Bryce
Sergeant
- Joined
- Jun 2, 2011
- Location
- Washington, D.C.
CUSTER AT FIVE FORKS
By Bryce Sudarow
Sheridan's battle plan for Five Forks was unusual. His cavalry would deploy in the woods in front of Pickett's infantry, and by skirmishing would hold them in place. Meanwhile the infantry of Warren's V Corps would attack the Confederate left flank and roll up their line. As soon as the cavalry heard the guns of the V Corps they were to assault the formidable Confederate breastworks and carry their line. Sheridan believed that between the flank attack by the infantry and the frontal attack by the dismounted cavalry attack he would win the battle.
Sheridan assigned the job of pinning down Pickett's men to the two divisions under Wesley Merritt, the divisions of Thomas Devin and George Armstrong Custer. Initially, Custer had only two brigades on the field, a third being in the rear with the wagon train. Custer's left flank was on the western edge of the forest that marked the eastern boundary of the Gilliam property. His right flank rested on the Scott Road. Col Alexander Pennington's 1st Brigade was on the right, and Capehart's 3rd brigade on the left. Gen. Thomas Devin's division stretched from the Scott Road on its left to the Gravelly Run Church Road on its right. From left to right his brigades were: Col Charles Fitzhugh's brigade, the reserve brigade under Col Alfred Gibbs, and Col Peter Stagg's Michigan brigade. The two divisions were small to begin with (only 5,700 strong between them) and were outnumbered two to one by the Confederates.
Merritt began skirmishing with the rebels about noon and the fighting continued for the next four hours. Sheridan's reconnaissance failed to locate the Confederate left flank which was several hundred yards west of the Gravely Run Church Road. Consequently, the V Corps attacked but could not find the rebel left flank. This led to incalculable confusion. Eventually Sheridan did attack the left flank of Pickett's line with the division of Romeyn Ayres, and carried a formidable line built at right angles to the main trench line. But when Ayres tried to continue rolling up the Confederate line Sheridan stopped him, claiming he was firing on the cavalry. Meanwhile the Confederates built a second line at right angles to their main line and Sheridan could not budge it. General Joshua Chamberlain of Griffin's division followed a ravine into the rear of this new line and routed the rebs, causing them to vacate this second line. But when Chamberlain tried to roll up the Confederate line Sheridan stopped him, again claiming the infantry were firing into the cavalry. This put an end to Sheridan's flank attacks, with most of the Confederate line was still intact.
Sheridan's plan called for the dismounted cavalry to charge when they heard the gunfire of the V Army Corps attack. He anticipated that the cavalry would assault the works and carry them while the V Corps was still attacking the far left of the rebels. When they failed to do this, he bought them additional time by halting the westward advance of the V Corps.
But Sheridan had made a serious mistake, The dismounted cavalry's task was to carry the rebel earthworks. Sheridan stated at the subsequent court of inquiry that he did not examine the Confederate breastworks before the battle. He was not aware that the rebel abatis blocked the way to the breastworks. Merritt did not know about them either Thus Sheridan's plan for a dismointed cavalry victory was doomed from the start.
Pennington's brigade suffered the highest casualties of any of the four dismounted cavalry brigades. After the war Pennington spoke to the sculptor James E. Kelly of the travails of his brigade in the woods at Five Forks, "It was a terrible place. Woods full of smoke. The men exhausted from thirst and canteens empty. Two field guns immediately on my front and the infantry fire of the enemy, added to the smoke of our own guns, made it unbearable as one could hardly breathe.1
Describing the battle in the woods Roger Hanaford of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry wrote, ". . . . calling on their men to charge away, the whole line went up into the most infernal fire it was ever in my lot to be under. While dashing forward I did not mind it but when I found myself away in front and no one following me I dropped behind a big pine. Never did I hug the ground closer. The rebel musketry was deadly and terrific yet it seemed as nothing to the grape and canister that swept thru the woods just skimming the ground.2
I believe Sheridan had a hidden agenda. He stopped the advance of the V Army Corps because he wanted Wesley Merritt's dismounted cavalry to win the glory of taking the rebel earthworks. He did not particularly like the V army Corps, and Merritt, Devin, and Custer were his favorite generals. It is unlikely Chamberlain and Ayres could make sense of Sheridan's decisions.
The dismounted cavalry assaults by Devin's division also failed. The abatis and breastworks stopped the dismounted cavalrymen in their tracks, and within an hour Sheridan's battle plan was in ruins. The Confederates still held their lines, and the infantry under Sheridan were held in checkmate at the eastern end of the Confederate line.
Custer's Battle plan for Five Forks
Custer perceived a second, even more dangerous, flaw in Sheridan's battle plan. Even assuming the cavalry and infantry assaults succeeded in defeating Pickett's force, Sheridan did not assign anyone to cut off the rebel escape routes. There were two escape routes. One was up the Dinwiddie Court House–Five Forks Road to the north to Ford Depot on the southside railroad. The other was down the White Oak Road to the west. At the northwestern edge of the Gilliam property the Roper Road provided such an escape avenue that paralleled the road to Ford Depot. Custer decided to disobey orders by mounting two of his brigades and cutting the rebel escape route down the White Oak Road.
