Gettysburg not a decisive turning point?

Correct me if I'm wrong but Lee never followed up any of his victories with a pursuit. He was cognizant of his shortcomings vis a vis manpower and logistics. He knew he had to manage his inferiority in numbers and supplies carefully.

After Gaines Mill he continued pursuit of McClellan.

Pursuit of Pope after Second Manassas lead to Chantilly. After that, Union forces were in the impenetrable Washington defenses so he invaded Maryland as a followup.

After Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville he couldn't follow up due to the Rappahannock River in the way. That frustration is one of the main factors that lead to the invasion of Pennsylvania (the other being logistical concerns).
 
My suspicion is that Southern Leadership did not think Secession would cause a war, or if it did it would be small scale as it would have seemed to them war did not benefit the leadership of either side. Once the South established itself as a New Nation it could then negotiate a deal with the US to address numerous issues without the possibility of abolitionist causing trouble, like had recently happened at Harper's Ferry.

The Leadership of the South failed to understand Northern outrage at Secession and the attack on Fort Sumter. This began the war. Southern Nationalist who were also willing to fight volunteered in 1861. By 1862 those Nationalist had enough. Then the draft and mandatory conscription laws began. That began White Southern Resistance to the Confederate Government.

The leadership of the South did not consider the possibility of what would actually happen. If they had either they would not have declared Independence of they never would have fired on Sumter.
 
Good point. Lee instead of Meade would've been the target of criticism for not following up his victory. Correct me if I'm wrong but Lee never followed up any of his victories with a pursuit. He was cognizant of his shortcomings vis a vis manpower and logistics. He knew he had to manage his inferiority in numbers and supplies carefully.
Regarding Lee, I would disagree only on Second BR. In addition to a pursuit of sorts at Chantilly/Ox Hill, it's difficult to separate the victory there and the Maryland Campaign that followed very quickly.
 
There are so many good points made in this thread, it's difficult to settle on an opinion of what constitutes a singular "turning point" in the war. For myself, I think the metaphor of "high water mark", or "high tide" in the Eastern Theater can be assigned to Gettysburg. However, when considering the larger picture, it was only with Grant's victory at Vicksburg combined with Lee's defeat at Gettysburg in July of 1863 that we see a high water mark. There were Southern victories from there, yet none that were decisive, so the "tide was ebbing". In my opinion, if there was any one "turning point", it was Grant's assignment and posting back East to lead all the armies in 1864. Without Grant's leadership, the war might have continued for years, or the Union might have sued for peace, or any number of things might have happened.
 
Lee's defeat at Gettysburg removed the biggest trump card the Confederacy had: The ability to of the Confederacy to have an overwhelming victory which would make the US public turn against the war. No longer could the South create such a type of victory and certainly not on Northern soil. The war would become a meat grinder which the Confederacy had to know it would lose. They had far fewer resources, far fewer men and far more internal problems than the US. Eventually external pressure on these internal weaknesses would cause the Confederacy to collapse.
The best hope for the Confederacy was a tremendous victory on Northern soil. After Gettysburg it could never happen.
 
This is an excellent point that few understand. Even if Pickett's Charge had been successful, Lee's army was so bled dry that it would have been in no condition to do anything other than to fall back on its supply line and retreat back into Maryland, if not Virginia. It would have been the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory.
It would very possibly have had the effect that Lee intended; to weaken the North's resolve to wage war and influence the 64' election. Do you think Lee thought that he was going to march on Washington DC, lay siege and sack it? There is only one poster here I can think of that takes that notion seriously. Lee knew better than that. A victory at Gettysburg, or where ever he met the AOP north of the Potomoc, and he could have returned to VA victorious, basically telling the Northern populace that not only can I defeat whatever you throw at us in VA, but I can march my army north and do the same in your own backyard.

Its not farfetched, coming off of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, though maybe in hindsight, unrealistic, but Lee knew it was his only real option at bringing an end to the war and gaining independence.
 
It would very possibly have had the effect that Lee intended; to weaken the North's resolve to wage war and influence the 64' election. Do you think Lee thought that he was going to march on Washington DC, lay siege and sack it? There is only one poster here I can think of that takes that notion seriously. Lee knew better than that. A victory at Gettysburg, or where ever he met the AOP north of the Potomoc, and he could have returned to VA victorious, basically telling the Northern populace that not only can I defeat whatever you throw at us in VA, but I can march my army north and do the same in your own backyard.

