Custer George Armstrong Custer!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

[M E Wolf]

Name CUSTER, George Armstrong "Autie", "Fanny", "Curly"
Born December 5 1839, Harrison Cty OH
Died June 25 1876, Little Big Horn MT
Pre-War Profession Teacher, graduated West Point 1861
War Service 1861 Lt., carried dispatches at First Bull Run, served on staffs of McClellan and Pleasonton, distinguished himself at Aldie, June 1863 appointed Brig. Gen. of Volunteers in command of 2nd Bde/3rd Divn/Cavalry Corps, Gettysburg, Yellow Tavern, commanded 3rd Cavalry Divn in the Shenandoah Valley campaign, Fisher's Hill, Five Forks, cut off the ANV's last escape route at Appomattox, April 1865 promoted Maj. Gen. of Volunteers.
Brevet Promotions Maj. Gen. U.S.V. October 19 1864, Brig. Gen. U.S.A. March 13 1865, Maj. Gen. U.S.A. March 13 1865.
Post War Career Army service as an Indian fighter, publicist.
Notes
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/1 [S# 12]
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VIRGINIA
March 17-September 2, 1862.(*)
No. 2. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. John G. Barnard, U.S. Army, Chief Engineer of operations from May 23, 1861, to August 15, 1862.
[excerpt]
The knowledge of the Chickahominy gained at Bottom's Bridge showed me that the stream might be reached at almost any point with little risk and thoroughly examined, provided the enemy's pickets did not actually hold our side. Taking with me Lieutenant Custer, of Fifth U.S. Cavalry, I reached it at a point three-fourths of a mile below New Bridge, and caused him to enter it. He waded across without any difficulty (the depth being about 4 feet), and a few days afterward, emboldened by this experiment, he caused the length of the stream to be waded from the bridge for a half a mile down. The attack and capture of the enemy's pickets by him and Lieutenant Bowen was founded upon these reconnaissances, to which the successful results are due.
-[excerpt]
I left the headquarters camp (then rear of Dr. Trent's) as soon as I could get my horses, and proceeded on this reconnaissance. I had passed the Chickahominy, when I was overtaken by an aide-de-camp (Lieutenant Custer), who informed me that the commanding general desired to modify his instructions; that he wished me to reconnoiter a position extending from near Dr. Gaines' to Barker's Mill Pond. He (Lieutenant Custer) asked for my map, and sketched with a pencil a line extending between those limits. How or by what forces it was intended to occupy that position I was not informed. I took the road by McGee's house to New Cold Harbor and to Dr. Gaines', thence back on to the spur on the right of Dr. Gaines'; thence through the woods to New Cold Harbor again; thence to Old Cold Harbor; thence by the road to Dispatch Station to near where I started; thence by the same road to near Barker's saw-mill.
[excerpt]
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/1 [S# 12]
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, VIRGINIA
March 17-September 2, 1862.(*)
No. 5. -- Report of Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys, U.S. Army, Chief of Topographical Engineers.
[excerpt]
Those who served more permanently under my orders were, Lieut. Col. W. R. Palmer, Capt. H. L. Abbot, First Lieuts. Orlando O. Wagner and N. Bowen, Topographical Engineers; Lieut. George A. Custer, Fifth Cavalry; Capt. James Hope, Second Vermont Volunteers; First Lieut. Carswell McClellan, New York Volunteers; Messrs. F. W. Dorr and J. W. Donn, assistants United States Coast Survey; Messrs. Fred. Churchill, F. W. Vaughn, H. H. Humphreys, Walter Taylor, civil engineers, and Mr. James McMackin, draughtsman.
[excerpt]
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/1 [S# 12]
MAY 5, 1862.--Battle of Williamsburg, Va.
No. 44. -- Report of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division.
HEADQUARTERS SMITH'S DIVISION,
May 10, 1862.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, for the information of the brigadier-general commanding Fourth Army Corps, that on the morning of the 4th instant, soon after daylight, General Hancock rode up to me bringing two contrabands, who informed me that the works in front of us had been evacuated. I immediately directed General Hancock to call for a few volunteers from each regiment of his brigade to cross the dam in front of us, and made the necessary dispositions of my artillery and infantry to cover as much as possible the crossing of these men, in case the work should still be occupied. Before, however, the troops arrived at the points designated, at about 5.30 a.m., Lieutenant Custer, Fifth Cavalry, and Captain Read, assistant adjutant-general to General Brooks, had crossed the dam and taken possession of the works. The Fifth Vermont being near at hand, I ordered it forward at once to occupy the works, and other regiments were immediately ordered in as a support.
[excerpt]
About 8 o'clock my artillery began to cross.. I immediately ordered a battery with General Hancock's brigade forward to support the cavalry. About this time a dispatch was received from the general-in-chief ordering me not to engage the enemy, as he had made arrangements for cutting them off. Captain Chambliss had, however, been cautiously following their retreating rear guard, and by the time I overtook the advance, about 11.30 a.m., it was within a mile of the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. Here I received a positive order from General Sumner to halt, and occupied myself pushing reconnaissances to ascertain whether we could turn the head of Skiff Creek, the bridge over which had been burned (and in the endeavor to put out the fire Lieutenant Custer had burned his hands), and also to ascertain if a practicable route could be found to the Yorktown road, the road directly in front of us being impassable. Both these reconnaissances were successful.
[excerpt]
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/1 [S# 12]
MAY 5, 1862.--Battle of Williamsburg, Va.
No. 49. -- Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U.S. Army, commanding First Brigade.
[excerpt]
Capt. L. D. H. Cuttle, assistant adjutant-general to General Smith; Lieut. C. R. Crane, ordnance officer, General Smith's staff; Capt F.A. Aiken, volunteer aide to General Smith; Capt. Edward Martindale, acting commissary subsistence, General Davidson's brigade; First Lieut. Charles Kusserow, adjutant to Captain Ayres, commander o artillery; Second Lieut. F. U. Farquhar, of the Engineers; Second Lieut. G. A. Custer, Fifth Regular Cavalry, acting topographical engineer; Lieut. W. H. Long, aide to General Davidson, and to Capt. John Hancock, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. William G. Mitchell, aide-de-camp; First Lieut. I. B. Parker, aide-de-camp; Second Lieut. C. S. McEntee, acting brigade quartermaster, members of my own staff.