Around 1 o'clock Custer set in motion the first phase of his plan. He sent a messenger to brevet
Brigadier General William Wells at Dinwiddie Court House, with orders to mount his brigade and join Custer near Five Forks. Wells got the message around 2 p.m. but was misdirected and had to retrace his steps. He joined Custer about 4 o'clock. His troopers dismounted and took position on the left of Capehart's brigade.
In the mid-afternoon while Wells was en route to join Custer, the General sent 1st Lieutenant Wilmon Whilldin Blackmar , Provost Marshal of Capehart's 3rd brigade, back to Dinwiddie courthouse to get Capehart's horses. Upon returning with the horses, Blackmar found Custer eating a late lunch with Capehart. Custer invited him to lunch and handed him a sandwich. While they ate Custer mentioned that soon they should hear volley firing from the far right of the Union line when the infantry attacked the Confederate left flank. That would be the signal for Capehart and Wells' brigades to mount up and make a dash for the White Oak Road.
Shortly before 4 o'clock Custer sent for his third brigade, which was commanded by Brig. Gen. William Wells. It consisted of the 8th New York Cavalry under Maj. James Bliss, the 15th New York Cavalry under Col John J. Coppinger, and the 1st Vermont Cavalry under Lt. Col. Josiah Hall. Upon their arrival, Custer ordered Capehart to leave the woods and mount up. To fill the gap left by Capehart's departure, Pennington shifted part of his brigade towards the left. In these two mounted brigades, Custer probably had about 2,500 men.
The Confederate line along the White Oak Road in front of the Gilliam field was nearly a mile long. The left was occupied by Confederate infantry— one regiment from Joseph Mayo's brigade, and the entire brigade commanded by Montgomery Corse. Willie Pegram supported the infantry with three of his artillery pieces. Most of the Confederate right was held by the dismounted Virginia cavalry brigade of Richard Beale. Yet another line jutted westward from Beale's line. This was held by the 5th North Carolina Cavalry under Capt. John R. Erwin from Brig. Gen. Rufus Barringer's North Carolina cavalry brigade. The 2nd North Carolina Cavalry under Major John Lockhart and the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry under Lt. Col. Roger Moore were mounted and in reserve behind Lockhart. A battery of four guns of horse artillery under Capt. George Wilmer Brown supported the cavalry and was stationed directly behind the 5th North Carolina Cavalry. (Brown's battery was formerly commanded by William McGregor and is often referred to as McGregor's Battery in 1865). A second battery of horse artillery that no one noticed was stationed behind Corse. It consisted of four guns and was commanded by Capt. Edward Graham. Maj. William McGregor commanded the horse artillery battalion that included Brown and Graham. The Confederates probably numbered about 1,400 infantry and 2,500 cavalry.
Custer intended to enter the woods on the western edge of Gilliam field. Shielded by the trees he planned to ride north around the Confederate right flank and occupy the White Oak Road. To divert attention from this movement, he sent two regiments from Wells' brigade against the dismounted men of the 5th North Carolina Cavalry of Barringer's brigade.
Here is an account of that attack written by a member of Brown's Battery.
After a while out in front we saw a small white puff of smoke, then another, and so on till it sounded like a pack of firecrackers. Then the men in the little rail pens began to come in on a run, turning and firing as they ran. scrambled over the works they said: "Boys, we are going to catch hell. The whole earth is covered with cavalry." Raising our eyes, we saw them coming, first at a walk, then at a trot march, and next at a gallop, and then bugles blew the charge. Did you ever hear the charge sounded? Great Caesar! It is a blare that goes to the bone, and it would make a rabbit fight a bulldog. On, on they came. We threw short fuse shells into them as fast as we could pull the lanyard, and then canister. On they came. We thought that they would ride over us; but when the canister got in its work they wavered, swayed, and turned back.
The dismounted fifth North Carolina cavalry and Brown's horse artillery easily repulsed the two attacks. But the Confederates did not realize that the attack was a mere diversion.
Capehart took advantage of the confusion in the rebel ranks caused by the attacks to mount his brigade and ride westward into the trees and onto a rough trail leading north. A short time later Wells gathered together the 8th New York, 15th New York, and the 1st Vermont and followed him.
At times the trail was so narrow that it was necessary to form into a column of fours. Some distance along Capehart spotted a small detachment of mounted Confederates and gave chase with his entire brigade as the North Carolinians fled northward toward the White Oak Road. The detachment sent messengers in all directions to warn the Confederate forces that the Federals were coming.
Col William H Cheek's regiment, the 1st North Carolina Cavalry, had suffered so heavily the day before that it was given the job of watching for a federal attack coming from the west against the right flank of the Confederate line. They were positioned a mile west of the Confederate intrenchments. In the late afternoon a courier galloped up to Colonel Cheek and informed him that Pickett's line had been broken, and they were to take the [Roper] Road northward leading to Pott's Station on the Southside railroad.
