After Gettysburg

[FZ11]

As I've said a couple of times, what Meade "should" have done as an army commander after a defensive victory against an enemy deep in friendly (US) territory and what he "could" have done with the Army of the Potomac as it was in July, 1863, may be two different things ... But we don't know they were, in fact, because Meade did not try.

He was, after all, five days behind Lee getting to the Potomac. However bad the weather was, that is not exactly evidence of a relentless pursuit. Could he have attacked Lee's rear guard, either at Gettysburg or on the Potomac? Yes.

Did he? No.

Meade wasn't Grant or Sheridan, obviously.

At the same time, thankfully, Meade wasn't McClellan.

So there's that.

Best,

No you got it wrong. Eric and others above, are correct. Meade is constrained by his orders to protect Washington,etc. Meade can't just go "chase Lee down" as you and some suggest because Lee could possibly slip South toward Washington. Meade made a sound decision.

 

[TFSmith121]

If the weather was so bad Meade was five days behind Lee and Lee was stuck at Williamsport for a week or whatever it was before he could cross, and he's encumbered by his wounded and prisoners, and especially given the losses Lee had sustained in Pennsylvania, how is Lee going to "slip south" toward Washington, exactly?

Best,

 

[Bee]

If the weather was so bad Meade was five days behind Lee and Lee was stuck at Williamsport for a week or whatever it was before he could cross, and he's encumbered by his wounded and prisoners, and especially given the losses Lee had sustained in Pennsylvania, how is Lee going to "slip south" toward Washington, exactly?

Best,

For clarification, Lee and the wagon train of wounded moved separately:

By noon on July 4, a torrential downpour blanketed South Mountain adding to Imboden's troubles and the agony of the wounded men. Imboden was fully cognizant of the crushing responsibility General Less hand placed on his shoulders. And per Lee's instructions, Imboden resolved that once the train started, it would not halt until it reached its destination - even if that meant disabled wagon had to be abandoned along the way. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, page 6.

As the sun set (on July 4th), Lee finally began moving his Army of Northern Virginia south and west, hoping to escape to safety across the Potomac River. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, page 39.​

 

[War Horse]

As I've said a couple of times, what Meade "should" have done as an army commander after a defensive victory against an enemy deep in friendly (US) territory and what he "could" have done with the Army of the Potomac as it was in July, 1863, may be two different things ... But we don't know they were, in fact, because Meade did not try.

He was, after all, five days behind Lee getting to the Potomac. However bad the weather was, that is not exactly evidence of a relentless pursuit. Could he have attacked Lee's rear guard, either at Gettysburg or on the Potomac? Yes.

Did he? No.

Meade wasn't Grant or Sheridan, obviously.

At the same time, thankfully, Meade wasn't McClellan.

So there's that.

Best,

As early as July 5th Meade had divided his army into 3 wings of Howard, Slocum and Sedgwick. Meade sent these wings on a reconnaissance in force on the 5th. Howard encountered an ambush at around noon resulting in the mortal wounding of one of his officers. Sedgwick encountered Heavy fighting at Granite Hill where he ran into old Jubal Early's artillery. Sedgwick had found Lee's rearguard command by Ewell. I'd say Meade had accomplished something. He had divided his army sent them in different directions with the orders to concentrate at Middletown on July 7th. Meade had found Lee's rearguard all by sunset July 5th.

 

[TFSmith121]

As early as July 5 Meade had divide his army into 3 wings of Howard, Slocum and Sedgwick. Meade sent these wings on a reconnaissance in force on the 5th. Howard encountered an ambush at around noon resulting in the mortal wounding of one of his officers. Sedgwick encountered Heavy fighting at Granite Hill where he ran into old Jubal Early's artillery. Sedgwick had found Lee's rearguard command by Ewell. I'd say Meade had accomplished something. He had divide his army sent them in different directions with the orders to concentrate at Middletown on July 7th. Meade had found Lee's rearguard all by sunset July 5th.

And did any of the three wings mount a serious attack against what they found? Did Meade concentrate any of the three against one or more of the enemy forces and attack it? Did Meade, once concentrated, mount an attack at Williamsport?

The answers are, I believe, no.

Again, could he have done so with that Army, based on the previous 27 months of war? We don't know, but should have an attack been mounted? In terms of following up a beaten enemy, the answer - from a "best practice" sense if nothing else - has to be yes.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

For clarification, Lee and the wagon train of wounded moved separately:

By noon on July 4, a torrential downpour blanketed South Mountain adding to Imboden's troubles and the agony of the wounded men. Imboden was fully cognizant of the crushing responsibility General Less hand placed on his shoulders. And per Lee's instructions, Imboden resolved that once the train started, it would not halt until it reached its destination - even if that meant disabled wagon had to be abandoned along the way. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, page 6.

