Command Failings at Spring Hill

[Nathan Stuart]

Who was to blame on the Confederate command side for the incredible escape of Schofield's Army at Spring Hill?

By nightfall on November 29, Hood had Cheatham's Corps, Stewart's Corps and Johnson's Division (from Lee's Corps), as well as Forrest's cavalry, in the vicinity of Spring Hill.

Ignoring other factors, like Schofield's skilful maneuverings, I reviewed the following abbreviated command reports/ versions of the senior Southern commanders present to try and determine who might have been at fault on that day.



Report of General Hood – Army Commander

…"About 4 pm our infantry forces, M-G Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy…The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike…M-G Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt that we should have possessed ourselves of this road. Stewart's corps and Johnson's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the golden opportunity had passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of dealing the enemy a heavy blow. Accordingly, L-G Stewart was furnished a guide and ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill….In the dark and confusion Stewart did not succeed in getting the position desired, but about 11 pm went into bivouac."…

('OR': Vol. 45, Pt 1, at pp 652-653)



Report of L-G Stewart – Corps Commander

…"On the morning of November 29 General Hood moved with Cheatham's corps and mine and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps (who reported to me), Cheatham's corps in advance….General Hood gave me a guide and told me to place my right across the pike beyond Spring Hill….A staff officer of General Cheatham's,…informed me that General Hood had sent him to place me in position…It was evident…it would require all night to accomplish it…Feeling satisfied there was a mistake, I directed the troops to be bivouacked….In the uncertainty I was in…I explained to General Hood,…I had directed the troops, who had been marching rapidly since daylight and it was now 11 pm, to be placed in bivouac…Hood remarked, in substance, that it was not material; to let the men rest; and directed me to move before daylight in the morning, taking the advance toward Franklin"…

('OR': Vol. 45, Pt 1, at pp 712-713)



Report of M-G Bates – Division Commander

…"I moved that day in rear of Cleburne's division to the neighbourhood of Spring hill…I deployed my division in line of battle, in obedience to orders from General Cheatham…General Hood, who was personally present, directed me to the turnpike….I pushed forward in the direction of the enemy, who held the turnpike. It was now getting dark….I received an order…from General Cheatham to halt….My main line was within 200 yards of the turnpike….I obeyed the order of General Cheatham…it being in the night….I bivouacked between 9 and 10 o'clock for the night."…

('OR': Vol. 45, Pt 1, page 742)



Report of M-G Forrest – Cavalry Commander

…"I moved rapidly toward Spring Hill with my entire command…I discovered the enemy hurriedly moving his wagon train up the Franklin pike…being out of ammunition…I ordered…to move at daylight on the morning of the 30th​…to intercept a column of the enemy"…

('OR': Vol. 45, Pt 1, at page 753)



Published Version of M-G Cheatham – Corps Commander

Interestingly, there does not appear to be any Official Report lodged by the other Corps commander, M-G Cheatham, for the action. Cheatham's own version of Hood's command that day was published in 1881 as follows:

…"I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open – orders to remain quiet until morning – and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin"…

('Southern Historical Society Papers' Volume 9, at page 526)



If these separate versions are accepted on face values, they can be reviewed to find any common threads, conflicts or uncertainties found in the orders given.

According to Hood, he repeatedly directed Cheatham and Stewart to take possession of the pike. If this was the case, it would seem that Hood's orders were not followed by Cheatham, Stewart and Forrest for different reasons. Cheatham, however, refuted Hood's claims much later.

Regardless of Hood's past propensity for perhaps fabricating truths in reports, based on Cheatham's contrary claim (of Hood's order) and the corroborating accounts by Stewart and Bates, it appears that Hood may have contradicted himself (during the evening) by changing his original orders to possess the pike by electing waiting until next daylight. A valid criticism may be that he did not impress upon subordinates firmly enough and consistently, his original directions.

This possible finding might justify a further investigation into the actual state of Hood's mind at the time.