A few minutes later a second very excited courier gave instructions to ride at a gallop to the road or they would be cut off. The regiment was traveling at a fast trot and was nearing the Roper Road when Cheek spotted a column of Union cavalry from Capehart's brigade coming up the road.
Cheek realized the Federals would reach the Roper Road first, so he had to stop them. He ordered the first squadron to meet the Yankees with their sabers at a full charge. The opposing forces fought each other with their sabers for several minutes until the Federals fell back.3
Rooney Lee Wrecks Custer's Plan
At this moment Capehart's entire brigade had nearly reached the White Oak Road and within a few minutes would have been in position to block Pickett's retreat from Five Forks. The brigade withdrew southward, however, in obedience to direct orders from Capehart and Custer. Thus, Custer opened the escape route down the White Oak Road from Five Forks for the Confederates
Rooney Lee was aware that Custer threatened to cut off the rebel retreat. He sent the mounted men of the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry to attack Custer as his two brigades moved north towards the White Oak Road. The main body of the 3rd rested against Confederate earthworks, while part of the regiment entered the western portion of the Gilliam Field. The 2nd North Carolia Cavalry was nearby, with Rooney Lee on the other side of a rail fence
Lieutenant Wilmon W. Blackmar of Capehart's brigade was riding towards the rear of Custer's column. He was brigade provost-marshal on Capehart's staff.. Off to the right (east) he saw a mounted part of the 3rd North Carolina in a field west of the Gilliam house. Riding in a column of fours just behind Blackmar was the brigade of William Wells
A small detachment from Wells' brigade broke away from the column and charged the rebels in the field. The rebels fled eastward. Soon in the far distance the Yankee cavalrymen could be seen galloping back, fleeing for their very lives. They were pursued by a very large body of Confederate cavalry from Barringer's North Carolina cavalry brigade.
Blackmar observed that the enemy was charging towards the head of Well's brigade and might soon route it. He rode rapidly northward and overtook his brigade commander, Capehart. Blackmar hastily told Capehart what he had discovered and Capehart ordered him to ride back at once to the threatened area and form the brigade in line of battle as rapidly as it turned back to him.
Blackmar was gone from the western edge of the Gilliam field for only a few minutes. Upon returning he sat on his horse with the brigade colors in his hands on the west side of a deep ravine awaiting the arrival of Capehart's men. The fugitives from Wells' brigade were nearing the ravine. The 3rd North Carolina Cavalry was in hot pursuit, striking them over the head with sabers. They followed them up to the edge of the ravine and took some of them prisoners, while other Union cavalrymen got away by jumping their horses over the ravine. The enemy rode right to the edge of the ravine and halted.
Within a short time Capehart and 200 men returned and hastily formed a line on the west side of the ravine. More men were arriving every minute. On their right the 8th and 15th New York of Wells' brigade were forming their own line, with the 1st Vermont in reserve. The North Carolinians retreated a short distance eastward when they saw the Federals forming this line.
Blackmar jumped his horse over this ravine and called for the color bearer to follow him, but the color-bearer hesitated. Blackmar supposed then he was alone on that side of the ravine, but someone laid his hand upon his shoulder and said loudly, "Go and get the colors, Captain." Custer had awarded Blackmar a battlefield promotion. When he heard Custer speak, the color bearer crossed the ravine and joined them.
Among the troopers from Capehart's brigade were members of the 2nd West Virginia Cavalry. Lt. Emerson McMilline said "Boys, this won't do. Let's go over." Putting the spurs to his horse he cleared the ditch. In the next few minutes Capehart's and Wells' men cleared the ditch and deployed. Fragments of the two brigades were ready to charge the rebels. One observant cavalryman noticed the field consisted of stubble that was left over from the previous year's grain harvest.4
When the Union cavalry regiments crossed to the east side of the ravine, they were deployed on a battalion front, with two of three battalions stacked behind the front battalion. But when they entered the field east of the ravine the battalions in the rear came forward and formed on either side of the front battalion. This allowed the Federals to form a continuous battle line.
Capehart's brigade deployed on the left of Custer's battle line and Wells' two regiments formed one hundred yards away on the right. Custer and his bodyguard deployed in between the two brigades. The line then surged forward.
Capehart's men made a saber charge and fought hand to hand with the 3rd North Carolina, both sides using sabers. In the melee Major Lockhart was wounded.5 Many of the 3rd North Carolina were killed and the 2nd West Virginia lost more casualties than any other regiment in Capehart's brigade, most of them wounded. As the North Carolinians conducted a fighting retreat all the way to the east end of the field, Capehart's brigade followed them closely.5
At the east end of the Gilliam field from behind a rail fence Rooney Lee, Rufus Barringer and the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry watched Custer's Federals approach them from the west. With the exception of Corse's brigade, Pickett's entire infantry command was crowding the road trying to escape up the Roper Road, having been routed by Crawford's division of Warren's Fifth Corps. Behind them, Crawford's Federals were advancing westward. They began firing into the rear of the earthworks held by Beale's Cavalry brigade. Bullets began falling among Beale's and Barringer's cavalry and among Brown's Battery. It was time to go. The battery limbered up and prepared to travel westward along the congested White Oak Road, heading for the Roper Road. Rooney Lee's AAG Maj. Luke Tiernan O'Brien stopped three members of the battery and asked them to lift the rails of the fence so the 2nd North Carolina could make its attack. David Cardwell, Dick Chamberlaine, and Henry Moore carried out the order. But when they mounted in order to rejoin their battery they were swept up by the charge of the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry.