After the artillery was withdrawn Capt. Charles C. Wheeler, commanding Battery E, First New York Artillery, acted as an aide to me, and, with Lieut. G. A. Custer, Lieut. W. G. Mitchell, and Lieut. I. B. Parker, was of the greatest, value in the crisis of the fight in carrying my orders for the advance.
[excerpt]
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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XI/1 [S# 12]
MAY 23-24, 1862,-- Skirmishes at Ellison's Mill, New Bridge, and Mechanicsville, Va.
NO. 2. -- Report of Lieut. Nicolas Bowen, Topographical Engineers, U. S. Army.
CAMP NEAR COLD HARBOR, VA.,
May 25, 1862.
GENERAL: In accordance with orders received from you I proceeded yesterday morning (24th instant), with Captain McMillan, Second U. S. Infantry; Captain Forsyth, Eighteenth U.S. Infantry; Lieutenant Custer, Fifth U.S. Cavalry; Messrs. Churchill and Humphreys, attachés of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, and an escort of the Fourth Michigan, Colonel Woodbury commanding, and a squadron of the Second U.S. Cavalry, Captain Gordon commanding, to make a reconnaissance of the Chickahominy River between New Bridge and a point about 2 miles above. We proceeded to a Mr. Hogan's house, and from there, under cover of the woods, we reached a point about 200 yards from the river. Near this point, about half a mile above the bridge, Lieutenant Custer, Messrs. Churchill, Humphreys, and myself had found a good ford and had crossed the river on the previous day (23d). About 60 men were deployed as skirmishers, dashed out of the woods at a double-quick, half the number crossing the river, the whole forming a line perpendicular to the river, and moving down toward the bridge, the main body moving by the flank parallel to the river. About 300 yards from the crossing we found the enemy and charged them. Captain Gordon, with his squadron, now made a charge down to the bridge, to try to cut off the enemy, who were on the other side of the river. He was not able to effect this. The bridge was burned and the ford not suitable for cavalry at this point. The enemy could be seen on the opposite side running at double-quick, deployed as skirmishers, and not 30 yards from us.
[excerpt]
By the accounts of prisoners since taken and by what we could observe the enemy's loss in killed, &c., was at least 100, including a field officer and several other commissioned officers. I would respectfully ask that the names of the following persons be placed before the general in-chief as having displayed the most gallant bearing under a severe fire: Captain McMillan, Second U.S. Infantry; Captain Forsyth, Eighteenth U.S. Infantry, to whose cool judgment much is due; Captain Gordon, Second U.S. Cavalry, for his dashing charge; Lieutenant Custer, Fifth U.S. Cavalry, who was the first to cross the stream, the first to open fire upon the enemy, and one of the last to leave the field; Messrs. Churchill and Humphreys, attachés of the Topographical Engineers. These two last-named gentlemen, with Lieutenant Custer, deserve the most honorable mention for their conduct on the previous day (23d) in crossing the river at the ford. Too much praise cannot be given to Colonel Woodbury and his command, as well as to that of Captain Gordon, a small command of about 50.
[excerpt]

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 336. -- Reports of Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton,
U.S. Army, commanding Cavalry Corps.(*)
[excerpt]
On July 14, both Buford's and Kilpatrick's divisions pursued the rebels to Falling Waters, capturing many prisoners; a good deal of abandoned property also fell into our hands. The enemy's rear guard made an obstinate resistance near Falling Waters, but was dispersed by General Kilpatrick, who took from them, among other trophies, three infantry battle-flags.

