The Peninsula General Barnard on McClellan's Peninsula Campaign

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The following quoted from the report of General Barnard, who was McClellan's Chief Engineer during the Peninsula Campaign and later promoted to Chief Engineer of the US Army (Updated: on the death of Totten, but he declined).

The report is dated January 26, 1863. The significance of the date is that McClellan has been relieved by then and Barnard has been promoted out of the Army of the Potomac by then; I do not know if that had any affect on what was written. In any case, it would be very unusual to see a critique of the campaign just concluded in any officer's after-action report.

I have added italics, bold and underlined text to highlight certain parts of what follows.

I will break sections of Barnard's report up in the next several messages to hopefully make this easier to see and read.

The beginning of Barnard's report:

In compliance with the request of Major-General McClellan, I make the following report of the engineer operations of the Army of the Potomac executed under my direction as chief engineer of that army from the time of its organization to the date at which it was withdrawn from the James River:​

...
followed by a long description of actual events and technical matters. What follows is at the conclusion of the report:

Here, perhaps, I might close, but it occurs to me that this paper, purporting to give a history of the operations of engineers from the organization of the Army of the Potomac to the close of its campaign on the Peninsula, can hardly be considered complete without a retrospect, pointing out the mistakes that were made, and thus tracing the causes of its failure to their true sources.​

 

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Barnard on the delays over the Fall of 1861 and the Winter of 1862:

One of the prominent among the causes of the ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the material, yet was about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded and that capital kept in a partial state of siege by a greatly-inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. In the Winter 1861-62 Norfolk could and should have been taken. The Navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do. Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it had been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true question was to seize the first practicable moment to satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural longing of an impatient nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammeled liberty of action while it was possessed.​

Barnard on the initial plan:

When the army did move, a plan was adopted perfectly certain to invite, nay, to compel, interference, and when the army was to go by Annapolis to the Lower Chesapeake I felt confident that one-half would scarcely have embarked before the other half would be ordered back to Washington. The enemy was then at Manassas, and the feint (even if no reality) of an attack on Washington was so obvious, so certain to create a panic which no Executive could resist, that interference with the removal of the mass of the army was certain.​

Barnard on the plan after Johnston falls back from Manassas:

When the enemy had fallen back behind the Rappahannock and destroyed the railroad bridges the circumstances were greatly changed, and there were strong arguments for the line adopted; yet results have proved how many reasons there were to be considered besides the purely military ones which opposed themselves to the adoption of such a line.​

 

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Barnard on the withholding of McDowell:

The facts connected with the withholding of McDowell's corps have been so completely exhibited in the proceedings of the McDowell Court of Inquiry that every one who wishes can form his own judgment. Whether it was wise or unwise, it was one of those things resulting from the taking a line of operations which did not itself cover Washington.

... [rearranged, following paragraph moved here to connect to the above paragraph] ...

After it was known that McDowell was called off to another quarter there was no longer hope of an increase of force by the junction of his corps. There were no other re-enforcements to look for beyond what we received by the middle of the month of June. The rebel force was known or supposed to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the influx of troops from other parts, and by the breaking up of Beauregard's army.

Barnard on the overall situation when the Peninsula Campaign began:

At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula the rebel cause was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge, and reduced in numbers by sickness, loss in battle, expiration of period of service, &c., while the conscription law was not yet even passed. It seemed as if it needed but one vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion, so nearly throttled. How, then, happened it that the date of the initiation of the campaign of the magnificent Army of the Potomac was the date of the resuscitation of the rebel cause, which seemed to grow strong pari passu with the slow progress of its operations?​

Note: pari passu would translate as something like "with even step" or steadily.​

 

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Barnard on the what should have been done when the advance on Yorktown began:

However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the morale, was on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded, and if we failed it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labors of the siege. Our troops toiled a month in the trenches or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts' content. They are not yet exhausted.
​

Barnard on the siege of Yorktown:

The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors, and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for prudential considerations.​

 

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Barnard on the pursuit to and battle of Williamsburg:

Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force; but the battle of Williamsburg, fought as it was without reconnoitering the position, without concert of action among the different corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a blunder which ought not to have happened.