Using their sabers and pistols the 2nd Cavalry crashed into the Union line. They almost captured Custer himself. Luckily for him the 2nd West Virginia and the New Yorkers from Wells' brigade came to his rescue. The three members of Brown's Battery rode close together. A 2nd North Carolina color bearer was cut from his horse, and Moore seized the flag as it fell. A Yankee struck at Moore with his saber but missed his head and struck the flagstaff. Moore hit him over the head with his pistol.
The fierce close-quarters fight lasted a few minutes only and then the Confederates drove Custer all the way back to the western edge of the field. But by this time Capehart's entire brigade had returned from the White Oak Road. These men reinforced their beleaguered comrades of the 2nd West Virginia Cavalry. Likewise, the 1st Vermont reinforced Wells' two New York regiments
Custer now counterattacked with his full strength and forced Rooney Lee to withdraw from the battlefield. He continued eastward until he encountered Crawford's infantry advancing westward. Custer retraced his steps westward to the Roper Road and sent his cavalrymen off to chase Pickett's fugitives until dark put an end to the pursuit. Custer remained on the field and joined in one final attack
Warren's Movements
While Sheridan was fighting on the White Oak Road against Pickett's left flank and Custer was preparing to cut off the rebel retreat on White Oak Road, Crawford's division had traveled westward in a march that was parallel to the Confederate battle line towards the Ford Depot Road and Crawford had formed his men along that road facing south towards the intersection of the Five Forks and White Oak Road.
Warren caught up with Crawford midway between Hatcher's Run and Five Forks and the federal infantry brushed aside two guns of Graham's Petersburg Battery and part of Mayo's Virginia brigade and had nearly reached Five Forks whe Confederates fired into their right flank and panicked them.
Some of Crawford's men crossed to the south side of the White Oak Road and took cover in the woods on the eastern edge of the Gilliam field. Others remained north of the White Oak Road and advanced westward. South of the White Oak Road Warren on horseback rode up and down the Union line to inspire his men. Then he reached over and took the Fifth Army Corps flag from the color bearer and rode into the Gillim field. Soon Warren was joined by other color bearers. The last engagement of the day was led by Warren himself. At about 6 pm, mounted on his horse and carrying his corps flag, he inspired his troops to leave the woods south of the road. As he advanced, an aide from Custer rode up and delivered the message that Custer would advance with him on his left. The cavalry formed a mounted line of battle with their carbines in their hands.
Warren and Custer crossed the Gilliam field and drove the last Confederates from the battlefield. Montgomery Corse's brigade withdrew through the woods. Warren and Crawford between them captured 107 prisoners from Corse's brigade
In the final attack of the battle Warren led part of the V Corps westward across the Gilliam field towards 1200 of Munford's dismounted cavalry who were deployed in the wood. Custer and part of Pennington's mounted brigade deployed on Warren's left. The combined commands drove Munford off the field.
Conclusion and analysis
To sum up: Sheridan based his battle plan on faulty reconnaissance and on a misunderstanding of what his dismounted cavalry was capable of. His attacks on Pickett's line failed and left the Confederate forces intact. Warren won the battle by attacking the Confederate rear and by sweeping the last holdouts of Pickett's army under Corse from the field. But above all Sheridan's strategy was flawed because he did not include in his plan a means to cut off the rebel retreat
Custer's plan to seize the western end of the White Oak Road was bold and brilliant. It harkened back to the mass cavalry assaults in the Shenandoah Valley. By using horses for mobility and speed he planned to bypass the rebel defenses and occupy the western end of the White Oak Road. If he had succeeded, he would have cut two or three thousand Confederates off from their escape route up the Roper Road and these Confederates would have been captured.
Custer came very close to making his plan succeed. Capehart's brigade was on the verge of occupying the road when Custer ordered the brigade to join him at the western end of the Gilliam property.
Rooney Lee had attacked a portion of Wells' brigade and for all Custer knew the rebels threatened to cut him off from Capehart's brigade. Custer could not have known Lee was attacking him with only two regiments. But if Custer had known, he could have stopped Rooney Lee with Wells' brigade and left Capehart on the White Oak Road.
After winning the battle, Warren was relieved of his command by Sheridan.
By Bryce Sudarow
Sheridan's battle plan for Five Forks was unusual. His cavalry would deploy in the woods in front of Pickett's infantry, and by skirmishing would hold them in place. Meanwhile the infantry of Warren's V Corps would attack the Confederate left flank and roll up their line. As soon as the cavalry heard the guns of the V Corps they were to assault the formidable Confederate breastworks and carry their line. Sheridan believed that between the flank attack by the infantry and the frontal attack by the dismounted cavalry attack he would win the battle.
