Failures at Shiloh

[Elennsar]

Unfallible evidence is not available to us. We are lacking reports from crucial players. The testimony of four significant figures from the battle, with no reason to act in concert with one another to push some agenda, is pretty convincing.

We have three figures saying Johnston's death was important, two of which have very good reason to say the failure of the Confederates was for reasons other than their own generalship and one from the other end of the line and without any clear reports on the condition of the Confederate troops to go on, plus one report not saying it was Johnston's death at all - just that there was enough of a lull to be grateful for it. "Coincided chronology" is not the same as claiming it was that event as opposed to some other event at the same time.

And nevermind the reports of the brigade commanders on their brigades and their activities. What would the commanders actually making the advance know of the state of their commands and if that had anything to do how hard the attack was pressed or not?

That's the part that makes me think poorly of the pro-Sidney argument here. Johnston may well be more than "insignificant", but that's not a reason to go to the other extreme and flat out ignore anything written that suggests it might not have been decisive.

 

[NedBaldwin]

In other words, your mind is made up and we don't need any actual evidence bearing out their statements.

You don't consider statements by people present at the time to be evidence?

 

[Elennsar]

You don't consider statements by people present at the time to be evidence?

These are the statements of people present at the time of Johnston's fall:

Maney: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0010;view=image;seq=471;page=root;size=100
Martin (commanding Bowen's brigade):
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0010;view=image;seq=639;page=root;size=100 - on
Jackson: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=571&size=100
Chalmers:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=565&size=100



Also, and I say this purely out of curiosity:

The quote Saruman ascribes in this thread to Webster ("I was exceedingly grateful for the cause [of the delay] be it what it might, which gave us abundant time to take up a new position and prepare to hold it to the death.") appears to be the same as what he lists as from Hurlbut here:
http://civilwartalk.com/threads/johnston-is-not-mortally-wounded-at-shiloh.27914/

So which was it? And when was it?

It's not in Hurlbut's report (Webster has none): http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Hurlbut;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=221;page=root;size=100 unlike the quote by Bragg (credited to Hardee).

That doesn't mean much of anything on its validity either as a true quote or an accurate statement, I'm just trying to find the original source.

 

[ole]

Without concrete evidence, sometimes one has to speculate to fill in the blanks.

Johnston is dead and his thrust is thrown into confusion. Gonna take a while to decide who is in charge and what are we going to do? Is there a lull? Of course there is until someone takes effective charge of the assault. Don't know who that was, but it was resumed. Unfortunately, later in the day.

 

[Saruman]

These are the statements of people present at the time of Johnston's fall:

Maney: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0010;view=image;seq=471;page=root;size=100
Martin (commanding Bowen's brigade):
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0010;view=image;seq=639;page=root;size=100 - on
Jackson: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=571&size=100
Chalmers:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=565&size=100



Also, and I say this purely out of curiosity:

The quote Saruman ascribes in this thread to Webster ("I was exceedingly grateful for the cause [of the delay] be it what it might, which gave us abundant time to take up a new position and prepare to hold it to the death.") appears to be the same as what he lists as from Hurlbut here:
http://civilwartalk.com/threads/johnston-is-not-mortally-wounded-at-shiloh.27914/

So which was it? And when was it?

It's not in Hurlbut's report (Webster has none): http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Hurlbut;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=221;page=root;size=100 unlike the quote by Bragg (credited to Hardee).

That doesn't mean much of anything on its validity either as a true quote or an accurate statement, I'm just trying to find the original source.

Sorry it was actually Hurlbut who said that, not Webster. Hurlbut was describing how the delay enabled his infantry to rally and take up a position supporting Webster's guns. This is in a letter to William P. Johnston and so it is definitely in relation to Albert S. Johnston's death and its impact on the CS assault. I will edit previous posts to change Webster to Hurlbut.

So the statements of Bragg, Hardee, Sherman, and Hurlbut all agree Johnston's death was influential. Good enough for me.

 

[peteanddelmar]

What evidence suggests any such thing?

The Confederates were tired, ill supplied, and disorganized when the attacks started fading out.

