After Gettysburg

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Could, or perhaps should have Meade cut off and destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia? I personally think that the Army of the Potomac was utterly spent after the three days of the battle, but would appreciate other people's input.
 
I think Meade took a lot of unfair criticism for lack of aggressiveness in the aftermath of Gettysburg. The notion that the Army if the Potomac was in a position post-Gettysburg to inflict an Appomattox scale defeat on Lee was flawed.

His army was nearly as badly battered as Lee's, with some key losses in leadership positions and himself new to its command, there was still plenty of fight left in the ANV unlike April of 1865 when it was on its last legs, and the condition of the roads made any sort of grand and decisive manuevers unlikely. Lee would also have the advantage of choosing the ground.

Had Meade been more aggressive it's unlikely it would end with the destruction of the ANV, with a high probability that Lee might offset his setback at Gettysburg by inflicting a subsequent defeat on Meade.

Meade IMO made the smart call, by pursuing aggressively without being reckless, even if it wasn't the call the the press and politicians in Washington wanted.

In some respects I think he was a victim of George B. McClellan. McClellan's excess of caution while in command had created a political climate in Washington where there was little tolerance for anything that looked like a lack of aggression from the Army of the Potomac, even when some degree of caution was wise.
 
I did a five part study of this question on my blog last year that has led to a 170,000 work book manuscript. This is not a simple question, nor is it one that can be addressed in a few pithy words of prolix prose here. If you're interested in my take on it, you can find it here: www.civilwarcavalry.com. The posts were from July 2015. I'm not about to repeat them here.
 
This is a summary/direct quotes based on the 5 part series of articles that Eric wrote:

Meade lost three of his seven infantry corps commanders. Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, a fellow Pennsylvania and career Regular with whom Meade was close,

Likewise, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, commander of the II Corps, was badly wounded during the repulse of the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble attack on July 3. After Reynolds fell, Meade sent Hancock to Gettysburg to take command of the field and to determine whether it was a good place for the army to stand and fight. Hancock had been magnificent throughout the entire Battle of Gettysburg, and his loss was immeasurable.

Finally, Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, the commander of the III Corps, while an amateur soldier, was nothing if not aggressive

Thus, having lost his most aggressive commanders and saddled with very inexperienced corps commander, Meade had nobody to advocate really aggressive activity. Further, he lost the two subordinates he most trusted and depended on most heavily in Reynolds and Hancock, and instead had to rely upon four inexperienced temporary corps commanders in Newton, Hays, Birney and French (EDIT:French succeeded the wounded Daniel Sickles to command of the III Corps. Unfortunately for French, his tenure as a Corps commander was short-lived and fraught with controversy. Lack of respect from his men & failure at Mine Run ended his CW duties) http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/biographies/william-henry-french.html

The Army of the Potomac had used up much of its ammunition and supplies at Gettysburg. The limbers of its artillery units needed to be refilled, and so did the cartridge boxes of the infantry. Meade's logistical chain needed time to re-supply the army. That practical necessity also hindered Meade's decision-making freedom. The Army of Northern Virginia, by contrast, had been receiving supplies around the clock at Williamsport. A small ferry called Lemon's Ferry carried Lee's wagons across the Potomac River one at a time and returned with crates of supplies. The ferry ran twenty-four hours a day, and each trip brought back more ammunition and other supplies. By the time that the Army of the Potomac was in position to attack, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had been fully resupplied.

A severe set of thunderstorms set in the night of Lee's retreat. By morning, most of the roads were impassible and untenable for any heavy artillery et al.

Regarding how Mead is perceived today, it is important to realize that a major campaign against his reputation had begun shortly after the Battle of Gettysburg: Sickles, Butterfield, and others had personal scores to settle. Hooker still had a strong following with powerful folk supporting his return to leadership, Halleck was a friend to nobody and very adept at talking out of both sides of his mouth, and the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War had an agenda within an agenda. Mead had very few allies.

