Failures at Shiloh

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Feb 2, 2015
Being new to the site, I am hoping to spark a bit of interaction on Shiloh. Offering that as a bit of texture for the beginning, I would like to ask what everyone thinks were the biggest failures at Shiloh.
1) Uncle Billy being caught with his pants down (literally).
The entire Union position was not prepared for any type of defense. I feel that Sherman should have taken some basic defensive measures. I place more of this on Sherman than Grant, although the ultimate responsibility was Grant's.
2) Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beauregard's very flawed deployment.
The way that the deployment was made, insured that command and control would be impossible to maintain.
3) Johnston getting himself killed.
Johnston was the only General Commanding to be killed in the entire Civil War. I know that wing / corp / division / brigade commanders were killed with some regularity. However, I think that Johnston was the only General Commanding an Army that was killed in the entire war. His death may have been one of the deciding factors of the battle.
The above list is not meant to be comprehensive. It is meant to hopefully spark a bit of comment and discussion.
 
Being new to the site, I am hoping to spark a bit of interaction on Shiloh. Offering that as a bit of texture for the beginning, I would like to ask what everyone thinks were the biggest failures at Shiloh.
1) Uncle Billy being caught with his pants down (literally).
The entire Union position was not prepared for any type of defense. I feel that Sherman should have taken some basic defensive measures. I place more of this on Sherman than Grant, although the ultimate responsibility was Grant's.
2) Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beauregard's very flawed deployment.
The way that the deployment was made, insured that command and control would be impossible to maintain.
3) Johnston getting himself killed.
Johnston was the only General Commanding to be killed in the entire Civil War. I know that wing / corp / division / brigade commanders were killed with some regularity. However, I think that Johnston was the only General Commanding an Army that was killed in the entire war. His death may have been one of the deciding factors of the battle.
The above list is not meant to be comprehensive. It is meant to hopefully spark a bit of comment and discussion.

1) I have a contrarian view on this. From the evidence I have seen Sherman took some basic defensive measures. Two days previous to the battle he issued an order to his command with general instructions of what to do if there was an attack. Cleburne reported that when he attacked Sherman's position there were 'breastwork of logs and bales of hay'. Attacked several times, Sherman successfully held his initial position until it was turned. In my opinion the bigger failures were with adjacent division/brigade commanders.

...

3) McPherson was technically an Army Commander at the time he was killed.
 
3) Johnston getting himself killed.
Johnston was the only General Commanding to be killed in the entire Civil War. I know that wing / corp / division / brigade commanders were killed with some regularity. However, I think that Johnston was the only General Commanding an Army that was killed in the entire war. His death may have been one of the deciding factors of the battle.
The above list is not meant to be comprehensive. It is meant to hopefully spark a bit of comment and discussion.

...

3) McPherson was technically an Army Commander at the time he was killed.

Was Johnston just an army commander? I thought he was a department commander at the time of his death.

In any case, I'd argue that Johnston personally leading regimental charges was symptomatic of the failures in confederate command at Shiloh--there seemed to be nobody looking at the big picture. Maybe if he hadn't died Johnston would have woken up and taken a bigger view, but that would have taken a fairly big change in behavior. Basically, I think the failure wasn't so much Johnston dying, but that Johnston wasn't doing his job, and showed no signs of changing that behavior right up to his tragic death. He was an excellent officer, so I can't quite reconcile this misunderstanding of his responsibilities...

I wonder if the fact that Johnston had experience leading troops in battle before the civil war was more of a handicap than a help. Perhaps in the heat of battle he would instinctively fall back on familiar behavior rather than the role he actually needed to take.
 
borderstates,

These issues have been discussed pretty fully in previous threads in the Shiloh forum, but all of them boil down to circumstances rather than plans dictating the various actions of the leaders: The camp at Pittsburg Landing was always intended to be quite temporary, so it's defense was never an issue, whereas where to put the additional arriving troops was; unexpected rain and road congestion postponed the Confederate advance and attack, so Beauregard deployed the army as quickly as possible under the circumstances, according to how to fit them in rather than maintaining unit cohesion; and Johnston, trying to adhere to his already lagging schedule was more concerned with keeping things moving. None of this exonerates any of the perps from their mistakes, but shows how the old adage about how plans go out the window with the first shot of a battle applies especially here on Shiloh's dark and bloody ground...
 
In general, the Confederate reports in the OR do not support the conclusion that "The entire Union position was not prepared for any type of defense." Some examples:

Confederate reports depicting first encounters with Union positions

Report of Col. R. M. Russell, Twelfth Tennessee Infantry, commanding First Brigade.

