Decision at Snake Creek Gap

[Elennsar]

But how far off is that brigade (in time), and how long would it take to contact Martin and for him to come up?

 

[NedBaldwin]

But how far off is that brigade (in time), and how long would it take to contact Martin and for him to come up?

According to Nisbett's memoirs (Colonel of the 66th GA), Vaughan's brigade arrived at the time Dodge's command was probing the works.

Calhoun, where Martin's cavalry was based, is 5 miles from Resaca and, I think, was linked by telegraph. So the contact and response time should have been quick. However, I think Martin was preoccupied:

"The rebel General Martin, with a brigade of cavalry, was operating on the right of General [Morgan] Smith's position [the location marked Sugar Valley PO on the map earlier in this thread], and the right and rear of General McPherson's advance." -- Kilpatrick to Elliott [volume 38 part 4 page 96]​

 

[NedBaldwin]

Nothing but Victory, The Army of the Tennessee by Steven Woodworth
pg. 494
About 4:00pm the Fifteenth Corps arrived and halted in the rear of the Sixteenth ready to support if necessary.

At the same time the Confederate commander was announcing that Resaca was held by 4000 men McPherson had two corps at his disposal. Instead of a powerful effort he sent just a single division (Veatch) toward the railroad. The lead brigade (Fuller), with Dodge present, reported the line defended by one regiment and a battery of artillery. Before they could strike they received orders to return. The entire force was countermarched to the eastern entrance to the gap having accomplished nothing.

The Woodworth quotes show the sad state of scholarship on this event.

The 16th, Dodge's Corps, consisted of two divisions totalling 5 brigades, which means he was only a little bit larger than the confederates in Resaca.

The 15th Corps consisted of three divisions -- Osterhaus, Smith and Harrow; Harrow never left the gap and Smith was stopped at Sugar Valley. Only Osterhaus arrived near Resaca.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Apparently it is going to be impossible to discuss command initiative while you voice your disagreement with every fact that does not conform to your personal view of this event.

I thought this was a history forum not a fantasy forum but if you would prefer to use incorrect information about events maybe you could give us a disclaimer first. Something like -- 'the following discussion is not based on actual events'.

 

[1SGDan]

Your argument is with two respected historians and the commander of one of the armies involved. But since you can't seem to pull your head out of your #@% long enough to realize that there are many interpretations of events and someone beside you can find evidence to support a different view then I will withdraw my posts until we can have an intelligent discussion based on facts other than what you believe to be the truth.

 

[Elennsar]

The Woodworth quotes show the sad state of scholarship on this event.

The 16th, Dodge's Corps, consisted of two divisions totalling 5 brigades, which means he was only a little bit larger than the confederates in Resaca.

The 15th Corps consisted of three divisions -- Osterhaus, Smith and Harrow; Harrow never left the gap and Smith was stopped at Sugar Valley. Only Osterhaus arrived near Resaca.

Per the Official Records, the 16th Corps should be over ten thousand strong http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...o=waro0072;didno=waro0072;view=image;seq=0137

3:2 odds may not be awesome versus fortifications, but I'm not altogether sure I'm following how you calculate 6,000 there.

 

[ole]

According to Scaife, Dodge had six brigades. He may had only five involved, but that ought to have been stated.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Per the Official Records, the 16th Corps should be over ten thousand strong http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Army of the Tennessee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0072;didno=waro0072;view=image;seq=0137

3:2 odds may not be awesome versus fortifications, but I'm not altogether sure I'm following how you calculate 6,000 there.

According to Scaife, Dodge had six brigades. He may had only five involved, but that ought to have been stated.

A couple pages back on the ORs from that link is the details of the units composing the 16th Corps:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Army of the Tennessee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0072;didno=waro0072;view=image;seq=130;page=root;size=100

Veatch's (4th) division is shown with 3 brigades. But next to the 3rd brigade is a note 'g'. At the bottom of the page footnote g reads "g At Decatur, Ala.; joined army at Atlanta August 7" So that is how Dodge went from 6 brigades to 5.

Dodge also notes this in his report:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...1=Dodge;view=image;seq=377;size=100;page=root

In addition to that brigade, the 7th Illinois should be subtracted -- see footnote 'U' on this page
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Army of the Tennessee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0072;didno=waro0072;view=image;seq=129;page=root;size=100

In addition, the night before the move on Resaca, McPherson issued an order directing that
"All wagons and baggage of every description will be left behind, except ambulances and ammunition wagons enough to make sixty rounds per man in addition to what they have in cartridge-boxes. The wagons left behind will be properly parked near the entrance of the gap, and a brigade of infantry from Major-General Logans command, one brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery from Brigadier- General Dodges command, will be left as guard for the train."

My understanding is that instead of leaving a brigade behind, Dodge detached regiments from other brigades to leave behind, including
the 2nd Iowa -- http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=weaver;rgn=full text;idno=waro0074;didno=waro0074;view=image;seq=0441
and the 12th Illinois -- http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=weavers;rgn=full text;idno=waro0074;didno=waro0074;view=image;seq=0457
I think there is one other but cant find it right now.

