Burnside Bridge; What Happened?

[FahanParish]

The question is, what the Heck happened here? How did such a mess present itself and why are we still scratching our heads, 150 years hence?[/QUOTE]

Past the continuing uncertainty over the time the attack was begun -a continuing parlor discussion as the timing was an annoyance to McClellan but not an obstacle to success- what happened there that day is fairly well understood - there's no mystery. Several sources state the Union engineers did not do their work well enough to locate an easily fordable spot downstream - Snavely's Ford - but some of Rodman's Ohio troops moved downstream until coming on it and crossed over at that spot - and then came up in support of the troops that had by then made their way across Rohrbach's bridge.

William Marvel in a 1994 article takes issue with Henry Kyd Douglas's written statement that the water at the bridge "was not deep enough to wet their waist belts". Marvel himself tried to ford Antietam Creek at the bridge in 1994 and found it treacherous going. Douglas has been quoted ever since his credibility on the depth of the stream never questioned because he grew up four miles from the bridge - but over to Shepherdstown. Sharpsburg was not his home.

As to Burnside being focused on the bridge - Capt. John Griswold of the 11th Connecticut was not and he went into the water to avoid the rain of fire cutting down those trying to cross the bridge - and met with the same fate. The fire pinned down most of the 11th Connecticut on the near bank - Griswold was shot in mid-stream and gained the far bank only to die on it. No one other than Griswold made it that far.

Col. Kingsbury also of the 11th Connecticut tried to move through the creek on the south side of the bridge - Kingsbury like Griswold was hit while he moved forward in the creek and hit three more times before his men carried him to safety - he died the next day.

1/3 of the 11th Connecticut was cut down trying to go over - and around - the bridge. What happened that day was that the impossible was being asked of Union troops. The mistake of the engineers in failing to locate Snavely's Ford was a costly one but - two Confederate regiments - the 2nd and 20th Georgia - had the good high ground and a rock wall at the top of the ridge - any attack directed at them was greatly at the disadvantage - troops marching up into their directed fire.

The 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania gained the other side of the bridge on their courage and on the reality that the fire of the Confederate regiments was slackening - the ammunition of the 2nd and 20th Georgia was giving out.

That's what happened that day. Had their ammunition not given out the 2nd and 20th Georgia would be on that ridge above the Antietam yet.

 

[Drew]

The question is, what the Heck happened here? How did such a mess present itself and why are we still scratching our heads, 150 years hence?

[/QUOTE]Past the continuing uncertainty over the time the attack was begun -a continuing parlor discussion as the timing was an annoyance to McClellan but not an obstacle to success- what happened there that day is fairly well understood - there's no mystery. Several sources state the Union engineers did not do their work well enough to locate an easily fordable spot downstream - Snavely's Ford - but some of Rodman's Ohio troops moved downstream until coming on it and crossed over at that spot - and then came up in support of the troops that had by then made their way across Rohrbach's bridge.

William Marvel in a 1994 article takes issue with Henry Kyd Douglas's written statement that the water at the bridge "was not deep enough to wet their waist belts". Marvel himself tried to ford Antietam Creek at the bridge in 1994 and found it treacherous going. Douglas has been quoted ever since his credibility on the depth of the stream never questioned because he grew up four miles from the bridge - but over to Shepherdstown. Sharpsburg was not his home.

As to Burnside being focused on the bridge - Capt. John Griswold of the 11th Connecticut was not and he went into the water to avoid the rain of fire cutting down those trying to cross the bridge - and met with the same fate. The fire pinned down most of the 11th Connecticut on the near bank - Griswold was shot in mid-stream and gained the far bank only to die on it. No one other than Griswold made it that far.

Col. Kingsbury also of the 11th Connecticut tried to move through the creek on the south side of the bridge - Kingsbury like Griswold was hit while he moved forward in the creek and hit three more times before his men carried him to safety - he died the next day.

1/3 of the 11th Connecticut was cut down trying to go over - and around - the bridge. What happened that day was that the impossible was being asked of Union troops. The mistake of the engineers in failing to locate Snavely's Ford was a costly one but - two Confederate regiments - the 2nd and 20th Georgia - had the good high ground and a rock wall at the top of the ridge - any attack directed at them was greatly at the disadvantage - troops marching up into their directed fire.

The 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania gained the other side of the bridge on their courage and on the reality that the fire of the Confederate regiments was slackening - the ammunition of the 2nd and 20th Georgia was giving out.

That's what happened that day. Had their ammunition not given out the 2nd and 20th Georgia would be on that ridge above the Antietam yet.[/QUOTE]

Thoughtful answer, thanks. I will repeat though, William Marvel entering the creek 130 years after the fact tells us nothing. Stream beds can be expected to change, often dramatically, over time. Conditions will also depend heavily on seasonal weather conditions.

Douglas' upbringing four miles from the bridge still gives him serious credibility. Until, someone else from his time and place pipes up and says different. We haven't seen that, as far as I know.

 

[cash]

Kyd Douglas has been shown in several sources to be less than credible in his book.