Soon after daylight the attack had been made by the right of our army, under Major-General Hardee, and the First was held as a supporting corps. While in this position the enemy opened fire upon us with solid shot and shell with field batteries posted in strong positions on the hills in front.


Report of Lieut. Col. Robert H. Barrow, Eleventh Louisiana Infantry.

From our position it was impossible to do any effective service, but exposed at the same time to the severity of the fire from the' enemy's batteries. Then it was that the command passed along our line to charge and take the battery which was firing on us at all hazards. I am pleased to state that this command was cheerfully obeyed, and with alacrity, both by men and officers, attempted to be executed; but owing to a creek, a dense thicket of undergrowth of briers and vines and a slough through which our regiment had to pass to gain the position of this battery, but four companies (the first three on our right and one on our extreme left, whose progress had not been so greatly impeded by the creek and underbrush) had been able to make their way through and gain the summit of a hill just opposite, and about 300 yards from that upon which the battery was planted, and between which there was still this slough. As soon as that portion of our regiment had gained this hill it was discovered that this battery, which had been so advantageously planted by the enemy, was sustained by a heavy infantry <ar10_421> force, aided by a large number of sharpshooters, who were concealed in and behind their tents, and who all together opened such a deadly and well-aimed fire as to make it impossible to hold the point gained by us, and compelled us to fall back, with a considerable loss in killed and wounded. In falling back, however, there was much confusion and disorder, and, owing to the hurried manner and the fire under which we were compelled to reform the regiment, some of the companies composing it did not take their proper positions in line of battle, and many of the men were not even in their own companies or regiments.


Report of Lieut. Col. T. H. Bell, Twelfth Tennessee Infantry.

About 6 o'clock on the morning of the 6th we were ordered into line <ar10_423> of battle about 2 miles from the scene of action. The regiment was formed on the extreme right of the First Brigade, supporting the right wing of Brigadier-General Stewart's brigade. In this position we were moved rapidly to the scene of action. When within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy their artillery opened a heavy fire upon us, as we continued to move on steadily, losing a few men. We continued to advance until we reached the enemy's cavalry encampment, which we found evacuated.
After passing through we found the enemy in large force, taking shelter behind logs, trees, and tents. We engaged them here for some time.


Report of Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr., Thirteenth Tennessee Infantry.

The next morning I advanced upon the enemy, who was strongly posted with a battery of six guns, commanding every avenue of approach, and supported by strong detachments of infantry. While in this position I was told by General Bragg that this battery was a source of great annoyance to our troops, and that it must be taken at all hazards. I was ordered to take this battery by a right flank movement. I had proceeded but a short distance when I discovered that I would be exposed to a heavy fire from two of the enemy's camps. I therefore ordered an advance to be made directly forward at this particular crisis. Four companies of the left wing were separated from the command, but with the remainder of the command, under fire of their batteries, I soon engaged a heavy body of infantry, which, after a severe conflict and a desperate charge, I succeeded in putting to flight, and captured their battery. The ammunition being nearly exhausted, I supplied myself with that found in the enemy's encampments.


Report of Lieut. Col. O. F. Strahl, Fourth Tennessee Infantry.

The position occupied by this regiment on the morning of the 6th instant was on the right of the Second Brigade, First Division, First Army Corps, and moved forward in the second line of battle until about 10 a.m., when it came up with the first, which was driven back by a battery of the enemy in front, placed on the opposite side of an old field, on a hill. Here we were thrown into some confusion by the first line of battle falling back through ours; but we soon rallied, and formed in front under a very heavy fire of grape and shell from the enemy's guns, which were about 800 yards distant.


Report of Lieut. Col. C. D. Venable, Fifth Tennessee Infantry.

On the morning of April 6 we were called into line of battle before sunrise, and moved in direction of the enemy's right. Having moved forward a half mile or more, we made a deposit of our baggage, and then, moving in the same direction some 200 or 300 yards, my colors were shot down by a cannon-ball; then moving by the right flank about 400 yards; then by the left flank again into line of battle. Moved in that direction about 400 yards, under a heavy fire of grape shot, and halted in front of the enemy's encampment. In about fifteen minutes I moved forward again through the encampment and halted just to its rear, and in a very short time was ordered to support the left of General Bragg. Being conducted to the position where I was needed, I formed line of battle at the foot of a hill, in a small ravine and in front of another encampment; fired one round and moved to the summit of the hill and halted, under a heavy fire of grape shot; remained but a few minutes and retired to the foot of the hill, but soon moved forward again through the encampment, under a heavy cross-fire from two batteries on the right and infantry on the left and front.


