Failures at Shiloh

[diane]

A S Johnston died too soon for it to be determined if he would have been the cat's meow or the cat's box. He certainly showed plenty of potential in his former career. It would have helped if Beauregard had been more like Meade, content to be a really good second banana to a better general. Many of Johnston's original plans were quite good but were hampered - Beauregard, for instance, changing a strong frontal assault into a piecemeal one. The whole battle might not have been fought had Pope and Bragg not decided it was absolutely necessary to fubar Kentucky, and Pillow and Floyd decided on an ignoble scram from Ft Donelson with Buckner holding the bag. Johnston, being a Kentuckian by birth, well knew the strategic value of that state and needed it at least to remain neutral while he operated in Tennessee. It's true the best plans are immediately altered upon contact with the enemy, but Johnston had two strikes already handed him by his own commanders!

 

[Saruman]

What evidence suggests any such thing? The Confederates were tired, ill supplied, and disorganized when the attacks started fading out.

Participants in the battle agree that there was a definite loss of momentum in the Confederate assault when Johnston fell.

CS General William J. Hardee: "No one cause probably contributed so greatly to our loss of time, which was the loss of success, as the fall of the commanding general. For want of a common superior to the different commands on that part of the field, great delay occurred after this misfortune, and that delay prevented the consummation of the work so gallantly and successfully begun."

US General William T. Sherman: "The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston beyond all question fought skilfully from early morning till about 2pm, when their commander-in-chief was killed there was then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attack was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up to dark."

US General Stephen A. Hurlbut: "I was exceedingly grateful for the cause [of the delay] be it what it might, which gave us abundant time to take up a new position and prepare to hold it to the death."

This lull in the fighting gave the Union forces precious time to consolidate and strengthen their line. If Johnston had lived it is possible that the confederate assault would have brushed aside the disorganised Union troops and blown a wide hole in Grant's line. Johnston gave "resistless impulsion" to his troops and when he died so did their momentum.

 

[rebelyell]

I think if Johnston had lived the outcome would have been different.

 

[Elennsar]

Participants in the battle agree that there was a definite loss of momentum in the Confederate assault when Johnston fell.

CS General William J. Hardee: "No one cause probably contributed so greatly to our loss of time, which was the loss of success, as the fall of the commanding general. For want of a common superior to the different commands on that part of the field, great delay occurred after this misfortune, and that delay prevented the consummation of the work so gallantly and successfully begun."

We've seen piecemeal attacks, disjointed attacks, command intermingling, and every other sort of chaos for at least the last four hours (10 AM to 2 PM). A want of a common superior making any impression on events is not something that suddenly became an issue when Johnston got hit.

US General William T. Sherman: "The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston beyond all question fought skilfully from early morning till about 2pm, when their commander-in-chief was killed there was then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attack was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up to dark."

Which does nothing to indicate whether or not that lull was caused by his death, even in areas where the fighting had slowed down at that time.

US Colonel Joseph D. Webster: "I was exceedingly grateful for the cause [of the delay] be it what it might, which gave us abundant time to take up a new position and prepare to hold it to the death."

This lull in the fighting gave the Union forces precious time to consolidate and strengthen their line. If Johnston had lived it is possible that the confederate assault would have brushed aside the disorganised Union troops and blown a wide hole in Grant's line. Johnston gave "resistless impulsion" to his troops and when he died so did their momentum.

"It is true that fighting on the Confederate left somewhat diminished in midafternooon, but this had nothing to do with Johnston's death, as his defender's later claimed. The Confederates in that sector faced a serious ammunition shortage. The fighting in the center continued unabated. Indeed, if there was any loss of momentum following Johnston's death, it was on the Confederate right, where the army chief's death had left a command void." - from Larry Daniel's Shiloh.

But the assault force collected at 2 PM for Johnston's attempt at the Peach Orchard sector is only a small part of the army's strength (4,000 troops from Breckinridge, <1,000 from Stephens's brigade, and "one, possibly two of Jackson's regiments on the far right"). Polk and Bragg are still accomplishing little except piles of casualties.