On July 15, Buford's and Kilpatrick's divisions moved to Berlin to obtain supplies. Here the campaign of Gettysburg properly ended. The pursuit of the rebel army through Loudoun Valley to the Rappahannock River was made by the cavalry in detachments, of whose movements the reports of the division and brigade commanders give full details.

In reviewing the conduct of the cavalry corps in this campaign, it becomes a proud gratification to call the attention of the major-general commanding to the devoted spirit and resolution that animated the officers and men throughout all the difficulties, privations, trials, and dangers they had constantly to meet, and which they overcame so gloriously. Not a single mishap occurred to mar the recollection of their noble and brilliant deeds.

A report of this kind can only mention the names of those in position and for distinguished service, but I cordially indorse all the recommendations of the subordinate commanders. Brigadier-Generals Buford, Gregg, and Kilpatrick have proved themselves distinguished as division commanders, and I tender to them my warmest thanks for the intelligence and harmony with which they have invariably and skillfully executed every design transmitted from these headquarters. Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer, brigade commanders, have increased the confidence entertained in their ability and gallantry to lead troops on the field of battle. Colonel Devin, Sixth New York Cavalry; Colonel Gamble, Eighth Illinois; Colonel Gregg, Sixteenth Pennsylvania; Colonel Mcintosh, Third Pennsylvania; Colonel Huey, Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, in command of brigades, are entitled to mention for their meritorious and gallant conduct throughout the campaign.
[excerpt]
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O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 344. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg,
U.S. Army, commanding Second Division.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,
July 25, 1863.
COLONEL: The First and Third Brigades, of the Second Division, Cavalry Corps, arrived on the battle-field at Gettysburg, July 2, about noon, the Second Brigade having been sent to Westminster.

In compliance with orders from Major-General Pleasonton, commanding the corps, I placed these brigades on the extreme right of our line of battle, and at the point of intersection of the Gettysburg and Hanover turnpike with the road which ran in rear of the right of our line of battle. A line of pickets was established in front, connecting with the right of the infantry line and extending well to the right of the turnpike. An attempt made to dislodge some of the enemy's sharpshooters posted in front of the center of my line caused the enemy to throw out two regiments deployed. This force advanced against my line, but was soon compelled to withdraw under the admonition of a half dozen well-directed shells and a telling carbine fire from behind a line of stone fence.

On the morning of July 3, I was again ordered to take a position on the right of our line, and make a demonstration against the enemy. The First and Third Brigades were again posted on the right of the infantry, but about three-fourths of a mile nearer the Baltimore and Gettysburg turnpike. This position was taken because I learned that the First [Second] Brigade, of the Third Division, was occupying my position of the day before. A regiment was dismounted and put in the woods as skirmishers, but the enemy was not found in any considerable force.

At 12 m. I received a copy of a dispatch from the commander of the Eleventh Army Corps to the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac, that large columns of the enemy's cavalry were moving toward the right of our line. At the same time I received an order from Major-General Pleasonton, through an aide-de-camp, to send the First [Second] Brigade, of the Third Division, to join General Kilpatrick on the left. The First Brigade of my division was sent to relieve the brigade of the Third Division. This change having been made, a strong line of skirmishers displayed by the enemy was evidence that the enemy's cavalry had gained our right, and were about to attack, with the view of gaining the rear of our line of battle. The importance of successfully resisting an attack at this point, which, if succeeded in by the enemy, would have been productive of the most serious consequences, determined me to retain the brigade of the Third Division until the enemy were driven back. General Custer, commanding the brigade, fully satisfied of the intended attack, was well pleased to remain with his brigade. The First New Jersey Cavalry was posted as mounted skirmishers to the right and front in a wood, the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry deployed dismounted skirmishers to the left and front in open fields, and the First Maryland on the Hanover turnpike, in position to protect the right of my line.