Sheridan assigned the job of pinning down Pickett's men to the two divisions under Wesley Merritt, the divisions of Thomas Devin and George Armstrong Custer. Initially, Custer had only two brigades on the field, a third being in the rear with the wagon train. Custer's left flank was on the western edge of the forest that marked the eastern boundary of the Gilliam property. His right flank rested on the Scott Road. Col Alexander Pennington's 1st Brigade was on the right, and Capehart's 3rd brigade on the left. Gen. Thomas Devin's division stretched from the Scott Road on its left to the Gravelly Run Church Road on its right. From left to right his brigades were: Col Charles Fitzhugh's brigade, the reserve brigade under Col Alfred Gibbs, and Col Peter Stagg's Michigan brigade. The two divisions were small to begin with (only 5,700 strong between them) and were outnumbered two to one by the Confederates.
Merritt began skirmishing with the rebels about noon and the fighting continued for the next four hours. Sheridan's reconnaissance failed to locate the Confederate left flank which was several hundred yards west of the Gravely Run Church Road. Consequently, the V Corps attacked but could not find the rebel left flank. This led to incalculable confusion. Eventually Sheridan did attack the left flank of Pickett's line with the division of Romeyn Ayres, and carried a formidable line built at right angles to the main trench line. But when Ayres tried to continue rolling up the Confederate line Sheridan stopped him, claiming he was firing on the cavalry. Meanwhile the Confederates built a second line at right angles to their main line and Sheridan could not budge it. General Joshua Chamberlain of Griffin's division followed a ravine into the rear of this new line and routed the rebs, causing them to vacate this second line. But when Chamberlain tried to roll up the Confederate line Sheridan stopped him, again claiming the infantry were firing into the cavalry. This put an end to Sheridan's flank attacks, with most of the Confederate line was still intact.
Sheridan's plan called for the dismounted cavalry to charge when they heard the gunfire of the V Army Corps attack. He anticipated that the cavalry would assault the works and carry them while the V Corps was still attacking the far left of the rebels. When they failed to do this, he bought them additional time by halting the westward advance of the V Corps.
But Sheridan had made a serious mistake, The dismounted cavalry's task was to carry the rebel earthworks. Sheridan stated at the subsequent court of inquiry that he did not examine the Confederate breastworks before the battle. He was not aware that the rebel abatis blocked the way to the breastworks. Merritt did not know about them either Thus Sheridan's plan for a dismointed cavalry victory was doomed from the start.
Pennington's brigade suffered the highest casualties of any of the four dismounted cavalry brigades. After the war Pennington spoke to the sculptor James E. Kelly of the travails of his brigade in the woods at Five Forks, "It was a terrible place. Woods full of smoke. The men exhausted from thirst and canteens empty. Two field guns immediately on my front and the infantry fire of the enemy, added to the smoke of our own guns, made it unbearable as one could hardly breathe.1
Describing the battle in the woods Roger Hanaford of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry wrote, ". . . . calling on their men to charge away, the whole line went up into the most infernal fire it was ever in my lot to be under. While dashing forward I did not mind it but when I found myself away in front and no one following me I dropped behind a big pine. Never did I hug the ground closer. The rebel musketry was deadly and terrific yet it seemed as nothing to the grape and canister that swept thru the woods just skimming the ground.2
I believe Sheridan had a hidden agenda. He stopped the advance of the V Army Corps because he wanted Wesley Merritt's dismounted cavalry to win the glory of taking the rebel earthworks. He did not particularly like the V army Corps, and Merritt, Devin, and Custer were his favorite generals. It is unlikely Chamberlain and Ayres could make sense of Sheridan's decisions.
The dismounted cavalry assaults by Devin's division also failed. The abatis and breastworks stopped the dismounted cavalrymen in their tracks, and within an hour Sheridan's battle plan was in ruins. The Confederates still held their lines, and the infantry under Sheridan were held in checkmate at the eastern end of the Confederate line.
Custer's Battle plan for Five Forks
Custer perceived a second, even more dangerous, flaw in Sheridan's battle plan. Even assuming the cavalry and infantry assaults succeeded in defeating Pickett's force, Sheridan did not assign anyone to cut off the rebel escape routes. There were two escape routes. One was up the Dinwiddie Court House–Five Forks Road to the north to Ford Depot on the southside railroad. The other was down the White Oak Road to the west. At the northwestern edge of the Gilliam property the Roper Road provided such an escape avenue that paralleled the road to Ford Depot. Custer decided to disobey orders by mounting two of his brigades and cutting the rebel escape route down the White Oak Road.
Around 1 o'clock Custer set in motion the first phase of his plan. He sent a messenger to brevet
Brigadier General William Wells at Dinwiddie Court House, with orders to mount his brigade and join Custer near Five Forks. Wells got the message around 2 p.m. but was misdirected and had to retrace his steps. He joined Custer about 4 o'clock. His troopers dismounted and took position on the left of Capehart's brigade.