 

[Saruman]

We've seen piecemeal attacks, disjointed attacks, command intermingling, and every other sort of chaos for at least the last four hours (10 AM to 2 PM). A want of a common superior making any impression on events is not something that suddenly became an issue when Johnston got hit.

That's your opinion and that's fine. I have more faith in the word of General Hardee as to the impact of Johnston's death.

Which does nothing to indicate whether or not that lull was caused by his death, even in areas where the fighting had slowed down at that time.

Sherman said "when their commander-in-chief was killed there was a perceptible lull" so it seems apparent to me that he is linking the two events.

"Indeed, if there was any loss of momentum following Johnston's death, it was on the Confederate right, where the army chief's death had left a command void." - from Larry Daniel's Shiloh.

Yes I agree.

But the assault force collected at 2 PM for Johnston's attempt at the Peach Orchard sector is only a small part of the army's strength (4,000 troops from Breckinridge, <1,000 from Stephens's brigade, and "one, possibly two of Jackson's regiments on the far right"). Polk and Bragg are still accomplishing little except piles of casualties.

After Johnston had personally led the charge that routed Hurlbut's division, the Union army didn't have that much standing in the way between the rebels and the landing. Just Stuart's brigade. Johnston could have gathered more troops and made for the landing instead of just surrounding Prentiss. He was pretty determined to water his horse in the Tennessee. Unfortunately we can never know.

 

[Elennsar]

That's your opinion and that's fine. I have more faith in the word of General Hardee as to the impact of Johnston's death.

Faith is not what we need here. Actual information on the condition of the troops in question would be much more useful.
"Upon the death of General Johnston, the command having devolved upon General Beauregard, the conflict was continued until near sunset" is the language in Hardee's official report, however.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Hardee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=0584
(Hardee)

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Hardee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=592;page=root;size=100 No mention by Shaver of Johnston's death in regards to anything by his men.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Hardee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=600;page=root;size=100 Cleburne specifically mentions needing to resupply his men with ammuntion.


http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Hardee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=608;page=root;size=100

I'm posting the reports of Hardee's subordinates since you're quoting Hardee on Johnston's death having a role here, so one would think if that's how he or his subordinates felt at the time it would be present in their reports (the link goes to the part discussing events around 2 PM for Shaver and Cleburne, Wood does not appear to have felt that as obliged to talk about the hour).

Sherman said "when their commander-in-chief was killed there was a perceptible lull" so it seems apparent to me that he is linking the two events.

Sherman did indeed say that. It doesn't mean he knew the actual condition of the enemy.

Yes I agree.

Do you intend to just treat the fact the majority of the army is not showing any signs of being hindered by his death as a minor detail?

After Johnston had personally led the charge that routed Hurlbut's division, the Union army didn't have that much standing in the way between the rebels and the landing. Just Stuart's brigade. Johnston could have gathered more troops and made for the landing instead of just surrounding Prentiss. He was pretty determined to water his horse in the Tennessee. Unfortunately we can never know.

"By 2:30, the situation on the Federal left had temporally stabilized."

Hurlbut's line in that regard isn't described as 'obviously breaking apart" for another hour and a half.

Quick rallying for routed men.

 

[Saruman]

Faith is not what we need here. Actual information on the condition of the troops in question would be much more useful.

Hardee's quote is describing the impact of Johnston's death, not the condition of troops, so again, I have more stock in it than your opinions.

Sherman did indeed say that. It doesn't mean he knew the actual condition of the enemy.

Sherman was actually there and involved in the battle, so I think he has a pretty good idea of what's happening.

Do you intend to just treat the fact the majority of the army is not showing any signs of being hindered by his death as a minor detail?

Johnston's death stalled the momentum on the right, which was crucial. That's why Johnston placed himself on the right, as the attack on the left was successful and didn't need his personal supervision.