 

[flummery]

Wiley Sword speculates that Hood, who was in pain from his war injuries (amputated leg at Chickamauga, and amputated arm from Gettysburg), may have had clouded judgment that night from use if alcohol and laudanum. He was supposedly awakened several times that night for instructions by his generals and may easily have contradicted himself. He concluded they would be victorious the next day.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Good points, for a possible explanation.

Some writers have suggested that alcohol/medication/substance use might have affected his thinking around this time.

Yet other respected commentators have thought that Hood's cognition, at least for making command decisions, was not impacted by any of these.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

If Hood did contradict himself with orders at Spring Hill, I wonder about his mental state at the time.

There was no doubting his passion and zeal for the cause. But I suspect the combination of the pressures of the arduous Atlanta campaign, the heavy defeats and losses, and the responsibilities of Army command might have all interacted to adversely impact his mental condition.

The Spring Hill situation reminds me of what I regard as a highly pertinent statement here that was previously made about Hood by someone who knew him. On learning of Hood's appointment to Army command a friend of his fiance, Sally 'Buck' Preston, commented, …"Get Hood to decline to take this command. It will destroy him if he accepts it"… (reproduced in 'The Confederacy's Last Hurrah', by Wiley Sword, at page 30).

Ignoring any physical incapacities or possible cognitive limitations, was Hood mentally fit for command at Spring Hill?

 

[Luke Freet]

Wiley Sword speculates that Hood, who was in pain from his war injuries (amputated leg at Chickamauga, and amputated arm from Gettysburg), may have had clouded judgment that night from use if alcohol and laudanum. He was supposedly awakened several times that night for instructions by his generals and may easily have contradicted himself. He concluded they would be victorious the next day.

Sword's work is based on outdated myths regarding Hood's health; research shows that by the time he took command of the second corps of the Army of Tennessee back in February, he had no issues with recurring pain in his wound; and he certainly wasn't taking laudanum.
Reading Eric Jacobson's book on the Battle of Franklin, it seems Hood only involved himself early on, when he ordered Bate to push for the pike; afterwards, he retired to a local house for his headquarters, and left the matter in Cheatham's hands. It seems there was a miscommunication of intent on Hood's part regarding the objectives for the army at Spring Hill; it seems that Hood wanted to take the pike, while Cheatham interpreted Hood's wording as meaning he had to take the town itself. Thus, after Cleburne's assault, he pulled his three divisions into position to launch an attack towards Spring Hill (which never materialized).
Bate's Division, which was skirmishing with a few detached units guarding the pike around the Rippavilla Mansion, could have taken the pike, but as he was preparing for his attack, he received Cheatham's order to pull back to form up for his planned assault on Spring Hill. Bate, confused, sent a courier to Cheatham asking for clarification, to which Cheatham, in the presence of Hood, chewed out the courier and threatened to arrest Bate if he did not obey the order. Hood could have intervened at this moment to clarify his intent and inform Cheatham of his earlier orders to Bate (which it seems Cheatham did not know about), but he said nothing. Thus, an opportunity to take and hold the pike with little resistance was squandered.
And then there is the issue with Cheatham's planned assault never occurring. Cheatham gave orders to Brown to launch the attack, but received word from Brown regarding troops on his flank (which was really just a single regiment extending the union line). Cheatham personally rode up to Brown, saw the situation, and gave his second order to launch the attack, before being called to speak with Hood on some matter. Jacobson implies that Cheatham may not have gotten the chance to give his order to Brown before he was interrupted, as Brown and his chief of staff did not recall receiving this supposed second order.
After reading all of this, I lay most of the blame on Cheatham's poor judgement and shoddy command style, which benefitted him in division command but showed its flaws dramatically in his rank. Hood is also to blame though, as he had opportunities to realize Cheatham was making major mistakes and corrected him, but did not.

