ANV artillery question

[MikeyB]

What was the status of the ANV artillery at the close of the Battle on July 3rd? Was the army universally out of ammunition, or only Longstreet's artillery that supported Pickett's charge?

Had Meade decided to launch a counterattack w/ the VI corp or something like that into the confused, weakened and rallying center, post Pickett's Charge, would they have been met with devastating battery fire like PPT's men had just taken?

 

[rpkennedy]

What was the status of the ANV artillery at the close of the Battle on July 3rd? Was the army universally out of ammunition, or only Longstreet's artillery that supported Pickett's charge?

Had Meade decided to launch a counterattack w/ the VI corp or something like that into the confused, weakened and rallying center, post Pickett's Charge, would they have been met with devastating battery fire like PPT's men had just taken?

What was critically short among the guns of the First and Third Corps in particular was long range ammunition. Much of that had been fired away between July 1 and 3. That said there was some ammo available among the army's wagons but it would take time to distribute it. What they had in plentiful supply was short range ammo that could blunt any potential counterattack.

Ryan

 

[Tom Elmore]

Some comments regarding Confederate artillery ammunition at the close of the battle on July 3:

"The batteries are generally short of ammunition" (Gen. Robert E. Lee, in a conversation held with Brig. Gen. Imboden around 1 a.m. on July 4)

"Our army was held there [near Hagerstown on the retreat] with little or no ammunition." (Channing Bolton, Engineering Officer, Pender's staff)

"The officer [in charge of the reserve ordnance train of the army] directed me to inform Gen. Pendleton that the supply in the reserve train was getting low [as of late afternoon on July 3], and if the expenditure which was then being made continued much longer, we would not have enough to supply the demand ... Some of that ammunition marked and inspected and certified to by the Confederate States Ordnance Department at Richmond, Virginia was opened; I saw it with my own eyes; and yet it would not fit a single gun in the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia, and was intended for siege guns." (Reminiscences of Coupland R. Page, on Brig. Gen. Pendleton's staff)

"July 4 … I was near a conference of high ranking artillery officers and heard [Col.] E. P. Alexander say that we did not have left more than four rounds of ammunition to each gun." (Capt. William W. Chamberlaine, Memoirs of the Civil War - on Col. Walker's staff of the Third Corps artillery)

That being said, the short-range 12-pounder Howitzers in the army had nearly all been idle during the battle and presumably had full, or nearly full, chests. Here are the numbers of those howitzers available in the various battalions:

Cabell - 2
Eshleman - 2
Alexander - 4
Poague - 6
Lane - 5
Pegram - 2
Garnett - 2
Total - 23

Those 23 Howitzers would have been gainfully employed against a Federal counterattack against Lee's center. No doubt they would done considerable damage against, for example, a massed Sixth Corps assault, but they were not sufficient in numbers to inflict what in my opinion would be considered "devastating" damage, that is, to turn back an all-out Federal effort given the huge gaps left in the center of Lee's army after the repulse of Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble's brigades.

 

[BillO]

23 smoothbores firing canister as fast as they could seems fairly "devastating" to me, across open ground anyway.

 

[Belfoured]

23 smoothbores firing canister as fast as they could seems fairly "devastating" to me, across open ground anyway.

The problem is the width of the assault, but also the exposure of those guns to counter-battery fire - especially the Federal guns towards LRT. The guys serving those howitzers would be targets themselves for long-range fire from the rifles.

 

[thomas aagaard]

Had Meade decided to launch a counterattack w/ the VI corp

Note that The VI corp had been used to reinforce the other corps across the federal lines.
It is doubtful that it would have been possible to send orders to all its units, get them concentrated and launch the attack in any timeframe that could take advantage of the disorder from the csa attack.

 

[MikeyB]

Very interesting information everyone. Many thanks.

 

[MikeyB]

The problem is the width of the assault, but also the exposure of those guns to counter-battery fire - especially the Federal guns towards LRT. The guys serving those howitzers would be targets themselves for long-range fire from the rifles.

How accurate was battery to battery fire in a situation like this? For battle plan purposes, could a general reliably plan that the Federal guns surpressing/destroying the Confederate anti-infantry batteries?

 

[Belfoured]

Note that The VI corp had been used to reinforce the other corps across the federal lines.
It is doubtful that it would have been possible to send orders to all its units, get them concentrated and launch the attack in any timeframe that could take advantage of the disorder from the csa attack.

That's a valid point. It probably could have been ordered within a couple of hours because the Corps was spread out in reserve more or less N-S, but not immediately.

 

[Belfoured]

How accurate was battery to battery fire in a situation like this? For battle plan purposes, could a general reliably plan that the Federal guns surpressing/destroying the Confederate anti-infantry batteries?

At those ranges it would likely be accurate enough to do a good amount of damage - at least enough to force some guns to withdraw. Given Hunt's aversion to certain rifled ordnance, I'm not sure how much the rifles would have had in the way of bolts, but a line of 23 howitzers probably would have been within range for shell and shrapnel, as well. A lot would depend on where the ANV line was and where these howitzers would have been positioned. My point is that it would not have been a "no cost" option. Keep in mind that they'd be holding their fire until the infantry got within canister range and the Union rifles would have significantly out-ranged them in the interim.

