Here is another way of looking at what happened that day, though Cox was a biased observer, having been a staff officer in the army of the Tennessee and an admirer of McPherson:
I beg to say, by way of introduction, that the paper which I have the great pleasure of reading this evening relates to the two most critical and important days in the career of General McPherson, and the two days, by much the most critical, of the Atlanta campaign, when, as it seems to me, the possibility of very serious disaster was most imminent. These two days were the 9th of May, when the affair at Snake Creek Gap took place, and the 22d of July in front of Atlanta, when Hood attacked the Federal left.
The course pursued by McPherson at Snake Creek Gap has been the subject of much adverse and ill-considered comment; and that his services on the 22d of July, the day he fell, were of an unusual character is not generally understood.
I have attempted to explain how, from the standpoint of to-day, it may be seen that the results of these two pivotal days were shaped and directed for great good by the man whose name is especially associated with them.
The Atlanta campaign began with Johnston at Dalton with an army, in round numbers, of fifty thousand men. The position he occupied was a very strong one; and, had been skill, fully and completely fortified.
Toward this position, Sherman turned his face with the Armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee, his forces in the aggregate being about twice as strong as those of his adversary. The Army of the Cumberland was a little larger than that of Johnston, and commanded by General Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee was something over twenty thousand, and commanded by General McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio, one-third smaller, was led by General Schofield. With this splendid force and organization, the campaign was opened.
It may be said generally that Johnston's position at Dalton was in a valley, with the railroad and his line of supplies directly in his rear. His right flank was in no danger, and he seems to have assumed that his left and rear were effectually protected by the range of mountains, which extended in a southwesterly direction, and which covered, like a wall, the railroad and his communications.
But investigation showed that in this range of mountains there were two gateways through which it was possible to move attacking columns. One of these gateways, Dugs Gap, was, perhaps, four miles south of where the Confederate left rested, and the other, Snake Creek Gap,concerning which very little appears to have been known, was about fourteen miles farther on.
The opening chapter of General Sherman's plan, generally stated, was to manoeuvre with the main body of the army, in front of Johnston's works at Dalton, while he made a tentative movement against Dugs Gap, and threw a strong detachment toward Snake Creek Gap, hoping to get through one or both of them and into the enemy's rear.
Hooker with the Twentieth Corps was to move upon the adjacent gateway; while McPherson, with the Fifteenth Corps, commanded by Logan,and the Sixteenth, commanded by Dodge, constituting the Army of the Tennessee, was to move upon the more distant and more important one, and the remaining seventy thousand men were to watch the embankments at Dalton.
When the plan of moving through Snake Creek Gap was suggested to General Thomas, there seems to be no doubt that he endorsed it, but he very earnestly and, for him, very urgently advised that the proposed plan be modified, and that the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio, aggregating, say, thirty thousand men, be deployed in front of Dalton, while the Army of the Cumberland, consisting of sixty thousand, be moved through the Gap and thrown across the railroad on the enemy's line of retreat.
But General Sherman preferred his own view and its execution was proceeded with: the Army of the Cumberland and Army of the Ohio sat down in front of Dalton, Hooker entered upon the difficult task of penetrating Dugs Gap' and McPherson put his command in motion for the Gap below. It was hoped against every reasonable probability that the important Gap would be found to be unoccupied; that it could be seized and a lodgment effected across the railroad in the enemy's rear; that Thomas and Schofield, watching the works at Dalton, would prevent Johnston from letting go and so being able to fall upon the detachment thus in possession of the railroad in his rear; and that the sum of the operations would be, first, the evacuation of Dalton, and second, the destruction of the army which held it.
The orders to the Army of the Tennessee were necessarily of a somewhat elastic character, leaving much to the discretion of its commander. General Sherman was emphatic in making known his objects and what he expected to be done, but he purposely so framed his orders that they did not stand in the way of whatever the emergency might demand.
McPherson, as always, entered into the spirit of the duty to which he was assigned, with zeal and energy, but not, I think, without misgivings. His army marched in the direction of its purposes to Gordon's Mills, thence to Villanow, and on the 8th of May into Snake Creek Gap, the head of the column passing through the defile, or nearly through it, to its mouth looking into Sugar Valley, without hearing of the enemy or firing a gun.