Exactly. Accounts of the battle show Confederate momentum early that fizzled as the day wore on. Plus the union resitance was much tougher later. Artillery was in place and the same southern soldiers that stopped in Union camps to eat the other guys breakfast were too tired to press the matter any farther.
But the Confederates had fought valiantly considering their lack of everything. But they didn't win the field in any way.

 

[Elennsar]

Sorry it was actually Hurlbut who said that, not Webster. Hurlbut was describing how the delay enabled his infantry to rally and take up a position supporting Webster's guns. This is in a letter to William P. Johnston and so it is definitely in relation to Albert S. Johnston's death and its impact on the CS assault. I will edit previous posts to change Webster to Hurlbut.

No worries, just glad to have that straightened out.

One thing I'd say is a decided mistake outside the issues on Johnston:

It was a mistake to delay gathering "all available guns" to bombard the Hornet's Nest until 3:30. Obviously this is not ideal ground for artillery, but leaving it to do nothing hardly made the infantry's job more feasible.

I'm not saying any specific general deserves blame, this is something multiple men should have made more of a point of.

 

[diane]

Also, I should make a post about this earlier:

Bragg wasn't even in the neighborhood of Kentucky in the period Sidney Johnston was finding that Polk was a worthless subordinate. But that just shifts which men should be cussed at.

Thanks - I meant to convey they together messed over Johnston's large scale plan. Kirby Smith in East Tennessee was trying to get Bragg's cooperation to nail Buell before Perryville, but Bragg had already helped install a Confederate governor and all... Well, as you say, they were the ones to cuss at!

 

[Elennsar]

Thanks - I meant to convey they together messed over Johnston's large scale plan. Kirby Smith in East Tennessee was trying to get Bragg's cooperation to nail Buell before Perryville, but Bragg had already helped install a Confederate governor and all... Well, as you say, they were the ones to cuss at!

Yeah, I'm not going to defend Bragg in Kentucky except to say that he got his army out with no worse results and fewer casualties than Lee in Maryland - just that by the point he was mishandling Kentuckians Sidney Johnston was up eating boar and drinking mead in Valhalla.

Lots of blame on Polk though. Even if Kentucky going as it did wasn't all his fault, he still was acting in a "---- the plans of my superiors" way about it.

 

[popeyej77]

Bragg's pettiness and general incompetence made cohesive command structure in the army of Tenn . impossible.You can blame Pope and the other subordinate generals all you want but that kind of dysfunction starts at the top.

 

[Elennsar]

Bragg's pettiness and general incompetence made cohesive command structure in the army of Tenn . impossible.You can blame Pope and the other subordinate generals all you want but that kind of dysfunction starts at the top.

I strongly suggest you look at Polk's insubordinate behavior in Kentucky (under Bragg) to see what Bragg had to work with.

I'm not going to say Bragg is an innocent. But to say that he alienated men perfectly willing to work with him is at best partially true and at worst flat out ignoring those who never were.

From Army of the Heartland by Thomas L. Connelly (page 261)

"Polk's aloof attitude was another indication that the Confederates were beating themselves by failing to cooperate. Kirby Smith's independent move and subsequent indifference toward Bragg had frustrated a united command. Polk's silence at Bardstown had left his commander puzzled over the threat on the Confederate left. Hardee's letters from Perryville had not clarified the extent of danger on his front. Bragg was also at fault. His constant failure to give specific orders to his subordinates gave them freedom unmerited by personal relations and past experience. The result was that the cohesion of the high command in Kentucky had become dependent on respect for Bragg, but this seemed to be lacking among his subordinates. Kirby Smith had shown little respect for Bragg, even after Bragg took command of both columns. And now Polk's attitude had led him to hold back explanations for disobedience at Bardstown and Perryville, which jeopardized the safety of that army. This is not to say that Polk understood the situation that was developing on his front at Perryville.
But Bragg had a right to know what Polk knew - and Polk had not been telling him."

With subordinates like that, who needs Union leadership to shine in order to fail?


As relates to Shiloh, I'm not going to say anything good about Bragg's leadership. I don't think it was worse than Polk or Hardee, but that's because of the overall bloody simple mindedness (or simple bloody mindedness, if you prefer) of Confederate tactics there.

 

[popeyej77]

Of course they didn't respect him,how could they when he took every oppurtunity to either belittle or outright insult them personally.