As the sun set (on July 4th), Lee finally began moving his Army of Northern Virginia south and west, hoping to escape to safety across the Potomac River. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, page 39.​

Separately, but on the same route, I believe. There are a couple of pieces in Battles and Leaders that speak to the movements of Lee's wounded and prisoners; if Lee had been pressed at any point, he might have abandoned one or both categories of personnel to get the effective troops to and then (possibly) across the Potomac.

In either event, it would have added to the US victory, which was the point of the "pursuit."

Best,

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

And did any of the three wings mount a serious attack against what they found? Did Meade concentrate any of the three against one or more of the enemy forces and attack it? Did Meade, once concentrated, mount an attack at Williamsport?

The answers are, I believe, no.

Again, could he have done so with that Army, based on the previous 27 months of war? We don't know, but should have an attack been mounted? In terms of following up a beaten enemy, the answer - from a "best practice" sense if nothing else - has to be yes.

Best,

I don't know you, so I have no idea what efforts you've taken to study these events. Consequently, I'm simply going to ask: have you ever seen the ground that made up Lee's position at Williamsport? Have you seen Salisbury Ridge? Have you seen the entrenchments that Lee's engineers designed and his army constructed? Personally, I have been walking that ground for the better part of 20 years now, and I know that terrain like the back of my hand. I've written one well-regarded monograph on the retreat from Gettysburg (with two friends) and am now finishing a very lengthy discussion of these events for my Meade manuscript. It's fair to say that I know all of the sources AND I know the ground.

If you have not walked that ground, then, with all due respect, you have no idea what you're talking about. I will let those men who actually saw Lee's defensive works resolve this issue once and for all. I have extracted a small excerpt from the book project that I am completing:

The men of the Army of Northern Virginia were already confident of their success. "As we got things into shape, oh! How we all did wish that the enemy would come out in the open & attack us, as we had done them at Gettysburg," declared Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, who was the acting chief of artillery for Longstreet's First Corps. "Our troops are drawn up in a line of battle on a splendid range of hills," declared a supremely confident Virginia artillerist, "and as we have received a large supply of ammunition, I think we will give the enemy a big whipping, notwithstanding the large superiority of their numbers. Everything seems to indicate a large battle in which it is necessary that we should prove victorious, as our rations are running low with but little chance of getting more, until we take them from the enemy." Make no mistake about it: the Army of Northern Virginia was just as full of fighting spirit as it had ever been, and it was itching for Meade to attack it in such a dominating defensive position of its own choosing.

Most importantly, the defensive position chosen and developed by Lee and his engineers was formidable. It ran along Salisbury Ridge, a prominent north-south ridge, and was anchored on the banks of the Potomac River on either end, meaning that it could not be flanked. While there were some low spots where creeks or marshy ground lay, the Confederate engineering staff built in interlocking fields of fire to ensure that these positions were defensible. The position featured a compact line of battle, with a complete road network with lines of retreat, supply, and communication behind it that allowed resources to be shifted to meet threats. The line bristled with artillery. In short, the strong defensive position atop Salisbury Ridge made the Confederate position on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg seem like a poor choice by comparison.

"The Rebel lines crossed the road from St. James' College to Williamsport, near a large white house, about half a mile (south?) west of the college. The country occupied by the Rebels is undoubtedly very strongly defensible," wrote John Watts DePeyster. "As a military position it is superior to Antietam or Sharpsburg. The latter is, for this country, comparatively clear and rolling rather than strictly hilly. The position assumed by the Rebels in July 1863 is broken, rocky, marshy, and densely wooded in many places. The district occupied by Lee is known as the 'marsh land,' and is said to extend northward to the Pennsylvania line. In this neighborhood, a little to the north of the college, it is drained by Marsh Run, a little stream which crosses the Sharpsburg Pike about a mile south of Hagerstown, while another Marsh Creek finds its way into the Potomac, south-southeast of Williamsport, between Foreman's Ford and Mercerville."

