Decision at Snake Creek Gap

[1SGDan]

Deleted for lack of cooperation and failure to stay on topic

 

[unionblue]

1SGDan,

More please.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

 

[ole]

Question. Would Thomas's army have been able to get through the Gap? I understand it was quite narrow in places.

 

[Elennsar]

McPherson seems to have neglected carrying out the offensive part of the operation - did he seriously think a mere eighteen men being sent forward would be enough to threaten the railroad, and/or that he had nothing more to spare?

 

[NedBaldwin]

Johnston is reinforced by Polk but he deploys them to defend what he
expects the enemy will attempt – a move to Rome.

You have mischaracterized what happened. Polk was on his way from Alabama with the divisions of Loring, French and Jackson; the route they were taking would bring them into Georgia at Rome. So Johnson had not been reinforced by Polk prior to Polk reaching Rome. Polk's lead units didnt reach Rome until May 10th at which time Johnston had directed it to move on to Resaca

Although McPherson's movements are discovered around Villanow Johnston still believes the focus of his move is Rome, no effort is made to defend Snake Creek Gap.

I disagree with this. Johnston's directions to Martin on the 7th stated "as Calhoun can be much sooner reached by an enemy from La Fayette than Rome can, he wishes you to move up the river and take position in the vicinity of Calhoun". Martin was in Rome; Johnson had just directed him to leave there and move to Calhoun. Two days earlier Johnston had also ordered Cantey to move his brigade from Rome to Resaca. Thus he had taken men away from Rome to reinforce the area where Snake Creek Gap came out.

Late on the 8th BG George Cantey, commanding at Resaca,
finally dispatches Colonel Warren Grigsby's brigade of Kentucky Cavalry to the gap.

Where did you get that Cantey was the one who dispatched Grigsby?

Despite the lack of resistance McPherson advances within two miles of Resaca and then stops
at Bald Hill.

McPherson and his subordinates reported resistance., so it seems false to me to write "Despite the lack of resistance ".
Dodge, commanding the head of the column, wrote in his report of fighting with confederate cavalry at the mouth of the gap and then skirmishing the entire distance from the gap to Resaca. At Bald Hill he found a couple of confederate regiments in line of battle. He had to deploy one of his two divisions to drive them off the hill.

Looking into the village McPherson can see an earthen fort with artillery which
takes them under fire. Also visible is Johnston's only means of escape, the bridge across the
Oostanaula River. There are some troops seen moving about and McPherson sends only an 18
man detail of the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry to the railroad.

A very incomplete description. Here is Dodge, describing the action in front of Resaca:

About 4 p. m. I received orders to advance my left, the Fourth Division. to the railroad north of Resaca, and hold the Bald Hill with the Second Division. General Veatch was immediately ordered to move, with Fullers and Spragues bri- gades, of his (Fourth) division, massed in close column by divisions, and, forming promptly, he moved rapidly across the west fork of Mill Creek, in plain view of Resaca. The enemy, observing the movement, opened a heavy fire from his batteries upon the column, and also, together with rapid musketry, upon the left of the Second Division, (loing, however, but little execution. After having moved the column across the first open field, I received from General Mc- Pherson an order directing me to look well to my right, as the enemy was massing and pressing forward in that direction. Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Fuller led the advance of the column, and, just as he was gaining cover of the woods on the east side of Mill Creek, I received notice that Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Spragues brigade had been halted, by order of General McPherson, to support the left of the Second Division and hold the space between that division and the Fourth Division. I was with the advance (Fullers brigade). The skirmishers had just reported that they were within a short distance of the railroad when the enemy opened fire upon the brigade with a regiment of infantry and a battery in position, directly on our right. I immediately sent orders to Colonel Fuller to charge the battery and swing still farther to the north, nuder cover of the timber. Before this order was executed I received orders from General McPherson to withdraw the brigade and close upon Colonel Sprague, who was formed on the left of the Second Division. This had to be done in view of the enemy, whose batteries had a point-blank range across the open fields upon the column. Colonel Fuller deployed his brigade under cover of the timber, and, withdrawing by regiments across the open fields, formed in position on the west side of Mill Creek. By the time the withdrawal was accomplished it was sunset, and I received orders to withdraw the command and return to Snake Creek Gap.​

At the time of his retreat Resaca and the lifeline of the Army of Tennessee is guarded only 4,000 troops.