The very superior force of dismounted skirmishers of the enemy advanced on our left and front required the line to be re-enforced by one of General Custer's regiments. At this time the skirmishing became very brisk on both sides, and an artillery fire was begun by the enemy and ourselves. During the skirmish of the dismounted men, the enemy brought upon the field a column for a charge. The charge of this column was met by the Seventh Michigan Cavalry, of the First [Second] Brigade, Third Division, but not successfully. The advantage gained in this charge was soon wrested from the enemy by the gallant charge of the First Michigan, of the same brigade. This regiment drove the enemy back to his starting point. Other charges were made by the enemy's columns, but in every instance were they driven back. Defeated at every point, the enemy withdrew to his left, and on passing the wood in which the First New Jersey Cavalry was posted, that regiment gallantly and successfully charged the flank of his column. Heavy skirmishing was still maintained by the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry with the enemy, and was continued until nightfall. During the engagement, a portion of this regiment made a very handsome and successful charge upon one of the enemy's regiments. The enemy retired his column behind his artillery, and at dark withdrew from his former position. At this time I was at liberty to relieve the First [Second] Brigade of the Third Division, which was directed to join its division.
[excerpt]
Brigadier-General Custer, commanding First [Second] Brigade, Third Division, very ably assisted me in the duties of my command. Col. J. B. Mcintosh, commanding First Brigade of my division, handled his brigade with great skill, and deserves particular mention for his gallantry and untiring energy throughout the day. The Third Brigade, Second Division, Col. J. Irvin Gregg commanding, was held in reserve upon the field. The batteries commanded by Capt. A.M. Randol and Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington, jr., rendered most effective service. The fire of the artillery during this engagement was the most accurate that I have ever seen.
[excerpt]

continued





[excerpt]

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 359. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick,
U.S. Army, commanding First Brigade of, and Third Division.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD. DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,
Smithsburg, Md., July 5, 1863. (Received 1.45 p.m.)
GENERAL: Yesterday, at 12 m., I attacked the right flank of the enemy at different points, and found him in force at each point. I passed through Emmitsburg, and ordered one brigade to pass through the mountain. [W. E.] Jones' brigade of cavalry drove back my people, and I was attacked at the same time on my right flank. Knowing that the train of wagons was passing, I gave battle, forced my way through the pass, drove back the rebel cavalry and artillery, captured one entire regiment, colonel, lieutenant-colonel, most of the officers, and one battle-flag. General Custer here had a hard fight. The enemy's cavalry and infantry made every effort to drive me back, but we passed on, reached the train, barricaded the road in our rear, and the entire train from the mountains to Ridgeville was in my possession. I have destroyed the wagons of Ewell's entire corps, and over 1,500 prisoners have been taken. I have sent them to Frederick City. I now hold a strong position; my lines of retreat are certain. The enemy is in sight, tired and worn out; he shall not have one moment's rest. The pontoons between Williamsport and Sharpsburg are destroyed. General Early was cut off last night from his people, and my men are chasing both himself and staff over the country He is wounded.
Very respectfully,
J. KILPATRICK,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.
Major-General PLEASONTON.
-----
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,
August 10, 1863.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Third Division in the Maryland and Pennsylvania campaign:
[excerpt]
On the morning of June 29, the First Brigade (General Farnsworth), consisting of the Fifth New York, Eighteenth Pennsylvania, First Vermont, First West Virginia Cavalry, and Elder's battery. U.S. Horse Artillery, left Frederick City, and marched to Littlestown, Pa.

The Second Brigade (General Custer), consisting of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Michigan Cavalry, and Pennington's battery, U.S. Horse Artillery, reached the same place at 10 p.m. the same day.

At daylight on the morning of the 30th, the division marched to find the enemy'. We reached Hanover at 10 a.m., and, while passing through the town (the Second Brigade in advance), the First Brigade (General Farnsworth)was attacked in flank and rear by the Confederate cavalry under Stuart. Some confusion ensued. The attack was determined and fierce. The main and side streets swarmed with rebel cavalry. The Eighteenth Pennsylvania was routed, but the gallant Farnsworth had passed from front to rear ere the shout of the rebel charge had ceased to ring through the quiet street, faced the Fifth New York about, countermarched the other regiments, and with a rush and blow struck the rebel hosts in full charge. For a moment, and a moment only, victory hung uncertain. For the first time our troops had met the foe in close contact; but they were on their own free soil; fair hands, regardless of the dangerous strife, waved them on, and bright, tearful eyes looked pleadingly out from every window. The brave Farnsworth made one great effort, and the day was won. The foe turned and fled. He had for the first and last time polluted with his presence the loyal town of Hanover.

General Custer's brigade had now returned, and to save the town I moved first to its left and afterward to its right. The main streets were barricaded and held by our troops and the citizens, who gallantly volunteered to defend their homes. After an artillery duel of an hour, in which Pennington and Elder both participated, the enemy gave way, and we formed a junction with the main army, from which we had been separated for several hours.

The First Brigade (General Farnsworth), and especially the Fifth New York Cavalry, was greatly distinguished in this engagement.

July 1, the division marched to Berlin, via Abbottstown, to intercept Stuart, but failed. A detachment under Lieut.. Col. A. J. Alexander pursued Stuart to Rossville.

