Burnside Bridge; What Happened?

[Andy Cardinal]

I

I think the book should more properly entitled Stonewall Rode With Me. Douglas was something of an 1860's Forest Gump when it came to all things Jackson. Much of his self serving recollections should, IMHO, be read with suspicion.

Would say, in all honesty, that most Recollections are self--serving to some extent, some obviously more so that others. It is human nature to put yourself at the center of attention, and to put the best possible light forward you can. All recollections should be read with a degree of suspicion.

 

[MHB1862]

I

Would say, in all honesty, that most Recollections are self--albert to some extent, some obviously more so that others. It is human nature to put yourself at the center of attention, and to put the best possible light forward you can. All recollections should be read with a degree of suspicion.

A notable exception is Porter Alexander's Fighting for the Confederacy.
He was writing for family rather than publication. I just finished rereading it for the umpteenth time and still marvel at his candor and writing skills. We all owe Gary Gallaher a great debt for bringing it to us in it's entirety.

 

[WJC]

There are several articles out there about people trying to ford the creek to see if it was doable.

Historian William Marvel wrote one in which he tried various spots. He found crossing at the ford downstream of the bridge that was used during the battle to be quite easy. Then he tried a spot further up -- "The banks there, vertical and slick with mud, stood 4 feet or more out of the water. I let myself down into chest-deep water and started across, but less than one-third of the way across my feet became tangled in the branches of a submerged tree, and I turned back." So then he tried closer to the bridge -- "I found most of the creek bed only 3 feet deep, but in the main channel I suddenly dropped in, to my chin." So then he tried next to the bridge -- "water came only to my waist, but stones made the bottom precarious footing. Twice I stumbled enough to fall into the water".

It had rained the night before the battle so the creek was probably high.

Interesting information. However, it can be misleading to judge streams and terrain as they exist today in an attempt to replicate an event many years ago. Such results must always be 'taken with a grain of salt'....

 

[WJC]

A notable exception is Porter Alexander's Fighting for the Confederacy.
He was writing for family rather than publication. I just finished rereading it for the umpteenth time and still marvel at his candor and writing skills. We all owe Gary Gallaher a great debt for bringing it to us in it's entirety.

I'll second that. It has become my favorite Civil War book....

 

[Rob9641]

A notable exception is Porter Alexander's Fighting for the Confederacy.
He was writing for family rather than publication. I just finished rereading it for the umpteenth time and still marvel at his candor and writing skills. We all owe Gary Gallaher a great debt for bringing it to us in it's entirety.

Yep, it's a keeper.

 

[Drew]

Interesting information. However, it can be misleading to judge streams and terrain as they exist today in an attempt to replicate an event many years ago. Such results must always be 'taken with a grain of salt'....

Yeah, I think I've tried to make this point. No body of water, especially one moving, is going to be anything like it was, 150 years hence.

But let the modern waders have their fun.

 

[ErnieMac]

I am going to suggest the Burnside Bridge debacle (at least from the Union standpoint) was a failure of leadership that had little to do with the depth of water in Antietam Creek. A brief synopsis follows:

• On the west side of the Antietam were posted 350 men of the 2nd and 20th Georgia, positioned on high ground dominating the bridge and dug in. 110 of these men were killed or wounded in the fighting. I can't say for certain, but am guessing most casualties occurred at the time the bridge was forced.
• On the east side of the Antietam were 9000 infantrymen of Burnside's Ninth Corps. The number is taken from posted returns less artillery, cavalry and most of Rodman's division which was off looking for Snavely's Ford.
• The initial attack (10:00 -10:30 a.m.) was made by men of George Crook's Brigade (2000 men) and the 11th Connecticut (430 men) from Rodman's division. The troops approached the bridge in line of battle. During the following two hours Crook was able to establish an artillery battery overlooking the bridge and push 5 companies of the 28th Ohio to the west bank above the bridge. Total casualties 8 killed, 52 wounded, 5 missing. The 11th Connecticut acting as a skirmish line attempted to ford the creek just below the bridge. They suffered the brunt of the Confederate fire losing 37 dead and 103 wounded.
• The second wave, James Nagle's Brigade of Sturgis' Division, followed at about noon, also in line of battle. After being stalled by Confederate fire, Nagle's men fired off their ammunition and retired. Total casualties for the brigade 35 dead, 154 wounded and 15 missing.
• The final attack by Ferrero's Brigade of Sturgis' Division occurred between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. Sturgis seems to been the planner after being directed to take the bridge or else [my paraphrasing]. Instead of line of battle a column formation was used and the bridge carried at bayonet point. Ferrero's men suffered losses of 95 killed, 371 wounded and 6 missing, more than the combined casualties of the other unit.
• The total casualties for the assault on the Burnside Bridge were 175 killed, 680 wounded and 26 missing, only 7% of the casualties 2108 killed, 9549 wounded and 753 missing). [Note that the casualty figures given for Burnside's units were for the entire battle. Those suffered at the bridge would be somewhat lower.]