In 2012 the CWI did a tour of Antietam, and military historian Mark Grimsley waded the creek. The footing was slippery, the banks are steep and muddy, meaning it was very difficult to get out of the creek.

Most historians are agreed wading the creek was not feasible.

 

[Drew]

Kyd Douglas has been shown in several sources to be less than credible in his book.

In 2012 the CWI did a tour of Antietam, and military historian Mark Grimsley waded the creek. The footing was slippery, the banks are steep and muddy, meaning it was very difficult to get out of the creek.

Most historians are agreed wading the creek was not feasible.

Your experience is irrelevant to 1862. So is every other modern attempt to "interpret" a 150 year-old creek bed.

That you guys don't understand this I guess should be expected. It's really stupid, though.

Thanks for letting everyone know, "the footing was slippery." Also, that the banks, "were muddy." I'll bet.

I can only imagine how difficult it was for middle-aged, wanna-be Union Soldiers, "to get out of the creek."

Whatever.

 

[cash]

Your experience is irrelevant to 1862. So is every other modern attempt to "interpret" a 150 year-old creek bed.

That you guys don't understand this I guess should be expected. It's really stupid, though.

Thanks for letting everyone know, "the footing was slippery." Also, that the banks, "were muddy." I'll bet.

I can only imagine how difficult it was for middle-aged, wanna-be Union Soldiers, "to get out of the creek."

Whatever.

Your uninformed opinion is noted.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I spent some time downstream from the bridge a few days ago in an attempt to see for myself. My impression is that there are definitely spots where men could cross the creek, and others where it is indeed difficult and even treacherous. I did not see any place where in my mind artillery, wagons, and other support could cross. Nor do I believe any infantry command could cross in force in most places. Therefore, it seems to me possession of the bridge was necessary to cross the creek in force.

That does not mean that a force of skirmishers (for example) could not have waded across the stream in order to outflank and force the Georgians from the bluffs above the bridge.

A couple of things that I wondered about:

First, what was the tree cover like in September 17? It is a fairly heavily wooded area today. I assume it may have more open in 1862. But if there was significant tree cover, that would make it much more difficult to cross the creek at any spot.

Second, what was the depth of Antirtam Creek on September 17? (I know this has been discussed in earlier posts.) On the day I was there it was knee or mid-thigh depth in most spots. (I did wade my way out in a few places; the water was cold!) But the banks were also extremely steep which made it an adventure to get down into the water. If the water was higher in 1862, it would have been easier to get into the creek -- but of course the water would have been deeper to cross.

3. Has the creek changes it's channel at all since the battle?

4. I am no expert on fords. I looked at two of the fords (including Snavely's) and found them to be pretty rough. We're they in better shape in 1862?

I had never been below the bridge before my hike. I was struck by the high hills that rise on the west side of the creek almost as soon as you come out of the water. Is there enough room to get the troops into formation in most spots?

Finally, I think it is important to remember that capturing the bridge or crossing the creek was not the primary objective -- attacking Lee's right flank was. The battle for the bridge was in a sense preliminary. I think most would agree that Burnside was not a very imaginative commander. Faced with a similar in some ways problem in crossing the Rappahannock at Fredricksburg, Henry Hunt came up with an imaginative solution to get across the river. That solution was not available at Antietam, but the point is that Burnside did not have the imagination to come up with an alternative solution himself. Neither, apparently, did anyone else in the Ninth Corps that day.

 

[Drew]

3. Has the creek changes it's channel at all since the battle?

The only constant with respect to moving water, is change. There's no way Antietam Creek looks like, feels like or runs the same way it did in 1862. It's physical impossibility, no matter what modern waders have to say about it.

 

[Bruce Vail]

The only constant with respect to moving water, is change. There's no way Antietam Creek looks like, feels like or runs the same way it did in 1862. It's physical impossibility, no matter what modern waders have to say about it.

I have had the good fortune to have been canoeing on that creek. As you say, a creek changes over time and you cannot assume that all of its features are the same now as they were then.

Having said that, any one who goes down there and gets in the creek today will agree with Bruce Catton that it is easily fordable at numerous places and that Gen. Burnside's fixation on the bridge structure is inexplicable, and was an important factor in preventing a more sweeping Union victory that day.

 

[Bruce Vail]

There was a short thread last year in this subject:

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/taking-the-burnside-bridge.131137/

 

[Drew]

There was a short thread last year in this subject:

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/taking-the-burnside-bridge.131137/

Thanks - maybe there's a way to merge the two...

 

[Rob9641]

The big problem with trying to judge crossing the creek on a visit today is that NOBODY IS SHOOTING AT YOU!

I am at Burnside Bridge every weekend. I've seen the creek at all kinds of levels, I've crossed it well below the bridge under drought conditions, and I've kayaked it under average conditions. The slippery banks are always a problem, the muddy bottom of the creek is a problem, and I don't care who you are if you try to walk through water you are going to slow down (not good if you are under fire).

The bridge runs slap into a bluff on its west side, and the Confederates were on the bluff shooting until they ran out of ammunition and Rodman got his division across Snavely's Ford (which would bring him up on the Confederates' flank and, because of the big bend in the creek, to their rear). The Confederates had the most defensible position you ever saw, and they used it well until Rodman and lack of ammunition forced them back.

