Burnside Bridge; What Happened?

[NedBaldwin]

It is my contention that had the style of attack made by Ferrero's men occurred at 10:00 a.m. or any time before noon and reinforcements been in position to exploit it as they were at 1:00 p.m. the results would have been the same.

It is my contention that Ferrero suceeded because Confederate were running out of ammunition and Rodman had crossed the ford and was coming up on the flank. At 10am neither of those conditions would be.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

It is my contention that Ferrero suceeded because Confederate were running out of ammunition and Rodman had crossed the ford and was coming up on the flank. At 10am neither of those conditions would be.

I agree with this and (as I said above) I think the flank attack was delayed by poor scouting/poor planning.

Burnside seems to have had a pattern of not looking into the details and of issuing vague attack orders. This pattern would repeat itself at Fredricksburg. He does not seem to have been a detail man. On the other hand, he commanded a very successful expedition to North Carolina earlier in the year. I don't know very much about this, and wonder at his planning there? Did he plan the details or did someone else?

To be fair, I believe most attacks during the war we're designed to go around a defended river/creek. I'm having a hard time thinking of another instance where an assault was made at crossing point directly in the face of the enemy.

 

[ErnieMac]

I agree that senior officers were often at the front. It war where officers led from the front and the casualties show that quite dramatically. These men often looked over what was in front of them to determine the best tactics to deal with what they saw. I am not intending to argue at all, but I wonder if those senior folks would have actively checked up on the reports from HQ staff engineers concerning things like, in this case, the nearest usable fords. I can't answer that question and welcome any insights you or others may have on the subject.
Is it remotely possible that in such things a West Point trained officer would be less inclined to double check that a general without that education? Only the top of the West Point graduates were assigned as engineers. Might that make a West Point trained officer disinclined to do his own recon for such things? I'm just thinking out loud and welcome input from those better informed.

I agree that most of the examples we have cited were examples of commanders scouting during combat, looking at what they were up against. It seems most prebattle reconnaissance was performed by engineers or trained scouts. Lee's early morning scout at Gettysburg on July 2 and Albert Sidney Johnson's preparations for Shiloh are cases in point. On other occasions the armies just seem to have ran headlong into each other.

 

[ErnieMac]

It is my contention that Ferrero suceeded because Confederate were running out of ammunition and Rodman had crossed the ford and was coming up on the flank. At 10am neither of those conditions would be.

Having reread the battle reports of Toombs, Benning and Cumming from the Confederate side I concede lack of ammunition was a significant factor. The reports also mention that the Federals were swarming around them from front and both flanks. Would Ferrero's attack at an earlier time resulted in another repulse or more casualties with the same result? I can't say for sure.

Battle maps show that Rodman's first unit had just crossed at Snavely's Ford when the bridge was forced. The Confederates would have known, but I think the decision had already been made to withdraw.