 

[Ole Miss]

Hood was the commanding General and bears the burden of fault. Lack of planning, communications and leadership were the charges against Hood. Period.
Regards
David

 

[EricAJacobson]

Wiley Sword speculates that Hood, who was in pain from his war injuries (amputated leg at Chickamauga, and amputated arm from Gettysburg), may have had clouded judgment that night from use if alcohol and laudanum. He was supposedly awakened several times that night for instructions by his generals and may easily have contradicted himself. He concluded they would be victorious the next day.

Wiley Sword was wrong. Completely wrong.

 

[Luke Freet]

Hood was the commanding General and bears the burden of fault. Lack of planning, communications and leadership were the charges against Hood. Period.
Regards
David

that is true. The big reason why these miscommunications happened in the first place is because Hood was awful when it came to staff work. The army staff he inherited from Joe Johnston deteriorated rapidly under his watch.

 

[gunny]

According to Hood, he repeatedly directed Cheatham and Stewart to take possession of the pike. If this was the case, it would seem that Hood's orders were not followed by Cheatham, Stewart and Forrest for different reasons. Cheatham, however, refuted Hood's claims much later.

Cheatham wasn't the only one to refute Hood's claims. In Confederate Veteran, Stewart is vehement when he stated that neither he nor Cheatham failed to comply with orders that evening.

It seems there was a miscommunication of intent on Hood's part regarding the objectives for the army at Spring Hill; it seems that Hood wanted to take the pike, while Cheatham interpreted Hood's wording as meaning he had to take the town itself. Thus, after Cleburne's assault, he pulled his three divisions into position to launch an attack towards Spring Hill (which never materialized).

The orders were clear, but the missions changed when Cleburne was attacked in the flank. Although the pike was due west, the brigade that ambushed Cleburne broke and ran into Spring Hill proper, where two other Federal brigades and a ton of artillery was in position. In order to secure the pike, the enemy force in Spring Hill first needed to be dealt with and light was fading fast. Bate's failure to comply with Cheatham's order was likely the biggest factor in the failure before nightfall.

And then there is the issue with Cheatham's planned assault never occurring. Cheatham gave orders to Brown to launch the attack, but received word from Brown regarding troops on his flank (which was really just a single regiment extending the union line).

The size of the force that was on Brown's flank was actually one and a half full regiment supported by at least a section of artillery (on his flank alone). In his direct front were three more regiments supported by artillery. Brown's division - at the time he received the order to attack - consisted of two and a half brigades which was only slightly more - numerically - than the force he confronted. All of Gist's brigade and half of Strahl's were still detached and didn't arrive until after dark.

It is clear that every commander on the field is somewhat responsible for the failure - but most at fault was Hood himself. He was apparently not in condition to command the army. Time and time again he blamed his failures on his subordinates. If he was physically incapable, he should have declined command. One could probably say that Davis is most to blame for appointing Hood to command.

 

[Luke Freet]

If he was physically incapable, he should have declined command.

Thing is, the guy was physically capable; well enough to ride a horse and be able to give orders and such. I bring up how the Laudanum addiction story was a myth not because it in any way exonerates Hood, but because it shows he was often in his right mind when making many of his worst decisions, and therefore often has little excuse for the failings which occurred.

The size of the force that was on Brown's flank was actually one and a half full regiment supported by at least a section of artillery (on his flank alone). In his direct front were three more regiments supported by artillery. Brown's division - at the time he received the order to attack - consisted of two and a half brigades which was only slightly more - numerically - than the force he confronted. All of Gist's brigade and half of Strahl's were still detached and didn't arrive until after dark.

Not the case. Brown's Division was the largest in the army at that time (3700 men), and though a significant chunk of it was unavailable, that leaves him with approximately 2500 men to array against the one brigade to his front; on top of this, given how badly cut up Bradley's Brigade was when it was hit by Cleburne (and the fact much of the two brigades were made up of newly recruited conscripts assigned to depleted veteran formations), A a coordinated assault by Brown and Cleburne if it went in as ordered would have easily pushed out Wagner's men, and secured the pike.