"By 2:30, the situation on the Federal left had temporally stabilized."
Hurlbut's line in that regard isn't described as 'obviously breaking apart" for another hour and a half. Quick rallying for routed men.

Yes because Johnston had been killed at 2pm and momentum lost.

PS. I think I will also get to 14,000 posts from arguing with you.

 

[Elennsar]

Hardee's quote is describing the impact of Johnston's death, not the condition of troops, so again, I have more stock in it than your opinions.

Because the condition of troops has nothing to do with whether or not their attacks are successful or continued or not.

I don't care what you think of my opinions, but I care a great deal for whether or not you want to just ignore inconvenient facts on the situation on the field.

Also, I find the quote about "the fall of the commanding general" being so decisive in Bragg's (not Hardee's) report, which given that his part of the army was continuing to beat itself to death against the Hornet's Nest at the time of and after Johnston's death is not something I find very credible.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0010;q1=no. 166;view=image;seq=487;size=100;page=root - Bragg's report.

Hardee on page 569 says something slightly different.

But if we're trying to find the word of what those on the spot said, I want to see what Breckinridge and his subordinates thought in regards to the attack's failure.

Sherman was actually there and involved in the battle, so I think he has a pretty good idea of what's happening.

Your opinion does not do anything to make Sherman actually know the details of the other side of the field.

Johnston's death stalled the momentum on the right, which was crucial. That's why Johnston placed himself on the right, as the attack on the left was successful and didn't need his personal supervision.

Because overall supervision and such, who cares. Let's just have a bunch of semi-independent commanders fighting their own separate battles and sucking in reinforcements based on immediate concerns rather than overall objectives.

I'm not going to say the right wasn't important. But someone else could have dealt with it, and there is no "someone else" except Beauregard to deal with overall management and making sure that fighting elsewhere are not diverting troops from crucial areas because those without overall responsibility are more concerned with their particular area than the overall plan.

"Only Sidney Johnston could motivate these troops" is hard to swallow, and I'm not saying that to slight his skills there.

Yes because Johnston had been killed at 2pm and momentum lost.

PS. I think I will also get to 14,000 posts from arguing with you.

Not much in the way of momentum to lose if their opponents are reforming this readily.

 

[popeyej77]

Yes they were and that's why Beauregard ordered the halt.I can't fault him for that though many did.The confederate army desperately needed to rest and reorganize.The blunder is that they failed to do so,some units fell back all the way to the mornings starting point to bivioac while others stayed where they were and very little reorganization was done.Forrest couldn't even find Beauregard to tell him of Buell crossing the river.Had that reorganization occured and Buell not arrived,it could have gone either way on Monday,but every battle could have turned on a ton of Ifs.

 

[Elennsar]

A S Johnston died too soon for it to be determined if he would have been the cat's meow or the cat's box. He certainly showed plenty of potential in his former career. It would have helped if Beauregard had been more like Meade, content to be a really good second banana to a better general. Many of Johnston's original plans were quite good but were hampered - Beauregard, for instance, changing a strong frontal assault into a piecemeal one. The whole battle might not have been fought had Pope and Bragg not decided it was absolutely necessary to fubar Kentucky, and Pillow and Floyd decided on an ignoble scram from Ft Donelson with Buckner holding the bag. Johnston, being a Kentuckian by birth, well knew the strategic value of that state and needed it at least to remain neutral while he operated in Tennessee. It's true the best plans are immediately altered upon contact with the enemy, but Johnston had two strikes already handed him by his own commanders!

Also, I should make a post about this earlier:

Bragg wasn't even in the neighborhood of Kentucky in the period Sidney Johnston was finding that Polk was a worthless subordinate. But that just shifts which men should be cussed at.

 

[Saruman]

Because the condition of troops has nothing to do with whether or not their attacks are successful or continued or not. I don't care what you think of my opinions, but I care a great deal for whether or not you want to just ignore inconvenient facts on the situation on the field.