154. Report of Col. Alexander W. Campbell, Thirty-third Tennessee Infantry.

On the morning of the 6th my regiment was formed according to your orders for the purpose of making an advance upon the enemy. Occupying the left center of your brigade, my position threw my right upon the road leading to the enemy's camps. Before reaching the first of the enemy's camps, out of which he had been driven by our advance guard, we moved by the right flank, crossing the road, and made a steady advance, until we were ordered by you to make a move by the left flank. Just after we had commenced the movement I was ordered by Major Richmond, aide to General Polk, to move to the front, which separated myself from the Thirteenth Arkansas and Fifth Tennessee, the balance of the brigade. Just after commencing the forward movement we encountered a galling fire from a battery of the enemy, evidently intended to prevent our advance to the support of the regiments then engaging their infantry. <ar10_435>
At this point my regiment was fired upon by a regiment lying upon the ground in the enemy's camp, wounding 7 of my men, I of whom is thought to be mortally wounded. My regiment returned the fire with spirit and advanced steadily forward Until we reached the middle of the camp, when the fire of the enemy's battery became very severe, killing Adj. John C. Harris and wounding Capt. John Biddeford and several of the men. We were, however, soon relieved of this distressing cannonading by the capture of the enemy's battery by one of our advance regiments.


No. 158. -- Report of Col. Preston Smith, One hundred and fifty-fourth Tennessee Infantry.

In obedience to the order of Brigadier-General Johnson I moved forward my command, the One hundred and fifty-fourth Senior Tennessee Regiment, at daylight on Sunday morning, on the road leading to Pittsburg, and proceeded to form a line of battle, my regiment being on the right and Blythe's Mississippi regiment on my left; these two regiments forming the right wing of Brigadier-General Johnson's brigade, this wing resting on the right of the road and the brigade held in reserve to support Brigadier-General Clark's brigade.
We followed the movements of that command until about 8 a.m., when an order was received from Major-General Bragg, through an officer of his staff, directing me to lead my regiment into action. This order was executed by moving my regiment by the right flank through a large open field, exposed the while to the shot and shell of the enemy's guns, placed in a road in front of us. I continued to march the command by the flank until it had crossed a muddy creek, some 300 yards from the enemy's battery, when the line of battle was formed under a galling fire from the battery, infantry, and sharpshooters.
At this point the gallant Capt. Marshall Polk, with a section of his battery, advanced to my immediate front, and poured into the enemy's works and on his battery a heavy and well-directed fire of grape and canister. After he had fired seven or eight rounds I directed him to cease firing and ordered my regiment forward.


No. 166. -- Report of General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps.

The enemy did not give us time to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets. <ar10_465> The order was immediately given by the commanding general and our lines advanced. Such was the ardor of our troops that it was with great difficulty they could be restrained from closing up and mingling with the first line. Within less than a mile the enemy was encountered in force at the encampments of his advanced positions, but our first line brushed him away, leaving the rear nothing to do but to press on in pursuit. In about one mile more we encountered him in strong force among almost the entire line. His batteries were posted on eminences, with strong infantry supports.
Finding the first line was now unequal to the work before it, being weakened by extension and necessarily broken by the nature of the ground, I ordered my whole force to move up steadily and promptly to its support. The order was hardly necessary, for subordinate commanders, far beyond the reach of my voice and eye in the broken country occupied by us, had promptly acted on the necessity as it arose, and by the time the order could be conveyed the whole line was developed and actively engaged.


No. 168. -- Report of Col. Randall L. Gibson, Thirteenth Louisiana Infantry, commanding First Brigade, with application for Court of Inquiry.

Proceeding again by the left flank in line of battle, we marched through the enemy's camp and up to the battery, which was taken at the instant by the first line. It was at this point that we first opened fire on the enemy.
I was then commanded by Major-General Bragg to attack the enemy in a position to the front and right. The brigade moved forward in fine style, marching through an open field under a heavy fire and half way up an elevation covered with an almost impenetrable thicket, upon which the enemy was posted. On the left a battery opened that raked our flank, while a steady fire of musketry extended along the entire front. Under this combined fire our line was broken and the troops fell back; but they were soon rallied and advanced to the contest. Four times the position was charged and four times the assault proved unavailing. The strong and almost inaccessible position of the enemy— his infantry well covered in ambush and his artillery skillfully posted and efficiently served— was found to be impregnable to infantry alone. We were repulsed. Our men, however, bore their repulse with steadiness. When a larger force of infantry and artillery was moved to flank this position on the right, a part of the brigade formed on the left of the assaulting line, and a part held a position to the rear in the old field near by. The enemy was driven from his position. From this his retreat became precipitate, and in obedience to orders we moved with the main body of the army toward the river.

No. 170. -- Report of Col. H. W. Allen, Fourth Louisiana Infantry.