Untrue. At the time his retreated the number was over 6,000.

 

[unionblue]

You have mischaracterized what happened. Polk was on his way from Alabama with the divisions of Loring, French and Jackson; the route they were taking would bring them into Georgia at Rome. So Johnson had not been reinforced by Polk prior to Polk reaching Rome. Polk's lead units didnt reach Rome until May 10th at which time Johnston had directed it to move on to Resaca




I disagree with this. Johnston's directions to Martin on the 7th stated "as Calhoun can be much sooner reached by an enemy from La Fayette than Rome can, he wishes you to move up the river and take position in the vicinity of Calhoun". Martin was in Rome; Johnson had just directed him to leave there and move to Calhoun. Two days earlier Johnston had also ordered Cantey to move his brigade from Rome to Resaca. Thus he had taken men away from Rome to reinforce the area where Snake Creek Gap came out.



Where did you get that Cantey was the one who dispatched Grigsby?




McPherson and his subordinates reported resistance., so it seems false to me to write "Despite the lack of resistance ".
Dodge, commanding the head of the column, wrote in his report of fighting with confederate cavalry at the mouth of the gap and then skirmishing the entire distance from the gap to Resaca. At Bald Hill he found a couple of confederate regiments in line of battle. He had to deploy one of his two divisions to drive them off the hill.




A very incomplete description. Here is Dodge, describing the action in front of Resaca:

About 4 p. m. I received orders to advance my left, the Fourth Division. to the railroad north of Resaca, and hold the Bald Hill with the Second Division. General Veatch was immediately ordered to move, with Fullers and Spragues bri- gades, of his (Fourth) division, massed in close column by divisions, and, forming promptly, he moved rapidly across the west fork of Mill Creek, in plain view of Resaca. The enemy, observing the movement, opened a heavy fire from his batteries upon the column, and also, together with rapid musketry, upon the left of the Second Division, (loing, however, but little execution. After having moved the column across the first open field, I received from General Mc- Pherson an order directing me to look well to my right, as the enemy was massing and pressing forward in that direction. Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Fuller led the advance of the column, and, just as he was gaining cover of the woods on the east side of Mill Creek, I received notice that Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Spragues brigade had been halted, by order of General McPherson, to support the left of the Second Division and hold the space between that division and the Fourth Division. I was with the advance (Fullers brigade). The skirmishers had just reported that they were within a short distance of the railroad when the enemy opened fire upon the brigade with a regiment of infantry and a battery in position, directly on our right. I immediately sent orders to Colonel Fuller to charge the battery and swing still farther to the north, nuder cover of the timber. Before this order was executed I received orders from General McPherson to withdraw the brigade and close upon Colonel Sprague, who was formed on the left of the Second Division. This had to be done in view of the enemy, whose batteries had a point-blank range across the open fields upon the column. Colonel Fuller deployed his brigade under cover of the timber, and, withdrawing by regiments across the open fields, formed in position on the west side of Mill Creek. By the time the withdrawal was accomplished it was sunset, and I received orders to withdraw the command and return to Snake Creek Gap.​

Untrue. At the time his retreated the number was over 6,000.

NedBaldwin,

What sources are you using for your above post?

Sincerely,
Unionblue

 

[NedBaldwin]

NedBaldwin,

What sources are you using for your above post?

Sincerely,
Unionblue

Mostly the Official Records. A little bit of my information comes from articles by Johnston and Breckenridge in the Century Magazine, the memoirs of James Cooper Nisbet of the 66th Georgia, the diary of Gen. Dan Reynolds and the writings of Prof. Steve Newton

 

[NedBaldwin]

1. Why, if he was unwilling to send McPherson to Rome because he was under-manned, did Sherman select him to operate independently in this operation?

I don't understand the idea behind this question. The decision not the send McPherson directly toward Rome from Alabama had to do with the reduction in size of his force (not only due to the detachment on the Red River but also to the furlough of the 17th Corps) and Sherman's concern for having his moving columns too far apart from each other. So Sherman adjusted his plan so that McPherson's army would function in closer support of Thomas's army.