"The greatest part of it was on top of a range of hills on the left bank of Marsh Run, a small creek which flows through a swampy valley into the Potomac," described a clergyman assigned to St. James College, a private boys' school located in the middle of Lee's line. "On the right bank of the creek is a similar range of hills, nearly parallel, but somewhat lower, than the first. There the main army was entrenched. The hills are gently sloping down to the creek, the distance between them varies from one to two miles, and the space between them is almost an entirely open field. The attacking party would have been from the first moment, when they left their entrenchments, exposed to the artillery and musketry fire, of a well-protected and concealed enemy. The key of the rebel position was, according to their own statements, a prominent hill on the farm of John L. Roland, about three-fourths of a mile behind the College of St. James. The rebels had, of course, strong batteries, on top of it and in the neighborhood. The College itself was held as a kind of a out-post and strongly occupied by sharp-shooters." This position was well chosen, well designed, and formidable. There is no other way to describe it.

The breastworks consisted of two parallel lines of trenches. The front line was apparently fairly weak and was positioned along the forward slopes of the ridge. It consisted of trenches with forward bastions made of packed earth and wheat sheaves covered by dirt, built up along a long ditch. Near the crest of the ridgeline lay the main line of works, constructed of fence rails, rocks, and packed earth, prompting one observer to call it a "very strong line of gopher holes and rifle pits."

Indeed, the men of the Army of the Potomac remembered the debacle at Fredericksburg seven months earlier, and they had little stomach for a repeat, or to attack such a strong position anchored on commanding high ground. "It was thought not to risk a battle here as we have not over 50,000 efficient troops and the enemy to be equal to that if not more, with advantage of position and troops concentrated," said a Union signalman. Nevertheless, Meade was confident. Normally reticent around reporters, he was positively giddy on the night of July 13. "We shall have a great battle tomorrow," he declared to a reporter. "The reinforcements are coming up, and as soon as they come we shall pitch in."

Despite their commander's confidence, the men in the ranks who would have to make that assault had every reason to be concerned. The Confederate defensive position was formidable. Referring to the long line of earthworks in front of them, Col. Charles Wainwright, the chief of artillery for the I Corps, said, "These were by far the strongest I have seen yet, evidently laid out by engineers and built as if they meant to stand a month's siege." The parapets were nearly six feet wide on top, and the engineers had placed their guns perfectly to create converging fields of fire that could sweep the entire front of the position. After inspecting the position, Wainwright concluded, "My own opinion is under the circumstances and with the knowledge General Meade then had he was justified in putting off the attack."

Humphreys, who had spent thirty years as a topographical engineer and knew a strong position when he saw one, declared, "Wherever seen, the position was naturally strong, and was perfectly entrenched. It presented no vulnerable points, but much of it was concealed from view…its flanks were secure and could not be turned." He concluded, "A careful survey of the entrenched position of the enemy was made, and showed that an assault upon it would have resulted disastrously to us." He also observed, "On the other hand, General Burnside was severely criticized for attacking at Fredericksburg, where the entrenchments were not as formidable than those at Williamsport."

Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, the Army of the Potomac's highly respected chief of artillery, echoed a similar note. "A careful survey of the enemy's entrenched line after it was abandoned justified the opinion of the corps commanders against the attack, as it showed that an assault would have been disastrous to us. It proved also that Meade in overriding their opinion did not shrink from a great responsibility, notwithstanding his own recent experience at Gettysburg where all the enemy's attacks on even partially entrenched lines had failed. If he erred on this occasion it was on the side of temerity." As one former Fifth Corps staff officer correctly put it, "One thing we do know, in our long association with Gen. Meade, we always found him to be a careful, cautious commander, who never would consent to the useless sacrifice of his soldiers in battle." A similar situation played out a few months later at Mine Run, where Meade again made the correct choice not to assault Lee's very strong defensive works.

Lt. Col. Rufus Dawes, commander of the 6th Wisconsin of the First Corps, examined Lee's fortifications and found them "strong and well constructed." With that in mind, he declared, "I think General Meade would have certainly failed to carry them by direct assault. I take no stock in the stuff printed in the newspapers about the demoralization of the rebel army after Gettysburg. They were worn out and tired as we were, but their cartridge boxes had plenty of ammunition, and they would quietly have lain in their rifle pits and shot us down with the same coolness and desperation they showed at Gettysburg." Dawes, a well-respected combat leader who fought in most of the heaviest battles of the Civil War, did not lack courage. He was known for his fearlessness, and his opinion must carry weight as such.

