- Joined
- Sep 4, 2014
- Location
- Lexington, SC
IIRC He was captured with Kidd who escaped minutes later.My head is spinning on this one: Survives War, Andersonville & Sultana. Yup, one tough hombre, indeed.
IIRC He was captured with Kidd who escaped minutes later.My head is spinning on this one: Survives War, Andersonville & Sultana. Yup, one tough hombre, indeed.
I am not disputing Meade did not "think" he could mount a significant attack in July with the Army as it was; the issue is "could" he have? "Should" he have, all things being equal, as Lincoln certainly wished, and as Grant demonstrated in 1864-65? Obviously, McClellan could not in 1862 after Antietam, in a roughly similar operational situation ... And Meade was (thankfully) no McClellan.
Lee would have loved an attack he was waiting for it and gen meade Army was pretty beat up I believe he made the right decision by letting sleeping dogs lie.I think Meade took a lot of unfair criticism for lack of aggressiveness in the aftermath of Gettysburg. The notion that the Army if the Potomac was in a position post-Gettysburg to inflict an Appomattox scale defeat on Lee was flawed.
His army was nearly as badly battered as Lee's, with some key losses in leadership positions and himself new to its command, there was still plenty of fight left in the ANV unlike April of 1865 when it was on its last legs, and the condition of the roads made any sort of grand and decisive manuevers unlikely. Lee would also have the advantage of choosing the ground.
Had Meade been more aggressive it's unlikely it would end with the destruction of the ANV, with a high probability that Lee might offset his setback at Gettysburg by inflicting a subsequent defeat on Meade.
Meade IMO made the smart call, by pursuing aggressively without being reckless, even if it wasn't the call the the press and politicians in Washington wanted.
In some respects I think he was a victim of George B. McClellan. McClellan's excess of caution while in command had created a political climate in Washington where there was little tolerance for anything that looked like a lack of aggression from the Army of the Potomac, even when some degree of caution was wise.
I see the excuses on why Meade was unable to catch Lee before he crossed the river back into Virginia. Is not the first question: Why was Meade cavalry unable to cut off or slow down Lee's retreat back to the river. I have read the Stuart was masterful in the days after the battle in screen Lee's army but lets be honest the union army knew or had a good idea where Lee was going to cross the river at. Meade could not gather troops from other areas to block Lee at the river. Meade did have access to the telegraph.
The union Cavalry also knew where Lee and his wagons were going and could not cutoff or break up Lee's retreat. My argument is simple: The union army knew where Lee was going to cross the river and what roads he had to take to get there. The union army should have be able to get ahead of Lee's army which was dragging wagons through the mud. Think about that...
We will for sure. I couldn't agree more about encouraging NEW members to post and learn. It's when the same old, old members are looking for a fight is where I draw the line! Ron, next month will be tremendous and we will enjoy each other's company at the Reliance MineI dunno Mike. A few new names especially in the early part of the thread. I remember being new and being quite surprised by the knowledge here. I hope these new folks will continue to post , realize there is a lot to learn, and be active members of our little community. The value of this site goes beyond the knowledge of the Civil War. I think we will see that next month in Gettysburg. I hope the new folks pick that up and embrace it.
I am so looking forward to that!Go read one continuous fight
A summary against my points by you would do me much more good... Maybe the question comes down to the fact Meade was still getting use his new job as Commander of the Army of the Potomac. I figure he was more worried about Washington, D C. defense before he thought of chasing Lee back to Virginia.
I like to point out a few years later Gen. Early threatens Washington and the Grant was able to collect other troops from other areas to meet Gen. Early's threat. Meade or Halleck should have been able once it was known Lee was retreating by to Virginia to gather troops from other areas to stop Lee from crossing the Potomac. They had 10 days to get it done... between trains and the telegraph they should have been able to bring more troops to the area...
All your points are addressed in the book
What troops and from where?
All your points are addressed in the book
In history, Lee's retreat from Gettysburg is considered a great achievement because Meade was slow to act once he caught Lee at the river's edge. Meade should have called for an assault once he met up with Lee's rear guard. All the blame of lee's escape does fall on Meade's shoulders...
I don't think you would get much debate there, and certainly not from me. But that discussion would be off topic for this thread. theoldmanAs I wait for the stones to be cast, I'll just say IMHO, that there didn't have to be a Gettysburg in the first place. I still feel to this day that the biggest blunder was Antietam. I think the AotP could have pushed Lee into the river, had the attack been coordinated, and the reserves thrown in. But that is an old man's rant for the evening.