We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought, and we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we had not fought till next day, a battle would in all probability have been unnecessary; but if it had been, we could have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitered our position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some results might have flowed from it. We had every advantage. Franklin's division landed at West Point on the next day and Sedgwick's division on the day following. These two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front and have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat and perhaps his capture must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him to West Point, would have been accomplished.​

 

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Barnard on the what should have been done after the battle of Williamsburg:

On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed the Chickahominy and connected with the Navy in the James. We should have had a united army and the co-operation of the Navy, and probably would have been in Richmond in two weeks. The facts that we did not know the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle (as it lay across our direct road to Richmond); that our transports were on the York River, and that the railroad furnished a good means of supply to the army; that we wished to connect with McDowell coming from Fredericksburg, &c., determined our route. In taking it we lost essentially all that was worth going so far to gain, viz, the James River approach and the co-operation of the Navy.
​

Barnard on the actual movement after Williamsburg:

The route chosen, two weeks should not have been spent in traversing the 40 miles from Williamsburg to Bottom's and New Bridge; and the barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in making use of the circumstance to turn and seize the passage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the 28th and even earlier had measures been pressed to prepare for it.​

 

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Barnard on what to do after the battle of Seven Pines/Fair Oaks:

The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which if not seized do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing.​

 

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Barnard on what should have been done in the Seven Days:

Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious enough at that time that when the rebels struck a blow at our left wing they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths.

At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first place, and, in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th, minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or had the fortified lines (thrown up expressly for that object) been held by 20,000 men (as they could have been), we could have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond. As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force except enough left before our lines to keep up an appearance, and we fought with 27,000 men, losing the battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance of conquest turned into a retreat for safety by a force probably not greatly superior to our own.
​

Barnard on the what should have been done behind the lines as the AoP advanced:

In view of the length of time which our operations before Richmond actually consumed, there is now no doubt that the depot at the White House should have been fortified, as well as one or two points on the railroad thence to the Chickahominy; that the tete-de-pont at Bottom's Bridge should have been completed, and likewise tétes-de-pont or strong positions prepared to cover the débouchés from our bridges to the left bank of the Chickahominy. With these the army would have possessed freedom of motion and concentration on either side, and the disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have occurred.
​

Notes:

• The "disastrous battle of the 27th" mentioned is the Battle of Gaines Mill.
• A "tete-de-pont" is a bridgehead, usually on the enemy side of a river.
• The military term "débouchés" refers to ways or routes to get out of a small confined space like a bridgehead and rapidly exploit it.

 

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Barnard on what to do after the Seven Days:

When the army reached the James River it needed no prophet to predict the disasters which have since befallen our country's cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had deprived it of the élan which results from success alone. It was, moreover (as well as our forces elsewhere), sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army from its first low state had risen to be an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success. Had its numbers, indeed, approached to that attributed to it (200,000 men), there is little doubt that a march upon Washington would have speedily followed our withdrawal to the James. From such considerations, as well as those flowing from the results of past operations, I counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with the forces covering Washington.​

 

[Saphroneth]

However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the morale, was on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded, and if we failed it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labors of the siege.

Barnard here is blaming McClellan for following Barnard's own advice, oddly enough. Barnard early on suggested a siege without trying an assault.

Of course, we now know how strong Yorktown was and it was quite strong.

The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors, and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for prudential considerations.

How much time would actually be gained by doing this? I'm not sure any would have been.

We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought, and we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we had not fought till next day, a battle would in all probability have been unnecessary; but if it had been, we could have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitered our position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some results might have flowed from it. We had every advantage. Franklin's division landed at West Point on the next day and Sedgwick's division on the day following. These two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front and have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat and perhaps his capture must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him to West Point, would have been accomplished.

Barnard here, meanwhile, is criticising a decision to keep pressure on the enemy. It seems like he's criticising every choice because it was the one taken.

The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which if not seized do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing.

This appears to be suggesting an attack over a river crossing without any clear evidence that the other side was undefended...

Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious enough at that time that when the rebels struck a blow at our left wing they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths.

What's he even talking about here? I know it's in the Seven Days, but which battle?
It can't be the first two battles because those were against the Federal right wing, but after that the Federal army has no supply line and attacking is advancing while out of supply - a recipe for defeat.