 

[NedBaldwin]

... I'm not altogether sure I'm following how you calculate 6,000 there.

Cantey's brigade with 1,600 reported at the end of April + 400 of 37th MS mentioned as en route [OR1-v32-pt3-page866]

66th Georgia regiment + 26th Georgia Battalion which according to Nisbett's memoirs (Colonel of the 66th) was 1,500 [Four Years On The Firing Line]

The infantry regiments of Reynolds brigade with 800 based on a report from April [http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=reynolds;rgn=full text;idno=waro0059;didno=waro0059;view=image;seq=0862]

Vaughan's brigade -- I dont have a primary source for the size this one but Steve Newton put it at 1,200 in an article in North & South magazine. [What Really Happened At Snake Creek Gap?, Steven Newton, North & South Volume 4 Number 3, 2001]

Grigsby's cavalry brigade reported around 800 [OR1-v32-pt3-page866]

So why did MacKall say 4,000? Becuase I dont think he was counting Vaughan or the regiments arriving from the south (Reynolds). There is also the issue of counting effectives versus PFD.

Steve Newton argued, in the article mentioned above, that there were even more present based on his interpretation the following message from Johnston to Wheeler on May 4thL "I have sent orders to General Kelly to join you with all the horses fit for field service in the two brigades at Resaca .... He was instructed to have the men left considered as belonging to the defense of the place where our trains are." Does that mean they were left in Resaca? Newton things so but I'm not convinced.

Also, there was obviously artillery there, but I havent identified any particular batteries among the infantry mentioned above.

 

[Elennsar]

A couple pages back on the ORs from that link is the details of the units composing the 16th Corps:
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Army of the Tennessee;rgn=full text;idno=waro0072;didno=waro0072;view=image;seq=130;page=root;size=100

Veatch's (4th) division is shown with 3 brigades. But next to the 3rd brigade is a note 'g'. At the bottom of the page footnote g reads "g At Decatur, Ala.; joined army at Atlanta August 7" So that is how Dodge went from 6 brigades to 5.

But why would 3rd Brigade be listed as part of the strength of the command (as in PFD) when it hasn't joined yet? Same in regards to any other later additions.

In addition, the night before the move on Resaca, McPherson issued an order directing that
"All wagons and baggage of every description will be left behind, except ambulances and ammunition wagons enough to make sixty rounds per man in addition to what they have in cartridge-boxes. The wagons left behind will be properly parked near the entrance of the gap, and a brigade of infantry from Major-General Logans command, one brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery from Brigadier- General Dodges command, will be left as guard for the train."

My understanding is that instead of leaving a brigade behind, Dodge detached regiments from other brigades to leave behind, including
the 2nd Iowa -- http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=weaver;rgn=full text;idno=waro0074;didno=waro0074;view=image;seq=0441
and the 12th Illinois -- http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=weavers;rgn=full text;idno=waro0074;didno=waro0074;view=image;seq=0457
I think there is one other but cant find it right now.

This, that I do follow.


And thank you for clarifying on how you calculated Confederate numbers.

 

[tmh10]

Nedbaldwin and Elennsar, I am enjoying the information you are providing. A little disapointed in IsgDan dropped out of the conversation, but learning a lot from your post.

 

[NedBaldwin]

But why would 3rd Brigade be listed as part of the strength of the command (as in PFD) when it hasn't joined yet? Same in regards to any other later additions.

Even though temporarily detached it was still part of the overall force commanded by Sherman as listed on the pages prior to those strength tables.

That first strength number is from April when all three brigades of the division was together in Decatur Alabama.

Also compare the strength numbers shown between July 31 and August 31, which is the time frame during which the brigade joined the division -- the infantry strength numbers dropped by over 1,100. This would be a very dramatic change if the July 31 did not include the 3rd brigade.

 

[NedBaldwin]

My understanding is that instead of leaving a brigade behind, Dodge detached regiments from other brigades to leave behind, including
the 2nd Iowa -- http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=weaver;rgn=full text;idno=waro0074;didno=waro0074;view=image;seq=0441
and the 12th Illinois -- http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=weavers;rgn=full text;idno=waro0074;didno=waro0074;view=image;seq=0457
I think there is one other but cant find it right now.

Found the other detached regiment I was thinking of:

• "the command was joined by the Twelfth Illinois, Second and Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry Volunteers; with the supply train, which they had been detached to guard" -- report of Gen Corse, who took over the 2nd division later in the campaign.
  

 

[NedBaldwin]

Command Culture as an issue in McPherson's decisionmaking​

McPherson's force that day came from two Corps -- the 15th and the 16th. The 15th had been Sherman's corps, experienced as a unit over the previous year from Vicksburg to Chattanooga But it ended up second in the marching order.

The 16th was in front. It was composed of troops that spent the previous year on garrison duty in West Tennessee and had never campaigned or fought as unit before. Some of the regiments had been at Shiloh, some had been with Pope at Island #10 and with Rosecrans at Iuka/Corinth, but others had joined later and not seen battle yet. Dodge was brand new as Corp commander. He had led a brigade at Pea Ridge, then commanded posts in Kentucky and Tennessee. There was tension between Dodge and one of his division commanders, Tom Sweeny, which would boil over in July when the two swore at each other leading to a fist fight and court martial for Sweeny.