 

[gunny]

Thing is, the guy was physically capable; well enough to ride a horse and be able to give orders and such. I bring up how the Laudanum addiction story was a myth not because it in any way exonerates Hood, but because it shows he was often in his right mind when making many of his worst decisions, and therefore often has little excuse for the failings which occurred.

Not the case. Brown's Division was the largest in the army at that time (3700 men), and though a significant chunk of it was unavailable, that leaves him with approximately 2500 men to array against the one brigade to his front; on top of this, given how badly cut up Bradley's Brigade was when it was hit by Cleburne (and the fact much of the two brigades were made up of newly recruited conscripts assigned to depleted veteran formations), A a coordinated assault by Brown and Cleburne if it went in as ordered would have easily pushed out Wagner's men, and secured the pike.

I would suggest that just because you can ride a horse and give you orders doesn't make one physically capable. All great leaders went to the front or at least near it to supervise and ensure their orders were carried out. Hood never did this in any of the battles he commanded. Not one. In fact, studying his command style, you can see that he planted his headquarters far to the rear in every engagement he commanded. Atlanta, Peachtree Creek, Spring Hill, Franklin, Nashville. Two miles away from the action in many cases.

Although Brown did command the largest division on the corps, his division numbered no more that 2,750 effectives at Spring Hill. His two largest brigades were the ones that were detached or partially detached there. Gist's brigade numbered around 800 men alone and Strahl's was the second largest numbering approximately 700 men with half of them detached with Gist. This means that only about 1,500 men were available in Brown's command when he was given the order. Had the remainder of his command been there, the artillery and infantry would not have been on his flank, but in his front. The flanking fire from artillery and infantry would have enfiladed his lines and wreaked havoc in any advance on the force in his front.

This image shows the formation after the arrival of the remainder of Gist's brigade and portion of Strahl that was detached. At this point it was too dark to advance anyway, but note that Gordon, Carter and the portion of Strahl's brigade that would have advanced would be enfiladed as they ascended the hill toward the massed battery on their left and Lane in their front. White Hall is on dominant terrain and well beyond their flank with the 100th Illinois and 28th Kentucky (partially armed with repeating rifles) as well as a section of Battery G's artillery.

 

[Ole Miss]

Beauregard at Shiloh stayed far from the front lines as well. He declared victory from his headquarters about 2 miles from the fighting at the end of the 1st day.

It is hard to know what is actually happening when you rely solely on reports
Regards
David
PS very informative thread with many insightful posts

 

[Luke Freet]

Although Brown did command the largest division on the corps, his division numbered no more that 2,750 effectives at Spring Hill. His two largest brigades were the ones that were detached or partially detached there. Gist's brigade numbered around 800 men alone and Strahl's was the second largest numbering approximately 700 men with half of them detached with Gist. This means that only about 1,500 men were available in Brown's command when he was given the order.

This math seems quite off. According to the November 6th returns (which comparing against the casualties at Franklin and the later December 10th returns, are very close to their actual strength on the campaign), Brown's Division numbered 3715 officers and men "effective total present". Gist brigade in the corps returns for December 13th numbered 880 men, meaning whatever figure is used here is way undervaluing their actual size. Assuming that Gist's brigade numbered around 1000 men, and the remaining brigades numbered 900 men (it is noted that Gist's and Strahl's brigade were the 1st and 2nd largest brigades), that would mean that two and a half of the three tennesse brigades would equate to 2150 men. I'm not certain where your numbers are from and would like to know.
Source for numbers: Official Records, Series 1, Volume 45, Part 1, pages 678-680

I would suggest that just because you can ride a horse and give you orders doesn't make one physically capable. All great leaders went to the front or at least near it to supervise and ensure their orders were carried out. Hood never did this in any of the battles he commanded. Not one. In fact, studying his command style, you can see that he planted his headquarters far to the rear in every engagement he commanded. Atlanta, Peachtree Creek, Spring Hill, Franklin, Nashville. Two miles away from the action in many cases.