At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on the left bank.

This is a suggestion to abandon the supply dump and supply line entirely.


Barnard here isn't very impressive. It seems as though he's being contrarian, opposing every choice made because it was the one that was made, even when historically he supported it at the time!

 

[67th Tigers]

"As to Gaines's Mill, I don't know anything of the particular matter you speak of - I do know that soon after, when it was learned that Halleck was in Washtn & McClellan under a cloud - that Barnard - who talked so little and nodded so nicely with Porter, as you describe - turned tail on McClellan & Porter both, cut up his own words (?) and advice - and blamed McC for not refusing to be governed by Barnard's own advice at Yorktown."

Hunt to Robinson, 24th July 1886 (emphasis in original)

 

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Barnard on the what should have been done when the advance on Yorktown began:

However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the morale, was on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded, and if we failed it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labors of the siege. Our troops toiled a month in the trenches or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts' content. They are not yet exhausted.​

​

Barnard here is blaming McClellan for following Barnard's own advice, oddly enough. Barnard early on suggested a siege without trying an assault.

No -- you have not bothered to read and understand what Barnard said. Barnard is saying that he had recommended against an assault in April and that he was wrong: the proper thing to do was to make the assault.

Of course, we now know how strong Yorktown was and it was quite strong.

I have never been a soldier and certainly never any kind of engineer (other than in software terms). I have no idea what you may have done in your life, but don't suspect that you have either.

General John G. Barnard, OTOH, was a West Point trained soldier (2nd of 43 in the Class of 1833 at the age of 18), an experienced engineer who served in the War with Mexico (defenses of Tampico, surveys of battlefields) and the Civil War. He had worked on the construction of fortifications at Ft. Adams (RI) under Totten, Fort Columbus/Fort Jay, Fort Hamilton and Fort Wadsworth in New York City, New Orleans, Pensacola, Mobile, Fort Livingston, Louisiana, Fort Jackson, Louisiana, Fort St. Philip, Louisiana and on the Pacific Coast at San Francisco.

Please realize that Barnard understood it far more than you or I do. He made an original recommendation against assault, he performed the survey, he was there working the siege every day of it, he examined the works both before and after the Union occupied them. He understood the fortifications were strong -- better than you or I do. He says he was wrong and the assault would have been a better course to choose.

 

[Saphroneth]

Please realize that Barnard understood it far more than you or I do. He made an original recommendation against assault, he performed the survey, he was there working the siege every day of it, he examined the works both before and after the Union occupied them. He understood the fortifications were strong -- better than you or I do. He says he was wrong and the assault would have been a better course to choose.

But what he was not was in possession of the Confederate ORs and movement orders (as we are now). He did not know how strongly held the line was at the time, and I suspect he was probably also fudging things a bit - remember, the most viable assault route hadn't even been discovered on the 5th and was only found late on the 6th (with an assault on the 7th impossible due to torrential rain). The position held by only a few thousand men split between all the dams is weak, the position with a few thousand men at each dam is very strongly held.


Barnard's argument is based on the idea that "There is reason to believe that they were not held by strong force when our army appeared before them, and we know that they were far from complete." I'm not sure on what he bases the "far from complete" line, but the "not held by strong force" is certainly inaccurate - they were held by the equivalent of about two Federal divisions and there were only five available to McClellan. Obviously after the rains the defences are much stronger.
What this means is that Barnard is advocating a "hasty" assault - off the line of march, or at most with a day's prep work total. This is not an easy thing - if the target is the route the engineers historically considered possible, just discovering it expends the 5th of July and some of the 6th and bringing up troops/artillery takes more time. Then you're attacking a couple of thousand well dug in infantry across a narrow dam.

But that this was the most vulnerable point (which was because of relatively shallow water near the dam, which was not easy to discover just from looking) was found over the course of several days, and was not apparent on the 5th and 6th. This means the course of action Barnard is probably actually advocating is an assault all along the line - that is, ramming single divisions into concentrated artillery and infantry fire across narrow defiles, mutually unsupporting and without the reserves available to follow up success.