 

[Elennsar]

Of course they didn't respect him,how could they when he took every oppurtunity to either belittle or outright insult them personally.

"It's okay to be an insubordinate jerkass if you claim your commander is a bigger jerkass." is not the stuff of a functional chain of command even if Bragg was Captain Quegg.

It is, however, the stuff of the Army of Tennessee.

 

[ole]

Whoa. Shiloh was in early March. Perryville was in October of the same year.

Bragg was a divison commamder at Shiloh; an Army commander at Perryville.

He was already displaying his prediliction for making good plans and then saying, "oh drat, the plan didn't work."

One of major thingx Bragg lacked, besides encurring the enmity of his subordinates, was the knowledge or capacity or whatever, to know that the plan does tend to change upon an encounter with the enemy.He did not have that flexibility.

At Shiloh, he made numerous charges, over an open field, against what was to be known as the Hornet's nest. (How many has not been defined. Six? Ten? Thirteen?

 

[Elennsar]

Larry Daniel gives it as eight.

But none of the Confederate attacks at Shiloh are particularly inspired tactically. We see Cleburne bleeding his brigade white, for example.

I'm not going to say that Bragg was a great general or a likable guy, but any criticism he gets has to keep in mind everyone else's decisions. It's not fair to single Bragg out for launching (piecemeal) frontal assaults if we can't find Hardee or Polk or Breckinridge ordering anything better.

Does he deserve responsibility for his decisions? Absolutely. But what good is there to say about Hardee at Shiloh that didn't come from his pen or his friends?

 

[StonewallWanabe]

Speaking of failures at Shiloh, Grant's failure to entrench would have to be considered a huge one. If Robert E Lee had been the General on the Union side at Shiloh, he most certainly would have followed General Halleck's orders to entrench (for that matter he would have been wise enough to do so even without orders). Lee would also have not made the mistake of failing to try to anticipate the possibility of a counterattack by the enemy, and would have done whatever he could to have utilized his calvary as the "eyes and ears" of his army, in order to detect such a potential counterattack.

 

[Elennsar]

Lee did not entrench at Antietam, why would he entrench at Shiloh except in regards to any specific order?

 

[NedBaldwin]

.... he most certainly would have followed General Halleck's orders to entrench ....

As far as I am aware, there was no order to entrench; there was an order from Halleck that said:

"Your telegrams of yesterday just received. I do not fully understand you- By all means keep your forces together until you connect with General Buell, who is now at Columbia, and will move on Waynesborough with three divisions. Don't let the enemy draw you into an engagement now. Wait till you are properly fortified and receive orders."

Some people seem to think that the bolded part was meant to tell Grant to entrench, but I think that is not entirely clear.

 

[StonewallWanabe]

Lee did not entrench at Antietam, why would he entrench at Shiloh except in regards to any specific order?

Have you visited Antietam? Because if you have then I'm sure you are aware that the sunken road at Antietam provided Lee's army with one of the most effective pre-existing trenches of the entire war up to that point. What did you want him to do, fill in the sunken road, and then dig it out again?! Add to that the rolling hills just beyond that, which prevented the Union soldiers from being able to see that trench until it was too late, and the result was a major blood bath, with the trench doing exactly what it was intended to do.

Even earlier than that in the war, Lee was nicknamed the "King of Spades", because of his well known penchant for entrenching. And just prior to the Seven Days battles, when Lee took over for the wounded General Johnston, one of the first things he did was to have the soldiers start digging, in preparation for the upcoming battle (in spite of many of his soldiers grumbling about being put to such manual labor, and in spite of initially being criticized in the press for doing so).

 

[brass napoleon]

Speaking of failures at Shiloh, Grant's failure to entrench would have to be considered a huge one. If Robert E Lee had been the General on the Union side at Shiloh, he most certainly would have followed General Halleck's orders to entrench (for that matter he would have been wise enough to do so even without orders). Lee would also have not made the mistake of failing to try to anticipate the possibility of a counterattack by the enemy, and would have done whatever he could to have utilized his calvary as the "eyes and ears" of his army, in order to detect such a potential counterattack.

I basically agree, although as noted above, I'm not sure that Halleck gave any orders to entrench. In fact, it's largely forgotten that Halleck was the overall commander of this operation, and I think he very much deserves a sizeable share of the blame.