July 2, received orders to move as quickly as possible toward Gettysburg. I proceeded rapidly across the country in the direction of the firing. Reached the battle-field at 2 p.m. Received orders from headquarters Cavalry Corps, through Brigadier-General Gregg, to move over to the road leading from Gettysburg to Abbottstown, and see that the enemy did not turn our flank. Was attacked by Stuart, Hampton, and Lee at sundown near Hunterstown. After a spirited affair of two hours, the enemy was driven from this point with great loss, and we encamped for the night.

The Second Brigade(General Custer) fought most handsomely. It lost, in killed, wounded, and missing, 32. The conduct of the Sixth Michigan Cavalry and Pennington's battery is deserving of the highest praise.

At 11 p.m. I received orders to move to Two Taverns, which point we reached at daylight.

At 8 a.m., received orders from headquarters Cavalry Corps to move to the left of our line and attack the enemy's right and rear with my whole command and the Regular Brigade. By some mistake, General Custer's brigade was ordered to report to General Gregg, and he did not join me during the day.

At 1 p.m. General Farnsworth had reached the rear and right of the enemy's position and become engaged with his skirmishers.

At 3 p.m. General Merritt came in on General Farnsworth's left, and the enemy was driven over 1 mile.

At 5.30 p.m. I ordered an attack with both brigades. The Regulars, dismounted, were pushed in on the left, and Brigadier-General Farnsworth moved down with two regiments--the First West Virginia and Eighteenth Pennsylvania---closely followed by the First Vermont and Fifth New York, through a piece of woods, and drove the enemy from one position to another until a heavy stone wall was reached, behind which the rebel infantry was gathered in great numbers. Our cavalry broke, rallied, and broke again before that formidable barrier, but the First Vermont and First West Virginia, led by the gallant Farnsworth, cleared the fence, sabered the rebels in the rear, rushed on over a second line of infantry, and were only stopped by another fence and a third line of infantry and artillery. The artillery, under Elder and Graham, all this time was doing good execution.

Previous to this attack, the enemy had made a most fierce and determined attack on the left of our main line of battle, with the view to turn it. We hope we assisted in preventing this. I am of the opinion that, had our infantry on my right advanced at once when relieved from the enemy's attack in their front, the enemy could not have recovered from the confusion into which Generals Farnsworth and Merritt had thrown them, but would have been rushed back, one division on another, until, instead of a defeat, a total rout would have ensued.

The firing had now ceased, and the great battle was over. At dusk we encamped on the field so dearly won.

In these various attacks throughout the day, both by Generals Farnsworth and Custer, who were engaged on the right, the enemy was known to have sustained great loss.

[excerpt]

On the morning of the 4th, I received orders from headquarters Cavalry Corps to move with my division to Emmitsburg, where I would find Colonel Huey's brigade, of Brigadier-General Gregg's division; that Lee's army had evacuated Gettysburg at 3 o'clock that morning; that a heavy train of wagons was moving on the road to Hagerstown; that I was expected to take with me my entire division and the brigade referred to, destroy this train, and operate on the enemy's rear and flanks.
[end of excerpt]

 

[M E Wolf]

O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 361. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. George A. Custer,
U.S. Army, commanding Second Brigade of, and Third Division.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION,
September 9, 1863.
I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagements in which my command participated during the Pennsylvania and Maryland campaigns. Owing to the frequency with which this brigade encountered the enemy, my report assumes the form of a diary:

FIRST MICHIGAN CAVALRY.
On June 30, the regiment was ordered to support Battery M, Second U.S. Artillery, at Hanover, Pa. No loss was sustained by the regiment here, as it was not actively engaged.
On July 2, at the battle of Hunterstown, one squadron, under command of Captain Duggan, was detailed to hold the road leading into the town from the right front of it. One platoon was deployed as skirmishers on the left of the road leading into town from the rear. This platoon was actively engaged and did good service. The regiment sustained no loss upon this day.
On July 3, engagement 2 or 3 miles to the right of the Two Taverns, in which this regiment charged in close column upon Hampton's brigade, using the saber only, and driving the enemy from the field, with a loss to this regiment of 6 officers and 80 men.
On July 4, the regiment moved with the division toward Monterey Gap. At Fountain Dale, was sent upon a road leading from the right of the town to Fairfield Gap, where the enemy was found occupying it. A charge was made by one squadron, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stagg, with success and against superior numbers. The enemy were driven out and the Gap held until the entire column and train had passed.
Here the regiment sustained a heavy loss. Colonel Stagg, in leading the charge, had his horse killed, and was himself seriously injured by the falling of the same. Here Capt. William R. Elliott was mortally wounded, and Lieut. James S. McElhenny killed; 17 men also lost. At Monterey Pass, the regiment lost 2 officers and 6 men.
On July 5 and 6, at Smithsburg, the regiment supported Battery M, Second U.S. Artillery, sustaining no loss.
At Boonsborough on July 8 the regiment was often under fire, but met with no loss.
[excerpt]