Yes, in this day and age, it is required for you as a field general to be able to ride a horse and give orders at the front. Hell, he did this early on in the engagement, riding at the front of the infantry column and personally ordering Bate to make for the Pike while he tasked Cheatham with taking Spring Hill (or the Pike near Spring Hill). The fact he retires from the field of battle soon after and takes little charge has nothing to do with his physical capability, but his command style, which, with the roster of subordinates he had, was a waste of time.

 

[Lester Moore]

From the many books I have read, on the Battle of Franklin and the Confederate debacle at Spring Hill, the buck stops with Hood. But, to place exact blame and place responsibility on some of Hood's subordinate officers, I would say Gen. John C. Brown. At about 4pm, still daylight, Hood had observed from a hill top east of the Columbia Pike, a train of Federal forces moving north toward Spring Hill. He then gave orders to General Cheatham, his frontline tactician, to secure and block the Columbia Pike cutting off the Federal retreat to Spring Hill. At 5pm, Cheatham, Cleburne and Brown all met and planned their assault on the Pike and Springhill. At that time Cheatham departed expecting the hear Brown's fire . Some time passed and Cheatham heard no firing. Not knowing... General Strahl rode up to Brown's command and informed the General, he would be out flanked on his left and caught in a crossfire. Brown conferred with this staff and all decided it would be best to inform Cheatham and wait for other instructions...and NOT follow orders and attack. Once Cheatham did arrive and was informed of the situation, he was also not anxious to assume the risk of an assault. By now it was totally dark, about 6:45pm. Accord to "Brown," Cheatham fully approved of his, Brown's, action...calling off the attack. Naturally, next morning everyone was pointing fingers. For some reason, Hood actually blamed Cleburne for failure of letting the enemy escape.

 

[Luke Freet]

For some reason, Hood actually blamed Cleburne for failure of letting the enemy escape.

Oh yeah, can't forget that moment...blaming the only guy who was actually trying to do something that day.

Then again, if I remember correctly, that story comes from Cheatham and Brown, both of whom had a vested interest in denigrating Hood, so that detail may not have happened...
That's the crux of this mess: Several of the key figures involved give defensive accounts of their actions or never were able to give accounts at all (Cleburne obviously died the next day without getting any word in; and Hood was planning on writing his version of events that day for his memoir, before the yellow fever got him).

 

[gjpratt]

Cheatham wasn't the only one to refute Hood's claims. In Confederate Veteran, Stewart is vehement when he stated that neither he nor Cheatham failed to comply with orders that evening.

From everything I have read, Stewart was a straight shooter of impeccable integrity. He is probably the most trustworthy and reliable witness, IMHO.

 

[Lester Moore]

One of the biggest mistakes Jeff Davis made was placing Hood in charge of the Army of Tennessee. After that mistake, he should have at least appointed Patrick Cleburne as Corps Commander, not Benjamin Cheatham. I personally feel that the Spring Hill debacle would not have happened with Cleburne in charge. The problem was, Cleburne was not on Davis' favorite list, far from it. First of all, Davis had a real affenity for West Point grads. Cleburne was not. Secondly, Cleburne was an immigrant, born in Ireland. Third, the year before, Cleburne had suggested the idea giving the slaves their freedom if they would fight for the Confederacy. Jeff Davis was totally irate over Cleburne suggestion.

 

[gunny]

This math seems quite off. According to the November 6th returns (which comparing against the casualties at Franklin and the later December 10th returns, are very close to their actual strength on the campaign), Brown's Division numbered 3715 officers and men "effective total present". Gist brigade in the corps returns for December 13th numbered 880 men, meaning whatever figure is used here is way undervaluing their actual size. Assuming that Gist's brigade numbered around 1000 men, and the remaining brigades numbered 900 men (it is noted that Gist's and Strahl's brigade were the 1st and 2nd largest brigades), that would mean that two and a half of the three tennesse brigades would equate to 2150 men. I'm not certain where your numbers are from and would like to know.
Source for numbers: Official Records, Series 1, Volume 45, Part 1, pages 678-680

Yes, in this day and age, it is required for you as a field general to be able to ride a horse and give orders at the front. Hell, he did this early on in the engagement, riding at the front of the infantry column and personally ordering Bate to make for the Pike while he tasked Cheatham with taking Spring Hill (or the Pike near Spring Hill). The fact he retires from the field of battle soon after and takes little charge has nothing to do with his physical capability, but his command style, which, with the roster of subordinates he had, was a waste of time.