3. Had McPherson acted and seized Resaca what would have been the impact?

If McPherson had assaulted Resaca in the remaining daylight with the force at hand (3 divisions), he might have seized it but it would have been bloody fight (attacking prepared fortifications is generally not easy). Meanwhile Johnston had dispatched Hood with three divisions to move on Resaca, so the next morning McPherson would be cut off from Sherman and facing attack or siege. Without ammunition resupply (his wagons were west of the gap), would McPherson have been able to hold onto Resaca for long?

 

[unionblue]

Mostly the Official Records. A little bit of my information comes from articles by Johnston and Breckenridge in the Century Magazine, the memoirs of James Cooper Nisbet of the 66th Georgia, the diary of Gen. Dan Reynolds and the writings of Prof. Steve Newton

NedBaldwin,

Thank you for providing the above sources for your comments. I have come to recognize that you always base your observations on historical fact and sources.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

 

[NedBaldwin]

NedBaldwin,

Thank you for providing the above sources for your comments. I have come to recognize that you always base your observations on historical fact and sources.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

If you are interested in any specific comment I made, I can provide the specific source for it.

 

[unionblue]

If you are interested in any specific comment I made, I can provide the specific source for it.

NedBaldwin,

Thank you for the offer, but at this time I don't require such.

I am more interested in how much I can learn about this incident in history between you and 1SGDan and your comments and observations between one another.

I look upon this upcoming exchange as a virtual history "shower" of information.

Thanks again for your sources and your offer to be more specific with them. The offer is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

 

[NedBaldwin]

your argument is with Albert Castel not me.

Yes, I have plenty of issues with Castel.

"To defend Resaca and its vital railroad bridge he(Cantey) has approximately 4000 troops. Two fifths belong to his own brigade and consist in large part of raw recruits, they are the ones that skedaddled from Bald Hill, Another two-fifths are members of the 66th Georgia and a attached battalion, who have bee detached from Walker's division to garrison Resaca. The remainder are Grigsby's dogged but dog tired Kentuckians.

Castel overlooks that Dan Reynolds brigade arrived from Mobile, one regiment on the 8th and two more on the 9th.
In addition, on the 9th Chief of Staff MacKall wrote to Cantey that "General Johnston sends you another brigade", which was Vaughan's Tennessee brigade.

 

[Elennsar]

The ultimate question here is if Thomas had been in McPherson's place with the Army of the Cumberland, as his original plan wanted, would the situation have been changed?

Almost beyond a doubt. Thomas is more experienced and more able than McPherson and has a significant larger force at his disposal.

How far True As Steel would have gone, I'm sure, but I can't imagine him sending eighteen men forward and then giving up.

Castel overlooks that Dan Reynolds brigade arrived from Mobile, one regiment on the 8th and two more on the 9th.
In addition, on the 9th Chief of Staff MacKall wrote to Cantey that "General Johnston sends you another brigade", which was Vaughan's Tennessee brigade.

Where is that (on Reynolds) from precisely?

Trying to see what if any messages those three (or four counting MacKall) generals had to say while making sense of this.

I haven't read Castel so I'm not taking sides there and my copy of McMurry's book is currently a victim of my lack of organization of my books.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Where is that (on Reynolds) from precisely?

• Official Records, Series 1 - Volume 38, Part IV page 679, MacKall to Cantey May 8th: " One Arkansas regiment will reach you in the train to-day. Stop it and take the cars. Leave your best colonel to command until General Reynolds arrives" [the part about Cantey taking the cars was rescinded]
  
  
• Same source, different message, same day: "Brigadier-General CANTEY, Resaca: The Arkansas regiments on their way from Atlanta are to stop at Resaca."
  
  
• Worthy of the Cause for Which They Fight: The Civil War Diary of Brigadier General Daniel Harris Reynolds, 1861–1865. Fayetteville, University of Arkansas Press, 2011, entry for May 9:
  "A considerable skirmish at Resaca. The enemy were repulsed. Cantey's brigade lost some 70 men killed, wounded and prisoners. I lost none from my brigade; none of it engaged. One regiment, 25th, was on the skirmish line but to the left of where the attack was made, and two regiments, 4th Arkansas and 39th North Carolina, arrived shortly after the skirmishing commenced and were taken from the cars and placed in line of battle but were not called upon to fire a gun. My left rested on the Oostenaula River."