Capt. Griswold of the 11th Conn. did not ford the stream alone (a bit below the bridge). He had a dozen or more men with him. None of them made it to the other side, except Griswold, who went down right away. That's the best evidence there is that Kyd Douglas was just wrong - you could not ford the creek under battle conditions on Sept. 17, 1862. It was suicide to try. Send your whole corps trying to run through mud and water and you are going to lose an unacceptable number of them (remember, they weren't done once they were over the bridge - their job included pushing the Confederates into Sharpsburg and cutting off their escape route to Virginia - they had to have enough men left to do that).

 

[General Butterfield]

Found this lecture from a little over a month ago:

 

[Rob9641]

Hoptak (ranger in the video) was formerly a ranger at Antietam. I was here for this talk, and it was very good. Hoptak knows his stuff (and his book on the Battle of South Mountain is a keeper, too).

 

[1stMDINFCSA]

Just like everything Civil War related you have to stop thinking with a modern mind and try and look at things as they were. We have been to Burnside bridge on numerous occasions. Sitting across the bridge in the Confederate rifle pit positions shows that anyone coming a crossed, slowed by crossing in the water, would be like shooting fish in a barrel.
Burnside, having been rebuked earlier by McClellen, was not doing anything but relaying orders to Cox. The delays in orders being carried out, the whoa is me attitude of Burnside, the complete and total lack of Calvary recon(anywhere on the field) plus the incredibly strong Confederate defensive position caused this part of the battle to become the debacle that it did. Just my humble opinion.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Found this lecture from a little over a month ago:

This is a really interesting video and I tend to agree with several of Hoptak's conclusions. First, especially under fire, crossing the stream itself was difficult. Second, Burnside/Cox were ill-served by McClellan's engineers. Rodman was on a wild goose chase looking for a ford to cross. It was Rodman's turning movement that allowed the bridge to be crossed eventually anyway. Third, while infantry may have been able to cross in more places, the bridge was the only place artillery, wagons, and other support essential to launching the attack on Lee's flank could cross.

One thing that came out to me was that McClellan changed his tune somewhat between his October 1862 and August 1863 reports. He was much more critical of Burnside in the 2nd.

 

[ErnieMac]

Excellent point about artillery, wagons, etc.

 

[Jimklag]

I didn't want to blow up a nice recent thread about Henry Kid Douglas' work, I Road With Stonewall, but it contains a judgement about Antietam Creek and the ability the Union Army had to ford it in 1862. Some complained Douglas' assertion wasn't true.

So, I looked up the only Union version of the story I've got handy, Gene Schmiel's Citizen-General; Jacob Dolson Cox and the Civil War Era. Cox worked for Burnside and was in command of the effort to take the bridge over Antietam Creek.

The work acknowledges the creek was fordable in several places near the bridge, though the banks were "slippery." I have for my own part failed to enter a creek, anywhere, without "slippery" banks, be that is as it may be.

One of the things his biographer shows, is that General Cox recorded, "...I do not hesitate to affirm that the Confederate position was virtually impregnable to direct attack over the bridge." I think he was probably right.

The question is, what the Heck happened here? How did such a mess present itself and why are we still scratching our heads, 150 years hence?

Btw, @Drew . Love your avatar.

 

[MHB1862]

I didn't want to blow up a nice recent thread about Henry Kid Douglas' work, I Road With Stonewall, but it contains a judgement about Antietam Creek and the ability the Union Army had to ford it in 1862. Some complained Douglas' assertion wasn't true.

So, I looked up the only Union version of the story I've got handy, Gene Schmiel's Citizen-General; Jacob Dolson Cox and the Civil War Era. Cox worked for Burnside and was in command of the effort to take the bridge over Antietam Creek.

The work acknowledges the creek was fordable in several places near the bridge, though the banks were "slippery." I have for my own part failed to enter a creek, anywhere, without "slippery" banks, be that is as it may be.

One of the things his biographer shows, is that General Cox recorded, "...I do not hesitate to affirm that the Confederate position was virtually impregnable to direct attack over the bridge." I think he was probably right.

The question is, what the Heck happened here? How did such a mess present itself and why are we still scratching our heads, 150 years hence?

I think the book should more properly entitled Stonewall Rode With Me. Douglas was something of an 1860's Forest Gump when it came to all things Jackson. Much of his self serving recollections should, IMHO, be read with suspicion.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think the book should more properly entitled Stonewall Rode With Me. Douglas was something of an 1860's Forest Gump when it came to all things Jackson. Much of his self serving recollections should, IMHO, be read with suspicion.

"Life is like a case of lemons"

 

[Drew]

I think the book should more properly entitled Stonewall Rode With Me. Douglas was something of an 1860's Forest Gump when it came to all things Jackson. Much of his self serving recollections should, IMHO, be read with suspicion.

That old joke is a good one, but it is true that Douglas grew up right up the road from the Antietam battlefield. Jackson was very good about identifying young officers with that kind of local knowledge and listening to them.