COLONEL: On the morning of the 6th the Fourth Louisiana went into the engagement with about 575 men, rank and file. All the commissioned officers were present and participated in the engagement except Lieutenants Turnbull, Blum, and Lemmon, absent on sick furlough.
While drawn up in line of battle and awaiting orders a Tennessee regiment immediately in our rear fired into us by mistake, killing and wounding a large number of my men. This was a terrible blow to the regiment; far more terrible than any inflicted by the enemy. It almost demoralized the regiment, who from that moment seemed to dread their friends much more than their enemies. At the command to advance we charged up the hill into an almost impenetrable thicket. The enemy opened a deadly fire, which was quickly returned.
During the engagement Colonel Fagan, of the First Arkansas, sent word to Capt. H. M. Fayrot, of the Delta Rifles, "For God's sake to cease firing; that we were killing his men and he was killing ours." Captain Favrot, being on the extreme right, gave the order to cease firing. While in this position a murderous fire of grape and canister was poured into us from the masked batteries and rifle pits.
 
No. 173. -- Report of Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

The engagement had now fairly commenced on the right, and that portion of Major-General Hardee's line to which we were now moving up, by order of General Bragg, was sharply engaging the enemy's skirmishers. The face of the country at this point, consisting of alternate hills and boggy ravines overgrown with heavy timber and thick underbrush, presented features remarkably favorable for the operations of skillful skirmishers. Our impetuous volunteers charged them, however, whenever they appeared, and drove them from their cover back to their lines, near the first camp met with on the Bark road leading toward Pittsburg. Here the enemy, having greatly the advantage of position for both his infantry and artillery, made a more creditable stand. A battery of his field pieces was in position on the height of a domineering hill, from 400 to 600 yards in front of our lines, commanding his camp and the approaches to it. Immediately in our front, and between us and this battery, ran a boggy ravine, the narrow swamp of which was thickly overgrown with various species of shrubs, saplings, and vines, so densely interwoven as to sometimes require the use of the knife to enable the footman to pass. Over this the enemy's battery had a full field of fire upon our whole lines as we descended the declivity terminating in the swamp, and on the opposite skirts of the swamp his infantry had all the advantages presented by such shelter on the one side and obstacles on the other. This ravine and its accompanying obstacles could be avoided on the right, but my position in the line required a dislodgment of the enemy from his cover before taking a movement in that direction, lest he should fall upon my flank and rear before I could make the circuit of the swamp and hill to reach him where he was.
No. 175. -- Report of Lieut. Col. Charles Jones, Seventeenth Louisiana Infantry.

We were brought into action on the morning of the 6th, occupying the extreme right of the brigade until we were exposed to the enemy's artillery, where we remained for some time, until we were ordered, with a portion of the line on our right and left, to take a battery immediately in our front. A Tennessee regiment (the Twenty-second, I think) was in front of us. We were delayed a moment by this regiment, when I gave the order to charge. When we reached the top of the hill the enemy poured into us a murderous fire. The Tennessee regiment before referred to retired by the flank through our lines, cutting their way through the center of our fourth company, separating our right from our left, and throwing us into some confusion. We did not retire, however, until we had poured several volleys into the enemy. We lost several killed and wounded in this charge.
We retired to the foot of the hill to reform for a second attack. The right wing also retired farther to the right, having been cut off from the colors by the Tennessee regiment. They charged a second time with, I think, the Twentieth Louisiana on the enemy's left line of support, when the battery was secured. I charged with the left wing on the enemy's right around the left of the hill, where I received a destructive flank fire from another of the enemy's batteries, as well as from his small-arms. From this position we were compelled to fall back to our first. It was in this second charge that Capt. R. H. Curry, of Company C, and Capt. W. A. Maddox, of Company I, both fell severely wounded.
No. 176. -- Report of Col. August Reichard, Twentieth Louisiana Infantry.

Soon after the commencement of the battle the brigade moved forward, and as we approached the enemy I was ordered to file off by the left, in the execution of which movement, the regiment passing through a dense undergrowth in which it was impossible to see five paces ahead, I was suddenly informed that we were separated from the balance of the brigade. Just at the moment when I was retracing my steps to rejoin the brigade a Tennessee regiment in full retreat broke right through my line, causing much disorder. The regiment, however, soon rallied, regained its position, and gallantly fought during the whole day side by side with the other regiments of the brigade. At the last charge, toward evening, when my regiment was severely cut up by a cross-fire from rifle pits and a battery pouring forth a hail-storm of canister, my regiment was separated from the rest of the brigade, and, as night set in, I led the remnant of the regiment to our hospital, where we bivouacked.
No. 177. -- Report of Col. W. A. Stanley, Ninth Texas Infantry.

