Decision at Snake Creek Gap

[1SGDan]

When in your opinion did Hood get there?
I think I know why Cox wrote what he did as there was a post war article by a Confederate officer who said Hood was there.
Why would that invalidate Coxs entire essay?

Currently at work but seem to remember that Johnston didn't start moving his army until the night of the 10th or 11th. Will have to go back later and follow the communications trail.

Cox's comments (and probably McPherson's decisions) were based on an assumption.While th MDMP requires that you make some assumptions about the possible COA's your enemy may make in reaction to your plan (which Sherman did). You should never assume actions not in evidence. McPherson should have tested the defense before assuming it was too strong.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Currently at work but seem to remember that Johnston didn't start moving his army until the night of the 10th or 11th. Will have to go back later and follow the communications trail.

Cox's comments (and probably McPherson's decisions) were based on an assumption.While th MDMP requires that you make some assumptions about the possible COA's your enemy may make in reaction to your plan (which Sherman did). You should never assume actions not in evidence. McPherson should have tested the defense before assuming it was too strong.

In the civil war, how large attack and how many casualties is an appropriate test in your view of fortifications?

 

[CW3O]

In the civil war, how large attack and how many casualties is an appropriate test in your view of fortifications?

Interesting question, but weren't there other alternatives than an all out attack? A reconnaissance in force? From what has posted concerning McPherson's actions I wonder what he based his decisions on. An 18 man limited reconnaissance mission?

He may have made the correct decision, but the state of the defenses is somewhat in question until the conflicting sources are sorted out. What did McPherson actually know of them?

 

[1SGDan]

In the civil war, how large attack and how many casualties is an appropriate test in your view of fortifications?

Certainly more than 18 soldiers. A single regiment was not assumed to be there they were reported as such. arrangements had been made to push them away but at the last minute McPherson lost his nerve.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Interesting question, but weren't there other alternatives than an all out attack?
.

Im trying to understand what would satisfy Dan

 

[1SGDan]

Basically a legitimate effort at accomplishing his mission that had it been made may have yielded a far greater reward than what was anticipated. That was the original premise of the thread. At what point does a subordinate commander have to hold himself to a strict interpretation of his orders and when is it incumbent on him to do more when opportunities arise.

I believe that a strong effort on the afternoon and early evening of the 9th may not only have taken the railroad but had every chance of driving Cantey out of the village.

 

[CW3O]

I have read Cox's essay, and while it smacks of some level of excuse making, does raise some important military points. Most interesting to me was the approaching darkness. According to Cox there was less than an hour of daylight left when McPherson stood on the stump and made his decision not to attack. Cox numbered the defenders at two brigades and at least ten guns at that time, not an insignificant number behind fortifications but likely not 6,000. What reinforcements did the confederates get before daylight the next day?

 

[NedBaldwin]

He may have made the correct decision, but the state of the defenses is somewhat in question until the conflicting sources are sorted out. What did McPherson actually know of them?

Part of 16th corps moved near the defenses, receiving artillery and musket fire ("The enemy, observing the movement, opened a heavy fire from his batteries upon the column, and also, together with rapid musketry, upon the left of the Second Division, doing, however, but little execution." -- Dodge's report; "here ). Other parts of the Corps moved near the defenses and "skirmished with the enemy until after dark" (report of Col. Adams commanding 2nd brigade, 2nd div.) McPherson also apparently looked at the fortifications in person. So he had some information to go by.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I have read Cox's essay, and while it smacks of some level of excuse making, does raise some important military points. Most interesting to me was the approaching darkness. According to Cox there was less than an hour of daylight left when McPherson stood on the stump and made his decision not to attack. Cox numbered the defenders at two brigades and at least ten guns at that time, not an insignificant number behind fortifications but likely not 6,000. What reinforcements did the confederates get before daylight the next day?

Earlier I itemized the Confederates I have identified as being there. It included Cantey's brigade, Reynold's Brigade (part of which arrived that afternoon), Vaughan's Brigade (also arrived that aternoon), a detechament of Georgia troops and Grigsby's cavalry.

Late in the day Johnston dispatched Hood (the person, I'm not referring to a command force) to Resaca (arrival time unclear) as well as the divisions of Cleburne, Hindman and Walker. These divisions moved close to Resaca but were halted before they arrived when it was determined that the threat level had gone down.

 

[Tony Gunter]

This thread reminds me of some of the discussions I have had about the Battle of Raymond. Ed Bearss wrote an account 50 years ago that jumped to some REALLY terrible conclusions ... I mean, just a jaw-droppingly bad interpretation that completely misrepresents what happened during the battle. Bearss is such a great guy who has done so many great things, that when you point out his interpretation of Raymond is way the hell out in left field, you get a lot of people who act like you just desecrated the grave of Mother Theresa.

I think there are some similarities between the misinterpretations of Resaca and Raymond, and the commonality is McPherson. He was very terse in his reports, and engaged in no finger-pointing or CYA after a battle ... all mistakes were dealt with internally, off the record. So the lack of explicit descriptions for his actions leave huge gaps that many fill with supposition.