Regardless, Hardee, Sherman, Hurlbut, and Bragg all stated that Johnston's fall had a detrimental effect on the momentum of the confederate assault. That is the evidence I was referring to a few posts ago. You may believe it or choose to discount it. Everybody has their own opinion.

Your opinion does not do anything to make Sherman actually know the details of the other side of the field.

No it doesn't, but my opinion doesn't influence Sherman's opinion, and Sherman was there.

Because overall supervision and such, who cares. Let's just have a bunch of semi-independent commanders fighting their own separate battles and sucking in reinforcements based on immediate concerns rather than overall objectives. I'm not going to say the right wasn't important. But someone else could have dealt with it, and there is no "someone else" except Beauregard to deal with overall management and making sure that fighting elsewhere are not diverting troops from crucial areas because those without overall responsibility are more concerned with their particular area than the overall plan.

Shiloh was difficult terrain and the troops and officers were inexperienced. No general could have maintained enough control to execute complex maneuvers. Johnston performed very well considering.

"Only Sidney Johnston could motivate these troops" is hard to swallow, and I'm not saying that to slight his skills there.

I don't think it's hard to accept. Johnston was the only one who could motivate the Tennesseans to attack and break Hurlbut's line. The brigade commanders, Breckinridge, and Harris all failed.

Not much in the way of momentum to lose if their opponents are reforming this readily.

That's because Johnston was the driving force behind the attack. Remove him and the attack stalls.

 

[popeyej77]

Polk had his faults but I would hardly call him worthless.His men loved and fought well for him.

 

[Elennsar]

I don't think it's hard to accept. Johnston was the only one who could motivate the Tennesseans to attack and break Hurlbut's line. The brigade commanders, Breckinridge, and Harris all failed.

Let's see how the brigade commanders describe it.

Maney: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0010;view=image;seq=471;page=root;size=100

Martin (commanding Bowen's brigade):
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0010;view=image;seq=639;page=root;size=100 - on

Jackson: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=571&size=100

Chalmers:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=565&size=100

Statham does not appear to have left a report.

Do you see those four talking about how the attack was dependent on Johnston's leadership?

 

[Saruman]

Let's see how the brigade commanders describe it.

Maney: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Stephens;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=471;page=root;size=100

Martin (commanding Bowen's brigade):
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=no. 225;rgn=full text;idno=waro0010;didno=waro0010;view=image;seq=639;page=root;size=100 - on

Jackson: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=571&size=100

Chalmers:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ro0010&q1=JAckson&view=image&seq=565&size=100

Statham does not appear to have left a report.

Do you see those four talking about how the attack was dependent on Johnston's leadership?

Breckinridge rode up to Johnston and said, "General, I have a Tennessee regiment that won't fight." Governor Harris broke in energetically, "General Breckinridge, show me that regiment!" Breckinridge, courteously and apologetically, indicated the command, and Johnston said, "Let the Governor go to them."

With great difficulty Harris got the men into line but couldn't encourage them forward. Breckinridge soon returned and said he feared that he could not get the brigade to make the charge. Johnston replied to him cheerfully, "Oh yes, general; I think you can."

Breckinridge, visibly upset, said that he had tried and failed. "Then I will help you," said Johnston.

 

[Elennsar]

Breckinridge rode up to Johnston and said, "General, I have a Tennessee regiment that won't fight." Governor Harris broke in energetically, "General Breckinridge, show me that regiment!" Breckinridge, courteously and apologetically, indicated the command, and Johnston said, "Let the Governor go to them."

With great difficulty Harris got the men into line but couldn't encourage them forward. Breckinridge soon returned and said he feared that he could not get the brigade to make the charge. Johnston replied to him cheerfully, "Oh yes, general; I think you can."

Breckinridge, visibly upset, said that he had tried and failed. "Then I will help you," said Johnston.

And we don't have any report from either Breckinridge or Statham giving any information on the (judging by Daniel) 45th Tennessee, but we do have information on the rest of the regiments whose momentum you are asserting depended on Johnston's leadership.