On the morning of the 6th we advanced in line of battle under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry from the enemy's first encampment. Being ordered to charge the battery with our bayonets, we made two successive attempts; but finding, as well as our comrades in arms on our right and left, it almost impossible to withstand the heavy fire directed at our ranks, we were compelled to withdraw for a short time, with considerable loss. Being then ordered we immediately proceeded <ar10_509> to the support of the Washington Artillery, which, from their battery's well-directed fire, soon silenced the battery of the enemy, after which we immediately charged, routing the enemy from their first encampment, and continued a forward, double-quick march until we passed through two other encampments of the enemy, where we found our troops again heavily engaged with a second battery and its supports, to the galling fire of which my regiment was openly exposed.
No. 178. -- Report of Maj. Franklin H. Clack, "Confederate Guards Response" Battalion.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders, about 5 a.m., of the 6th instant, I drew up my command in column at half distance on the left of the Seventeenth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers, which occupied the right of your brigade, at a point distant, as I was informed, about 3 miles from the enemy's nearest camp, and between Owl Creek and Bark road, in McNairy County, Tennessee.
The position assigned the brigade at first, that of a reserve to support the First and Third Brigades of General Ruggles' division, having been changed, I formed my battalion in line of battle, under your orders in the same relative position as at first in the brigade, which at that time formed the left of General Hardee's line.
On arriving at the ridge nearest the enemy's first camp, owing to some accident, the Seventeenth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers became for a time separated from my right, and the First Florida and the Ninth Texas remained in their position on my left.
The order was then given to advance, and I took up a position in a hollow immediately below a hill on which was a camp of the enemy and on the slope beyond which they had a battery in position. The charge was made by my battalion, supported on my right by a portion of a regiment, which I was informed constituted a part of General Polk's command. The enemy were being driven back with much effort and stubbornly resisting, when some one in the force on the right gave the order to fall back, and simultaneously that force came rushing back, bearing my men with them. I drew off my force to the hollow from which we had charged. The second charge was successful, and we pursued the< ar10_511> enemy through that and another camp, and were brought to a stand by discovering a considerable force of the enemy posted in a thick wood on a slope to our left.
Having been separated from you, I consulted with Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the Seventeenth Louisiana, who I found had joined me on my left, and with General Russell, and we deemed it advisable to pause. You then placed the brigade in line and, if I am not mistaken in localities, led us to the successful attack of a camp on the left of our line.
From this time, sir, until the close of the day I am unable to describe the various localities in which you led us to the attack. We made several other successful charges., being ordered from one part of the field to the other, where our services were most needed.
Having bivouacked that night in a camp of the enemy, on the succeeding morning, at 5 o'clock, in obedience to your orders, I formed my line and we were placed as a reserve. Being ordered to the left in advance, with the artillery on our left, the enemy were discovered in position in our front, protected by log breastworks. The order was given to charge, which was executed, and the enemy driven from their position. It was then discovered that they had a camp on the hill behind their breastworks, and after our flag had been planted in their camp a battery placed on a slope about 500 yards to our left opened on us, and you ordered us to fall back to the ravine whence we had charged. The enemy still having our range, you ordered a further retiring beyond range.
No. 191. -- Report of Col. Daniel W. Adams, First Louisiana Infantry, commanding First Brigade.

When we reached a position about 200 yards of the enemy's lines, near the hour of 8.30 a.m., they opened a very heavy fire upon us with the rifled muskets, followed very soon thereafter by the fire of their artillery.
In a very short time after the engagement commenced General Gladden, who was gallantly commanding in the advance of the brigade, received a very severe wound, which afterward proved mortal, from a cannon-shot, and having to be taken from the field, relinquished the command of the brigade in my favor.
Finding that the enemy were then pouring a most destructive fire upon us, I ordered a rapid advance of the brigade to drive them from their cover and position; but as we advanced the fire became so very severe that I found the whole brigade began to falter and finally to fall back. Fearing the worst consequences, I rode to the color-bearer of <ar10_537> the First Regiment Louisiana Infantry, the command of which I had turned over to Major Farrar, and seizing the battle-flag, placed myself in front of the brigade and called upon them to follow me, which they did with great alacrity, and leading them close to the enemy's lines I ordered a charge, which was promptly and effectively executed. The enemy were driven from their position and retreated very rapidly. Following them we took possession of the encampment and of General Prentiss' headquarters, and some of the privates of the Louisiana regiment seized and secured seven stand of colors.
No. 195. -- Report of Col. Z. C. Deas, commanding Twenty-second Alabama Infantry.

