valley in 1862, was better known as and better deserved the title of Jackson's commissary than as the commander of his troops."

I think we were weighted by first, a demoralized army, and for this I hold General Lee largely responsible. He had an apparent antipathy to anything partaking of pomposity and the vanity of war, but he had an utterly undue regard for the value of the elementary teaching of West Point and for the experience gained by the very small police duty of our miniature regular army. He failed to realize that while a military school is excellent for the training of drill masters, who are most necessary, it teaches little of military science in comparison with the hard experience of a single campaign. When an army is confined for military leaders to a handful of lieutenants, who have never seen more than a regiment, probably not more than a company, in action, and never have had to deal with harder problem in the maintenance of their men than how to get a wagon train from the nearest railroad station, it is apt to be hurt by the restriction. And it was often difficult to get past the incompetents, who went in as drill masters and were then pushed up by the ability of their men, who were of a class few armies have ever seen, to become commanders of large operations.

A further, crushing weight was that we had among our division commanders more than one or two, who were far inferior to a number of their regimental officers. And not only did the incompetency of these generals hold back their commands, but the men and officers, both of whom by this time appreciated the true value of their commanders, were getting tired of sacrificing themselves under leaders who did them no credit and whom they distrusted. It is very near the literal truth that an army of sheep, led by a lion, will defeat an army of lions with a sheep for a commanders. We had too many sheep commanders."
View attachment 460739
Col. J.C. Haskell.


Col. Robert Tansill, CSA agreed with Haskell about a lack of competent commanders:

"It may, I think, be safely asserted, that not one half of the generals in the army were capable of performing the duties pertaining to their rank, and some had not sufficient military intelligence to qualify them for the first sergeant of a company of a regular army. The President in making such appointments doubtless believed that he was doing right...but this does not prevent those not blinded by such strange hallucinations from seeing the barbarity of the one and the great evil and absurdity of the other. And, strange to say, that while such appointments were made the country was filled with young men of military education, mental ability, and experience; many of whom were graduates of West Point, and had sacrificed their commissions for the South, but were retained in subordinate or nominal situations. In consequence of this unpromising state of things, the military instruction of the army was so imperfect that all the advantages to be derived from grand tactical maneuvers in battles, from which such signal success is often obtained, were entirely lost to the army, as it was incapable of making such essays with the least prospect of success, and without the risk of total ruin....It may be well to observe that I am not a graduate of any military institution, but I have been a soldier for thirty three years , yet I have too often been made sensible of my own deficiences in professional learning not to know its great importance , and appreciate it in others."

The campaign to Maryland in 1862, and that to Pennsylvania in 1863, had also a most pernicious effect army and the country. I shall refrain from discussing the strategy or policy of these operations, as I should have to make reflections in which I have no disposition to indulge. They were doubtless undertaken with the best intentions, but they were great faults. Nothing but the consummate ability of General Lee, and the intrepid valor of his troops, saved the army from utter destruction.


General Lee wrote Hood before Gettysburg regarding the lack of competent commanders:

View attachment 460741
View attachment 460742

And to simplify at the highest levels, Lee had to reorganize from two corps - Longstreet and Jackson - to three - Longstreet, Ewell and Hill. We know all about the problems at Gettysburg that can be tied directly or indirectly to this. As your post suggests, there also were other losses at Chancellorsville that Lee appears to have known but nonetheless overlooked by launching his invasion as soon as he did.

 

[RedRover]

And to simplify at the highest levels, Lee had to reorganize from two corps - Longstreet and Jackson - to three - Longstreet, Ewell and Hill. We know all about the problems at Gettysburg that can be tied directly or indirectly to this. As your post suggests, there also were other losses at Chancellorsville that Lee appears to have known but nonetheless overlooked by launching his invasion as soon as he did.

President Davis had the authority to form "army corps" as he saw fit after Sept.-Oct., 1862:

It was obviously for Gen. Lee to figure out how this would be attended to, to the President's approval, as Davis also appointed the corps commanders.

It was not Lee's custom to overlook the bad conditions of his army. Upon his movement into Maryland in 1862 he noted to Davis:

And regarding the movement into Pennsylvania in mid-1863, A.L. Long of his staff noted:

Besides the battle casualties, and the wear and tear, and the reorganization, Lee's army on the defensive was not getting fed.

On March 27, Lee wrote the War Department asking for relief:

The war department responded by cutting the rations further, claiming Lee's men were too well fed:

So the ration issue was evidently worsening while laying on the defensive. From Fitzhugh Lee:

From James Dabney McCabe:

Others noted it perhaps spared the Confederate commissary department in Virginia a total collapse...

But the situation was still difficult through the next winter:

 

[dgfred]

I enjoyed reading your post.

We too quickly forget the impact of the Confederate losses at Gettysburg. The most important Confed army suffered tremendous losses among its officer corps. Its leadership was severely impacted. The AoNV remained a potent force, but it was not the army it had once been.

Your point about "Southern hopes for independence ... a political solution," is excellent. After Gettysburg, that wasn't going to happen.

Sort of like Stalingrad for the Germans in WWII. High point then low point.

 

[Belfoured]

President Davis had the authority to form "army corps" as he saw fit after Sept.-Oct., 1862:

View attachment 460744
It was obviously for Gen. Lee to figure out how this would be attended to, to the President's approval, as Davis also appointed the corps commanders.

It was not Lee's custom to overlook the bad conditions of his army. Upon his movement into Maryland in 1862 he noted to Davis:

View attachment 460745

And regarding the movement into Pennsylvania in mid-1863, A.L. Long of his staff noted:

View attachment 460746
View attachment 460747

Besides the battle casualties, and the wear and tear, and the reorganization, Lee's army on the defensive was not getting fed.

On March 27, Lee wrote the War Department asking for relief:

View attachment 460753

The war department responded by cutting the rations further, claiming Lee's men were too well fed:

View attachment 460750

View attachment 460751
View attachment 460752

So the ration issue was evidently worsening while laying on the defensive. From Fitzhugh Lee:

View attachment 460754
View attachment 460755

From James Dabney McCabe:

View attachment 460759
Others noted it perhaps spared the Confederate commissary department in Virginia a total collapse...
View attachment 460756

But the situation was still difficult through the next winter:

View attachment 460758
View attachment 460757

That he did. But, as we know, this was not done until after Chancellorsville and it was driven by Stonewall Jackson's demise. Whether the split was probably going to happen anyway is a legitimate issue, but the relevant point is that there were now two corps assigned to Ewell and Hill - bpth new to corps command. There has been a good deal of criticism by numerous historians of their actions at Gettysburg (complicated by Hill's on-again, off-again capacity).

 

[jackt62]

the relevant point is that there were now two corps assigned to Ewell and Hill - bpth new to corps command. There has been a good deal of criticism by numerous historians of their actions at Gettysburg (complicated by Hill's on-again, off-again capacity).

In some ways, Gettysburg was the "bridge too far" for Lee and the ANV. Aside from Ewell and Hill, less than stellar performances must be ascribed to many of the main players including Lee himself, Stuart, Anderson, Heth, Mahone, perhaps Longstreet and Rodes, to name some of the most prominent. Whether it was the jolt provided by Jackson's demise and subsequent Corps reorganization, faulty strategic planning, lack of effective command, control, and intelligence functions, or a combination of the above, Gettysburg was indeed the "high water mark" for Lee's ANV, which began a long, slow transformation from a bold aggressive force to one that was forced to fight mostly defensively until its final demise at Appomattox.