On the morning of the 9th, the command, with the possible exception of one division of the Fifteenth Corps, which was with the trains and unavailable, had emerged into Sugar Valley and was ready to proceed with and carry out its part of the plan. It was composed entirely of infantry and artillery, with the exception of a small and very tired regiment of mounted infantry of about three hundred men. There must have been some good reason why no cavalry was provided, for it would be difficult to conceive of a situation in which an adequate mounted force was more plainly necessary; but whatever the situation demanded, the duty was required to be performed with infantry and artillery. The handful of dragoons, whatever their energy and usefulness in the morning, had ceased to be a factor by the time they had reached the end of their day's ride and battle and when their services would have been of almost inestimable value and importance.
As we have seen, the first act, the occupation of the Gap, had been successfully accomplished without firing a gun, and the evacuation of Dalton was a foregone conclusion. The other chapter, the seizure of the railroad and the things connected therewith, which, in all its details rested in the discretion of McPherson, remained to be performed.
The imperfect and misleading maps which were our chief if not our only sources of information, showed that the nearest point on the railroad was Resaca, that the only practicable line of march from the Gap led to that point, and that it was out in the open, eight miles away.
In Sherman's Memoirs it is intimated that Resaca was only three miles from the mouth of the Gap, but it was more than twice that distance. General Dodge says it was nearly nine miles; it was certainly over eight; and the road, if road it could be called, was most of the way a characteristic Georgia wagon-track, upon which the progress of an army must necessarily be slow.
This wagon-track led almost directly across the valley to Resaca and the railroad; and about fifteen miles up the railroad, and up the valley, was General Johnston and his army of fifty thousand veterans.
To reach the railroad, therefore, and effect the proposed lodgment across it, involved a march of eight tedious and uncertain miles into a terra incognita, with the left flank of the column wide open from start to finish. And on this exposed flank was the enemy, almost within striking distance, whose movements were completely masked and who might be waiting at any point for the opportunity to strike. In addition to the railroad, there were certainly two available highways by which he could come rapidly down the valley: the Rome road, which crossed the line of march a few miles from the mouth of the Gap, and the Calhoun road perhaps two miles nearer Resaca. The country ahead was wholly unexplored, and what force there was in front, or on the left, or anywhere, could be ascertained only as it was developed and as the column felt its way.
Few men of discernment and a knowledge of the maxims of war could have contemplated without apprehension an attempt to solve the very difficult problem and duty which was imposed that morning upon the altogether faithful and zealous commander of the Army of the Tennessee. He knew that Dugs Gap continued to be securely sealed and that the roads leading to him from Dalton were all open to the enemy and all protected against a flank attack. He knew that Wheeler's divisions of cavalry could in a few hours ride down to him through a country they had been over many times before, and he knew that Johnston, a thoroughly trained and most efficient general, had an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of all the details of the situation. These things and much more he knew, and yet he had no choice except to act upon the hopes and expectations of his superior and go ahead.
At the earliest practicable moment, on the morning of the 9th of May, the advance of the Army of the Tennessee, consisting of the 9th Illinois mounted infantry and a regiment of infantry belonging to the Sixteenth Corps, was sent forward. As it emerged from the Gap into Sugar Valley it came in contact with Grigsby's brigade of Confederate cavalry, which upon orders from Johnston had taken position or was being formed on the Snake Creek road a short distance from the mouth of the defile.
In Sherman's Memoirs, we read that this brigade was encountered and that it " retreated hastily toward Dalton." Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky, who was with it in command of one of the regiments of which it was composed, says that it made a vigorous resistance and skirmished heavily until late in the afternoon and until it was forced back behind the works at Resaca, where it joined the other Confederate troops there in position.
The Rome road, a highway from Dalton to Rome, and which was a short line from the enemys' position toward Snake Creek Gap, was reached by the Federal advance quite early in the day; and a reconnoissance up it toward the North was made with a few men to ascertain whether the enemy held it or were moving in force to receive us. The Sixteenth Corps, however, which had the advance, was not detained, and the Fifteenth followed as soon as it was learned that there was no sufficient reason to delay the march.
By two o'clock, or about that hour, General Sweeny's division of the Sixteenth Corps had been deployed and had reached the Calhoun road, where it was halted. General McPherson here again caused a careful reconnoissance to be made toward Dalton, and as the reconnoissance was proceeding Sweeny's division was moved forward, while Veatch's division of the same corps was held near the cross-roads and the divisions of the Fifteenth Corps directed to close up.