Marching in line of battle, at about 7 o'clock we came upon the enemy, drawn up in front of their camp, where they opened fire upon us with their infantry and a battery of artillery, to which we responded. Robertson's battery was brought into action, which soon silenced them, and shortly afterwards the enemy wavered, and we charged over their dismantled guns, driving them through their camps, where we halted to reform, and after a short time they again opened upon us with another <ar10_542> battery, which was silenced by our batteries. We then moved forward a few hundred yards and halted in support. Here Colonel Adams, who was in command--General Gladden having been very seriously wounded by a cannon-ball in the first engagement--was seriously wounded, and the command of the brigade devolving upon me, Lieutenant-Colonel Marrast took command of my regiment, and will finish this report.
No. 198. -- Report of Lieut. Col. William D. Chadick, Twenty-sixth Alabama Infantry.

On the 5th we reached our line of battle in front of the enemy's camp. After having rested in place a few hours we were ordered on picket duty. The night was spent without sleep.
Returning to the line of battle a little after daylight, we were ordered forward without a moment's halt. On reaching the scene of action the regiment was momentarily thrown in rear of our brigade by the troops on our left precipitately rushing in before us while we were crossing a marsh. A perplexing confusion ensued, which it was evident could only be remedied by moving up on the right of our brigade, which was done without an order from General Gladden, as we were unable to obtain one. We occupied the only available space in the line and in a few moments were hotly engaged, contributing a full share to the driving back of the enemy. When the charge was made upon the lines and into the camp of the enemy the Twenty-sixth was among the first to penetrate them. Passing through the camp, we were halted in rear of the tents along a line of fence immediately beneath the path of a terrific cannonading between our own and the enemy's batteries. Here Maj. John S. Garvin was wounded by an exploding shell.
No. 199. -- Report of Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.

When we arrived in sight our line of battle was formed, and the brigade moved steadily forward in the following order: The Tenth Mississippi Regiment, in command of Col. R. A. Smith, on the right; the Seventh Mississippi Regiment, Lieut. Col. H. Mayson, commanding, second; the Ninth Mississippi Regiment, Lieut. Col. W. A. Rankin, third; the Fifth Mississippi, Col. A. E. Fant, fourth; the Fifty-second Tennessee, Col. B. J. Lea, on the left, and Gage's battery of light artillery in the rear.
When within about 150 yards of the enemy the line was halted and a heavy firing ensued, in which a number of our men were killed and wounded, and Colonel Lea and Maj. T. G. Randle, of the Fifty-second Tennessee Regiment, lost their horses. After several rounds were discharged the order to charge bayonets was given, and the Tenth Mississippi Regiment (about 360 strong), led by its gallant colonel, dashed up the hill, and put to flight the Eighteenth Wisconsin Regiment, numbering nearly 1,000 men. The order to charge having been given from the right flank, where I was then stationed, was not heard down the line, and consequently the Tenth Mississippi moved alone in the first charge, though it was quickly followed by the Ninth and Seventh Mississippi, when the whole line of the enemy broke and fled, pursued by these three regiments through their camps and across a ravine about half a mile to the opposite hill, where they were halted by command of General Johnston.
No. 204. -- Reports of Col. John C. Moore, Second Texas Infantry.

At about 8.30 o'clock we moved to the right, and took position in the front line of battle on the left of General Chalmers' brigade. This brought us near a small stream, which I was told is known as Lick Creek.
Soon after we took position the enemy, deployed as skirmishers, opened fire on our line, wounding two or three of our men and also mortally wounding Captain Brooks, who was carried to the rear, and died on the 8th.
The enemy being concealed behind trees and logs, Captain Smith was ordered to deploy his company as skirmishers, cover our front, and <ar10_561> ascertain the precise position of the enemy. At the same time Captain Girardey's battery was thrown forward, and by firing into the woods seemed to disperse the enemy's forces.
 
Neither of Johnston (who at least made it clear he was going to lead from the front) or BEauregard (who supposedly took on the role of coordinating from the rear) deserve anything nicer than a politely worded "Never command an army again." for their lack of management.

I'd say the entire Confederate battleplan - or lackof, once battlefield chaos kicked in - was a mistake. If this was going to be a win, it needed the Confederate effort to be all working together to achieve a common goal, not individual units thrown into whatever random thicket had the loudest sounding fighting at the moment they were visible to whatever officer grabbed them.

With or without Buell, that was not enough to put Grant's army in danger of destruction.
 
They certainly were in danger of destruction.Walk the ground and its easy to see,they were backed up to the landing where they had a stout line with artillery support.Wallace's men would have made it an even fight on Monday but without Buells army,they were still in danger.
 
That sounds like a strong vote of confidence in the ability of the Confederates to break that line.