 

[1SGDan]

"Gigsby's troopers offer 'considerable resistance'"
In fact McPherson reports at 12:30 pm on the 9th
We met one brigade of rebel cavalry shortly after we emerged from the gap this morning, drove them back after a slight skirmish.
No actions are described as more than skirmishing and the seizure of Bald Hill was more a rout than a fight. As McPherson closes on Resaca he has not encountered anything close to considerable resistance. He has the bulk of two corps with a few miles of Resaca and the enemy has displayed little inclination to fight.

The enemy at Resaca is described by their commander on May 9, 1864 – 4 pm
General: Grigsby's Brigade is in the trenches at Resaca.
General Johnston wants some cavalry in observation between this place and Resaca for fear of a surprise by an advance here. I do not think Resaca in any danger; we have 4,000 men there.

From the Major Cox paper
with about 4000 holding the works in his front

Historians Woodworth, Castel, and Connelly have also set the number at around 4000. They have been promised reinforcement but there is no indication in the communications that they have arrived yet. There is daylight left but McPherson makes no move other than call a conference of his commanders. Following the meeting he removes his battle line without even a attempt at his primary objective. A fantastic opportunity is wasted.

 

[Elennsar]

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=075/0105 - McPherson, 12:30 PM

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=075/0682 -Mackall, 4:30 PM

Any other relevant official reports would be welcome. Just trying to collect them for maximum clarity.

 

[NedBaldwin]

"Gigsby's troopers offer 'considerable resistance'"
In fact McPherson reports at 12:30 pm on the 9th
We met one brigade of rebel cavalry shortly after we emerged from the gap this morning, drove them back after a slight skirmish.
No actions are described as more than skirmishing and the seizure of Bald Hill was more a rout than a fight. As McPherson closes on Resaca he has not encountered anything close to considerable resistance.

"Considerable resistance" seems to be an interpretive description that is in the eye of the beholder. The commander on the scene used that term to describe what he experienced, authors have quoted his at face value. But it doesnt meet your standard for resistance. We get it.

He has the bulk of two corps with a few miles of Resaca and the enemy has displayed little inclination to fight.

Smith's 2nd division of the 15th Corps stopped at Sugar Valley, several miles back; Harrow's 3rd division is further behind; only the 1st division made it to near Resaca.

• "Captain Stansbary, of my staff, has just returned from Sugar Valley Post-Office. Two divisions of General McPhersons corps occupy the country from that point to the gap this side. General Mc-Pherson, with the other three divisions of his command, is six miles farther on in the direction of Resaca. At 6 p. in. his advance had reached a point about one mile from the railroad. Considerable firing of infantry and artillery had been heard for an hour." -- Gen. Kilpatrick, May 9th
• Monday, May 9, broke camp at 3 a. in., marched through Snake Creek Gap to Sugar Valley Post-Office, on the crossing of the Dallas [Dalton] and Resaca roads, and formed line of battle in order to hold these roads, while the Left Wing of the Sixteenth Corps and the First Division of the Fifteenth Corps moved forward for the purpose of destroying the railroad bridge over the Oostenaula River at Resaca; they having failed in their purpose, were withdrawn to Snake Creek Gap. -- Report of Capt. Gordon Lofland, Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Division

From the Major Cox paper with about 4000 holding the works in his front

Cox also refers to Dodge's Corps as "consisting of about six thousand men" but you had earlier declared that in your view Cox's comments were "pretty much" invalidated anyway.

Historians Woodworth, Castel, and Connelly have also set the number at around 4000.

It is no surprise, since they cite the MacKall message as the source for their number. Castel helpfully breaks apart what he thinks the 4,000 was composed of and that reveals what he overlooked. Looking at a broader range of sources than just one message shows that more were involved that day.

They have been promised reinforcement but there is no indication in the communications that they have arrived yet.

There is a subsequent communication saying "Vaughan has reached Resaca". Other sources put Vaughan's arrival as prior to McPherson's pulling back.

A fantastic opportunity is wasted.

The opportunity is imaginary.

 

[Elennsar]

"Considerable resistance" seems to be an interpretive description that is in the eye of the beholder. The commander on the scene used that term to describe what he experienced, authors have quoted his at face value. But it doesnt meet your standard for resistance. We get it.

What commander in what report used the term "considerable resistance"?

I'm trying to assemble the primary sources for reference, I'm not trying to take sides (same disclaimer applies to all questions in this post).

Cox also refers to Dodge's Corps as "consisting of about six thousand men" but you had earlier declared that in your view Cox's comments were "pretty much" invalidated anyway.