I've posted the official reports of seven of the army's brigade commanders. None of them think the fight went out of the Confederates when he fell.

 

[Saruman]

And we don't have any report from either Breckinridge or Statham giving any information on the (judging by Daniel) 45th Tennessee, but we do have information on the rest of the regiments whose momentum you are asserting depended on Johnston's leadership.

I've posted the official reports of seven of the army's brigade commanders. None of them think the fight went out of the Confederates when he fell.

Probably because they were just brigade commanders with no overarching view of the situation.

 

[Elennsar]

Polk had his faults but I would hardly call him worthless.His men loved and fought well for him.

I would. He was an insubordinate, backstabbing son of a ----- who wrecked any chance of the AoT having a functional command structure. Being

Probably because they were just brigade commanders with no overarching view of the situation.

1) What overarching view of the situation did Bragg and Hardee display? (Or Sherman, for that matter)

2) So the brigade commanders would have no idea what their own men are doing? I don't mind the argument that they might not know 'the overall state of the army", but that - for example - Maney doesn't even know if the brigade he's commanding has stalled or not?

You really are making that the argument here?

If we were talking about what Maney might know of events elsewhere, of course he's busy with the affairs of his own brigade and probably wouldn't know the overall flow of the battle. But whether his men are willing to move forward or not is well within what he should know.

I'm not going to say the attack was completely uninfluenced by Johnston's death, but the absence of such being mentioned by the brigade commanders sounds more like a matter of no one in a position to answer "Now what?", not a lack of fighting spirit.

 

[Saruman]

1) What overarching view of the situation did Bragg and Hardee display? (Or Sherman, for that matter)

2) So the brigade commanders would have no idea what their own men are doing? I don't mind the argument that they might not know 'the overall state of the army", but that - for example - Maney doesn't even know if the brigade he's commanding has stalled or not?

You really are making that the argument here?

If we were talking about what Maney might know of events elsewhere, of course he's busy with the affairs of his own brigade and probably wouldn't know the overall flow of the battle. But whether his men are willing to move forward or not is well within what he should know.

Regardless, Hardee, Bragg, Sherman, and Hurlbut are all on the record saying that Johnston's fall had a detrimental effect on the confederate attack. I choose to take them at their word. Others may not.

 

[Elennsar]

Regardless, Hardee, Bragg, Sherman, and Webster are all on the record saying that Johnston's fall had a detrimental effect on the confederate attack. I choose to take them at their word. Others may not.

In other words, your mind is made up and we don't need any actual evidence bearing out their statements.

P.S.

Where exactly does Webster say "Johnston" in "I was exceedingly grateful for the cause [of the delay] be it what it might, which gave us abundant time to take up a new position and prepare to hold it to the death." ?

I don't begrudge you being a supporter of the idea Johnston had potential and/or actually displayed ability, but if this is based on total deafness to anything that might indicate otherwise, well, it's your right to insist on whatever you want to insist on regardless.

 

[Saruman]

In other words, your mind is made up and we don't need any actual evidence bearing out their statements.

Unfallible evidence is not available to us. We are lacking reports from crucial players. The testimony of four significant figures from the battle, with no reason to act in concert with one another to push some agenda, is pretty convincing.

Where exactly does Webster say "Johnston" in "I was exceedingly grateful for the cause [of the delay] be it what it might, which gave us abundant time to take up a new position and prepare to hold it to the death." ?

He didn't know the cause of the delay at that point, but chronologically, it coincided with Johnston's fall.

I don't begrudge you being a supporter of the idea Johnston had potential and/or actually displayed ability, but if this is based on total deafness to anything that might indicate otherwise, well, it's your right to insist on whatever you want to insist on regardless.

Thank you, I will. And unless you have access to that time machine and sniper, you can not be so certain that Johnston's death was insignificant. This is a famous "what-if" from the Civil War and will be debated forever.