McClellan was also not in possession of the Confederate strength records, but his intel was pretty much correct for Confederate strength at the time.

 

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Barnard on the siege of Yorktown:
The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors, and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for prudential considerations.

How much time would actually be gained by doing this? I'm not sure any would have been.

My guess: 2 to 3 weeks if he was talking about Yorktown itself; perhaps a little more if he is talking about attacking in the center of the island. Confederate A. P. Hill, commanding in Yorktown on April 13th, seemed to think he could not defend for long against a Union attack. Apparently Union Chief Engineer Barnard felt much the same in hindsight.

 

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Barnard on the pursuit to and battle of Williamsburg:

Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force; but the battle of Williamsburg, fought as it was without reconnoitering the position, without concert of action among the different corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a blunder which ought not to have happened.

We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought, and we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we had not fought till next day, a battle would in all probability have been unnecessary; but if it had been, we could have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitered our position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some results might have flowed from it. We had every advantage. Franklin's division landed at West Point on the next day and Sedgwick's division on the day following. These two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front and have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat and perhaps his capture must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him to West Point, would have been accomplished.​

Barnard here, meanwhile, is criticising a decision to keep pressure on the enemy. It seems like he's criticising every choice because it was the one taken.

No, he is merely talking about what he thinks would have been better choices. There are dozens of choices and actions he does not mention, only a few he says would have been important changes.

On Williamsburg, he is saying that what was done didn't work out as it could have and this would have been better -- in particular, he is saying this would have taken advantage of the earlier decision to keep Franklin on board the ships so long. Given the Joe Johnston actions, he is probably right that the Confederates would have fallen back out of Williamsburg without a fight, and the Union would have just taken the place without serious loss.

He is talking about a different form of pressure than you are, making use of maneuverability and naval strength.

 

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Barnard on what to do after the battle of Seven Pines/Fair Oaks:

The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which if not seized do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing.​

This appears to be suggesting an attack over a river crossing without any clear evidence that the other side was undefended...

So? He is talking about following up a repulsed enemy attack. Such situations are **always** uncertain and unpredictable, yet commanders have routinely done them throughout history. Sometimes they work great, sometimes they flop, sometimes nothing particularly good or bad happens.

 

[General Butterfield]

Interesting post, I might not agree with everything but still fascinating stuff.

 

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Barnard on what should have been done in the Seven Days:

Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious enough at that time that when the rebels struck a blow at our left wing they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We could have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths.​

What's he even talking about here? I know it's in the Seven Days, but which battle?
It can't be the first two battles because those were against the Federal right wing, but after that the Federal army has no supply line and attacking is advancing while out of supply - a recipe for defeat.

This paragraph follows in order from the one before it about Seven Pines / Fair Oaks. Perhaps it belongs with it and I split the paragraphs wrong.

​

Supply lines are important -- slavish chaining to them is often a mistake. Men like Napoleon, Grant, and Sherman would cut loose from their supply lines with great success (although that is really just proof of their greater understanding of how to supply an army more than a statement that supply considerations are not important.) They knew how to operate without hard supply lines for a time and then re-establish them.

 

[trice]

Interesting post, I might not agree with everything but still fascinating stuff.

Yes. Essentially, this is a senior officer saying: "Well, that didn't work. Now that I look back, this is what I think we should have done differently." Fascinating for sure; also rarely seen.

 

[trice]

At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first place, and, in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th, minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or had the fortified lines (thrown up expressly for that object) been held by 20,000 men (as they could have been), we could have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond. As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force except enough left before our lines to keep up an appearance, and we fought with 27,000 men, losing the battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance of conquest turned into a retreat for safety by a force probably not greatly superior to our own.

This is a suggestion to abandon the supply dump and supply line entirely.

Actually, it is a series of suggestions for concentrating to attack the enemy. If the supply lines are abandoned for a time, he plans to re-establish them after beating the enemy (as he expressly stated).

Barnard here isn't very impressive. It seems as though he's being contrarian, opposing every choice made because it was the one that was made, even when historically he supported it at the time!

Actually, this is very impressive. It is very rare that you would see a senior officer being this honest in critiquing (not criticizing) himself and his fellow command. Even more rare to see it in an official report.