FIFTH MICHIGAN CAVALRY.
June 30.--Was engaged in severe skirmishing with the enemy near Hanover, Pa.
July 3.--At 10 a.m. moved out, and met the enemy on the right, at Gettysburg. The regiment was dismounted to fight on foot on the left of the brigade. Major Ferry was killed. Participated in the several charges made on that day.
July 4.--Participated in the engagement at Monterey Pass, where part of a large tram and many prisoners were captured.
July 5.--Was in the engagement at Smithsburg.
[excerpt]
SIXTH MICHIGAN CAVALRY.
June 30.--This regiment, with the Fifth Michigan Cavalry, occupied Littlestown, Pa. Company A was sent on a reconnaissance to Westminster. The remainder of the regiment proceeded to Hanover. Here we met the enemy's skirmishers; drove them to their guns, which we found supported by a heavy force of cavalry. A sharp engagement followed, in which we were outnumbered by the enemy six to one. Our loss was some 15 or 20 captured. The enemy lost several wounded and captured. Later in the day, Company A, of this regiment, had an engagement with a considerable force of the enemy.
July 2.--This regiment, being in the advance, encountered the enemy's cavalry at Hunterstown. Here Company A, Capt. H. E. Thompson, charged a brigade of cavalry. Though suffering great loss, he checked the enemy, so as to enable our battery to be placed in position. The other squadrons of the regiment drove the enemy back, when the guns of the battery caused them precipitately to surrender the field.
July 3.--Were in engagement at Gettysburg.
July 4.--Were deployed as skirmishers on either side of the road in the attack on Monterey Pass. Loss, slight.
July 5.--The regiment was employed in supporting a battery in the engagement at Smithsburg.
July 6.--Were ordered to the front at Hagerstown. On arriving there, General Custer, having driven the enemy, ordered us back.
[excerpt]

SEVENTH MICHIGAN CAVALRY.
June 30.--Engaged at Hanover, Pa.
July 2.--The regiment, excepting one squadron, was advanced as dismounted skirmishers in the engagement at Hunterstown.
July 3.--Charged the advance line of the enemy's skirmishers at Gettysburg. Held the field until the advance of the First Michigan Cavalry.
July 4.--Was engaged at Monterey Pass.
July 5.--The regiment supported Battery M, Second U.S. Artillery, at Smithsburg.
July 6.--Participated in the engagement at Hagerstown. Same day at Williamsport.
July 8.--Deployed as skirmishers at Boonsborough.
[excerpt]

BATTERY M, SECOND U. S. ARTILLERY.
June 29.--The battery was assigned to the Second Brigade, Third Division, Cavalry Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. G. A. Custer.
June 30.--While between Hanover and Abbottstown, Pa., a limber-chest of one caisson exploded, mortally wounding 1 man, killed 2 horses and wounded 2. At Hanover met a battery of the enemy, which was withdrawn after twenty minutes' firing.
July 1.--Was engaged with the enemy at Hunterstown, silencing his battery, and having 4 horses killed, 3 wounded, and 1 wheel disabled.
July 3.--Took up a position on the right of the line at Gettysburg, and was engaged with Stuart's cavalry; battery engaged all day.
July 4.--Was in an engagement at Monterey Pass, where a large portion of Ewell's train and a large number of prisoners were captured.
July 5.--Battery placed in position at Smithsburg, but not used.
[excerpt]
G. A. CUSTER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Captain ESTES,
A. A. G., Third Div., Cav. Corps, Army of the Potomac.
-----

 

[M E Wolf]

Now....for my thoughts and opinions about George A. Custer.

1. I find General Custer's report about the actions at Gettysburg rather bland. As he reported, it was like a diary.
My opinion on this is all assumptions on my part mixing my equestrian side and what cavalry had to do at that time, as a principle duty--and that is, as General Lee said "eyes and ears of the Army."

2. I am of the opinion that General Custer, having previous duty with the topography engineers early on in the ACW, would have been an asset to any commanding officer, as the 'eye' of the land would be most important with the use of it to military advantage. General A. Pleasonton was on the same campaign as Custer, with McClellan in the Peninsula campaign but in a Cavalry capacity and would have more than likely both being Cavalry had a bond of that particular arm of the military. Ordering Custer to attach with General Gregg, who was also Cavalry in the Peninsula campaign might have wished to have a familiar assigned in cooperation. General "Kill Cavalry" Kilpatrick was a 1861 West Point Graduate from the Cavalry just like Custer but, Custer had some added tutoring as a topographer, unlike Kilpatrick.