In the mid-afternoon while Wells was en route to join Custer, the General sent 1st Lieutenant Wilmon Whilldin Blackmar , Provost Marshal of Capehart's 3rd brigade, back to Dinwiddie courthouse to get Capehart's horses. Upon returning with the horses, Blackmar found Custer eating a late lunch with Capehart. Custer invited him to lunch and handed him a sandwich. While they ate Custer mentioned that soon they should hear volley firing from the far right of the Union line when the infantry attacked the Confederate left flank. That would be the signal for Capehart and Wells' brigades to mount up and make a dash for the White Oak Road.
Shortly before 4 o'clock Custer sent for his third brigade, which was commanded by Brig. Gen. William Wells. It consisted of the 8th New York Cavalry under Maj. James Bliss, the 15th New York Cavalry under Col John J. Coppinger, and the 1st Vermont Cavalry under Lt. Col. Josiah Hall. Upon their arrival, Custer ordered Capehart to leave the woods and mount up. To fill the gap left by Capehart's departure, Pennington shifted part of his brigade towards the left. In these two mounted brigades, Custer probably had about 2,500 men.
The Confederate line along the White Oak Road in front of the Gilliam field was nearly a mile long. The left was occupied by Confederate infantry— one regiment from Joseph Mayo's brigade, and the entire brigade commanded by Montgomery Corse. Willie Pegram supported the infantry with three of his artillery pieces. Most of the Confederate right was held by the dismounted Virginia cavalry brigade of Richard Beale. Yet another line jutted westward from Beale's line. This was held by the 5th North Carolina Cavalry under Capt. John R. Erwin from Brig. Gen. Rufus Barringer's North Carolina cavalry brigade. The 2nd North Carolina Cavalry under Major John Lockhart and the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry under Lt. Col. Roger Moore were mounted and in reserve behind Lockhart. A battery of four guns of horse artillery under Capt. George Wilmer Brown supported the cavalry and was stationed directly behind the 5th North Carolina Cavalry. (Brown's battery was formerly commanded by William McGregor and is often referred to as McGregor's Battery in 1865). A second battery of horse artillery that no one noticed was stationed behind Corse. It consisted of four guns and was commanded by Capt. Edward Graham. Maj. William McGregor commanded the horse artillery battalion that included Brown and Graham. The Confederates probably numbered about 1,400 infantry and 2,500 cavalry.
Custer intended to enter the woods on the western edge of Gilliam field. Shielded by the trees he planned to ride north around the Confederate right flank and occupy the White Oak Road. To divert attention from this movement, he sent two regiments from Wells' brigade against the dismounted men of the 5th North Carolina Cavalry of Barringer's brigade.
Here is an account of that attack written by a member of Brown's Battery.
After a while out in front we saw a small white puff of smoke, then another, and so on till it sounded like a pack of firecrackers. Then the men in the little rail pens began to come in on a run, turning and firing as they ran. scrambled over the works they said: "Boys, we are going to catch hell. The whole earth is covered with cavalry." Raising our eyes, we saw them coming, first at a walk, then at a trot march, and next at a gallop, and then bugles blew the charge. Did you ever hear the charge sounded? Great Caesar! It is a blare that goes to the bone, and it would make a rabbit fight a bulldog. On, on they came. We threw short fuse shells into them as fast as we could pull the lanyard, and then canister. On they came. We thought that they would ride over us; but when the canister got in its work they wavered, swayed, and turned back.
The dismounted fifth North Carolina cavalry and Brown's horse artillery easily repulsed the two attacks. But the Confederates did not realize that the attack was a mere diversion.
Capehart took advantage of the confusion in the rebel ranks caused by the attacks to mount his brigade and ride westward into the trees and onto a rough trail leading north. A short time later Wells gathered together the 8th New York, 15th New York, and the 1st Vermont and followed him.
At times the trail was so narrow that it was necessary to form into a column of fours. Some distance along Capehart spotted a small detachment of mounted Confederates and gave chase with his entire brigade as the North Carolinians fled northward toward the White Oak Road. The detachment sent messengers in all directions to warn the Confederate forces that the Federals were coming.
Col William H Cheek's regiment, the 1st North Carolina Cavalry, had suffered so heavily the day before that it was given the job of watching for a federal attack coming from the west against the right flank of the Confederate line. They were positioned a mile west of the Confederate intrenchments. In the late afternoon a courier galloped up to Colonel Cheek and informed him that Pickett's line had been broken, and they were to take the [Roper] Road northward leading to Pott's Station on the Southside railroad.
A few minutes later a second very excited courier gave instructions to ride at a gallop to the road or they would be cut off. The regiment was traveling at a fast trot and was nearing the Roper Road when Cheek spotted a column of Union cavalry from Capehart's brigade coming up the road.