Its not farfetched, coming off of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, though maybe in hindsight, unrealistic, but Lee knew it was his only real option at bringing an end to the war and gaining independence.
That was not really Lee's purpose in invading the north, according to the historic record. The invasion was originally proposed as an alternative to sending troops to help relieve Vicksburg, in the hopes that an invasion would somehow shake loose Grant, which seems rather far fetched in hindsight. In his report he states that his purpose was to transfer operations to Pennsylvania and to stymy Union plans for its summer campaign. It has been stated his purpose in transferring the seat of war to Pennsylvania was to give Virginia a chance to put in crops and to live off Pennsylvania farmers for the season. In fact, Lee further states in his report that is was not his intent to have a general battle in the North, unless attacked. Based on the historic record it seems Lee viewed the entire campaign as a raid for supplies, and he was not seeking some kind of war winning battle on northern soil. Now, I dont doubt he would have liked such an event and when battle was joined, yes, he was looking for his Cannae. But I dont see any evidence that he intended this invasion for that purpose.

So no, I dont think Lee ever had any hope of marching on DC. I was merely pointing out that Lee had bled his army dry over three days for no strategic purpose other than hoping for a miraculous annihilation of the AoP, which was never going to happen. And even if somehow, miraculously, Pickett's Charge had been successful and he had broken the Union line, he still would have had to retreat back to Virginia, which would have made the result look like a Union victory since the invasion would have been repulsed with bloody casualties inflicted on him. He was in a no win situation.
 
Last edited:
Because he left behind scant written records, what was on Lee's mind, his strategic rationale supporting his (with Davis's approval) decision to invade Northern soil, will likely remain a mystery. I believe it was a combination of factors that compelled a feeling that "it's now or never", gambling on a continued streak of good luck (he knew that eventually the AoP would find a competent commander who would bring to bear superior Union resources); hoping to fuel a growing war weariness in the North; hoping to relieve pressure on Vicksburg by drawing off some of Grant's forces; and wishing to relieve Virginia from the ravages of war (if only briefly), are just a few of the things that drove him north across the Potomac. Also, he was ill with a failing heart and I think he knew he could die from heart failure at any moment, thus he wanted to see the war come to a conclusion favorable to Virginia. It's regretful he didn't leave his memoirs, but then we wouldn't have as much to ponder over in these forums.
 
Th
Because he left behind scant written records, what was on Lee's mind, his strategic rationale supporting his (with Davis's approval) decision to invade Northern soil, will likely remain a mystery. I believe it was a combination of factors that compelled a feeling that "it's now or never", gambling on a continued streak of good luck (he knew that eventually the AoP would find a competent commander who would bring to bear superior Union resources); hoping to fuel a growing war weariness in the North; hoping to relieve pressure on Vicksburg by drawing off some of Grant's forces; and wishing to relieve Virginia from the ravages of war (if only briefly), are just a few of the things that drove him north across the Potomac. Also, he was ill with a failing heart and I think he knew he could die from heart failure at any moment, thus he wanted to see the war come to a conclusion favorable to Virginia. It's regretful he didn't leave his memoirs, but then we wouldn't have as much to ponder over in these forums.
The letters between Lee, Davis & Secretary of War spell out Lee's intentions & rational for the incursion. His order that sent Stewart into PA exist. Lee's attempt to bring up units to support the PA incursion exist. There isn't any doubt about what Lee intended to accomplish in PA.

Lee explicitly states that the manpower disparity between USA & CSA forces was at a tipping point. USA manpower resources were increasing steadily & CSA resources were in permanent decline. Lee believed that the spring of 1863 was the last chance to inflict a fatal blow on Northern morale. He explicitly said that Davis should disingenuously tell the peace movement in the North what it wanted to hear.

If Lee's intention was to just raid PA & bring back supplies, why did he not have communication back to his base & the transports assets required to take out the spoils? He did not because that wasn't his intention. We can set that red herring aside & place it where it belongs.

Lee proposed a concentration of idle units from Coastal Carolina at Culpepper VA under Gen Beauregard. Lee would enter PA. drawing the A of rhe P after him. Beauregard would threaten Washington & force the A of the P to respond. The A of NV & Beauregard would then crush the strung out A of the P between them & at minimum besiege Washington. This hammer blow would shatter Northern morale & lead to. Republican defeat in November. It was was an excellent plan; concentration of effort; clear purpose; explicit goals; high probability of success. Davis would have none of it. He didn't even provide the supporting units Lee needed to maintain contact with his base.

At a certain level, the PA incursion, the rump fragment of his plan, can be categorized as an act of desperation. In the meeting engagement at Gettysburg not one of the costly attacks he ordered achieved its tactical goals. The failure of Davis to grasp Lee's initial plan, the inaction to support the PA incursion & the complete defeat of his army left Lee no option but to resign.