I haven't been there, so I defer to those who have, but I'm really not convinced the Confederates could keep going to that extent with or without Buell's army.
 
Being new to the site, I am hoping to spark a bit of interaction on Shiloh. Offering that as a bit of texture for the beginning, I would like to ask what everyone thinks were the biggest failures at Shiloh.
1) Uncle Billy being caught with his pants down (literally).
The entire Union position was not prepared for any type of defense. I feel that Sherman should have taken some basic defensive measures. I place more of this on Sherman than Grant, although the ultimate responsibility was Grant's.
2) Pierre Gustave Toutant-Beauregard's very flawed deployment.
The way that the deployment was made, insured that command and control would be impossible to maintain.
3) Johnston getting himself killed.
Johnston was the only General Commanding to be killed in the entire Civil War. I know that wing / corp / division / brigade commanders were killed with some regularity. However, I think that Johnston was the only General Commanding an Army that was killed in the entire war. His death may have been one of the deciding factors of the battle.
The above list is not meant to be comprehensive. It is meant to hopefully spark a bit of comment and discussion.

1) Peabody knew that something was up. He sent out a strong reconnaissance force during the night. Hardee wrote "At early dawn, the enemy (Peabody's troops) attacked the skirmishers in front of my line." So maybe the Union attacked first? :wink:
2) Beauregard's deployment was flawed but probably didn't make much of a difference overall. The terrain was so wooded and dense that everyone would have got mixed up soon enough anyway. The Union forces became similarly intermingled.
3) Johnston was unlucky enough to be killed. Grant was equally exposed to danger and managed to survive. He had plenty of close calls. Also, Union General Nathaniel Lyon was killed at the Battle of Wilson's Creek.
 
Neither of Johnston (who at least made it clear he was going to lead from the front) or BEauregard (who supposedly took on the role of coordinating from the rear) deserve anything nicer than a politely worded "Never command an army again." for their lack of management.

Beauregard did command armies again and he was more than adequate (successful defence of Charleston, bottled up Butler in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, and defeated Grant's Army at Petersburg).

As for Johnston, it was his first battle and he did exceedingly well considering the circumstances (ie, commanding 45,000 green troops in an offensive on difficult terrain). If Grant had been killed at Belmont (commanding a piddly 3,000 green troops who managed to set fire to a camp before being driven from the field) or Lee at Cheat Mountain (coordinating 5,000 green troops under obstreperous commanders), people would be equally dismissive.
 
Beauregard did command armies again and he was more than adequate (successful defence of Charleston, bottled up Butler in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, and defeated Grant's Army at Petersburg).

More than adequate with heavy defenses in his favor (Charleston, Petersburg) and/or completely inept field leadership (Bermuda Hundred) as an opponent. It's not something justifying being one of the Confederacy's most senior generals.

As for Johnston, it was his first battle and he did exceedingly well considering the circumstances (ie, commanding 45,000 green troops in an offensive on difficult terrain). If Grant had been killed at Belmont (commanding a piddly 3,000 green troops who managed to set fire to a camp before being driven from the field) or Lee at Cheat Mountain (coordinating 5,000 green troops under obstreperous commanders), people would be equally dismissive.

If all Grant and Lee had was what Sidney Johnston has to his credit, people should see their records as not indicating any ability to command an army. That the "corps" commanders are independently talking about how to handle the command confusion as commands become intermingled, and

And you keep saying green troops as if this was an army raised six weeks ago. Sure, they're not familar with battle, but many of these regiments have been in service for months. They should be able to march and maneuver other than "find some area with a lot of shooting and go in, we're not going to even try to have an overall plan" - which is what the Confederate management of the battle looks like.
 
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More than adequate with heavy defenses in his favor (Charleston, Petersburg) and/or completely inept field leadership (Bermuda Hundred) as an opponent. It's not something justifying being one of the Confederacy's most senior generals.

Beauregard may have had fortifications but he was still outnumbered by two to one, outgunned, and outsupplied in each of those military operations. He demonstrated great skill in those victories of his and shouldn't be denied any credit.

If all Grant and Lee had was what Sidney Johnston has to his credit, people should see their records as not indicating any ability to command an army. That the "corps" commanders are independently talking about how to handle the command confusion as commands become intermingled, and you keep saying green troops as if this was an army raised six weeks ago. Sure, they're not familar with battle, but many of these regiments have been in service for months. They should be able to march and maneuver other than "find some area with a lot of shooting and go in, we're not going to even try to have an overall plan" - which is what the Confederate management of the battle looks like.

Still not bad for whipping Grant's army on the first day before his death.
 