It is my contention that had the style of attack made by Ferrero's men occurred at 10:00 a.m. or any time before noon and reinforcements been in position to exploit it as they were at 1:00 p.m. the results would have been the same. The difference would have been that A. P. Hill would have been in no position to help. Antietam Creek would not have made a difference no matter how high or low the water was.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I agree completely about the mismanagement of the initial assaults. The first attempt at 10:00 was a disaster -- Crook's division was assigned to the assault and Crook(apparently) didn't even understand what he was supposed to do. It seems he was not briefed about his role in the plan, which is an unconscionable oversight on Burnside's and/or Cox's part. Crook's troops went astray and Crook later said something to the effect that "they could at least have shown me where the bridge was."

In my opinion, the other leadership failure (either at army or corps level) was not properly scouting the fords. If Rodman knew where a useable ford was at 10:00, his division might have been across the creek by 11, which would have forced the bridge defenders to withdraw 2 hours before they did.

 

[ErnieMac]

Ezra Carman would write the following in the second volume of The Maryland Campaign of 1862 (page 425) as edited by Thomas G. Clemens:

"On the 16th McClellan's engineer officers made reconnaissances for fords and gathered information regarding them, and Burnside was informed by them that there was a ford less than a half mile below the bridge, and when Rodman's Division was led to its bivouac that night Fairchild's Brigade was supposed to be opposite the ford. Cox says all the orders for the movement of troops were based on the reports of the engineer officers.
..........
In reality the nearest ford below the bridge, the one referred to by the engineer officers - was two-thirds of a mile, and was impracticable, not properly situated, being at the foot of a steep bluff, rising more than 160 feet, over which it would have been almost impossible to deploy infantry against a skirmish line; and the passage of the ford would have consumed much time. It was not until after Rodman had been ordered to advance, about 10 o'clock, from the heights to which he had retired early in the morning, and had marched some distance that he became aware that the only ford by which he could cross was a mile distant - as the crow flies from his starting point - and that he would be required to march two miles over very rough ground to reach it. This was Snavely's Ford 680 yards below the ford indicated in the orders of the day."
​

Who's to blame? The engineer officers obviously. McClellan seems to be off the hook on this one, he ordered the scouting of the fords, and unless he had been directly overseeing the reconnaissance, would not have known of the oversight. Should Burnside, Cox or Rodman own some responsibility?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Ezra Carman would write the following in the second volume of The Maryland Campaign of 1862 (page 425) as edited by Thomas G. Clemens:

"On the 16th McClellan's engineer officers made reconnaissances for fords and gathered information regarding them, and Burnside was informed by them that there was a ford less than a half mile below the bridge, and when Rodman's Division was led to its bivouac that night Fairchild's Brigade was supposed to be opposite the ford. Cox says all the orders for the movement of troops were based on the reports of the engineer officers.
..........
In reality the nearest ford below the bridge, the one referred to by the engineer officers - was two-thirds of a mile, and was impracticable, not properly situated, being at the foot of a steep bluff, rising more than 160 feet, over which it would have been almost impossible to deploy infantry against a skirmish line; and the passage of the ford would have consumed much time. It was not until after Rodman had been ordered to advance, about 10 o'clock, from the heights to which he had retired early in the morning, and had marched some distance that he became aware that the only ford by which he could cross was a mile distant - as the crow flies from his starting point - and that he would be required to march two miles over very rough ground to reach it. This was Snavely's Ford 680 yards below the ford indicated in the orders of the day."
​

Who's to blame? The engineer officers obviously. McClellan seems to be off the hook on this one, he ordered the scouting of the fords, and unless he had been directly overseeing the reconnaissance, would not have known of the oversight. Should Burnside, Cox or Rodman own some responsibility?

I think Burnside personally, maybe Cox to an extent. Adequate scouting seems like it would be required due diligence. Due diligence was obviously lacking in many with the 9th corps high command.