 

[NedBaldwin]

Castel pg 138
"To defend Resaca and its vital railroad bridge he (Cantey) has approximately 4000 troops. Two fifths belong to his own brigade and consist in large part of raw recruits, they are the ones that skedaddled from Bald Hill, Another two-fifths are members of the 66th Georgia and a attached battalion, who have bee detached from Walker's division to garrison Resaca. The remainder are Grigsby's dogged but dog tired Kentuckians.

Regarding Cantey, Castel puts the brigade at 1,600 [2/5th of 4,000]. I think that was true of the start of the day. But I think an additional regiment of the brigade arrived that day.

The strength return of the Army of Tennessee for April 1864 [OR1-v32-pt3-page866] reported a present for duty for Cantey's brigade of 1,643 with a footnote that says:

"Joined from District of the Gulf and encamped at Rome. Report includes only the Seventeenth and Twenty-ninth Alabama Regiments and a battalion of sharpshooters. The effective total of the Thirty-seventh Mississippi, en route, estimated at about 400." [emphasis mine]
​

So when did the 37MS reach the rest of the brigade? On the 9th MacKall wrote to Cleburne "Vaughan has reached Resaca and his regiment from Atlanta." The part I underlined is cryptic; my interpretation is that 'his' refers to Cantey and that this indicates the arrival of the 37MS.

 

[NedBaldwin]

He COULD have taken the town but did not.

Speculation.

To me, your commentary is based on questionable claims of fact and wishful thinking.

I dont see it certain at all that McPherson could have captured the town if he attacked.
Even if he had, he would have been divided, isolated and low on supplies.
Hooker was a days march from Resaca and did not have orders to join McPherson there.
Johnson did deplete his force that day in order to ensure Resaca was safe and a few days later he would move his whole force to Resaca. Even though this supposedly made him vulnerable to Sherman and Thomas, they got no opportunity from it.

With the bridge supposedly destroyed and Polk arrive to the south, the road to Atlanta would not be wide open.

In my mind Thomas would have seized the opportunity.

In my mind this is whishful thinking. I dont see any basis for this claim except the idolization of Thomas.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Okay then state why.

Attacks against prepared fortifications were generally challenging.
Prior to Osterhaus's division arriving, only Dodge's Corps was at hand with roughly 8,000 men.
Hardly great numbers to attack 6,000+
Once Osterhaus arrives, the numbers are better (2-1) but time would be lost getting him into place.
There was a short window of time before sunset.

I have made no overt claims idolizing Thomas or anyone else. Your inability to see the possibilities here does not mean they did not exist.

LOL. Then explain why Thomas would have done differently? Is there an example of another time when he launched an impromptu attack against a fortified location and carried it?

 

[tmh10]

View attachment 42159

Thanks for posting the map. It helps to follow the movements being discussed.

 

[NedBaldwin]

If you find this kind of discussion uncomfortable then don't feel compelled to participate.

I am not at all uncomfortable with this discussion nor do I feel compelled to participate.

 

[NedBaldwin]

OR Vol. 38 Pt IV pg. 682

Further communication also reveals that even when reinforcements begin to arrive Cantey is ordered to spread them out. Works on the south bank of the river are ordered to protect against an attack from the south if the Union forces cross the river. There is no indication that the 4000 men referred to were or would be reinforced prior to an attack effort.

One of the further communications is this, from MacKall to Cantey, OR Vol. 38 Pt IV pg. 684:
"General Johnston sends you another brigade. He impresses upon you the importance of the bridges you guard and the absolute necessity of their being held. General Martin is near Calhoun. Make arrangements with him to come to your assistance, if pressed, and keep the general fully informed of everything that takes place. Remember that if you are attacked by a very large force the general will come to your assistance, and that you can hold out with the certainty of being relieved. As the enemy may cross below you and attack the bridge from the south, the general thinks you had better throw up some defenses at the south end of the bridge."

So there is another brigade coming (I mentioned this earlier) to reinforce him, in addition Martin is nearby to assist and Johnston will come to his assistance if he is attacked by a larger force.