Beauregard may have had fortifications but he was still outnumbered by two to one, outgunned, and outsupplied in each of those military operations. He demonstrated great skill in those victories of his and shouldn't be denied any credit.

Being outnumbered two to one when you're the one with fortifications, or your opponent's tactics are abysmal - or both - is not a particularly challenging obstacle to overcome.

Beauregard was a mediocre field commander.

Still not bad for whipping Grant's army on the first day before his death.

An army still prepared and willing to fight at the end of the day no matter how hard Buell and his supporters tried to present the Army of the Tennessee as reduced to disorganized men cowering by the river.

I'm not going to say that it was perfectly intact, but it was not forced into retreat from the field, it was not routed, it was not forced to surrender - the (using this title simply for convenience) Army of Tennessee had started its long and depressing record of valiant fighting leading to the fruits of victory remaining out of reach.
 
Being outnumbered two to one when you're the one with fortifications, or your opponent's tactics are abysmal - or both - is not a particularly challenging obstacle to overcome. Beauregard was a mediocre field commander.

No, Beauregard showed a lot of ingeniuty and skill in these battles. He was an excellent commander when on the defensive, and a mediocre commander on the offensive.

An army still prepared and willing to fight at the end of the day no matter how hard Buell and his supporters tried to present the Army of the Tennessee as reduced to disorganized men cowering by the river. I'm not going to say that it was perfectly intact, but it was not forced into retreat from the field, it was not routed, it was not forced to surrender - the (using this title simply for convenience) Army of Tennessee had started its long and depressing record of valiant fighting leading to the fruits of victory remaining out of reach.

Well, we don't know what would have happened if Johnston had lived. Perhaps Grant's army would have been forced into retreat from the field, routed, or forced to surrender. You cannot definitively claim that such an outcome couldn't have happened. None of us can.
 
No, Beauregard showed a lot of ingeniuty and skill in these battles. He was an excellent commander when on the defensive, and a mediocre commander on the offensive.

I'm not going to say Beauregard was completely awful, but I am underwhelmed by the "excellence" here. He's playing with the attackers having some stiff obstacles to confront.

Well, we don't know what would have happened if Johnston had lived. Perhaps Grant's army would have been forced into retreat from the field, routed, or forced to surrender. You cannot definitively claim that such an outcome couldn't have happened. None of us can.

And perhaps the offense would somehow have failed even worse than it did historically. What we have from the historical record does not suggest he would have made a difference overall.

It's possible, sure. But the Confederate attack fizzling out not happening would take something more than giving a nice speech.
 
Shiloh was OJT for just about everybody there. We're Monday Morning Quarterbacking them for not knowing how to fight a big battle. But the Confederate lack of a true chain of command involving army corps is inexcusable.

That said, the terrain took over and dictated what would happen once the guns opened up.
 
Well, we do have on paper the Confederate army organized into something like a proper chain of command.

(Dropping the quotes around corps for easiser reading)

Four corps - Polk, Bragg, Hardeee, Breckinridge

Polk has two divisions, each with two brigades.
Bragg has two divisions, each with three brigades.
Hardee has three brigades, in what apparently counts as a single division.
And so does Breckinridge.

But I'm not sure that actually had any relevance to how anyone was ordered about.
 
I'm not going to say Beauregard was completely awful, but I am underwhelmed by the "excellence" here. He's playing with the attackers having some stiff obstacles to confront.

Beauregard himself created some of those stiff obstacles. Beauregard showed lots of skill in his defensive operations and the odds were definitely arrayed against him, not with him. The fact that he approved the use of the Hunley so many times indicates the level of desperation and the massive odds leveled against the Confederates. But this topic is derailing this thread, so if you like, you may start a "Beauregard on the defensive" thread elsewhere.

And perhaps the offense would somehow have failed even worse than it did historically. What we have from the historical record does not suggest he would have made a difference overall. It's possible, sure. But the Confederate attack fizzling out not happening would take something more than giving a nice speech.

This is just your opinion and that's fine. The historical record is inconclusive. Evidence exists to suggest Johnston's death had a huge detrimental impact on the potential success of the CS attack. Its all about how people choose to interpret or discount that evidence. No one can ever know the truth unless they have access to a time machine and a sniper rifle to take out the soldier that shot Johnston.
 
This is just your opinion and that's fine. The historical record is inconclusive. Evidence exists to suggest Johnston's death had a huge detrimental impact on the potential success of the CS attack. Its all about how people choose to interpret or discount that evidence. No one can ever know the truth unless they have access to a time machine and a sniper rifle to take out the soldier that shot Johnston.

What evidence suggests any such thing?

The Confederates were tired, ill supplied, and disorganized when the attacks started fading out.
 

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