Read the articles and you will understand.​

https://emergingcivilwar.com/2015/07/09/civil-war-witch-hunt-part-iii/
 
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Thanks everyone. This is my foray into the forum ( writing from the UK ) and I've thoroughly enjoyed reading other people's input. Eric, I thought it was probable that this subject had been raised before, but couldn't see anything in the thread histories. On that basis, I wouldn't expect a comprehensive analysis from you again.
 
Could, or perhaps should have Meade cut off and destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia? I personally think that the Army of the Potomac was utterly spent after the three days of the battle, but would appreciate other people's input.

In High Tide at Gettysburg the author, Glenn Tucker, seems to suggest as much and, if I remember correctly, states that had Meade followed Lee, who had moved his army to different ground to await Meade, may have changed the outcome of the battle and the war.
 
I am assuming nothing after day 3...
Meade has the 6th Corps.
How far south does Lee need to retreat to supply.
How hard to press? Push when Lee has the ammo and get a bloody nose...hmmm.
 
If I'm not mistaken, the only example of a successful pursuit and destruction of an enemy army during the CW was Grant's Appomatox campaign that ended in the surrender of the ANV.

Well, Grant "pursued" Buckner et al "back" into Fort Henry when the breakout failed, so there's two. ;)

Canby forced Sibley to retreat back east across the New Mexico and Texas borderlands, and the "Arizona Brigade" was pretty much a husk by the time it made it back to Texas...

But yeah, it was pretty rare.

Best,
 
Well, Grant "pursued" Buckner et al "back" into Fort Henry when the breakout failed, so there's two. :wink:

Canby forced Sibley to retreat back east across the New Mexico and Texas borderlands, and the "Arizona Brigade" was pretty much a husk by the time it made it back to Texas...

But yeah, it was pretty rare.

Best,

I guess you could also add George Thomas' defeat of the AOT at the battle of Nashville after which it retreated to Alabama and Mississippi and was effectively destroyed as a fighting unit.
 
I guess you could also add George Thomas' defeat of the AOT at the battle of Nashville after which it retreated to Alabama and Mississippi and was effectively destroyed as a fighting unit.

True. The pattern is interesting; the US destroyed multiple and substantial rebel armies/forces in the field or sieges - Grant got three of them, Thomas one. The closest the rebels ever got to anything equivalent was Miles's division at Harper's Ferry. Nelson's force at Richmond was about the closest they came to a victory in the field akin to Franklin or Appomattox, and the scale is vastly different.

Interesting contrast with Sevastopol and some of the other European campaigns in roughly the same period; not exactly annihilation battles over there. Sevastopol is the very obvious example: the Russians withdrew in good order, with their organization intact, and with all the ordnance they could move. Kind of an interesting contrast with Williams' surrender at Kars, as well.

Best,
 
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If Grant had been in charge the Army of Northern Virginia would have been annihilated in Pennsylvania

Not quite sure I agree with that. Grant and the AOTP would still have faced the same obstacles that Meade faced and as previous posts have noted (exhausted forces, formidable foe still kicking, etc.). Grant wasn't able to annihilate the ANV despite maneuvering and battling that foe during the Overland Campaign. One can only say that at its conclusion, Grant forced the ANV into a 10 month war of attrition and stalemate along the Petersburg front.
 
Not quite sure I agree with that. Grant and the AOTP would still have faced the same obstacles that Meade faced and as previous posts have noted (exhausted forces, formidable foe still kicking, etc.). Grant wasn't able to annihilate the ANV despite maneuvering and battling that foe during the Overland Campaign. One can only say that at its conclusion, Grant forced the ANV into a 10 month war of attrition and stalemate along the Petersburg front.
Grant would have had Lee on the north side of the Potomac and I just don't think he would have let him escape. If there was a fourth day of Gettysburg with the union attacking and then staying constantly engaged like the Summer of '64 how would Lee of been resupplied? Grant would have attacked and attacked till Lee ran out of men and ammunition. At least that's how I see it
 

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