Cheek realized the Federals would reach the Roper Road first, so he had to stop them. He ordered the first squadron to meet the Yankees with their sabers at a full charge. The opposing forces fought each other with their sabers for several minutes until the Federals fell back.3
Rooney Lee Wrecks Custer's Plan
At this moment Capehart's entire brigade had nearly reached the White Oak Road and within a few minutes would have been in position to block Pickett's retreat from Five Forks. The brigade withdrew southward, however, in obedience to direct orders from Capehart and Custer. Thus, Custer opened the escape route down the White Oak Road from Five Forks for the Confederates
Rooney Lee was aware that Custer threatened to cut off the rebel retreat. He sent the mounted men of the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry to attack Custer as his two brigades moved north towards the White Oak Road. The main body of the 3rd rested against Confederate earthworks, while part of the regiment entered the western portion of the Gilliam Field. The 2nd North Carolia Cavalry was nearby, with Rooney Lee on the other side of a rail fence
Lieutenant Wilmon W. Blackmar of Capehart's brigade was riding towards the rear of Custer's column. He was brigade provost-marshal on Capehart's staff.. Off to the right (east) he saw a mounted part of the 3rd North Carolina in a field west of the Gilliam house. Riding in a column of fours just behind Blackmar was the brigade of William Wells
A small detachment from Wells' brigade broke away from the column and charged the rebels in the field. The rebels fled eastward. Soon in the far distance the Yankee cavalrymen could be seen galloping back, fleeing for their very lives. They were pursued by a very large body of Confederate cavalry from Barringer's North Carolina cavalry brigade.
Blackmar observed that the enemy was charging towards the head of Well's brigade and might soon route it. He rode rapidly northward and overtook his brigade commander, Capehart. Blackmar hastily told Capehart what he had discovered and Capehart ordered him to ride back at once to the threatened area and form the brigade in line of battle as rapidly as it turned back to him.
Blackmar was gone from the western edge of the Gilliam field for only a few minutes. Upon returning he sat on his horse with the brigade colors in his hands on the west side of a deep ravine awaiting the arrival of Capehart's men. The fugitives from Wells' brigade were nearing the ravine. The 3rd North Carolina Cavalry was in hot pursuit, striking them over the head with sabers. They followed them up to the edge of the ravine and took some of them prisoners, while other Union cavalrymen got away by jumping their horses over the ravine. The enemy rode right to the edge of the ravine and halted.
Within a short time Capehart and 200 men returned and hastily formed a line on the west side of the ravine. More men were arriving every minute. On their right the 8th and 15th New York of Wells' brigade were forming their own line, with the 1st Vermont in reserve. The North Carolinians retreated a short distance eastward when they saw the Federals forming this line.
Blackmar jumped his horse over this ravine and called for the color bearer to follow him, but the color-bearer hesitated. Blackmar supposed then he was alone on that side of the ravine, but someone laid his hand upon his shoulder and said loudly, "Go and get the colors, Captain." Custer had awarded Blackmar a battlefield promotion. When he heard Custer speak, the color bearer crossed the ravine and joined them.
Among the troopers from Capehart's brigade were members of the 2nd West Virginia Cavalry. Lt. Emerson McMilline said "Boys, this won't do. Let's go over." Putting the spurs to his horse he cleared the ditch. In the next few minutes Capehart's and Wells' men cleared the ditch and deployed. Fragments of the two brigades were ready to charge the rebels. One observant cavalryman noticed the field consisted of stubble that was left over from the previous year's grain harvest.4
When the Union cavalry regiments crossed to the east side of the ravine, they were deployed on a battalion front, with two of three battalions stacked behind the front battalion. But when they entered the field east of the ravine the battalions in the rear came forward and formed on either side of the front battalion. This allowed the Federals to form a continuous battle line.
Capehart's brigade deployed on the left of Custer's battle line and Wells' two regiments formed one hundred yards away on the right. Custer and his bodyguard deployed in between the two brigades. The line then surged forward.
Capehart's men made a saber charge and fought hand to hand with the 3rd North Carolina, both sides using sabers. In the melee Major Lockhart was wounded.5 Many of the 3rd North Carolina were killed and the 2nd West Virginia lost more casualties than any other regiment in Capehart's brigade, most of them wounded. As the North Carolinians conducted a fighting retreat all the way to the east end of the field, Capehart's brigade followed them closely.5
At the east end of the Gilliam field from behind a rail fence Rooney Lee, Rufus Barringer and the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry watched Custer's Federals approach them from the west. With the exception of Corse's brigade, Pickett's entire infantry command was crowding the road trying to escape up the Roper Road, having been routed by Crawford's division of Warren's Fifth Corps. Behind them, Crawford's Federals were advancing westward. They began firing into the rear of the earthworks held by Beale's Cavalry brigade. Bullets began falling among Beale's and Barringer's cavalry and among Brown's Battery. It was time to go. The battery limbered up and prepared to travel westward along the congested White Oak Road, heading for the Roper Road. Rooney Lee's AAG Maj. Luke Tiernan O'Brien stopped three members of the battery and asked them to lift the rails of the fence so the 2nd North Carolina could make its attack. David Cardwell, Dick Chamberlaine, and Henry Moore carried out the order. But when they mounted in order to rejoin their battery they were swept up by the charge of the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry.