Regarding the movement on Resaca, the following account appeared in Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Her Generals, and Soldiers, by Whitelaw Reid, published 1868:

'Manifestly the only safety for McPherson lay in the speed with which his movements should be executed. In this spirit he ordered General Dodge forward with all haste to make the attack upon Resaca; while with the Fifteenth Army Corps he covered the left flank of this column against the threatened attack by the roads leading down from Dalton. The movement seemed unaccountably delayed. McPherson chafed restlessly a little; then ordered a staff officer up to hasten it. The officer found General Sweeney, commanding Dodge's advance, quietly seated on a log, upbraiding some prisoners for being in arms against their Government. The importance of instant movement was explained and General McPherson's orders were delivered. General Sweeney explained that his men were re-forming and that he would move in a few minutes. A quarter of an hour passed. The staff officer again urged haste upon Sweeney and remonstrated at the vexatious delay. Still the movement lingered. Then, galloping back, he reported the facts to McPherson. In a few moments the General himself came dashing to the front. He at once started the column; then summoned General Dodge, explained to him the urgency of the situation, and ordered him to lose not a moment in the advance to Resaca, and to assault vigorously on his arrival. He then returned to prepare the Fifteenth Corps for receiving the expected attack in flank.


But he was struggling against too great odds—against not merely the inherent weakness of the plan that had been made for him, but against the tardiness of subordinates also. Dodge indeed moved forward at last, but, as a staff officer describes it, "with little spirit, making only a weak attack, then returning to McPherson and reporting that the position could not be carried, that the enemy had more troops in position, outside of their works, than he had in his entire command." It was now nearly five o'clock. There was no time in the remnant of the short afternoon to make a new disposition of the forces; where they stood they were in imminent danger, as has been seen, of attack on the flank from Dalton; and, estopped from going forward by this failure before Resaca, there was nothing left for them but to go backward. McPherson accordingly ordered back the troops to the Gap, where they strengthened the position and went into bivouac, while he dispatched word of the result to Sherman.'
​

Hard to say if this account is true, but I find it interesting nonetheless.

 

[Elennsar]

Even though temporarily detached it was still part of the overall force commanded by Sherman as listed on the pages prior to those strength tables.

That first strength number is from April when all three brigades of the division was together in Decatur Alabama.

Also compare the strength numbers shown between July 31 and August 31, which is the time frame during which the brigade joined the division -- the infantry strength numbers dropped by over 1,100. This would be a very dramatic change if the July 31 did not include the 3rd brigade.

That would answer that (all the brigades being together at that point, just not all at this - Snake Creek Gap - point). Although the numbers for May and June are close to the same figure as April (not distinct enough for a brigade no longer being counted with the division in those returns), which makes me wish we had numbers per brigade.

But as for the later dates without checking I don't know whether or not this saw a lot of expiring enlistments (but that should be taking place around this time).

 

[RobertP]

I'm finding this thread informative and fascinating at the same time. There's no doubt that NedBaldwin knows his subject and I'm interested in learning more. From a personal standpoint, my g-grandfather and his brother were with the 36th Miss., part of Sears Brigade in Polk's Corps that were summoned from Mobile. I understand they arrived in time for Resaca but have never been clear on the logistics and timetable, so I'm reading along with interest.

The fascinating part is the reaction from the author of the thread. Usually tersely assured that his opinion is the only correct one, he seems this time to have taken his marbles and gone home.

 

[Elennsar]

Speaking for myself, given how Ned has approached arguing with him, I'm not sure I would be a lot more patient with someone saying "you're using inaccurate information because I say so".

Which is why I'm trying to pull together information from the OR, in part.

 

[1SGDan]

I left the thread for a couple of reasons:
1. The refusal of one poster to accept facts other than his own. He essentially called Castel, Woodworth, and Johnston liars. there is no arguing with that kind of mindset. (BTW you may as well add Connelly to this list as well)
2. Quibbling over minor details was not the intended direction of the thread. But that poster could not be dissuaded from interrupting.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Speaking for myself, given how Ned has approached arguing with him, I'm not sure I would be a lot more patient with someone saying "you're using inaccurate information because I say so".

Point taken. I will work on begin better in this regard.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I left the thread for a couple of reasons:
1. The refusal of one poster to accept facts other than his own.

There arent my facts or your facts; we might have different interpretations of facts, and thats fine, but facts are facts.

He essentially called Castel, Woodworth, and Johnston liars. there is no arguing with that kind of mindset. (BTW you may as well add Connelly to this list as well)

I accused them of weak scholarship on this event. I do not believe every word in every book. There is no arguing with the mindset that thinks what a 20th Century historian wrote is sacrosanct.

2. Quibbling over minor details was not the intended direction of the thread. But that poster could not be dissuaded from interrupting.

These detail are essential to your argument about command decision -- your point of veiw was built on a set of details. If you are going to argue that McPherson could have easily taken Resaca, then determining the details of who was defending it and who he had to attack with are critical to the discussion.