Lieutenant Haskell, who, as noted previously, was a remarkably astute observer for a young, junior officer, believed that an assault on Lee's works "would have been repulsed with heavy loss, with little damage to the enemy." He believed that the vote of the council of war on July 12 reflected the belief of the commanders agreed with his own opinion. "Such a result might have satisfied the bloody politicians better than the end of the campaign as it was; but I think the country did not need the sacrifice of the Army of the Potomac at that time,--enough odor of sacrifice came up to its nostrils from the 1st Fredericksburg field, to stop their snuffling for some time." He stated, "I felt the probability of defeat strongly at the time, when we all supposed that a conflict would certainly ensue." Haskell concluded, "Of course the army, both officers, and men, had very great disappointment, and very great sorrow, that the Rebels escaped—so it was called—across the river;--the disappointment was genuine, at least to the extent that disappointment is like surprise; but the sorrow, to judge by looks, tones, and actions, rather than by words, was not of that deep, sable character, for which there is no balm. Would it be an imputation upon the courage or patriotism of this army, if it was not rampant for fight at this particular time, and under the existing circumstances? Had the enemy stayed upon the left bank of the Potomac twelve hours longer, there would have been a great battle there near Williamsport on the 14th of July." However, the outcome of that great battle would have been uncertain for the reasons stated by Haskell.


Again, and with all due respect, I will take the words of those who were there and saw those works with their own eyes as the word on this subject.

 

[FZ11]

If the weather was so bad Meade was five days behind Lee and Lee was stuck at Williamsport for a week or whatever it was before he could cross, and he's encumbered by his wounded and prisoners, and especially given the losses Lee had sustained in Pennsylvania, how is Lee going to "slip south" toward Washington, exactly?

Best,

Meade doesn't know what Lee can or will do at that time. Lee was crazy enough to attack Meade's center,was he not? The commanders Meade can count on,Reynolds and Hancock, are down,etc. Meade made a reasonable decision.

 

[TFSmith121]

This is in response to Mr. Wittenberg:

All true, and I have not suggested Meade should have done so.

But there comes a time in every retreat when the main force is on the road and the rear guard is all that's holding the line, correct?

IIRC, Meade did not mount a significant attack on the rebel rear guard at Gettysburg. Meade did not mount a significant attack when Lee was on the road between Gettysburg and Williamsport. And Meade did not mount a significant attack on the rebel rear guard at Williamsport.

And again, if the question is - in a general sense - "should" a force moving over from the defense to the counteroffensive in the pursuit of a defeated enemy attack said retreating enemy? The answer has to be yes; letting down the pressure on a weakened enemy is a sure road to allowing said enemy to recover.

But if the question is - "could" the Army of the Potomac, as it was in the summer of 1863 after the previous 27 months of service under McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker, have mounted an effective pursuit? If that answer is no, than it lays the responsibility clear.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Meade doesn't know what Lee can or will do at that time. Lee was crazy enough to attack Meade's center,was he not? The commanders Meade can count on,Reynolds and Hancock, are down,etc. Meade made a reasonable decision.

Well, it may appear that it was reasonable, but we don't know; solid victories become overwhelming ones when the retreating force is run down and destroyed.

The question is whether Meade and the Army he had inherited from the likes of McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker could have done that ... If the answer is no, then it is clear who was responsible, but we don't know, because Meade didn't really try to do so.

He probably knew his army's capabilities as well as anyone, of course, but that's quite an indictment of McClellan et al.

Best,

 

[Bee]

Again, and with all due respect, I will take the words of those who were there and saw those works with their own eyes as the word on this subject.

Thank you for taking the time and sharing words with us, Eric. I know that there exists a peculiar fixation on attempting to contradict the facts, testimonials, and research of experts, however, there are those of us who are here to just learn, and with your help, we accomplish this precious endeavor.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Thank you for taking the time and sharing words with us, Eric. I know that there exists a peculiar fixation on attempting to contradict the facts, testimonials, and research of experts, however, there are those of us who are here to just learn, and with your help, we accomplish this precious endeavor.

No worries, Bee. Sometimes, I just have to step in and correct things that I see that are just plain wrong. This was one of them.

 

[Rebforever]

Post #67 should be put in the archives.

 

[TFSmith121]

No worries, Bee. Sometimes, I just have to step in and correct things that I see that are just plain wrong. This was one of them.

Thank you for your expertise. My point has simply been that Meade chose not to mount any sort of significant follow-up attack(s) immediately after Gettysburg, and it may very well be true it was because the Army of the Potomac could not manage such - and if so, obviously that had much more to do with the previous 27 months of its organization and command, dating back to McClellan in 1861-62, than with the less than 27 days of his command at the Army level.

I am not disputing Meade did not "think" he could mount a significant attack in July with the Army as it was; the issue is "could" he have? "Should" he have, all things being equal, as Lincoln certainly wished, and as Grant demonstrated in 1864-65? Obviously, McClellan could not in 1862 after Antietam, in a roughly similar operational situation ... And Meade was (thankfully) no McClellan.