Pleasonton was a West Point graduate of 1844; General D. Gregg was a West Point graduate of 1855. Both Generals named Farnsworth --Elon (Elon under Kilpatrick and would perish in a ill fated charge, and nephew to General John F. Farnsworth), like his uncle--had no West Point training, yet very good commanding officers. It is very possible that Pleasonton wished a West Pointer to be attached with non-West Point commanders. Again--this is merely an assumption but, would make sense.

3. General Custer's later reports in the Official Records of the Rebellion are rather short and not flowery. It is known that Cavalry, having so many duties that wouldn't keep them still long, had to submit their reports in addition to the required reports, such as morning reports, field returns, after action reports, etc., is in my opinion normal for Brigade level. Reports submitted by Divisional commanders and Corps commanders get more 'wordy' and include more information in a summary like manner. Follows the modern military and or post scene investigation in law enforcement.

4. I am of the opinion, based on Custer's previous topography and recon assignments, the skills acquired during the Civil War wouldn't have totally been abandoned. There has to be circumstances to which these skills were ignored or lacking in the larger scope of things. With reports of this and that brigade of Cavalry going to the aid of another Cavalry unit, it is certainly a series of circumstances which mounted into the disaster at Little Big Horn. Because Cavalry depends on other sections of Cavalry and depends on horses for rapid movements, there might have been conditions which lead a veteran observer into the 'trap.'

5. It is again, just my opinion--that the way Custer died has diminished the entire military career appreciation. It isn't all that different from anybody in the public eye, falling out of it in disgrace. Yet, the Civil War service just doesn't measure the same as post Civil War service. I also agree with fellow posters, to whom mention that his rapid rise to command being a fresh graduate from West Point in 1861, like Kilpatrick--may have done them more harm than good. They didn't have a chance to be properly mentored and learn the 'business.' Because the war had individuals in high rank, to be reduced though no fault or failures on their part--I am empathetic to the possibility that this might have felt 'humiliating' and a need to regain the old rank. How could any Civil War General be seen by civilians with the understanding that seeing them back to a old rank, such as a Major in the Regular Army be explained. It would perhaps be difficult to be reduced and take orders from someone to whom hold a different experience in command. I am of the belief that if the commanding officer was a senior West Point --it would be easier to swallow. Depression?

6. It is always good to review the whole of someone when possible. Would people think differently had Custer survived or never had the disaster at Little Big Horn?

Just thoughts and opinions.

M. E. Wolf

 

[General]

I think that you put a lot of thought into that and I believe most, if not all, of it

 

[Nathanb1]

Good points, Mr. Wolf. On #6--I actually base more of my post-war opinion of him on the Battle of the Washita and his abandonment of Elliott and his men....and his going AWOL to see Libbie.....and.....some other things.

 

[jessgettysburg1863]

Custer was a great calvary commander, but he made mistakes just like every other human being(Little Bighorn being one) and is worthy of respect.

Well said, l do agree!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!.

 

[General]

Thanks for the topic

 

[cash]

http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=3281

 

[Nathanb1]

http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=3281

That I can agree with. I keep remembering Minty after we discuss cavalry and I've left the computer. And I also think Devin did some good, solid work. Hmmmmm......nice post!

 

[damYankee]

Great work M.E. Wolf!
I agree with your conclusions, with one added caveat.
Since the advent of the movie projector the popular opinion of many Americans can be traced directly to how men like Custer are portrayed in film. From 1912 to 1968 there were twenty films about Custer, all presenting him as a hero.
Starting in 1970 the trend was to show Custer in a less then positive light, Errol Flynn, Ronald Reagan, Leslie Nielsen, Robert Shaw all stared as heroes. From Richard Mulligan on he has been mostly presented as a maniacal egotistical freak.
Maybe in the future it will once again become acceptable to present historical figures with ties to American history as something other then anti social sociopathic maniacs. I rather doubt it though, Hollywood has been hell bent in destroying any positive self image we may have had. John Ford be damned.

 

[Nathanb1]

I have to try not to like him too much because I always think of him as Errol Flynn.

And I love Libby Custer. Read her book when I was a teenager.

 

[rickvox79]

Good points, Mr. Wolf. On #6--I actually base more of my post-war opinion of him on the Battle of the Washita and his abandonment of Elliott and his men....and his going AWOL to see Libbie.....and.....some other things.