Strategically, Lee was absolutely correct. The disparity between USA manpower vs dwindling CSA accelerated in 1863. The clean sweep of the board from Cumberland Gap to New. Orleans vindicates Lee's analysis. The fact of the matter was that Lee was only an army commander, it was Davis who was supreme commander. So was Lincoln, except he told Grant go win the war, tell me what I need to do to make that possible.

In very real terms, it was Lincoln & Davis that called the shots in 1863. The results speak for themselves.
 
Last edited:
My question is there any realistic alternative besides invasion to achieve their goals?
That really is the question, isn't it? The explicitly stated goal of secession was to guarantee the "God given right to hold other human beings as property." Within months, 1/2 half of Virginia was gone & border state slaves ran off in crippling numbers. The absolutely essential sale of "extras" from the northern tier of slave states southward was stopped. Loss of New Orleans meant the beating heart of the slave trade had stopped. In a very real sense, secession had destroyed the institution of slavery. Almost 200,000 USCT put the nails in that coffin.

In the East as far south as Rockingham NC the majority of male slaves of military age had self liberated. In Middle Tennessee 20,000 USCT & (+/-) 100,000 self liberated people directly or indirectly provided absolutely vital support for the invasion of the Deep South. The participation of self liberating people in guaranteeing their freedom cannot be exaggerated.

By the spring of 1863 the institution of slavery, the reason for the war, was teetering on the brink of extinction. There was nothing Lee & Davis could do about that. As Patric Cleburne so eloquently stated it, freeing the slaves in order to gain independence was the only viable option. We all know what Davis thought about that. Given that, the answer is no, there were no viable options leading to independence & guaranteeing the right to hold other human beings as property left to the CSA in 1863.
 
Last edited:
The Southern Goal was to achieve independence in order to protect the institution of slavery. Now it seems to even if somehow the South pulled a lucky rabbit from it's hat and won Independence slavery was still doomed.

The South has effectively moved the free border from Canada to Indiana

Why in Blazes should the US help them recover lost slaves now?

Why in Blazes would Western European countries want to trade with a slave Pariah state when that would offend their populations and alienate the larger US trade partner they have?

Why should the US let up on it's blockade?

How long before the slaves find out the US is not only not returning them but willing to aid them?

How long before non slaving owning Whites in the South get sick of protecting the interests of Slavery owners? They can either go West and become US citizens (again) or push for ending slavery. Eventually you just have slave owning whites and their slaves. How long can that last without outside help?

Can they beat Mexico to expand Southward? Would the US let them do that US or arm Mexico

Now it seems to me the following would happen:

The Confederacy implodes and the US walks on it ( this would be a mercy)

The Confederacy accepts reality and ends slavery on it's own. They make a go at being their own country but mutual interests bring them back to the US under certain terms. The same way Quebec stays with Canada.

Or maybe they stay Independent but they have a relationship with the US that is close to what we have with Canada. Different countries but one country very much is dominant.

No matter what though, slavery was done.
 
Last edited:
My question is there any realistic alternative besides invasion to achieve their goals?
Send Longstreet to the Tennessee theater when he still had 3 divisions and before his divisions had been chewed up at Gettysburg. And pull Johnston's force away from Mississippi and combine it Bragg's people. And do it before the US captures all of Tennessee.
 
Send Longstreet to the Tennessee theater when he still had 3 divisions and before his divisions had been chewed up at Gettysburg. And pull Johnston's force away from Mississippi and combine it Bragg's people. And do it before the US captures all of Tennessee.

Then you just open all the Confederacy to the North of that to conquest.
 
Expanding on @Rhea Cole 's note what was the situation by May 1863? Tactically the situation had changed in favor of the US because the Springfield rifles were a significant upgrade over the stuff that had been issued at the start of the war. The US was deploying many more wrought iron artillery pieces, and wasn't losing them to capture any longer.
Strategically. Rosecrans' Tennessee campaign had taken away another big piece of Tennessee. By March Farragut already had the Hartford and a support ship at the confluence of the Mississippi and the Red River. Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas were cut off from the eastern Confederacy.
Among the 15 slave states that existed in 1860, five of them had substantial populations of white men. Those were Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky. Tennessee and Missouri. Two of those states never completed succession. By May of 1863 the US occupied parts of Virginia and Tennessee. The US even had enclaves on the coast of North Carolina. The recruitment area of the Confederacy was small and about to shrink considerably. And manpower was just part of the problem. Where were the horses and mules necessary to run a field army going to come from?
 