So for those of us following along, why should we use his figure for Dodge (where does he but not his figure for the Confederates (or vice-versa)?

http://books.google.com/books?id=Xg8TAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq="with about 4000 holding the works in his front" Cox&source=bl&ots=bc7_yvBCnY&sig=CbgTrWbDHXmY2WWVkbVHYWFaLV8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hdPNU8eJFYaAiwLMuYDIDQ&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q="with about 4000 holding the works in his front" Cox&f=false - the statement for those like me who haven't read it outside this thread.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=present for duty;rgn=full text;idno=waro0074;didno=waro0074;view=image;seq=678;page=root;size=100

Obviously this is not perfect for this day, but it's a start.

There is a subsequent communication saying "Vaughan has reached Resaca". Other sources put Vaughan's arrival as prior to McPherson's pulling back.

When is that communication? What other sources?

 

[NedBaldwin]

What commander in what report used the term "considerable resistance"?

Dodge.

So for those of us following along, why should we use his figure for Dodge (where does he but not his figure for the Confederates (or vice-versa)?

Or why should we rely on any of his figures?

the statement for those like me who haven't read it outside this thread.

I posted the entire passage earlier in this thread.

When is that communication?

May 9th, no time stamp shown. Appears in the ORs page after the famous "4,000" message.

What other sources?

Nisbetts (Col, 66th GA) memoirs Four Years on the Firing Line -- "A Tennessee Brigade had just arrived from Dalton, and when they witnessed the steadiness of our movement under fire..." (p275)
and The Seventeenth Alabama A Regimental History - "We had a brisk skirmish with them, but Reynolds brigade from below and Vaughn 's from Dalton joined us during the fight."

 

[Elennsar]

Dodge.

Thank you.

Or why should we rely on any of his figures?

Indeed. We have the 4,000 mentioned elsewhere, we don't have the six thousand for Dodge mentioned elsewhere (do we?), let alone the other figures for the other Confederates Cox mentioned.

I posted the entire passage earlier in this thread.

And I posted a link to that paper. I intended it to be complementary to your post, not contradicting.

May 9th, no time stamp shown. Appears in the ORs page after the famous "4,000" message.

This?

"
HEADQUARTERS,
Dalton, May 9, 1864.
General CLEBURNE:

Vaughan has reached Resaca and his regiment from Atlanta.* Wheeler whipped two cavalry brigades twice his size. Captured 100 prisoners; 1 brigadier killed; got many arms; drove them back two miles. General Lee beat Grant again on Saturday. In our front no news.

MACKALL,

General and Chief of Staff."

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=075/0683

Nisbetts (Col, 66th GA) memoirs Four Years on the Firing Line -- "A Tennessee Brigade had just arrived from Dalton, and when they witnessed the steadiness of our movement under fire..." (p275)
and The Seventeenth Alabama A Regimental History - "We had a brisk skirmish with them, but Reynolds brigade from below and Vaughn 's from Dalton joined us during the fight."

Thank you.

Do you know of any reports made around the time of the 9th mentioning any of these units and their activities? Confederate report making seems to be lax, which might explain the issue of counting numbers.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Confederate report making seems to be lax

It sure does.

 

[Tony Gunter]

I think we are underestimating the amount of energy required to skirmish with a brigade of cavalry for 7 miles. Deploy into line of battle. Move forward. Cavalry falls back 1/4 mile. Deploy into column, march, deploy into line of battle. Rinse. Repeat.

If I'm reading this thread correctly, McPherson finds himself in front of Resaca with about 12,000 men against 6,000 men behind fortifications. The remainder of his force and his supply wagons are either spread out guarding crossroads or behind the gap. Over half of the Confederate army is bearing down on him from the north because Sherman is able to apply almost no pressure on Johnston due to strong defenses in the gaps, and Hooker is a couple of days away from supporting him.

So let's say McPherson manages to break through to Resaca after a bloody storming of the works. What is to stop the Confederate main body from wiping the floor with the diminutive AotT the next day?

I think Sherman's plan was critically flawed in that he 1) did not ensure McPherson would have the cavalry he needed 2) did not issue orders for Hooker to follow McPherson through the gap.

 

[Elennsar]

So let's say McPherson manages to break through to Resaca after a bloody storming of the works. What is to stop the Confederate main body from wiping the floor with the diminutive AotT the next day?

The absence of the Confederate main body?

Johnston mentions in his report of the campaign sending three divisions there, but I do not see where those orders were actually given - Hood obviously was sent with some force (per Connelly, "elements of Clerburne's, Walker's, and Hindman's divisions") after dark on the 9th, but Mackall does not mention an order in my searching (imperfect, so if anyone can point to a source I would be grateful) for anythings substantial to be sent under Hood.

 

[NedBaldwin]

The absence of the Confederate main body?

Johnston mentions in his report of the campaign sending three divisions there, but I do not see where those orders were actually given - Hood obviously was sent with some force (per Connelly, "elements of Clerburne's, Walker's, and Hindman's divisions") after dark on the 9th, but Mackall does not mention an order in my searching (imperfect, so if anyone can point to a source I would be grateful) for anythings substantial to be sent under Hood.

Walker's division, Hindman's division and most of (one brigade stayed behind) Cleburne's division is substantial -- 3 out of 7 of the divisions around Dalton.