I don't argue the numbers from the Official Records dated November 6. Those are very close to accurate. However, once the army arrived at Columbia, a large number of men were given short furloughs to see their families as many men were from this area. The number 2,750 men in Brown's division comes from his personal account in Confederate Military History, Volume 10, Tennessee, page 150. He states that his division "numbered not exceeding 2,750 men" that morning. He added that when they started the march from Bear Creek, Gist's brigade and about one-half of Strahl's brigades were detached for picket duty "leaving me with about one-half of my division."

If this is the case, his division confronted Lane's brigade in front of Spring Hill with fewer men that Lane's brigade actually consisted of. Lane stated in his official report that he assumed command on the morning of the 29th on the bank of Duck River. He stated that his brigade consisted of "80 commissioned officers and 1,586 enlisted men." (OR, Series 1, Volume 45, Part 1, pg. 255) This brigade was supported by no less than two batteries of artillery consisting of ten cannon.

Even if we consider Brown's division having 2,000 men before darkness that evening, it would be a stretch to believe the attack would be successful when he was outflanked by several hundred yards by artillery and infantry with no support on his right. He had been told Forrest would support his flank, but he had withdrawn his cavalry. The enemy force on his right was on higher ground located on a spur. His attack would have advanced in up a lower piece of terrain leaving his flank fully exposed.

This is why Strahl brought it to Brown's attention after skirmishers had been thrown forward for the attack to commence. Strahl recognized the threat, and soon thereafter Brown saw it with his own eyes, as did Governor Isham Harris who had gone to prod Cheatham forward in the attack.

A good number of Tennesseans were actually lucky enough to miss the battle of Franklin due to furloughs. Those same men that were considered effective on November 6 were mostly still considered effective on December 10.

Hood's action - however - do point to a physical inability to command. He had always led from the front as a brigade and division commander, but after his two ghastly wounds, either he was unwilling to be near the front or unable to be near the front when his forces were engaged in action. I think the guy was tough and courageous and would have wanted to be there, but he wasn't. Why is this? To speculate, I suggest getting in and out of the saddle with the long day had physically fatigued him. Probably wouldn't have been nearly as exhausting if he had another leg and use of both arms, but that is speculation.

As you suggest, it may have simply been his leadership style - but I don't think so as it never had been before his most recent wounding. In his physician's records of his progress, Hood was quite worried about being captured in the weeks following Chickamauga. Was this something that carried over into the Atlanta campaign? Who knows? But is this why he never went to the scene of battle as a corps or army commander? Bunch of questions here! LOL

 

[Luke Freet]

One of the biggest mistakes Jeff Davis made was placing Hood in charge of the Army of Tennessee. After that mistake, he should have at least appointed Patrick Cleburne as Corps Commander, not Benjamin Cheatham. I personally feel that the Spring Hill debacle would not have happened with Cleburne in charge. The problem was, Cleburne was not on Davis' favorite list, far from it. First of all, Davis had a real affenity for West Point grads. Cleburne was not. Secondly, Cleburne was an immigrant, born in Ireland. Third, the year before, Cleburne had suggested the idea giving the slaves their freedom if they would fight for the Confederacy. Jeff Davis was totally irate over Cleburne suggestion.