But having said that, if not, than that operational reality speaks volumes about the previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac, all of who had had far more time to organize it and put their stamp on it than Meade.

If that was unclear, my apologies.

Best,

 

[War Horse]

An interesting little story that without which Meade may never have gotten an opportunity to assault Lee's army while it was trapped by a swollen Potomac river. This story involves a young Bugler assigned to serving with Custer's 6th Michigan under Major James Kidd. This heroic bugler went by the name of John Hertz.

"At the battle of Falling Water, West Virginia, during the heavy fighting that marked the retreat from Gettysburg, Hertz swam across the rain-swollen Potomac River on July 4, 1863. Covered by Northern carbine fire, the bugler cut loose the pontoon bridge used by the Army of Northern Virginia to cross the river during the advance into Pennsylvania. With Hertz clinging to the bridge, the current swept the end of the bridge to the Maryland side of the roaring river, enabling a detachment of Union cavalry to cross and attack the enemy rear guard. After bringing back a few prisoners, the Union troopers destroyed the bridge, trapping Lee's army against the banks of the swollen river, and giving Meade the opportunity to bring Lee to bay. Hertz escaped that engagement unharmed."

Source: Glory Enough for All. Eric J. Wittenberg

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

An interesting little story that without which Meade may never have gotten an opportunity to assault Lee's army while it was trapped by a swollen Potomac river. This story involves a young Bugler assigned to serving with Custer's 6th Michigan under Major James Kidd. This heroic bugler went by the name of John Hertz.

"At the battle of Falling Water, West Virginia, during the heavy fighting that marked the retreat from Gettysburg, Hertz swam across the rain-swollen Potomac River on July 4, 1863. Covered by Northern carbine fire, the bugler cut loose the pontoon bridge used by the Army of Northern Virginia to cross the river during the advance into Pennsylvania. With Hertz clinging to the bridge, the current swept the end of the bridge to the Maryland side of the roaring river, enabling a detachment of Union cavalry to cross and attack the enemy rear guard. After bringing back a few prisoners, the Union troopers destroyed the bridge, trapping Lee's army against the banks of the swollen river, and giving Meade the opportunity to bring Lee to bay. Hertz escaped that engagement unharmed."

Source: Glory Enough for All. Eric J. Wittenberg

Hertz survived Andersonville and then survived the explosion and sinking of the Sultana. This was one tough customer.

 

[War Horse]

Hertz survived Andersonville and then survived the explosion and sinking of the Sultana. This was one tough customer.

Thank you, I had no idea about the Sultana

 

[Bee]

An interesting little story that without which Meade may never have gotten an opportunity to assault Lee's army while it was trapped by a swollen Potomac river. This story involves a young Bugler assigned to serving with Custer's 6th Michigan under Major James Kidd. This heroic bugler went by the name of John Hertz.

"At the battle of Falling Water, West Virginia, during the heavy fighting that marked the retreat from Gettysburg, Hertz swam across the rain-swollen Potomac River on July 4, 1863. Covered by Northern carbine fire, the bugler cut loose the pontoon bridge used by the Army of Northern Virginia to cross the river during the advance into Pennsylvania. With Hertz clinging to the bridge, the current swept the end of the bridge to the Maryland side of the roaring river, enabling a detachment of Union cavalry to cross and attack the enemy rear guard. After bringing back a few prisoners, the Union troopers destroyed the bridge, trapping Lee's army against the banks of the swollen river, and giving Meade the opportunity to bring Lee to bay. Hertz escaped that engagement unharmed."

Source: Glory Enough for All. Eric J. Wittenberg

A-HA! I knew that I was familiar with this story:

"The destruction of the pontoon bridge and the train at Falling Waters was the most daring exploits of the war" crowed a New York Times correspondent. Foley later received a well-deserved brevet to lieutenant colonel for his valor in leading this raid. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, page 161​

 

[War Horse]

A-HA! I knew that I was familiar with this story:

"The destruction of the pontoon bridge and the train at Falling Waters was the most daring exploits of the war" crowed a New York Times correspondent. Foley later received a well-deserved brevet to lieutenant colonel for his valor in leading this raid. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, page 161​

Yep, I knew he survived Andersonville, I had completely forgotten about him being aboard the Sultana. Those poor souls. They survived the worst hell on earth only to perish that way.

 

[Bee]

Yep, I knew he survived Andersonville, I had completely forgotten about him being aboard the Sultana. Those poor souls. They survived the worst hell on earth only to perish that way.

My head is spinning on this one: Survives War, Andersonville & Sultana. Yup, one tough hombre, indeed.