Using their sabers and pistols the 2nd Cavalry crashed into the Union line. They almost captured Custer himself. Luckily for him the 2nd West Virginia and the New Yorkers from Wells' brigade came to his rescue. The three members of Brown's Battery rode close together. A 2nd North Carolina color bearer was cut from his horse, and Moore seized the flag as it fell. A Yankee struck at Moore with his saber but missed his head and struck the flagstaff. Moore hit him over the head with his pistol.
The fierce close-quarters fight lasted a few minutes only and then the Confederates drove Custer all the way back to the western edge of the field. But by this time Capehart's entire brigade had returned from the White Oak Road. These men reinforced their beleaguered comrades of the 2nd West Virginia Cavalry. Likewise, the 1st Vermont reinforced Wells' two New York regiments
Custer now counterattacked with his full strength and forced Rooney Lee to withdraw from the battlefield. He continued eastward until he encountered Crawford's infantry advancing westward. Custer retraced his steps westward to the Roper Road and sent his cavalrymen off to chase Pickett's fugitives until dark put an end to the pursuit. Custer remained on the field and joined in one final attack
Warren's Movements
While Sheridan was fighting on the White Oak Road against Pickett's left flank and Custer was preparing to cut off the rebel retreat on White Oak Road, Crawford's division had traveled westward in a march that was parallel to the Confederate battle line towards the Ford Depot Road and Crawford had formed his men along that road facing south towards the intersection of the Five Forks and White Oak Road.
Warren caught up with Crawford midway between Hatcher's Run and Five Forks and the federal infantry brushed aside two guns of Graham's Petersburg Battery and part of Mayo's Virginia brigade and had nearly reached Five Forks whe Confederates fired into their right flank and panicked them.
Some of Crawford's men crossed to the south side of the White Oak Road and took cover in the woods on the eastern edge of the Gilliam field. Others remained north of the White Oak Road and advanced westward. South of the White Oak Road Warren on horseback rode up and down the Union line to inspire his men. Then he reached over and took the Fifth Army Corps flag from the color bearer and rode into the Gillim field. Soon Warren was joined by other color bearers. The last engagement of the day was led by Warren himself. At about 6 pm, mounted on his horse and carrying his corps flag, he inspired his troops to leave the woods south of the road. As he advanced, an aide from Custer rode up and delivered the message that Custer would advance with him on his left. The cavalry formed a mounted line of battle with their carbines in their hands.
Warren and Custer crossed the Gilliam field and drove the last Confederates from the battlefield. Montgomery Corse's brigade withdrew through the woods. Warren and Crawford between them captured 107 prisoners from Corse's brigade
In the final attack of the battle Warren led part of the V Corps westward across the Gilliam field towards 1200 of Munford's dismounted cavalry who were deployed in the wood. Custer and part of Pennington's mounted brigade deployed on Warren's left. The combined commands drove Munford off the field.
Conclusion and analysis
To sum up: Sheridan based his battle plan on faulty reconnaissance and on a misunderstanding of what his dismounted cavalry was capable of. His attacks on Pickett's line failed and left the Confederate forces intact. Warren won the battle by attacking the Confederate rear and by sweeping the last holdouts of Pickett's army under Corse from the field. But above all Sheridan's strategy was flawed because he did not include in his plan a means to cut off the rebel retreat
Custer's plan to seize the western end of the White Oak Road was bold and brilliant. It harkened back to the mass cavalry assaults in the Shenandoah Valley. By using horses for mobility and speed he planned to bypass the rebel defenses and occupy the western end of the White Oak Road. If he had succeeded, he would have cut two or three thousand Confederates off from their escape route up the Roper Road and these Confederates would have been captured.
Custer came very close to making his plan succeed. Capehart's brigade was on the verge of occupying the road when Custer ordered the brigade to join him at the western end of the Gilliam property.
Rooney Lee had attacked a portion of Wells' brigade and for all Custer knew the rebels threatened to cut him off from Capehart's brigade. Custer could not have known Lee was attacking him with only two regiments. But if Custer had known, he could have stopped Rooney Lee with Wells' brigade and left Capehart on the White Oak Road.
After winning the battle, Warren was relieved of his command by Sheridan.
- 1.Generals in Bronze, ed. William Styple, Belle Grove Publishing, 2005, p 264.
- 2. Dinwiddie Court House and Five Forks: Reminiscences of Roger Hannaford, Second Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 87, number 4, Oct 1979, p 428.
- 3. William H. Cheek, "A Personal Adventure at the Battle of Five Forks" in Sketch of the Ninth Regiment, Walter Clark, Vol. 1, p 478.
- 4 Rufus Barringer in Sketch of the Ninth Regiment, Walter Clark, Volume 1, p.442.
- 5 Joseph J. Sutton, History of the Second Regiment West Virginia Cavalry Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion, Portsmouth, Ohio, p 13.
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