I don't know if I'd put all of the blame on the loss of Elliott and his men on Custer. From all accounts I have read it sounds like Elliott charged off head long without putting a lot of thought into it. Custer had problems of his own once he realized how large the surrounding villages were. He probably could have done more to locate them but I think Elliott deserves some blame there too. Not much of an excuse for him going AWOL to be with Libbie though. That one is inexcusable. Thanks ME Wolf for the information on Custer's Civil War record and your thoughts on it.

Custer will always be a polarizing figure and it is interesting to see how drastically opinions change about him over the decades. It sounds like he had a solid Civil War record though. I know Custer has had quite a few movies made about him, but I think an HBO series on him, maybe 7-8 episodes, would be excellent. Start with his Civil War career or his time at West Point and end at the Little Bighorn.

 

[Nathanb1]

I don't really put all the blame for Elliott on Custer....but I do think some of his actions helped create that smaller disaster. Strangely enough, it all seems to foreshadow LBH in a way. I think the article Cash posted points out his tendency to just rush in without thinking through all the possibilities and to disregard his mens' safety. And finally, he just trusted in bravery (which I've never doubted he had in spades) and luck just a bit too much. But that's my opinion.

 

[ole]

Speculation on scouts. He had Indian scouts with him who told him there was a village on the Little Big Horn River -- a big village.

On the way there, he was spotted by a small group of hostiles who promptly disappeared. (Ironically, they kept going south and apparently didn't report back.) However, the fear of losing the village seems to have spurred him on into a reckless, headlong approach. His battle plan, on the surface, was sound for fighting Indians, but fatally flawed.

Send Reno, with a woefully inadequate force to attack the south end of the village. Send Benteen to the west with an equally inadequate force -- and the ammo resupply!

The Indians didn't react as expected. Part of the braves set out to evacuate the women and children. Part of them attacked Reno, and the rest crossed the river to attack Custer's main force.

Reno's force dug in across the river and held off the attacking force. He was joined by Benteen' group, and they both listened in dismay to the diminishing battle sounds two miles to the north. All too soon, it became quiet.

Upon being informed of Federal infantry approaching from the north, the Indians gathered up Their dead and wounded, and scattered.

 

[rickvox79]

I don't really put all the blame for Elliott on Custer....but I do think some of his actions helped create that smaller disaster. Strangely enough, it all seems to foreshadow LBH in a way. I think the article Cash posted points out his tendency to just rush in without thinking through all the possibilities and to disregard his mens' safety. And finally, he just trusted in bravery (which I've never doubted he had in spades) and luck just a bit too much. But that's my opinion.

I agree with that, lessons were not learned from Washita, instead it was a "glorious victory". Of course Benteen used it to increase his dislike for Custer, forever blaming him for Elliott. Although if I remember correctly Benteen admitted later in a letter to a friend that Elliott charged off on his own and was reckless. (edit: I believe this was Benteen-Goldin Letters by John Carroll page 296)

Ole mentions the fight that Reno and Benteen had after Custer's men were routed. I believe that portion of the battle is overlooked often but wow what a harrowing fight that was. Sioux and Cheyenne firing at them nonstop from all sides, basically out of water, it's amazing they were able to hold out. Benteen deserves some blame in my opinion with his slow response to Custer's order to bring ammo supplies up, but he deserves pretty much all of the credit for leading the survivors through that ordeal afterwards. While Reno shrank in the face of it all (that or went to the bottle), Benteen was rallying his men and keeping them alive.

 

[Freddy]

Again, at Washita Custer with 600 troopers faced maybe 200 warriors in the village. At LBH with essentially the same force Custer faced between 1,500-3,000 warriors. The village was several miles in length. Custer's scout, Mitch Boyer, told him the village was the largest he had seen in his 30 years on the plains. Custer split his regiment into four parts, 3 companies each for Reno and Benteen, 5 companies for Custer, and 1 company with the pack train, which was not involved in the attack plan. Even if Custer's battle plan had gone off exactly as Custer had envisioned there would have been many more dead on both sides.

 

[K Hale]

Again, at Washita Custer with 600 troopers faced maybe 200 warriors in the village. At LBH with essentially the same force Custer faced between 1,500-3,000 warriors. The village was several miles in length. Custer's scout, Mitch Boyer, told him the village was the largest he had seen in his 30 years on the plains.

So scouting WAS done, and Custer DID know the village was unusually large?

 

[Freddy]

So scouting WAS done, and Custer DID know the village was unusually large?

Custer's original plan was to night march, rest the regiment in the hills above the LBH and to scout the village and attack on the 26th, but they were discovered by Indians and Custer had to assume they had warned the village. So he decided to attack without any rest and scouting being done. Custer had been taken to a high point, Crow's Nest, several miles from the village by Mitch Boyer, "the best guide in the country," who told Custer, "If you don't find more Indians in that valley than you ever saw together, you can hang me." Custer could not see the village in the haze.