Sweeny advanced, (not tardily, I think, but cautiously,) driving the enemy before him, until he occupied a favorable position, partly upon a ridge, his line extending to the right and left of the road along a creek of considerable size about a mile from Resaca and in plain sight of the Confederate works. Then, as the Fifteenth Corps came up and was massed near the cross-roads, Veatch's command was advanced with orders to connect with Sweeny's left and feel for the railroad. It may be true that one of Veatch's brigades went forward with Sweeny, but certainly one of them was detained until General Logan came up with his corps.
By the time these dispositions had been made the day was drawing toward a close. The troops had been moved with a definite purpose and without waste of time. 'Not as rapidly as if they had not been in the enemy's country marching by the flank across roads which opened into his camp, and not as we might have moved if we had not been bound by every rule to find out, as best we might with infantry and artillery, whether we were being led into a trap and to our destruction. But it may be safely stated that, from the time the column started, there had been, on the part of its constantly alert commander, no want of energy and no unnecessary delay of any kind.
General Dodge has stated that it was about four o'clock when the head of Logan's corps reached the Calhoun crossroads. My impression is that it must have been later, for I remember seeing Fuller's men of Veatch's division going into position on Sweeny's left and that the sun behind them was not far above the tree-tops. I think there can be no doubt that it was after five o'clock when Dodge had completed, or nearly completed, his formation, and he met, or was requested to meet, McPherson and Logan to discuss the situation.
Unquestionably, as the march went on, McPherson had done the only things possible to be done with the forces at his disposal. As has been stated, he had no cavalry and the regiment of mounted infantry which he had used during the day had now, by honest and creditable work, been so much reduced that General Dodge says that when he got to the Calhoun road he could muster only eighteen men to send in search of the railroad. The eighteen weary troopers went upon their important quest, and it was after dark when they got back.
When McPherson called his lieutenants together, to consider what ought to be done, the situation was this:
The main portion of one corps, consisting of about six thousand men, was in line of battle, facing Resaca and the works of the enemy, with its left in air, and the rear of its left, which was wholly unprotected, toward Dalton and the main Confederate Army. About the strength of the enemy's works, and the presence of an efficient force behind them, there was not the shadow of a doubt. The works presented a formidable appearance, and the artillery fire which was opened from them, and the sound of musketry while the Federal line was being adjusted, were too significant to be misunderstood. We now know that General Hood was there watching our movements, and that the troops at his disposal and behind his works must have been able to hold them until dark. The Sixteenth Corps was in line facing the works, and the Fifteenth was massed at the Calhoun cross-roads, a mile away, with one brigade in line of battle anxiously looking up the unexplored and unknown valley toward General Johnston's camp.
This was the condition of things when the conference between McPherson, Logan, and Dodge took place. Everything seemed to indicate that the situation was in all its aspects a most critical one, and the views of his lieutenants were, therefore, of the greatest importance to the general in command. The recollections of those who have a knowledge of this conference differ very widely and essentially. In one of the two corps commanders, General McPherson had the greatest confidence, believing in his intelligence, sagacity, courage, and discretion; and it has been stated, upon what I regard as very high authority, that that corps commander represented without hesitation that an assault upon the works of Resaca would inevitably fail, and I believe that the statement of this fact, which seemed to be too obvious to require any statement to make it effectual, influenced the mind of McPherson very strongly in the direction of the conservative course which he adopted.
The interchange of views between the three generals was continued for some time, and my understanding is that General McPherson left the conference, stating in substance that he would decide very soon and communicate his orders.
Be this as it may, he rode with his staff to the foot of a high hill upon the right of the Resaca road and near which the meeting had taken place. It may be that General Logan or General Dodge accompanied him. Of that I am not sure; but we dismounted at the foot of the hill, and, leaving our horses with our orderlies, went up to the top. I distinctly remember the observation made by General McPherson, the fact that it took place during a brisk artillery fire, and that some of us thought the General's life was in danger
The timber on the side of the hill or ridge toward Resaca had been slashed to give range to the guns, and a large stump had been left near where we had halted. Upon this stump McPherson stepped, and, raising his glass, looked intently and deliberately at the enemy's works. He was over six feet tall, and, standing on the stump, was a very conspicuous object, but he seemed to be entirely unconscious of the fact, notwithstanding the artillery practice of the enemy, which gave unmistakable evidences of experience and skill, and which was directed toward where he stood. He did not, however, change his position, but without any sign of haste concluded his observation, and, having done so, walked slowly back into the timber, where he informed his chief-of-staff, Colonel Clark, that he would not attack and that he would withdraw his army to a place of safety near the Gap. The conclusion was at once communicated to the corps commanders, and the weary unwinding of the long miles of the morning was commenced.