I can see attaching blame to Rodman as well. One can imagine that Richardson or Hancock would have scouted ahead. But Rodman was a rookie I believe. Burnside should have been more involved.

 

[MHB1862]

I am going to suggest the Burnside Bridge debacle (at least from the Union standpoint) was a failure of leadership that had little to do with the depth of water in Antietam Creek. A brief synopsis follows:

• On the west side of the Antietam were posted 350 men of the 2nd and 20th Georgia, positioned on high ground dominating the bridge and dug in. 110 of these men were killed or wounded in the fighting. I can't say for certain, but am guessing most casualties occurred at the time the bridge was forced.
• On the east side of the Antietam were 9000 infantrymen of Burnside's Ninth Corps. The number is taken from posted returns less artillery, cavalry and most of Rodman's division which was off looking for Snavely's Ford.
• The initial attack (10:00 -10:30 a.m.) was made by men of George Crook's Brigade (2000 men) and the 11th Connecticut (430 men) from Rodman's division. The troops approached the bridge in line of battle. During the following two hours Crook was able to establish an artillery battery overlooking the bridge and push 5 companies of the 28th Ohio to the west bank above the bridge. Total casualties 8 killed, 52 wounded, 5 missing. The 11th Connecticut acting as a skirmish line attempted to ford the creek just below the bridge. They suffered the brunt of the Confederate fire losing 37 dead and 103 wounded.
• The second wave, James Nagle's Brigade of Sturgis' Division, followed at about noon, also in line of battle. After being stalled by Confederate fire, Nagle's men fired off their ammunition and retired. Total casualties for the brigade 35 dead, 154 wounded and 15 missing.
• The final attack by Ferrero's Brigade of Sturgis' Division occurred between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. Sturgis seems to been the planner after being directed to take the bridge or else [my paraphrasing]. Instead of line of battle a column formation was used and the bridge carried at bayonet point. Ferrero's men suffered losses of 95 killed, 371 wounded and 6 missing, more than the combined casualties of the other unit.
• The total casualties for the assault on the Burnside Bridge were 175 killed, 680 wounded and 26 missing, only 7% of the casualties 2108 killed, 9549 wounded and 753 missing). [Note that the casualty figures given for Burnside's units were for the entire battle. Those suffered at the bridge would be somewhat lower.]

It is my contention that had the style of attack made by Ferrero's men occurred at 10:00 a.m. or any time before noon and reinforcements been in position to exploit it as they were at 1:00 p.m. the results would have been the same. The difference would have been that A. P. Hill would have been in no position to help. Antietam Creek would not have made a difference no matter how high or low the water was.

The stiffness of resistance from Benning played a role as well. By the time Ferrero made his column assault the Georgians were very low on ammo and had lost the majority of their artillery support and had taken better than 30% casualties. A column could have been a disastrous bit of tactics if launched earlier. At the close ranges involved it would have been hard for the defenders to miss.

 

[MHB1862]

I think Burnside personally, maybe Cox to an extent. Adequate scouting seems like it would be required due diligence. Due diligence was obviously lacking in many with the 9th corps high command.

I can see attaching blame to Rodman as well. One can imagine that Richardson or Hancock would have scouted ahead. But Rodman was a rookie I believe. Burnside should have been more involved.

I wonder -and this is a question for all - if commanders on the ground routinely conducted their own scouting of what was supposed to be the Engineer's professional opinion after what should have been a thorough recon of the natural features confronting them?

Any thoughts?

 

[ErnieMac]

The stiffness of resistance from Benning played a role as well. By the time Ferrero made his column assault the Georgians were very low on ammo and had lost the majority of their artillery support and had taken better than 30% casualties. A column could have been a disastrous bit of tactics if launched earlier. At the close ranges involved it would have been hard for the defenders to miss.

It's only an opinion, but I'm thinking most of the Georgian casualties occurred after Ferrero got across the bridge. The rapidness of the movement would have made it impossible for the Georgians to have got off more than a couple rounds before the Federals were across.

 

[ErnieMac]

I think Burnside personally, maybe Cox to an extent. Adequate scouting seems like it would be required due diligence. Due diligence was obviously lacking in many with the 9th corps high command.

I can see attaching blame to Rodman as well. One can imagine that Richardson or Hancock would have scouted ahead. But Rodman was a rookie I believe. Burnside should have been more involved.