I agree on the principle that Cleburne should have been given corps command rather than Cheatham on a purely merit-based principle. Of course, Cheatham was the senior Major General in the army, and baring the unlikely scenario of Cleburne a promotion, seniority in the corps would become an issue, and would require a reorganization of the army to allow Cleburne to lead. Add in the fact that Cheatham actually had a solid record in division command and a highlight in corps command at Bald Hill during the Atlanta Campaign, and it would be easy to see why Cheatham got the corps in the end.
Will also say, I doubt Davis actually held Cleburne's proposal against the man, as Davis himself would start suggesting the use of slave soldiers that October.

 

[Luke Freet]

Hood's action - however - do point to a physical inability to command. He had always led from the front as a brigade and division commander, but after his two ghastly wounds, either he was unwilling to be near the front or unable to be near the front when his forces were engaged in action. I think the guy was tough and courageous and would have wanted to be there, but he wasn't. Why is this? To speculate, I suggest getting in and out of the saddle with the long day had physically fatigued him. Probably wouldn't have been nearly as exhausting if he had another leg and use of both arms, but that is speculation.

As you suggest, it may have simply been his leadership style - but I don't think so as it never had been before his most recent wounding. In his physician's records of his progress, Hood was quite worried about being captured in the weeks following Chickamauga. Was this something that carried over into the Atlanta campaign? Who knows? But is this why he never went to the scene of battle as a corps or army commander?

Thank you for clarifying.
I will say, I do believe his woundings play a part in his more detached command style during the Georgia and Tennessee Campaigns; he probably wanted to make sure he didn't lose another limb.
That said, the stuff about him being "exhausted" makes me wonder: how taxing was the march upon the other commanders? Maybe exhaustion played a role in Cheatham's and Brown's actions that late afternoon. That said, if it were a factor, I'm surprised that, reading Jacobson's work on the two battles, that he never brings that up as a possible factor in the whole debacle (that or he did and I missed it).

I don't argue the numbers from the Official Records dated November 6. Those are very close to accurate. However, once the army arrived at Columbia, a large number of men were given short furloughs to see their families as many men were from this area. The number 2,750 men in Brown's division comes from his personal account in Confederate Military History, Volume 10, Tennessee, page 150. He states that his division "numbered not exceeding 2,750 men." He added that when they started the march from Bear Creek, Gist's brigade and about one-half of Strahl's brigades were detached for picket duty "leaving me with about one-half of my division."

If this is the case, his division confronted Lane's brigade in front of Spring Hill with fewer men that Lane's brigade actually consisted of. Lane stated in his official report that he assumed command on the morning of the 29th on the bank of Duck River. He stated that his brigade consisted of "80 commissioned officers and 1,586 enlisted men." (OR, Series 1, Volume 45, Part 1, pg. 255) This brigade was supported by no less than two batteries of artillery consisting of ten cannon.

Even if we consider Brown's division having 2,000 men before darkness that evening, it would be a stretch to believe the attack would be successful when he was outflanked by several hundred yards by artillery and infantry with no support on his right. He had been told Forrest would support his flank, but he had withdrawn his cavalry. The enemy force on his right was on higher ground located on a spur. His attack would have advanced in up a lower piece of terrain leaving his flank fully exposed.

This is why Strahl brought it to Brown's attention after skirmishers had been thrown forward for the attack to commence. Strahl recognized the threat, and soon thereafter Brown saw it with his own eyes, as did Governor Isham Harris who had gone to prod Cheatham forward in the attack.

A good number of Tennesseans were actually lucky enough to miss the battle of Franklin due to furloughs. Those same men that were considered effective on November 6 were mostly still considered effective on December 10.

OK. I see the point. I do believe Jacobson mentioned the furloughs at Columbia at one point. I am uncertain if he brings up the strength disparity and Brown's numbers here. also explains why the division still had the strength it did at Nashville compared to Cleburne's.
I would presume that the least affected of Brown's Brigades would be Gist's Brigade of South Carolinians and Georgians. Given their size on December 10th and the casualties they'd have to have sustained at Franklin, Gist would have had no fewer than 1000 men in his brigade. That would leave Brown with 1750 men, and estimating Strahl's strength at 750, he would have had no more than 1500 men available.