 

[madhattar88]

Some comments regarding Confederate artillery ammunition at the close of the battle on July 3:

"The batteries are generally short of ammunition" (Gen. Robert E. Lee, in a conversation held with Brig. Gen. Imboden around 1 a.m. on July 4)

"Our army was held there [near Hagerstown on the retreat] with little or no ammunition." (Channing Bolton, Engineering Officer, Pender's staff)

"The officer [in charge of the reserve ordnance train of the army] directed me to inform Gen. Pendleton that the supply in the reserve train was getting low [as of late afternoon on July 3], and if the expenditure which was then being made continued much longer, we would not have enough to supply the demand ... Some of that ammunition marked and inspected and certified to by the Confederate States Ordnance Department at Richmond, Virginia was opened; I saw it with my own eyes; and yet it would not fit a single gun in the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia, and was intended for siege guns." (Reminiscences of Coupland R. Page, on Brig. Gen. Pendleton's staff)

"July 4 … I was near a conference of high ranking artillery officers and heard [Col.] E. P. Alexander say that we did not have left more than four rounds of ammunition to each gun." (Capt. William W. Chamberlaine, Memoirs of the Civil War - on Col. Walker's staff of the Third Corps artillery)

That being said, the short-range 12-pounder Howitzers in the army had nearly all been idle during the battle and presumably had full, or nearly full, chests. Here are the numbers of those howitzers available in the various battalions:

Cabell - 2
Eshleman - 2
Alexander - 4
Poague - 6
Lane - 5
Pegram - 2
Garnett - 2
Total - 23

Those 23 Howitzers would have been gainfully employed against a Federal counterattack against Lee's center. No doubt they would done considerable damage against, for example, a massed Sixth Corps assault, but they were not sufficient in numbers to inflict what in my opinion would be considered "devastating" damage, that is, to turn back an all-out Federal effort given the huge gaps left in the center of Lee's army after the repulse of Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble's brigades.

Alexander set 7 of those aside to be used to support the charge and was intended to be sent in behind the infantry. However, Alexander could not find them.

"I put in reserve in a selected spot, intending them to accompany Pickett's infantry in the charge to have the advantage of fresh horses and men and full chests of ammunition for the critical moment." - Porter Alexander

 

[Tom Elmore]

23 smoothbores firing canister as fast as they could seems fairly "devastating" to me, across open ground anyway.

Canister, at least at Gettysburg, was usually resorted to at ranges under 300 yards, which can be crossed by infantry in under four minutes at a run, limiting the overall destruction, especially since those 23 Howitzers were spread across a front of perhaps 1.5 miles, with some interference posed by woods and undulating ground.

 

[Belfoured]

Alexander set 7 of those aside to be used to support the charge and was intended to be sent in behind the infantry. However, Alexander could not find them.

"I put in reserve in a selected spot, intending them to accompany Pickett's infantry in the charge to have the advantage of fresh horses and men and full chests of ammunition for the critical moment." - Porter Alexander

Good point. There also are some references by Alexander to 9 howitzers which woul be in effect borrowed from Hill and used to "support" the attack.

 

[MikeyB]

At those ranges it would likely be accurate enough to do a good amount of damage - at least enough to force some guns to withdraw. Given Hunt's aversion to certain rifled ordnance, I'm not sure how much the rifles would have had in the way of bolts, but a line of 23 howitzers probably would have been within range for shell and shrapnel, as well. A lot would depend on where the ANV line was and where these howitzers would have been positioned. My point is that it would not have been a "no cost" option. Keep in mind that they'd be holding their fire until the infantry got within canister range and the Union rifles would have significantly out-ranged them in the interim.

What was the reason for the aversion to bolts? Was he right or wrong on the issue? To an artillery layman like myself, I'd think you'd get superior spin, like a football spiral?

 

[Belfoured]

What was the reason for the aversion to bolts? Was he right or wrong on the issue? To an artillery layman like myself, I'd think you'd get superior spin, like a football spiral?

Start with his objection to rifles of the time in general. He had two issues: (1) unlike spherical ordnance, there was a wide variety of designs for rifled projectiles - Read/Parrott, Dyer, Schenkl, Hotchkiss, etc. All had slightly different characteristics, sabot design, etc. Hunt was a big believer in uniformity for reliable gunnery; (2) he did not like the 3" caliber - after the war, he described it as the most "feeble" in the world. That said, the least useful of the four types (solid/bolt, shell, shrapnel, canister) was the bolt. It was really effective only against fixed structures or opposing artillery - and he felt that "sharpshooting" against enemy guns was largely unproductive. The result was that his prescribed chest contained no bolts. I don't think the spin was any better with bolts than it was with shell or shrapnel - the only advantage was a slightly greater range. (By the way, all had a tendency to "drift" in the direction of the twist in the tube, requiring the gunners to adjust for that).