There were not a few officers and men in the retiring column' who were sadly at a loss to understand why they had been withdrawn, apparently without having made an effort to accomplish the principal, if not the only, object of the march. They realized that they had been in line of battle, or expecting to be engaged, nearly all day, and that after they had reached the enemy and the all-important railroad, they were suddenly counter-marched and started back to the place from which they had set out.
But the colonel at the head of his regiment, however competent and intelligent he may be, rarely gets the true perspective of the general situation or understands the full significance of the duty he is called upon to perform.
As McPherson stood on the hill in front of Resaca, he was compelled either to make an attack, then and there, or withdraw his little army. There were not less than two brigades of Confederates behind the works, (which spoke for themselves), with at least ten guns; there was less than an hour of daylight; the position of the enemy in his rear was unknown; he was eight miles from the Gap, and his army was divided into detachments. Certainly, to make an attack under such conditions called for the exercise of a kind of military genius which General McPherson did not possess.
And if Resaca had been taken, it would have been essential to hold and watch the Rome cross-roads with one detachment, and the Calhoun cross-roads with another, which would have broken his command into three unequal parts, separated from each other by intervals of about two miles. The attack, if it had been made, could not have been concluded before dark, and the necessary result would have been that the three,isolated detachments would have slept on their arms where they had fought or been posted, with the certainty of battle in the morning. It seemed to be as plain as any indisputable deduction could be, that at the break of day the enemy would be in line on the Snake Creek road and before Resaca with thirty five thousand men. As it was, Johnston, knowing apparently the exact situation, sent Hood to Resaca, and his three divisions were placed on the cars during the night, and on the morning of the 1oth were at Tilton, a few miles away, where they had been halted.
We now perceive that Johnston could have moved the main body of his army to Resaca during the night of the 9th, and that by no possibility would Thomas or Schofield have been able to get there before the chances of the inevitable battle of the 1oth would have been decided.
And how uneven those chances would have been is no longer matter of conjecture. The Confederate General would have had almost every possible advantage. He would have encountered a divided force, and a very tired and hungry one, whose wagons on the unprotected road to the Gap were at the mercy of his cavalry. General Dodge tells us that on the evening of the 9th his transportation had not come up and that the men and animals of his corps had for a day and a half been without other food than they found in the poor and picked country over which they had marched. Loring's division of Polk's corps, of which corps Canty's men who were in Resaca constituted a part, was on the march near by and reached Resaca on the 1oth, and might have come directly up by the Calhoun road and made a connection with Hood and a lodgment between us and the Gap. There were contingencies too numerous to be recited, and all, or many of them, as plain to the Federal General as the fast-setting sun behind him. It has been said that genius is the capacity to perceive existing factors and to comprehend the weight and importance of each element of the situation. Whether McPherson saw and understood all the factors of which we now have knowledge, we need not seek to ascertain. His actions, I think, indicated that he did.
I remember a remark which it was my privilege to hear from his lips, which I have often thought of, and which should be preserved as a matter of record. A few days after the affair at Snake Creek Gap some allusion was made to it, and the General said, in substance, that if he had attacked Resaca, or if he had remained there, Johnston would have cut him off "as you cut off the end of a piece of tape with a pair of shears."
I did not then quite understand what he meant, but with our present information the figure is easily explained. He was eight miles out in the open with less than 20,000 men. There was a force of 50,000 of the enemy on his left and rear, and perhaps 8000 on his right and rear, with about 4000 holding the works in his front, and the roads behind him connecting the two principal bodies of the enemy were completely screened and wholly unobstructed. These were among the factors which may have influenced him when he declined to attack the force in his front and withdrew his command beyond the point of danger.
There are many other and scarcely less material facts and circumstances which point all in the same direction. The more attentively the situation and its incidents are examined, the more indisputably plain is the conclusion that McPherson's prudence and conservatism averted a most serious disaster. I think that no impartial mind, seeking the truth, can go through the details of the story of Snake Creek Gap as we have them to-day, without being convinced that, whatever his record, he never did his country a greater service than on the evening of the 9th of May, when he took his army away from the grave and intricate dangers which surrounded it. It is not, I think, too much to say that on that day, as upon a subsequent occasion, he saved the Army of the Tennessee from utter destruction.
Papers of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, New York Commandery 1896
Bringing the