Expanding on @Rhea Cole 's note what was the situation by May 1863? Tactically the situation had changed in favor of the US because the Springfield rifles were a significant upgrade over the stuff that had been issued at the start of the war. The US was deploying many more wrought iron artillery pieces, and wasn't losing them to capture any longer.
Strategically. Rosecrans' Tennessee campaign had taken away another big piece of Tennessee. By March Farragut already had the Hartford and a support ship at the confluence of the Mississippi and the Red River. Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas were cut off from the eastern Confederacy.
Among the 15 slave states that existed in 1860, five of them had substantial populations of white men. Those were Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky. Tennessee and Missouri. Two of those states never completed succession. By May of 1863 the US occupied parts of Virginia and Tennessee. The US even had enclaves on the coast of North Carolina. The recruitment area of the Confederacy was small and about to shrink considerably. And manpower was just part of the problem. Where were the horses and mules necessary to run a field army going to come from?have concisely stated the realities Lee faced up to during the winter of 1863. If Lee used the Ben Franklin method of listing positives & negatives on either side of a piece of paper, the negatives ran over to a second sheet of paper.
Wasaubob, you have concisely stated Lee's challenge. If he used the Ben Franklin technique of listing pros & cons on either side of a sheet of paper, the negatives ran onto a second sheet of paper.
 
I would say the idea that Lee "retreating without harassment" is inaccurate. The Union cavalry doggedly pursued him, but Stuart's cavalry did a good job holding them off.

I think the idea that Gettysburg was a turning point is derived from three things.

1. It was Lee's first real defeat with the Army of North Virginia.

2. Lincoln's famous speech at Gettysburg brought extra importance and attention to the battle.

3. Of all the battles of the war, Gettysburg is the one most What If'd by The Lost Cost. What if Stuart wasn't away? What if Stonewall Jackson was still alive? What if Ewell had attacked Cemetery Hill? What if Longstreet had been prompt and obedient? What if the bombardment had been more effective? And then there's the mythologizied High Water Mark. The Lost Cause narrative defined the popular understanding of the war for a long time and thus raised Gettysburg to preeminent status.

Modern scholarship (the last 40-50 years has definitely turned away from the idea that Gettysburg was the turning point, perhaps even a turning point, of the war. Studies have compared how Confederate soldiers wrote about Gettysburg in the late summer of 1863 vs how they wrote about Vicksburg, and the evidence is clear the latter had greater impact on Confederate morale.

I think there was also a study that indicated Chancellorsville was more devastating to the Confederate army than Gettysburg because the quantity and quality of officers lost.

In terms of winning the war, Lee certainly hoped the achieve a dramatic victory against the Army of the Potomac, but this was as motivated as much by the frustrations of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville as anything. There's also a substantial logistical element to the campaign (see Kent Masterson Brown's book for a good study of the subject). Antietam was before the Emancipation Proclamation, shortly before Union midterms, on the heels of Lee seemingly driving McClellan from the gates of Richmond then winning a dramatic victory at Second Manassas over Pope, simultaneous to the Kentucky Campaign. Antietam was a much greater turning point than Gettysburg: stopping Confederate momentum, influencing elections and government policy.

Jeffrey William Hunt's recent works show how much the Army of Northern Virginia recovered its numerical strength within a few months after Gettysburg and how Lee was still able to launch an offensive to throw Meade back toward Washington (Bristoe Campaign). Lee was also above to vigorously block Meade's offensive maneuvers that fall, even after detaching Longstreet.

The Overland Campaign in 1864 doesn't play out like it did because of Gettysburg in 1863, but rather because of Grant and his dogged determination to keep the initiative - the very thing Lee had tried to do through most of 1862.

In summary, I would say if I had to pick one turning point of the war it's Antietam, but if I could pick multiple turning points I would say:

1. Antietam

2. Vicksburg (for obvious reasons)

3. Chattanooga
  • squanders the Confederate victory at Chickamauga
  • was the last chance for the Confederates to win in the Western Theater; from this point forward the numbers are overwhelming
  • replaces Bragg with Johnston, and places Hood in the Army of Tennessee
  • elevates Grant to General-in-Chief
4. Overland Campaign: takes the initiative from Lee, never to be regained, and forces the ANV into a position where they are slowly ground down to ineffectiveness
Antietam can not be considered a defeat for Lee. May have been his best battlefield strategical effort. He held the field at the end of the day. Not to mention the at least 2-1 disadvantage he faced.
 

Learn About Us
About CivilWarTalk
Contact the Webmaster
Meet the Staff
Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
Register
Browse Forums
View Today's Discussions
Search the Forum
Get Help
FAQ
Student Guide
Forum Rules & Etiquette
Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top