I wonder -and this is a question for all - if commanders on the ground routinely conducted their own scouting of what was supposed to be the Engineer's professional opinion after what should have been a thorough recon of the natural features confronting them?

Any thoughts?

I'm not sure how much recon would have been expected from a division or corps after the army engineers made their report. I do know that high ranking officers were frequently at the front trying to see what was in front of them and a number lost their lives doing so. Burnside was the West Point professional, but seems to have taken a hands off position. If there is blame to be assigned I think it lies with him. Cox was a pre-War lawyer whose first major battle was Antietam; he'd commanded a brigade in some minor battles in western Virginia. Now he was commanding a Corps because Burnside was still trying to function as a wing commander. Rodman had been a banker and businessman before enlisting. He had been a regimental commander in North Carolina under Burnside, but had no experience in battle at a brigade or division level.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I wonder -and this is a question for all - if commanders on the ground routinely conducted their own scouting of what was supposed to be the Engineer's professional opinion after what should have been a thorough recon of the natural features confronting them?

Any thoughts?

Good question. I have no real idea. I know Phil Kearny regular conducted his own reconnaissances. Other than that I'm not sure.

 

[Andrew]

Good question. I have no real idea. I know Phil Kearny regular conducted his own reconnaissances. Other than that I'm not sure.

I don't think that worked out well for him.

 

[Drew]

I don't think that worked out well for him.

Had Gen. Kearny listened to his troops, it would have worked out fine for him. He didn't. Bang.

 

[MHB1862]

It's only an opinion, but I'm thinking most of the Georgian casualties occurred after Ferrero got across the bridge. The rapidness of the movement would have made it impossible for the Georgians to have got off more than a couple rounds before the Federals were across.

You may be right but a good man could get off 3 rounds a minute. Getting a column over that ground would have consumed well over a few minutes, especially when they got to the bridge proper and had to deal with advancing over wounded or dead in those tight confines. Even figuring only 150 soldiers having direct fire on the advancing columns, that's still a lot of lead at a dense column, plus whatever Eschelman's battery might have contributed.
I am away from my Sharpsburg stuff at the moment but I seem to recall that a book about the defense of the bridge talked about severe casualties before the twin 51sts made their assault. Their position was being pounded by Union artillery fire. If you like I'll look for the book to give you a place to check on what was happening on the high ground above the bridge.

 

[MHB1862]

I'm not sure how much recon would have been expected from a division or corps after the army engineers made their report. I do know that high ranking officers were frequently at the front trying to see what was in front of them and a number lost their lives doing so. Burnside was the West Point professional, but seems to have taken a hands off position. If there is blame to be assigned I think it lies with him. Cox was a pre-War lawyer whose first major battle was Antietam; he'd commanded a brigade in some minor battles in western Virginia. Now he was commanding a Corps because Burnside was still trying to function as a wing commander. Rodman had been a banker and businessman before enlisting. He had been a regimental commander in North Carolina under Burnside, but had no experience in battle at a brigade or division level.

I agree that senior officers were often at the front. It war where officers led from the front and the casualties show that quite dramatically. These men often looked over what was in front of them to determine the best tactics to deal with what they saw. I am not intending to argue at all, but I wonder if those senior folks would have actively checked up on the reports from HQ staff engineers concerning things like, in this case, the nearest usable fords. I can't answer that question and welcome any insights you or others may have on the subject.
Is it remotely possible that in such things a West Point trained officer would be less inclined to double check that a general without that education? Only the top of the West Point graduates were assigned as engineers. Might that make a West Point trained officer disinclined to do his own recon for such things? I'm just thinking out loud and welcome input from those better informed.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I agree that senior officers were often at the front. It war where officers led from the front and the casualties show that quite dramatically. These men often looked over what was in front of them to determine the best tactics to deal with what they saw. I am not intending to argue at all, but I wonder if those senior folks would have actively checked up on the reports from HQ staff engineers concerning things like, in this case, the nearest usable fords. I can't answer that question and welcome any insights you or others may have on the subject.
Is it remotely possible that in such things a West Point trained officer would be less inclined to double check that a general without that education? Only the top of the West Point graduates were assigned as engineers. Might that make a West Point trained officer disinclined to do his own recon for such things? I'm just thinking out loud and welcome input from those better informed.

I also find this interesting and am interested in what others think about it. Several officers (I mentioned Richardson and Hancock previously) were known to lead from the front. That does not necessarily mean the conducted reconnaissance missions though.